OF THE REVENUE
OF THE SOVEREIGN
OR COMMONWEALTH.
OF THE EXPENSES
OF THE SOVEREIGN
OR COMMONWEALTH.
The first duty
of the sovereign,
that
of protecting
the society
from the violence and invasion
of other independent societies,
can be performed only
by means
of a military force.
But the expense both
of preparing
this military force
in time of peace,
and of employing
it in time of war,
is very different
in the different states
of society,
in the different periods
of improvement.
Among nations of hunters,
the lowest and rudest state
of society,
such as
we find it
among the native tribes
of North America,
every man
is a warrior,
as well as a hunter.
When he goes to war,
either
to defend his society,
or
to revenge the injuries which
have been done to it
by other societies,
he maintains himself
by his own labour,
in the same manner
as when he
lives at home.
His society
(for in this state of things
there is properly
neither sovereign nor
commonwealth)
is at no sort of expense,
either
to prepare him for the field,
or to maintain him
while he is in it.
Among nations of shepherds,
a more advanced state
of society,
such as we
find it
among the Tartars and Arabs,
every man is,
in the same manner,
a warrior.
Such nations
have commonly no fixed
habitation,
but live either in tents,
or in a sort
of covered waggons,
which are easily transported
from place to place.
The whole tribe,
or nation,
changes its situation
according to
the different seasons
of the year,
as well as according to
other accidents.
When its herds
and flocks
have consumed the forage
of one part
of the country,
it removes to another,
and from that to a third.
In the dry season,
it comes down
to the banks
of the rivers;
in the wet season,
it retires
to the upper country.
When such
a nation
goes to war,
the warriors
will not trust their herds
and flocks
to the feeble defence
of their old men,
their women and children;
and their old men,
their women and children,
will not be left behind
without defence,
and without subsistence.
The whole nation,
besides,
being accustomed
to a wandering life,
even in time of peace,
easily
takes the field
in time of war.
Whether it
marches as an army,
or moves about as a company
of herdsmen,
the way of life
is nearly the same,
though the object
proposed by it
be very different.
They all go to war together,
therefore,
and everyone
does as well as he can.
Among the Tartars,
even the women
have been frequently known
to engage in battle.
If they
conquer,
whatever belongs
to the hostile tribe
is the recompence
of the victory;
but if they are vanquished,
all is lost;
and not only their herds
and flocks,
but their women
and children become
the booty of the conqueror.
Even the greater part
of those
who survive the action
are obliged
to submit
to him
for the sake
of immediate subsistence.
The rest
are commonly dissipated
and dispersed
in the desert.
The ordinary life,
the ordinary exercise
of a Tartar or Arab,
prepares him sufficiently
for war.
Running,
wrestling,
cudgel-playing,
throwing the javelin,
drawing the bow,.etc.
are the common pastimes
of those
who live in the open air,
and are
all of them the images
of war.
When a Tartar
or Arab actually goes to war,
he is maintained
by his own herds
and flocks,
which
he carries with him,
in the same manner
as in peace.
His chief or sovereign
(for those nations
have all chiefs or sovereigns)
is at no sort of expense
in
preparing him for the field;
and when he is in it,
the chance of plunder
is
the only pay which he either
expects or requires.
An army of hunters
can seldom exceed two
or three hundred men.
The precarious subsistence which
the chace affords,
could seldom allow
a greater number
to keep together
for any considerable time.
An army of shepherds,
on the contrary,
may sometimes amount
to two
or three hundred thousand.
As long as nothing
stops their progress,
as long
as they
can go on from one district,
of which they
have consumed the forage,
to another,
which is yet entire;
there
seems to be
scarce any limit
to the number
who can march on together.
A nation of hunters
can never be formidable
to the civilized nations
in their neighbourhood;
a nation of shepherds may.
Nothing
can be more contemptible
than an Indian war
in North America;
nothing,
on the contrary,
can be more dreadful
than a Tartar invasion
has frequently been in Asia.
The judgment of Thucydides,
that both Europe
and Asia could not resist
the Scythians
united,
has been verified
by the experience
of all ages.
The inhabitants
of the extensive,
but defenceless plains
of Scythia or Tartary,
have been frequently united
under the dominion
of the chief
of some conquering horde
or clan;
and the havock and devastation
of Asia
have always signalized
their union.
The inhabitants
of the inhospitable deserts
of Arabia,
the other great nation
of shepherds,
have never been
united but once,
under Mahomet
and his immediate successors.
Their union,
which was more the effect
of religious enthusiasm than
of conquest,
was signalized
in the same manner.
If the hunting nations
of America
should ever
become shepherds,
their neighbourhood
would be much more dangerous
to the European colonies
than it
is at present.
In a yet more advanced state
of society,
among those nations
of husbandmen
who have
little foreign commerce,
and no other
manufactures
but those coarse
and household ones,
which
almost every private family
prepares for its own use,
every man,
in the same manner,
either
is a warrior,
or easily becomes such.
Those who live by agriculture
generally pass the whole day
in the open air,
exposed to all
the inclemencies
of the seasons.
The hardiness
of their ordinary life
prepares them for the fatigues
of war,
to some
of which
their necessary occupations bear
a great analogy.
The necessary occupation
of a ditcher
prepares him
to work in the trenches,
and to fortify a camp,
as
well as to inclose a field.
The ordinary pastimes
of such husbandmen
are the same as those
of shepherds,
and are in the same manner
the images of war.
But as husbandmen
have less leisure
than shepherds,
they are not so frequently employed
in those pastimes.
They
are soldiers
but soldiers not
quite so much masters
of their exercise.
Such as they are,
however,
it seldom costs the sovereign
or commonwealth
any expense
to prepare them
for the field.
Agriculture,
even in
its rudest and lowest state,
supposes
a settlement,
some sort of fixed habitation,
which cannot be abandoned
without great loss.
When a nation of mere
husbandmen,
therefore,
goes to war,
the whole people
cannot take the field
together.
The old men,
the women and children,
at least,
must remain at home,
to take care of
the habitation.
All the men
of the military age,
however,
may take the field,
and in small nations
of this kind,
have frequently done so.
In every nation,
the men of the military age
are supposed
to amount to
about a fourth
or a fifth part
of the whole body
of the people.
If the campaign, too,
should begin after seedtime,
and end before harvest,
both
the husbandman
and his principal labourers
can be spared
from the farm
without much loss.
He trusts that
the work
which must be done
in the mean time,
can be well enough
executed by the old men,
the women,
and the children.
He is not unwilling,
therefore,
to serve
without pay
during a short campaign;
and it
frequently costs
the sovereign or
commonwealth as little
to maintain him
in the field as
to prepare him for it.
The citizens of all
the different states
of ancient
Greece seem to have served
in this manner
till after the
second Persian war;
and the people
of Peloponnesus
till after the Peloponnesian war.
The Peloponnesians,
Thucydides
observes,
generally
left the field in the summer,
and returned
home to reap the harvest.
The Roman people,
under their kings,
and during the first ages
of the republic,
served in the same manner.
It
was not
till the seige of Veii,
that they
who staid at home
began to contribute something
towards maintaining
those who went to war.
In the European monarchies,
which were founded
upon the ruins
of the Roman empire,
both before,
and for some time after,
the establishment of
what is properly called
the feudal law,
the great lords,
with all
their immediate dependents,
used to serve the crown
at their own expense.
In the field,
in the same
manner as at home,
they maintained themselves
by their own revenue,
and not by any stipend
or pay which
they received
from the king upon
that particular occasion.
In a more advanced state
of society,
two different causes
contribute
to render
it altogether impossible that
they who take the field
should maintain themselves
at their own expense.
Those two causes are,
the progress of manufactures,
and the improvement
in the art of war.
Though
a husbandman
should be employed
in an expedition,
provided
it begins after seedtime,
and ends before harvest,
the interruption
of his business
will not always occasion
any considerable diminution
of his revenue.
Without the intervention
of his labour,
Nature
does herself the greater part
of the work
which remains
to be done.
But the moment that
an artificer,
a smith,
a carpenter,
or a weaver,
for example,
quits his workhouse,
the sole source
of his revenue
is completely dried up.
Nature
does nothing for him;
he does all for himself.
When he takes the field,
therefore,
in defence of the public,
as he
has no
revenue
to maintain himself,
he
must necessarily be maintained
by the public.
But in a country,
of which a great part
of the inhabitants
are artificers
and manufacturers,
a great part of the people
who go to war
must be drawn
from those classes,
and must,
therefore,
be maintained
by the public as long
as they
are employed in its service,
When the art of war, too,
has gradually grown up
to be
a very intricate
and complicated science;
when the event of war
ceases
to be determined,
as in the first ages
of society,
by a single irregular skirmish
or battle;
but when
the contest
is generally spun out
through several
different campaigns,
each of which
lasts during the greater part
of the year;
it becomes universally
necessary
that the public
should maintain
those
who serve the public in war,
at least
while they
are employed in that service.
Whatever,
in time of peace,
might be
the ordinary occupation
of those
who go to war,
so very tedious and expensive
a service
would otherwise be
by far too heavy
a burden upon them.
After the second Persian war,
accordingly,
the armies of Athens
seem
to have been generally composed
of mercenary troops,
consisting,
indeed,
partly of citizens,
but partly, too,
of foreigners;
and all of them
equally hired
and paid
at the expense
of the state.
From the time
of the siege of Veii,
the armies of Rome
received pay
for their service
during the time which
they remained in the field.
Under the feudal governments,
the military service,
both of the great lords,
and of their immediate dependents,
was, after a certain period,
universally
exchanged
for a payment in money,
which was employed
to maintain
those
who served in their stead.
The number of those
who can go to war,
in proportion
to the whole number
of the people,
is necessarily much smaller
in a civilized than
in a rude state
of society.
In a civilized society,
as the soldiers
are maintained altogether
by the labour of those
who are not soldiers,
the number of the former
can never exceed
what the latter can maintain,
over and above maintaining,
in a manner suitable
to their respective stations,
both themselves
and the other officers
of government and law,
whom
they are obliged
to maintain.
In the little agrarian states
of ancient Greece,
a fourth or a fifth part
of the whole body
of the people
considered
the themselves as soldiers,
and would sometimes,
it is said,
take the field.
Among the civilized nations
of modern Europe,
it is commonly computed,
that not more than
the one hundredth part
of the inhabitants
of any country
can be employed as soldiers,
without
ruin to the country
which pays the expense
of their service.
The expense
of preparing
the army for the field
seems not
to have become
considerable in any nation,
till long
after
that of maintaining
it in the field
had devolved entirely
upon the sovereign
or commonwealth.
In all the different republics
of ancient Greece,
to learn
his military exercises,
was a necessary part
of education
imposed
by the state
upon every free citizen.
In every city
there seems
to have been a public field,
in which,
under the protection
of the public magistrate,
the young people
were taught
their different exercises
by different masters.
In
this
very simple institution consisted
the whole expense
which any Grecian state
seems ever to have been at,
in preparing
its citizens for war.
In ancient Rome,
the exercises
of the Campus Martius
answered the same purpose
with those
of the Gymnasium
in ancient Greece.
Under the feudal governments,
the many public ordinances,
that
the citizens of every district
should practise archery,
as well as several other
military exercises,
were intended
for promoting
the same purpose,
but do not seem
to have promoted it so well.
Either
from want
of interest
in the officers
entrusted
with the execution
of those ordinances,
or from some other cause,
they appear
to have been universally neglected;
and in the progress
of all those governments,
military
exercises seem
to have gone gradually
into disuse
among the great body
of the people.
In the republics
of ancient Greece and Rome,
during the whole period
of their existence,
and under the feudal governments,
for a considerable time
after
their first establishment,
the trade of a soldier
was not a separate,
distinct trade,
which constituted the sole
or principal occupation
of a particular class
of citizens;
every subject of the state,
whatever
might be
the ordinary trade or occupation
by which
he gained his livelihood,
considered himself,
upon all ordinary occasions,
as fit likewise
to exercise the trade
of a soldier,
and,
upon many extraordinary occasions,
as bound to exercise it.
The art of war,
however,
as it
is certainly the noblest
of all arts,
so,
in the progress
of improvement,
it necessarily becomes one
of the most complicated
among them.
The state of the mechanical,
as well as some other arts,
with which
it is necessarily connected,
determines
the degree of perfection
to which it
is capable of
being carried
at any particular time.
But in order to
carry it to this degree
of perfection,
it is necessary
that it
should become the sole
or principal occupation
of a particular class
of citizens;
and the division of labour
is as necessary
for the improvement of this,
as of every other art.
Into other arts,
the division of labour
is naturally introduced
by the prudence
of individuals,
who find that
they promote
their private interest better
by
confining themselves
to a particular trade,
than by exercising
a great number.
But it
is the wisdom
of the state only,
which can render the trade
of a soldier
a particular trade,
separate and distinct
from all others.
A private citizen,
who,
in time of profound peace,
and without any
particular encouragement
from the public,
should spend the greater part
of his time
in military exercises,
might,
no doubt,
both
improve himself very much
in them,
and amuse himself very well;
but he
certainly would not promote
his own interest.
It is the wisdom
of the state only,
which can render it
for his interest
to give
up the greater part
of his time
to this peculiar occupation;
and states
have not always had
this wisdom,
even when their circumstances
had become such,
that the preservation
of their existence
required
that they should have it.
A shepherd
has a great deal of leisure;
a husbandman,
in the rude state
of husbandry,
has some;
an artificer or manufacturer
has none
at all.
The first may,
without any loss,
employ a great deal
of his time
in martial exercises;
the second
may employ
some part of it;
but the last
cannot employ
a single hour in them
without some loss,
and his attention to his own
interest naturally
leads him
to neglect them altogether.
Those improvements
in husbandry, too,
which the progress of arts
and manufactures necessarily
introduces,
leave
the husbandman as little leisure
as the artificer.
Military
exercises come
to be as much
neglected
by the inhabitants
of the country as by those
of the town,
and the great body
of the people
becomes altogether unwarlike.
That wealth,
at the same time,
which always follows
the improvements
of agriculture
and manufactures,
and which,
in reality,
is no
more than
the accumulated produce
of those improvements,
provokes the invasion
of all their neighbours.
An industrious,
and, upon that account,
a wealthy nation,
is of all
nations the most likely
to be attacked;
and unless the state takes
some new measure
for the public defence,
the natural habits
of the people
render them altogether incapable
of defending themselves.
In these circumstances,
there
seem
to be but two methods
by which
the state
can make
any tolerable provision
for the public defence.
It may either,
first,
by means
of a very rigorous police,
and in spite of
the whole bent
of the interest,
genius,
and inclinations
of the people,
enforce
the practice
of military exercises,
and oblige either all
the citizens
of the military age,
or a certain number of them,
to join
in some measure the trade
of a soldier to
whatever other trade or
profession
they may happen
to carry on.
Or, secondly,
by maintaining
and employing a certain number
of citizens
in the constant practice
of military exercises,
it may render the trade
of a soldier
a particular trade,
separate and distinct
from all others.
If the state
has recourse
to the first
of those two expedients,
its military force
is said
to consist in a militia;
if to the second,
it is said
to consist
in a standing army.
The practice
of military exercises
is the sole
or principal occupation
of the soldiers
of a standing army,
and the maintenance
or pay which
the state affords them
is
the principal and ordinary fund
of their subsistence.
The practice
of military exercises
is only
the occasional occupation
of the soldiers
of a militia,
and they
derive
the principal and ordinary fund
of their subsistence
from some other occupation.
In a militia,
the character of the labourer,
artificer,
or tradesman,
predominates over
that of the soldier;
in a standing army,
that of the soldier
predominates
over every other character;
and in this distinction
seems
to consist
the essential difference
between those
two different species
of military force.
Militias
have been
of several different kinds.
In some countries,
the citizens
destined
for defending the state
seem
to have been exercised only,
without being,
if I may say so,
regimented;
that is,
without being divided
into separate
and distinct bodies of troops,
each of which
performed
its exercises
under its own
proper and permanent officers.
In the republics
of ancient Greece and Rome,
each citizen,
as long as he
remained at home,
seems
to have practised
his exercises,
either separately
and independently,
or with such
of his equals as he
liked best;
and not
to have been attached
to any particular body
of troops,
till he
was actually called upon
to take the field.
In other countries,
the militia
has not only been exercised,
but regimented.
In England,
in Switzerland,
and, I believe,
in every other country
of modern Europe,
where
any imperfect military force
of this kind
has been established,
every militiaman is,
even in time of peace,
attached
to a particular body
of troops,
which performs its exercises
under its own
proper and permanent officers.
Before the invention
of fire-arms,
that army
was superior
in which the soldiers had,
each individually,
the greatest skill
and dexterity
in the use
of their arms.
Strength and agility of body
were
of the highest consequence,
and commonly determined
the fate of battles.
But
this skill and dexterity in the use of their arms
could be acquired only,
in the same manner
as fencing
is at present,
by practising,
not in great bodies,
but each man separately,
in a particular school,
under a particular master,
or with his own particular
equals and companions.
Since the invention
of fire-arms,
strength and agility of body,
or even extraordinary dexterity
and skill
in the use of arms,
though they
are far from
being of no consequence,
are, however,
of less consequence.
The nature of the weapon,
though it by no means
puts the awkward
upon a level
with the skilful,
puts him more nearly so
than he ever was before.
All the dexterity and skill,
it is supposed,
which are necessary
for using it,
can be well enough
acquired
by practising
in great bodies.
Regularity,
order,
and prompt obedience
to command,
are qualities which,
in modern armies,
are of more importance
towards determining
the fate of battles,
than the dexterity and skill
of the soldiers
in the use
of their arms.
But the noise of fire-arms,
the smoke,
and the invisible death
to which
every man
feels himself every moment
exposed,
as soon
as he comes
within cannon-shot,
and frequently
a long time
before the battle
can be well said
to be engaged,
must render it very difficult
to maintain
any considerable degree
of this regularity,
order,
and prompt obedience,
even in
the beginning
of a modern battle.
In an ancient battle,
there
was no noise but
what arose
from the human voice;
there
was no smoke,
there
was no invisible cause
of wounds or death.
Every man,
till some mortal weapon
actually did approach him,
saw clearly
that no such weapon
was near him.
In these circumstances,
and among troops
who had some confidence
in their own skill
and dexterity
in the use
of their arms,
it must have been
a good deal less
difficult
to preserve some degree
of regularity and order,
not
only in the beginning,
but
through the whole progress
of an ancient battle,
and till
one of the two armies
was fairly defeated.
But the habits of regularity,
order,
and prompt obedience
to command,
can be acquired only
by troops
which are exercised
in great bodies.
A militia,
however,
in whatever manner
it may be either
disciplined
or exercised,
must always be much inferior
to a well
disciplined
and well exercised standing army.
The soldiers
who are exercised only once
a week,
or once a-month,
can never be so expert
in the use
of their arms,
as those
who are exercised every day,
or every other day;
and though
this circumstance
may not be
of so much
consequence in modern,
as it
was in ancient times,
yet
the acknowledged superiority
of the Prussian troops,
owing,
it is said,
very much
to their superior expertness
in their exercise,
may satisfy us that it is,
even at this day,
of very considerable
consequence.
The soldiers,
who are bound
to obey their officer
only once a-week,
or once a-month,
and who
are at all
other times at liberty
to manage
their own affairs their own way,
without being,
in any respect,
accountable to him,
can never be
under the same awe
in his presence,
can never have
the same disposition
to ready obedience,
with those whose whole life
and conduct
are every day
directed by him,
and who every day
even rise and go
to bed,
or at least
retire to their quarters,
according to his orders.
In
what is called discipline,
or in the habit
of ready obedience,
a militia
must always be still
more inferior
to a standing army,
than it
may sometimes be in what
is called the manual exercise,
or in the management
and use of its arms.
But,
in modern war,
the habit of ready
and instant obedience
is of much greater consequence
than a considerable superiority
in the management
of arms.
Those militias which,
like the Tartar
or Arab militia,
go to war
under the same chieftains whom
they are accustomed
to obey in peace,
are by far
the best.
In respect for their officers,
in the habit
of ready obedience,
they approach nearest
to standing armies
The Highland militia,
when it
served under its own chieftains,
had some advantage
of the same kind.
As the Highlanders,
however,
were not wandering,
but stationary shepherds,
as they
had all a fixed habitation,
and were not,
in peaceable times,
accustomed
to follow their chieftain
from place to place;
so,
in time of war,
they were less willing
to follow him
to any considerable distance,
or to continue
for any long time
in the field.
When they
had acquired any booty,
they
were eager
to return home,
and his authority
was seldom sufficient
to detain them.
In point of obedience,
they
were always much inferior to
what is reported
of the Tartars and Arabs.
As the Highlanders, too,
from their stationary life,
spend less of their time
in the open air,
they
were always less accustomed
to military exercises,
and were less expert
in the use
of their arms
than the Tartars and
Arabs are said
to be.
A militia of any kind,
it must be observed,
however,
which has served
for several successive
campaigns in the field,
becomes in every
respect a standing army.
The soldiers
are every day
exercised
in the use
of their arms,
and,
being constantly
under the command
of their officers,
are habituated
to the same prompt obedience
which takes place
in standing armies.
What they
were before they
took the field,
is of little importance.
They necessarily become
in every
respect a standing army,
after they have passed
a few
campaigns in it.
Should the war
in America drag out
through another campaign,
the American militia
may become,
in every respect,
a match for
that standing army,
of which
the valour appeared,
in the last war at least,
not inferior to
that of the hardiest veterans
of France and Spain.
This distinction
being well understood,
the history of all ages,
it will be found,
hears testimony
to the
irresistible superiority which
a well
regulated standing army
has over a militia.
One
of the first standing armies,
of which we
have any distinct account
in any well
authenticated history,
is that
of Philip of Macedon.
His frequent wars
with the Thracians,
Illyrians,
Thessalians,
and some of the Greek cities
in the neighbourhood
of Macedon,
gradually
formed his troops,
which in the beginning
were probably militia,
to the exact discipline
of a standing army.
When he was at peace,
which he was very seldom,
and never for any long time
together,
he was careful
not to disband that army.
It vanquished and subdued,
after
a long and violent struggle,
indeed,
the gallant
and well exercised militias
of the principal republics
of ancient Greece;
and afterwards,
with very little struggle,
the effeminate
and ill exercised militia
of the great Persian empire.
The fall
of the Greek republics,
and of the Persian empire
was the effect
of the
irresistible superiority which
a standing arm
has over every other sort
of militia.
It
is the first great revolution
in the affairs of mankind
of which history has preserved
any distinct
and circumstantial account.
The fall of Carthage,
and the consequent elevation
of Rome,
is the second.
All the varieties
in the fortune
of those two famous republics
may very well
be accounted for
from the same cause.
From the end
of the first to the beginning
of the
second Carthaginian war,
the armies
of Carthage
were continually in the field,
and employed
under three great generals,
who succeeded one another
in the command;
Amilcar,
his son-in-law Asdrubal,
and his son Annibal:
first
in chastising
their own rebellious slaves,
afterwards in subduing
the revolted nations
of Africa;
and lastly,
in conquering
the great kingdom of Spain.
The army which Annibal
led from Spain into Italy
must necessarily,
in those different wars,
have been gradually formed
to the exact discipline
of a standing army.
The Romans,
in the meantime,
though they
had not been altogether
at peace,
yet they
had not,
during this period,
been engaged in any war
of very great
consequence;
and their military discipline,
it is generally said,
was
a good deal relaxed.
The Roman armies which Annibal
encountered at Trebi,
Thrasymenus,
and Cannae,
were militia
opposed to a standing army.
This circumstance,
it is probable,
contributed
more than any other
to determine the fate
of those battles.
The standing army which Annibal
left behind him in Spain
had the like superiority
over the militia which
the Romans
sent to oppose it;
and, in a few years,
under the command
of his brother,
the younger Asdrubal,
expelled them almost
entirely from
that country.
Annibal
was ill supplied from home.
The Roman militia,
being continually
in the field,
became,
in the progress
of the war,
a well
disciplined
and well exercised standing army;
and the superiority of Annibal
grew every day less
and less.
Asdrubal
judged it necessary
to lead the whole,
or almost the whole,
of the standing army which
he commanded in Spain,
to the assistance
of his brother in Italy.
In this march,
he is said
to have been misled
by his guides;
and in a country which
he did not know,
was surprised and attacked,
by another standing army,
in every respect equal
or superior
to his own,
and was entirely defeated.
When Asdrubal
had left Spain,
the great Scipio
found nothing
to oppose him
but a militia inferior
to his own.
He conquered
and subdued that militia,
and,
in the course
of the war,
his own militia
necessarily became a well
disciplined
and well exercised standing army.
That standing army
was afterwards carried
to Africa,
where it found nothing
but a militia to oppose it.
In order to
defend Carthage,
it became necessary
to recal
the standing army of Annibal.
The disheartened
and frequently defeated
African militia joined it,
and,
at the battle of Zama,
composed the greater part
of the troops of Annibal.
The event of
that day determined
the fate
of the two rival republics.
From the end
of the second
Carthaginian war till
the fall
of the Roman republic,
the armies of Rome
were in every respect
standing armies.
The standing army
of Macedon
made some resistance
to their arms.
In the height
of their grandeur,
it cost them two great wars,
and three great battles,
to subdue that little kingdom,
of which
the conquest
would probably have been still
more difficult,
had it
not been
for the cowardice
of its last king.
The militias
of all
the civilized nations
of the ancient world,
of Greece,
of Syria,
and of Egypt,
made but a feeble resistance
to the standing armies
of Rome.
The militias
of some barbarous
nations
defended themselves
much better.
The Scythian
or Tartar militia,
which
Mithridates
drew from the countries north
of the Euxine
and Caspian seas,
were
the most formidable enemies
whom
the Romans
had to encounter
after the
second Carthaginian war.
The Parthian and German
militias, too,
were always respectable,
and upon several occasions,
gained
very considerable advantages
over the Roman armies.
In general,
however,
and when
the Roman armies
were well commanded,
they appear to have been
very much superior;
and if the Romans
did not pursue
the final conquest
either
of Parthia or Germany,
it
was probably
because
they judged that
it was not worth
while to add
those two barbarous countries
to an empire
which was already too large.
The ancient
Parthians
appear to have been a nation
of Scythian
or Tartar extraction,
and to have always retained
a good deal
of the manners
of their ancestors.
The ancient Germans were,
like the Scythians or Tartars,
a nation
of wandering shepherds,
who went
to war
under the same chiefs whom
they were accustomed
to follow in peace.
'Their militia
was exactly
of the same kind with
that of the Scythians
or Tartars,
from whom, too,
they were probably descended.
Many different causes
contributed
to relax the discipline
of the Roman armies.
Its extreme severity was,
perhaps,
one of those causes.
In the days
of their grandeur,
when no enemy
appeared capable
of opposing them,
their heavy armour
was laid aside
as unnecessarily burdensome,
their laborious exercises
were neglected,
as unnecessarily toilsome.
Under the Roman emperors,
besides,
the standing armies of Rome,
those
particularly which guarded
the German
and Pannonian frontiers,
became dangerous
to their masters,
against whom
they used frequently
to set up
their own generals.
In order to
render them less formidable,
according to some authors,
Dioclesian,
according to others,
Constantine,
first
withdrew them
from the frontier,
where they
had always before been
encamped in great bodies,
generally of two
or three legions each,
and dispersed them
in small bodies
through the different provincial
towns,
from whence they
were scarce ever removed,
but when it
became necessary
to repel an invasion.
Small bodies of soldiers,
quartered
in trading
and manufacturing towns,
and seldom removed
from those quarters,
became themselves trades men,
artificers,
and manufacturers.
The civil
came to predominate
over the military character;
and the standing armies
of Rome
gradually degenerated
into a corrupt,
neglected,
and undisciplined militia,
incapable
of resisting the attack
of the German
and Scythian militias,
which soon
afterwards invaded
the western empire.
It was only
by hiring the militia
of some of those nations
to oppose to that of others,
that
the emperors
were for some time able
to defend themselves.
The fall
of the western empire
is the third great revolution
in the affairs of mankind,
of which ancient history
has preserved
any distinct
or circumstantial account.
It was brought about
by the
irresistible superiority which
the militia of a barbarous
has over
that of a civilized nation;
which
the militia
of a nation of shepherds
has over that of a nation
of husbandmen,
artificers,
and manufacturers.
The victories which
have been gained by militias
have generally been,
not over standing armies,
but over other militias,
in exercise
and discipline inferior
to themselves.
Such
were
the victories which
the Greek militia gained
over
that of the Persian empire;
and such, too,
were those which,
in later times,
the Swiss militia gained over
that of the Austrians
and Burgundians.
The military force
of the German
and Scythian nations,
who established themselves
upon ruins
of the western empire,
continued
for some time
to be
of the same kind
in their new settlements,
as it
had been
in their original country.
It was a militia
of shepherds and husbandmen,
which,
in time of war,
took
the field
under the command
of the same chieftains whom
it was accustomed
to obey in peace.
It was,
therefore,
tolerably well
exercised,
and tolerably well
disciplined.
As arts and industry advanced,
however,
the authority
of the chieftains
gradually decayed,
and the great body
of the people
had less time
to spare
for military exercises.
Both the discipline
and the exercise
of the feudal militia,
therefore,
went gradually
to ruin,
and standing armies
were gradually introduced
to supply the place of it.
When the expedient
of a standing army,
besides,
had once been
adopted
by one civilized nation,
it became necessary that
all its neighbours
should follow the example.
They soon found that
their safety
depended upon their doing so,
and that their own
militia
was altogether incapable
of resisting the attack
of such an army.
The soldiers
of a standing army,
though they
may never have seen an enemy,
yet have frequently appeared
to possess all the courage
of veteran troops,
and,
the very moment
that they took the field,
to have been fit
to face the hardiest
and most experienced veterans.
In 1756,
when the Russian army marched
into Poland,
the valour
of the Russian soldiers
did not appear inferior to
that of the Prussians,
at that time supposed
to be
the hardiest
and most experienced veterans
in Europe.
The Russian empire,
however,
had enjoyed a profound peace
for
near twenty years before,
and could at that time
have very few soldiers
who had ever seen an enemy.
When
the Spanish war
broke out in 1739,
England
had enjoyed a profound peace
for about eight-and-twenty years.
The valour of her soldiers,
however,
far from being corrupted by
that long peace,
was never more distinguished than
in the attempt
upon Carthagena,
the first unfortunate
exploit of that unfortunate war.
In a long peace,
the generals,
perhaps,
may sometimes forget
their skill;
but where a well
regulated standing army
has been kept up,
the soldiers
seem never
to forget their valour.
When
a civilized nation
depends
for its defence
upon a militia,
it is at all times
exposed
to be conquered
by any barbarous
nation
which happens
to be in its neighbourhood.
The frequent conquests
of all the civilized countries
in Asia by the Tartars,
sufficiently
demonstrates
the natural superiority which
the militia of a barbarous
has over
that of a civilized nation.
A well
regulated standing army
is superior to every militia.
Such an army,
as it can best
be maintained by an
opulent and civilized nation,
so it can alone
defend such a nation
against the invasion of a
poor and barbarous
neighbour.
It is only by means
of a standing army,
therefore,
that the civilization
of any country
can be perpetuated,
or even preserved,
for any considerable time.
As it
is only by means
of a well
regulated standing army,
that
a civilized country
can be defended,
so it
is only by means of it
that
a barbarous country
can be suddenly
and tolerably civilized.
A standing army
establishes,
with an irresistible force,
the law
of the sovereign
through the remotest provinces
of the empire,
and maintains some degree
of regular government
in countries
which
could not otherwise admit
of any.
Whoever examines
with attention,
the improvements
which Peter the Great
introduced
into the Russian empire,
will find that
they almost all
resolve themselves
into the establishment
of a well
regulated standing army.
It is the instrument
which executes
and maintains
all his other regulations.
That degree
of order and internal peace,
which that empire
has ever since enjoyed,
is altogether owing
to the influence of
that army.
Men of republican
principles have been jealous
of a standing army,
as dangerous to liberty.
It certainly is so,
wherever the interest
of the general,
and that
of the principal officers,
are not necessarily connected
with the support
of the constitution
of the state.
The standing army
of Caesar
destroyed the Roman republic.
The standing army of Cromwell
turned the long parliament
out of doors.
But where
the sovereign
is himself the general,
and the
principal nobility and gentry
of the country
the chief officers
of the army;
where
the military force
is placed
under the command
of those
who have the greatest interest
in the support
of the civil authority,
because they
have themselves
the greatest share
of
that authority,
a standing army
can never be dangerous
to liberty.
On the contrary,
it may,
in some cases,
be favourable to liberty.
The security which
it gives to the sovereign
renders unnecessary
that troublesome jealousy,
which,
in some modern republics,
seems
to watch over
the minutest actions,
and to be
at all times ready
to disturb the peace
of every citizen.
Where the security
of the magistrate,
though supported
by the principal people
of the country,
is endangered
by every popular discontent;
where a small tumult
is capable
of bringing about
in a few hours
a great revolution,
the whole authority
of government
must be employed
to suppress
and punish every murmur
and complaint
against it.
To a sovereign,
on the contrary,
who feels himself supported,
not
only by the natural aristocracy
of the country,
but by a well
regulated standing army,
the rudest,
the most groundless,
and the most licentious
remonstrances,
can give little disturbance.
He can safely pardon
or neglect them,
and
his consciousness of his own superiority
naturally disposes him
to do so.
That degree
of liberty
which approaches
to licentiousness,
can be tolerated only
in countries where
the sovereign
is secured by a well
regulated standing army.
It is in such countries only,
that the public safety
does not require that
the sovereign
should be trusted
with any discretionary power,
for suppressing even
the impertinent wantonness
of this licentious liberty.
The first duty
of the sovereign,
therefore,
that
of defending the society
from the violence
and injustice
of other independent societies,
grows gradually more
and more expensive,
as the society
advances in civilization.
The military force
of the society,
which
originally cost
the sovereign no expense,
either
in time of peace,
or in time of war,
must,
in the progress
of improvement,
first
be maintained by him
in time of war,
and afterwards even in time
of peace.
The great change
introduced
into the art
of war
by the invention
of fire-arms,
has enhanced still
further both
the expense
of exercising and disciplining
any particular number
of soldiers
in time of peace,
and that
of employing them
in time of war.
Both
their arms
and their ammunition
are become more expensive.
A musket
is a more expensive machine
than a javelin
or a bow and arrows;
a cannon or a mortar,
than a balista
or a catapulta.
The powder
which is spent
in a modern review
is lost irrecoverably,
and occasions
a very considerable expense.
The javelins and arrows
which
were thrown
or shot in an ancient one,
could easily be picked up
again,
and were,
besides,
of very little value.
The cannon and the mortar
are not only much dearer,
but much heavier machines
than the balista
or catapulta;
and require a greater expense,
not only
to prepare them
for the field,
but to carry them to it.
As the superiority
of the modern artillery, too,
over that of the ancients,
is very great;
it has become
much more difficult,
and consequently
much more expensive,
to fortify a town,
so as to resist,
even for a few weeks,
the attack of
that superior artillery.
In modern times,
many different causes
contribute
to render the defence
of the
society more expensive.
The unavoidable effects
of the natural progress
of improvement have,
in this respect,
been a good deal
enhanced
by a great revolution
in the art of war,
to which a mere accident,
the invention of gunpowder,
seems to have given
occasion.
In modern war,
the great expense of firearms
gives an evident advantage
to the nation
which can best
afford that expense;
and, consequently,
to an opulent and civilized,
over a
poor and barbarous nation.
In ancient times,
the opulent and civilized
found it difficult
to defend themselves
against the poor
and barbarous nations.
In modern times,
the poor and barbarous
find it difficult
to defend themselves
against the opulent and civilized.
The invention of fire-arms,
an invention which
at first sight
appears to be so pernicious,
is certainly favourable,
both to the permanency
and to the extension
of civilization.
Of the Expense of Justice
The second duty
of the sovereign,
that
of protecting,
as far as possible,
every member
of the society
from the injustice
or oppression
of every other member
of it,
or the duty
of establishing
an exact administration
of justice,
requires
two very different degrees
of expense
in the different periods
of society.
Among nations of hunters,
as there is
scarce any property,
or at least none
that exceeds the value
of two or three days labour;
so there
is
seldom any established magistrate,
or any regular administration
of justice.
Men who have no property,
can injure one another
only in their persons
or reputations.
But when one man kills,
wounds,
beats,
or defames another,
though he
to whom the injury is done
suffers,
he who does
it receives no benefit.
It is otherwise
with the injuries
to property.
The benefit of the person
who does the injury
is often equal to
the loss of him
who suffers it.
Envy,
malice,
or resentment,
are the only passions
which can prompt one man
to injure another
in his person or reputation.
But the greater part of men
are not very frequently
under the influence
of those passions;
and the very worst men are
so only occasionally.
As their gratification, too,
how agreeable soever
it may be
to certain characters,
is not attended
with any real
or permanent advantage,
it is,
in the greater part of men,
commonly
restrained
by prudential considerations.
Men may live together
in society
with some tolerable degree
of security,
though there is no
civil magistrate
to protect them
from the injustice
of those passions.
But avarice and ambition
in the rich,
in the poor the hatred
of labour
and the love of present ease
and enjoyment,
are the passions which prompt
to invade property;
passions much more steady
in their operation,
and much more universal
in their influence.
Wherever
there is a great property,
there
is great inequality.
For one very rich man,
there
must be
at least five hundred poor,
and the affluence of the few
supposes the indigence
of the many.
The affluence of the rich
excites
the indignation of the poor,
who
are often both driven
by want,
and prompted by envy
to invade his possessions.
It is only under the shelter
of the civil magistrate,
that the owner of
that valuable property,
which is acquired
by the labour
of many years,
or perhaps of
many successive generations,
can sleep
a single night in security.
He is
at all times
surrounded by unknown enemies,
whom,
though he
never provoked,
he can never appease,
and from whose injustice
he can be protected only
by the powerful arm
of the civil magistrate,
continually
held up to
chastise it.
The acquisition
of valuable
and extensive property,
therefore,
necessarily
requires the establishment
of civil government.
Where there is no property,
or at least none
that exceeds the value
of two or three days labour,
civil government
is not so necessary.
Civil government
supposes
a certain subordination.
But as the necessity
of civil government
gradually grows up
with the acquisition
of valuable property;
so the principal causes,
which
naturally introduce
subordination,
gradually
grow up with the growth of
that valuable property.
The causes
or circumstances which
naturally introduce
subordination,
or which naturally and antecedent
to any civil institution,
give some men some superiority
over the greater part
of their brethren,
seem
to be four
in number.
The first
of those causes or circumstances,
is the superiority
of personal qualifications,
of strength,
beauty,
and agility of body;
of wisdom and virtue;
of prudence,
justice,
fortitude,
and moderation of mind.
The qualifications
of the body,
unless supported by those
of the mind,
can give little authority
in any period of society.
He is a very strong man,
who,
by mere strength of body,
can force
two weak ones
to obey him.
The qualifications of the mind
can alone
give very great authority
They are however,
invisible qualities;
always disputable,
and generally disputed.
No society,
whether
barbarous or civilized,
has ever found it convenient
to settle the rules
of precedency
of rank and subordination,
according to those
invisible qualities;
but according to something
that is
more plain and palpable.
The second
of those causes or circumstances,
is the superiority of age.
An old man,
provided his age
is not so far advanced as
to give suspicion of dotage,
is everywhere more
respected
than a young man
of equal rank,
fortune,
and abilities.
Among nations of hunters,
such as the native tribes
of North America,
age is the sole foundation
of rank and precedency.
Among them,
father
is the appellation
of a superior;
brother,
of an equal;
and son,
of an inferior.
In the most opulent
and civilized nations,
age regulates rank among those
who are
in every other respect equal;
and among whom,
therefore,
there
is nothing else
to regulate it.
Among brothers
and among sisters,
the eldest
always takes place;
and in the succession
of the paternal estate,
every thing
which cannot be divided,
but must go entire
to one person,
such as a title of honour,
is in most cases
given to the eldest.
Age is a plain and palpable
quality,
which
admits of no dispute.
The third
of those causes
or circumstances,
is the superiority
of fortune.
The authority of riches,
however,
though great in every age
of society,
is, perhaps,
greatest
in the rudest ages
of society,
which
admits
of any considerable inequality
of fortune.
A Tartar chief,
the increase of whose flocks
and herds is sufficient
to maintain a thousand men,
cannot well employ
that increase
in any other way
than in maintaining
a thousand men.
The rude state of his society
does not afford him
any manufactured produce
any trinkets
or baubles
of any kind,
for which
he can exchange
that part of his rude produce
which is
over and above
his own consumption.
The thousand men whom
he thus
maintains,
depending entirely
upon him
for their subsistence,
must both
obey his orders
in war,
and submit
to his jurisdiction in peace.
He is necessarily both
their general and their judge,
and his chieftainship
is the necessary effect
of the superiority
of his fortune.
In an
opulent and civilized
society,
a man
may possess
a much greater fortune,
and yet not be able
to command a dozen
of people.
Though the produce
of his estate
may be sufficient
to maintain,
and may,
perhaps,
actually
maintain,
more than a thousand people,
yet,
as those people pay for every
thing which
they get from him,
as he
gives scarce any thing
to any body
but in exchange
for an equivalent,
there
is scarce anybody
who considers himself
as entirely dependent
upon him,
and his authority
extends only
over a few menial servants.
The authority of fortune,
however,
is very great,
even in an
opulent and civilized
society.
That
it is much greater than
that either
of age
or of personal qualities,
has been
the constant complaint
of every period
of society which admitted
of any considerable inequality
of fortune.
The first period of society,
that of hunters,
admits of no such inequality.
Universal poverty
establishes
their universal equality;
and the superiority,
either
of age
or of personal qualities,
are the feeble,
but the sole foundations
of authority and subordination.
There is,
therefore,
little
or no authority or subordination
in this period
of society.
The second period of society,
that of shepherds,
admits of very great inequalities
of fortune,
and there is no period
in which
the superiority of fortune
gives so great authority
to those
who possess it.
There
is no period,
accordingly,
in which authority
and subordination
are more perfectly established.
The authority
of an Arabian scherif
is very great;
that
of a Tartar khan altogether despotical.
The fourth
of those causes
or circumstances,
is the superiority of birth.
Superiority of birth
supposes
an ancient superiority
of fortune
in the family
of the person
who claims it.
All families
are equally ancient;
and the ancestors
of the prince,
though they
may be better
known,
cannot well be more numerous
than those
of the beggar.
Antiquity of family
means everywhere the antiquity
either
of wealth,
or of that greatness
which is commonly either
founded upon wealth,
or accompanied with it.
Upstart
greatness
is everywhere less
respected
than ancient greatness.
The hatred of usurpers,
the love
of the family
of an ancient monarch,
are
in a great measure founded
upon the contempt which men
naturally have for the former,
and upon their veneration
for the latter.
As a military officer submits,
without reluctance,
to the authority
of a superior by
whom
he has always been
commanded,
but cannot bear
that his inferior
should be set over his head;
so men easily submit
to a family
to whom
they and their ancestors
have always submitted;
but are fired
with indignation when another
family,
in whom
they had never acknowledged
any such superiority,
assumes
a dominion over them.
The distinction of birth,
being subsequent
to the inequality of fortune,
can have no place in nations
of hunters,
among whom all men,
being equal in fortune,
must likewise
be very nearly equal
in birth.
The son
of a wise
and brave man may,
indeed,
even among them,
be somewhat more
respected
than a man of equal merit,
who has the misfortune
to be the son
of a fool or a coward.
The difference,
however
will not be very great;
and there
never was,
I believe,
a great family in the world,
whose illustration
was entirely derived
from the inheritance
of wisdom and virtue.
The distinction
of birth not only may,
but always does,
take place among nations
of shepherds.
Such nations
are always strangers
to every sort
of luxury,
and great wealth
can scarce
ever be dissipated
among them
by improvident profusion.
There
are no nations,
accordingly,
who abound more in families
revered and honoured
on account
of their descent
from a long race
of great
and illustrious ancestors;
because
there are no nations
among whom wealth
is likely to continue longer
in the same families.
Birth and fortune
are evidently
the two circumstances which
principally set
one man above another.
They are
the two great sources
of personal distinction,
and are,
therefore,
the principal causes which
naturally establish authority
and subordination
among men.
Among nations of shepherds,
both those causes
operate
with their full force.
The great shepherd
or herdsman,
respected
on account
of his great wealth,
and of the great number
of those
who depend
upon him for subsistence,
and revered
on account
of the nobleness
of his birth,
and of the immemorial antiquity
or his illustrious family,
has a natural authority
over all
the inferior shepherds
or herdsmen
of his horde or clan.
He can command
the united force
of a greater number
of people than any
of them.
His military power
is greater than
that of any of them.
In time of war,
they
are all of them
naturally disposed
to muster themselves
under his banner,
rather than under
that of any other person;
and
his birth and fortune thus
naturally procure
to him
some sort of executive power.
By commanding, too,
the united force
of a greater number
of people than any
of them,
he is best able
to compel any one of them,
who may have injured another,
to compensate the wrong.
He is the person,
therefore,
to whom all
those
who are too
weak
to defend themselves naturally look
up
for protection.
It is to him
that they
naturally complain
of the injuries which
they imagine
have been done to them;
and his interposition,
in such cases,
is more easily submitted to,
even by the person
complained of,
than that of any other person
would be.
His birth and fortune thus
naturally procure him
some sort
of judicial authority.
It is
in the age of shepherds,
in the second period
of society,
that the inequality
of fortune first
begins
to take place,
and introduces among men
a degree
of authority and subordination,
which
could not possibly exist before.
It
thereby introduces some degree
of
that
civil government
which is indispensably necessary
for its own preservation;
and it
seems to do this naturally,
and even independent
of the consideration of
that necessity.
The consideration of
that necessity
comes,
no doubt,
afterwards,
to contribute very much
to maintain
and secure
that authority
and subordination.
The rich,
in particular,
are necessarily interested
to support that order
of things,
which can alone
secure them
in the possession
of their own advantages.
Men of inferior wealth
combine
to defend those
of superior wealth
in the possession
of their property,
in order that men
of superior wealth
may combine
to defend them
in the possession of theirs.
All
the inferior shepherds and herdsmen feel,
that
the security
of their own herds and
flocks depends
upon the security of those
of the great shepherd
or herdsman;
that
the maintenance
of their lesser authority
depends upon
that of his greater authority;
and that
upon their subordination
to him
depends his power
of keeping their inferiors
in subordination to them.
They constitute a sort
of little nobility,
who feel themselves
interested
to defend the property,
and to support
the authority,
of their own little sovereign,
in order that
he may be able
to defend their property,
and to support
their authority.
Civil government,
so far as it
is instituted
for the security of property,
is, in reality,
instituted
for the defence
of the rich
against the poor,
or of those
who have some property
against those
who have none at all.
The judicial authority
of such a sovereign,
however,
far from being
a cause of expense,
was, for a long time,
a source
of revenue to him.
The persons
who applied
to him for justice
were always
willing
to pay for it,
and a present
never failed
to accompany a petition.
After the authority
of the sovereign, too,
was thoroughly established,
the person
found guilty,
over and above
the satisfaction
which he was obliged
to make to the party,
was like-wise forced
to pay an amercement
to the sovereign.
He had given trouble,
he had disturbed,
he had
broke the peace
of his lord the king,
and for those offences
an amercement
was thought due.
In the Tartar governments
of Asia,
in the governments of Europe
which were founded
by the German and
Scythian nations
who overturned
the Roman empire,
the administration of justice
was a considerable source
of revenue,
both to the sovereign,
and to all the lesser chiefs
or lords
who exercised
under him
any particular jurisdiction,
either
over some particular tribe
or clan,
or over some particular territory
or district.
Originally,
both the sovereign
and the inferior chiefs
used to exercise
this jurisdiction
in their own persons.
Afterwards,
they universally found it
convenient
to delegate it
to some substitute,
bailiff,
or judge.
This substitute,
however,
was still obliged
to account
to his principal or constituent
for the profits
of the jurisdiction.
Whoever reads the instructions
(They
are to be found
in Tyrol's History of England)
which were given
to the judges
of the circuit
in the time
of Henry II
will see clearly that
those
judges were a sort
of itinerant factors,
sent round the country
for the purpose
of levying
certain branches
of the king's revenue.
In those days,
the administration
of justice not only afforded
a certain revenue
to the sovereign,
but,
to procure this revenue,
seems
to have been one
of the principal advantages which
he proposed
to obtain
by the administration
of justice.
This scheme
of making the administration
of justice subservient
to the purposes of revenue,
could scarce
fail to be
productive
of several very gross abuses.
The person
who applied
for justice
with a large present
in his hand,
was likely
to get
something more than justice;
while
he who applied for it
with a small one
was likely
to get something less.
Justice, too,
might frequently be delayed,
in order that
this present
might be repeated.
The amercement,
besides,
of the person
complained of,
might frequently suggest
a very strong reason
for
finding him in the wrong,
even when he
had not really been so.
That such abuses
were far from being uncommon,
the ancient history of every
country in Europe
bears witness.
When the sovereign
or chief exercises
his judicial authority
in his own person,
how much soever
he might abuse it,
it must have been
scarce possible
to get any redress;
because
there could seldom be
any body
powerful enough
to call him to account.
When he
exercised it by a bailiff,
indeed,
redress
might sometimes be had.
If it
was for his own benefit only,
that the bailiff
had been guilty of an act
of injustice,
the sovereign himself
might not always be unwilling
to punish him,
or to oblige him
to repair the wrong.
But if it
was for the benefit
of his sovereign;
if it
was in order to make court
to the person
who appointed him,
and who might prefer him,
that he
had committed any act
of oppression;
redress
would,
upon most occasions,
be as impossible
as if the sovereign
had committed it himself.
In all barbarous governments,
accordingly,
in all those
ancient governments
of Europe in particular,
which were founded
upon the ruins
of the Roman empire,
the administration of justice
appears for a long time
to have been extremely corrupt;
far from being quite
equal and impartial,
even under the best monarchs,
and altogether profligate
under the worst.
Among nations of shepherds,
where the sovereign or chief
is only the greatest shepherd
or herdsman
of the horde or clan,
he is maintained
in the same
manner as any
of his vassals or subjects,
by the increase
of his own herds
or flocks.
Among those nations
of husbandmen,
who are
but just come
out of the shepherd state,
and who are not much advanced
beyond that state,
such as
the Greek tribes
appear
to have been
about the time
of the Trojan war,
and our German
and Scythian ancestors,
when they first
settled
upon the ruins
of the western empire;
the sovereign or chief is,
in the same manner,
only the greatest landlord
of the country,
and is maintained in the same
manner as any other landlord,
by a revenue
derived
from his own private estate,
or from what,
in modern Europe,
was called
the demesne of the crown.
His subjects,
upon ordinary occasions,
contribute nothing
to his support,
except when,
in order to
protect them
from the oppression
of some of
their fellow-subjects,
they stand
in need of his authority.
The presents which
they make him
upon such occasions
constitute
the whole ordinary revenue,
the whole
of the emoluments which,
except,
perhaps,
upon some
very extraordinary emergencies,
he derives
from his dominion over them.
When Agamemnon,
in Homer,
offers to Achilles,
for his friendship,
the sovereignty
of seven Greek cities,
the sole advantage which
he mentions
as likely
to be derived from it was,
that the people
would honour him
with presents.
As long as such presents,
as long as the emoluments
of justice,
or what
may be called
the fees of court,
constituted,
in this manner,
the whole ordinary revenue which
the sovereign derived
from his sovereignty,
it
could not well be expected,
it
could not even decently be proposed,
that he
should give them
up altogether.
It might,
and it
frequently was proposed,
that he should regulate
and ascertain them.
But after they
had been so
regulated
and ascertained,
how to hinder
a person
who was all-powerful from
extending them
beyond those regulations,
was still very difficult,
not to say impossible.
During the continuance
of this state of things,
therefore,
the corruption of justice,
naturally
resulting
from the
arbitrary and uncertain
nature
of those presents,
scarce admitted
of any effectual remedy.
But when,
from different causes,
chiefly from
the continually increasing expense
of defending the nation
against the invasion
of other nations,
the private estate
of the sovereign
had become altogether
insufficient
for defraying
the expense
of the sovereignty;
and when it
had become necessary
that the people should,
for their own security,
contribute
towards this expense
by taxes of different kinds;
it seems
to have been very commonly stipulated,
that no present
for the administration
of justice
should,
under any pretence,
be accepted either
by the sovereign,
or by his bailiffs
and substitutes,
the judges.
Those presents,
it seems
to have been supposed,
could more easily be abolished
altogether,
than effectually regulated
and ascertained.
Fixed
salaries
were appointed to the judges,
which were supposed
to compensate to them
the loss of whatever
might have been their share
of the ancient emoluments
of justice;
as the taxes
more than compensated
to the sovereign
the loss of his.
Justice
was then said
to be administered gratis.
Justice,
however,
never
was in reality administered gratis
in any country.
Lawyers and attorneys,
at least,
must always be paid
by the parties;
and if they were not,
they
would perform
their duty still worse than
they actually perform it.
The fees
annually paid
to lawyers and attorneys,
amount,
in every court,
to a much greater sum
than the salaries
of the judges.
The circumstance
of those salaries
being paid by the crown,
can nowhere much
diminish the necessary expense
of a law-suit.
But it was not so much
to diminish the expense,
as to prevent the corruption
of justice,
that
the judges
were prohibited
from receiving my present
or fee
from the parties.
The office of judge
is in itself
so very honourable,
that men are willing
to accept of it,
though accompanied
with very small emoluments.
The inferior office
of justice of peace,
though attended
with a good deal
of trouble,
and in most cases
with no emoluments at all,
is an object
of ambition
to the greater part
of our country gentlemen.
The salaries
of all the different judges,
high and low,
together
with the whole expense
of the administration
and execution
of justice,
even
where it
is not managed
with very good economy,
makes,
in any civilized country,
but
a very inconsiderable part
of the whole expense
of government.
The whole expense
of justice, too,
might easily be defrayed
by the fees
of court;
and,
without exposing
the administration
of justice
to any real hazard
of corruption,
the public revenue
might thus
be entirely discharged
from a certain,
though perhaps
but a small incumbrance.
It is difficult
to regulate the fees
of court effectually,
where a person so powerful
as the sovereign
is to share in them and
to derive
any considerable part
of his revenue from them.
It is very easy,
where
the judge
is the principal person
who can reap any benefit
from them.
The law
can very easily oblige
the judge
to respect
the regulation
though it
might not always be
able
to make
the sovereign respect it.
Where the fees of court
are precisely regulated
and ascertained
where they
are paid all at once,
at a certain period
of every process,
into the hands
of a cashier or receiver,
to be by him
distributed
in certain known proportions
among the different judges
after the process
is decided and
not till it is decided;
there
seems to be no more danger
of corruption than when
such fees
are prohibited altogether.
Those fees,
without occasioning
any considerable increase
in the expense
of a law-suit,
might be rendered fully
sufficient
for defraying
the whole expense of justice.
But not being paid
to the judges
till the process
was determined,
they
might be some incitement
to the diligence
of the court in examining
and deciding it.
In courts
which consisted
of a considerable number
of judges,
by proportioning
the share
of each judge
to the number
of hours and days which he
had employed
in examining the process,
either in the court,
or in a committee,
by order of the court,
those fees
might give some encouragement
to the diligence
of each particular judge.
Public
services
are never better
performed,
than when
their reward
comes only
in consequence
of their being performed,
and is proportioned
to the diligence
employed
in performing them.
In the different parliaments
of France,
the fees of court
(called epices and vacations)
constitute
the far greater part
of the emoluments
of the judges.
After all deductions
are made,
the neat salary paid
by the crown
to a counsellor
or judge in the parliament
of Thoulouse,
in rank and dignity
the second parliament
of the kingdom,
amounts only to 150 livres,
about £6:11s sterling a-year.
About seven years ago,
that sum
was in the same place
the ordinary
yearly wages of a
common footman.
The distribution
of these epices, too,
is according to
the diligence of the judges.
A diligent judge
gains a comfortable,
though moderate revenue,
by his office;
an idle one
gets little more than
his salary.
Those parliaments are,
perhaps,
in many respects,
not very convenient courts
of justice;
but they
have never been accused;
they seem never even
to have been suspected
of corruption.
The fees of court
seem originally
to have been
the principal support
of the different courts
of justice in England.
Each court
endeavoured
to draw to itself
as much business as it
could,
and was,
upon that account,
willing
to take cognizance
of many suits
which
were not originally intended
to fall
under its jurisdiction.
The court of king's bench,
instituted
for the trial
of criminal causes only,
took cognizance
of civil suits;
the plaintiff pretending
that the defendant,
in not doing him justice,
had been guilty
of some trespass
or misdemeanour.
The court of exchequer,
instituted for the levying
of the king's revenue,
and for enforcing
the payment
of such debts only as
were due to the king,
took cognizance of all other
contract debts;
the planitiff alleging
that he
could not pay the king,
because the defendant
would not pay him.
In consequence of such fictions,
it came,
in many cases,
to depend altogether
upon the parties,
before
what court
they would choose
to have their cause tried,
and each court endeavoured,
by superior dispatch
and impartiality,
to draw to itself
as many causes as it
could.
The present
admirable constitution
of the courts
of justice in England was,
perhaps,
originally,
in a great measure,
formed by this emulation,
which anciently took place
between their respective judges:
each judge
endeavouring
to give,
in his own court,
the speediest
and most effectual remedy which
the law would admit,
for every sort of injustice.
Originally,
the courts of law
gave damages only for breach
of contract.
The court of chancery,
as a court of conscience,
first
took upon it
to enforce
the specific performance
of agreements.
When the breach of contract
consisted
in the non-payment
of money,
the damage sustained
could be compensated
in no other way than
by ordering payment,
which was equivalent
to a specific performance
of the agreement.
In such cases,
therefore,
the remedy
of the courts of law
was sufficient.
It was not so in
others.
When the tenant sued his lord
for having unjustly
outed him of his lease,
the damages which
he recovered
were by no means
equivalent to the possession
of the land.
Such causes,
therefore,
for some time,
went all
to the court of chancery,
to the no small loss
of the courts of law.
It was to draw back
such causes to themselves,
that
the courts of law
are said
to have invented
the artificial and fictitious
writ
of ejectment,
the most effectual remedy
for an unjust outer
or dispossession
of land.
A stamp-duty
upon the law proceedings
of each particular court,
to be levied by that court,
and applied
towards the maintenance
of the judges,
and other officers
belonging to it,
might in the same manner,
afford a revenue sufficient
for defraying the expense
of the administration
of justice,
without bringing any burden
upon the general revenue
of the society.
The judges,
indeed,
might in this case,
be under the temptation
of multiplying unnecessarily
the proceedings
upon every cause,
in order to increase,
as much as possible,
the produce
of such a stamp-duty.
It has been
the custom in modern
Europe
to regulate,
upon most occasions,
the payment
of the attorneys and clerks
of court
according to
the number of pages
which they
had occasion
to write;
the court,
however,
requiring
that each page
should contain so many lines,
and each line so many words.
In order to
increase their payment,
the attorneys and clerks
have contrived
to multiply words
beyond all necessity,
to the corruption
of the law language of,
I believe,
every court
of justice in Europe.
A like temptation
might,
perhaps,
occasion a like corruption
in the form
of law proceedings.
But whether the administration
of justice
be so contrived
as to defray its own expense,
or whether the judges
be maintained
by fixed salaries
paid to them
from some other fund,
it does not seen necessary
that the person or persons
entrusted
with the executive power
should be charged
with the management
of that fund,
or with the payment
of those salaries.
That fund
might arise from the
rent of landed estates,
the management of each estate
being entrusted
to the particular court
which was
to be maintained by it.
That fund
might arise
even from the interest
of a sum
of money,
the lending out of which
might,
in the same manner,
be entrusted to the court
which was
to be maintained by it.
A part,
though indeed
but a small part
of the salary
of the judges
of the court
of session in Scotland,
arises
from the interest
of a sum
of money.
The necessary instability
of such
a fund seems,
however,
to render it an improper one
for the maintenance
of an institution
which ought to last
for ever.
The separation
of the judicial
from the executive power,
seems originally
to have arisen
from the increasing business
of the society,
in consequence
of its increasing improvement.
The administration of justice
became so laborious and so
complicated a duty,
as to require
the undivided attention
of the person
to whom it was entrusted.
The person
entrusted
with the executive power,
not having leisure
to attend
to the decision
of private causes himself,
a deputy
was appointed
to decide them in his stead.
In the progress
of the Roman greatness,
the consul
was too much
occupied
with the political affairs
of the state,
to attend
to the administration
of justice.
A praetor,
therefore,
was appointed
to administer it
in his stead.
In the progress
of the European monarchies,
which were founded
upon the ruins
of the Roman empire,
the sovereigns
and the great lords
came universally
to consider
the administration
of justice
as
an
office
both too laborious and too
ignoble
for them
to execute
in their own persons.
They universally,
therefore,
discharged themselves of it,
by appointing a deputy,
bailiff
or judge.
When
the judicial
is united
to the executive power,
it is scarce possible
that justice
should not frequently be sacrificed
to what
is vulgarly called politics.
The persons
entrusted
with the great interests
of the state
may
even without any corrupt views,
sometimes
imagine it necessary
to sacrifice
to those interests
the rights of a private man.
But
upon the impartial administration
of justice
depends
the liberty
of every individual,
the sense
which he
has of his own security.
In order to make
every individual
feel himself perfectly secure
in the possession
of every right which
belongs to him,
it is not only necessary
that the judicial
should be separated
from the executive power,
but that
it should be rendered
as much as possible independent
of that power.
The judge
should not be
liable to be removed
from his office according to
the caprice of that power.
The regular payment
of his salary
should not depend
upon the good will,
or even upon the good economy
of that power.
Of the Expense
of public Works
and public Institutions.
The third and last duty
of the sovereign or commonwealth,
is that of erecting
and maintaining
those public institutions
and those public works,
which though they
may be
in the
highest degree advantageous
to a great society,
are, however,
of such a nature,
that the profit
could never repay the expense
to any individual,
or small number
of individuals;
and which it,
therefore,
cannot be expected
that any individual,
or small number
of individuals,
should erect
or maintain.
The performance of this duty
requires, too,
very different degrees
of expense
in the different periods
of society.
After the public institutions
and public works
necessary
for the defence
of the society,
and for the administration
of justice,
both of which
have already been mentioned,
the other works and institutions
of this kind
are chiefly
for facilitating
the commerce of the society,
and those
for promoting
the instruction
of the people.
The institutions
for instruction
are of two kinds:
those
for the education
of the youth,
and those
for the instruction
of people of all ages.
The consideration
of the manner
in which the expense
of those
different sorts
of public works and
institutions
may be most properly defrayed
will divide this third part
of the present chapter
into three different articles.
Of the public Works
and Institutions
for facilitating
the Commerce
of the Society.
And, first,
of those
which are necessary
for facilitating Commerce
in general.
That
the erection and maintenance of the public works which
facilitate the commerce
of any country,
such as good roads,
bridges,
navigable canals,
harbours,.etc.
must require
very different degrees
of expense
in the different periods
of society,
is evident without any proof.
The expense of making
and maintaining
the public roads of any country
must evidently increase
with the annual produce
of the land
and labour of that country,
or with the quantity
and weight
of the goods which
it becomes necessary to fetch
and carry upon those roads.
The strength of a bridge
must be suited
to the number and weight
of the carriages
which are likely
to pass over it.
The depth
and the supply
of water
for a navigable canal
must be proportioned
to the number and
tonnage of the lighters which
are likely
to carry goods upon it;
the extent of a harbour,
to the number of the shipping
which are likely
to take shelter in it.
It does not seem necessary
that
the expense
of those public works
should be defrayed from
that public revenue,
as it is commonly called,
of which the collection
and application
are in most countries,
assigned
to the executive power.
The greater part
of such public works
may easily be so managed,
as to afford
a particular revenue,
sufficient
for defraying
their own expense
without bringing any burden
upon the general revenue
of the society.
A highway,
a bridge,
a navigable canal,
for example,
may,
in most cases,
be both made
add maintained
by a small toll
upon the
carriages
which make use of them;
a harbour,
by a moderate port-duty
upon the tonnage
of the shipping which load
or unload in it.
The coinage,
another institution
for facilitating commerce,
in many countries,
not only defrays
its own expense,
but affords
a small revenue
or a seignorage
to the sovereign.
The post-office,
another institution
for the same purpose,
over
and above defraying
its own expense,
affords,
in almost all countries,
a very considerable revenue
to the sovereign.
When the carriages which
pass over
a highway or a bridge,
and the lighters which sail
upon a navigable canal,
pay toll
in proportion
to their weight
or their tonnage,
they pay
for the maintenance
of those public
works exactly in proportion
to the wear
and tear which
they occasion of them.
It seems scarce possible
to invent
a more equitable way
of maintaining such works.
This tax
or toll, too,
though it
is advanced by the carrier,
is finally paid
by the consumer,
to whom
it must always be charged
in the price
of the goods.
As the expense of carriage,
however,
is very much
reduced by means
of such public works,
the goods,
notwithstanding the toll,
come cheaper to the consumer
than
they
could otherwise have done,
their price
not being so much raised
by the toll,
as it
is lowered
by the cheapness
of the carriage.
The person
who finally pays this tax,
therefore,
gains
by the application more than
he loses
by the payment of it.
His payment
is exactly in proportion
to his gain.
It is,
in reality,
no more than
a part of that gain
which he
is obliged to give up,
in order to
get the rest.
It seems impossible
to imagine
a more equitable method
of raising a tax.
When the toll
upon carriages of luxury,
upon coaches,
post-chaises,.etc.
is made somewhat higher
in proportion
to their weight,
than upon carriages
of necessary use,
such as carts,
waggons,.etc.
the indolence and vanity
of the rich
is made
to contribute,
in a very easy manner,
to the relief
of the poor,
by rendering
cheaper the transportation
of heavy goods
to all
the different parts
of the country.
When high-roads,
bridges,
canals,.etc.
are in this manner
made and supported
by the commerce
which is carried on by means
of them,
they
can be made only where
that commerce
requires them,
and, consequently,
where it is proper
to make them.
Their expense, too,
their grandeur
and magnificence,
must be suited to what
that commerce
can afford
to pay.
They
must be made,
consequently,
as it is proper
to make them.
A magnificent high-road
cannot be made
through a desert country,
where there is little
or no commerce,
or merely
because
it happens
to lead
to the country villa
of the intendant
of the province,
or to
that of some great lord,
to whom
the intendant finds it
convenient
to make his court.
A great bridge
cannot be thrown
over a river
at a place
where nobody passes,
or merely
to embellish the view
from the windows of a
neighbouring palace;
things which
sometimes happen in countries,
where works of this kind
are carried on
by any other revenue than
that which they
themselves are capable
of affording.
In several
different parts of Europe,
the toll or lock-duty
upon a canal
is the property
of private persons,
whose private interest
obliges them
to keep up the canal.
If it
is not kept
in tolerable order,
the navigation
necessarily ceases altogether,
and, along with it,
the whole profit which
they can make by the tolls.
If those
tolls were put
under the management
of commissioners,
who had themselves
no interest in them,
they
might be less attentive
to the maintenance
of the works
which produced them.
The canal of Languedoc
cost the king
of France and the province
upwards of thirteen millions
of livres,
which
(at twenty-eight livres
the mark of silver,
the value of French money
in the end
of the last century)
amounted to
upwards of nine hundred thousand pounds
sterling.
When that great work
was finished,
the most likely method,
it was found,
of keeping it
in constant repair,
was to make a present
of the tolls to Riquet,
the engineer
who planned
and conducted the work.
Those
tolls constitute,
at present,
a very large estate
to the different branches
of the family of
that gentleman,
who have,
therefore,
a great interest
to keep the work
in constant repair.
But had those
tolls been put
under the management
of commissioners,
who had no such interest,
they
might perhaps,
have been dissipated
in ornamental
and unnecessary expenses,
while the most essential parts
of the works
were allowed
to go to ruin.
The tolls
for the maintenance
of a highroad
cannot,
with any safety,
be made the property
of private persons.
A high-road,
though entirely neglected,
does not become altogether
impassable,
though a canal does.
The proprietors
of the tolls
upon a high-road,
therefore,
might neglect altogether
the repair of the road,
and yet continue
to levy very nearly
the same tolls.
It is proper,
therefore,
that the tolls
for the maintenance of such
a work
should be put
under the management
of commissioners or trustees.
In Great Britain,
the abuses which
the trustees
have committed
in the management
of those tolls,
have,
in many cases,
been very justly
complained of.
At many turnpikes,
it has been said,
the money
levied
is more than double of what
is necessary for executing,
in the completest manner,
the work,
which is often executed
in a very slovenly manner,
and sometimes
not executed at all.
The system
of repairing the high-roads
by tolls of this kind,
it must be observed,
is not
of very long standing.
We should not wonder,
therefore,
if it
has not yet been
brought to
that degree of perfection
of which it
seems capable.
If mean and improper
persons
are frequently appointed trustees;
and if proper courts
of inspection and account
have not yet been
established
for controlling their conduct,
and for reducing
the tolls to what
is barely sufficient
for executing
the work
to be done by them;
the recency
of the
institution both accounts
and apologizes
for those defects,
of which,
by the wisdom of parliament,
the greater part may,
in due time,
be gradually remedied.
The money
levied
at the different turnpikes
in Great Britain,
is supposed
to exceed so much
what is necessary
for repairing the roads,
that the savings which,
with proper economy,
might be made from it,
have been considered,
even by some ministers,
as a very great resource,
which might,
at some time or another,
be applied to the exigencies
of the state.
Government,
it has been said,
by taking the management
of the turnpikes
into its own
hands,
and by employing the soldiers,
who would work
for a very small addition
to their pay,
could keep
the roads in good order,
at a much less expense
than it
can be done by trustees,
who have no other workmen
to employ,
but such as
derive their whole subsistence
from their wages.
A great revenue,
half a million,
perhaps
(Since publishing
the two first editions
of this book,
I have
got good reasons
to believe
that all the turnpike tolls
levied in Great Britain
do not produce
a neat revenue
that amounts
to half a million;
a sum which,
under the management
of government,
would not be sufficient
to keep,
in repair five
of the principal roads
in the kingdom),
it has been pretended,
might in this manner
be gained,
without laying
any new burden
upon the people;
and the turnpike roads
might be made
to contribute
to the general expense
of the state,
in the same manner
as the post-office
does at present.
That
a considerable revenue
might be gained
in this manner,
I have no doubt,
though probably
not near so
much as the projectors
of this plan
have supposed.
The plan itself,
however,
seems liable
to several
very important objections.
First,
If the tolls
which are levied
at the turnpikes
should ever be considered
as one
of the resources
for supplying
the exigencies of the state,
they
would certainly be augmented
as those exigencies
were supposed
to require.
According to
the policy of Great Britain,
therefore,
they
would probably
he augmented very fast.
The facility
with which
a great revenue
could be drawn from them,
would probably encourage
administration
to recur very frequently
te this resource.
Though it may,
perhaps,
be more than doubtful
whether half
a million
could by any economy
be saved
out of the present tolls,
it can scarcely be doubted,
but that
a million
might be saved out of them,
if they were doubled;
and perhaps two millions,
if they were tripled
(I have now good reason
to believe
that all
these conjectural sums
are by much too large.).
This great revenue, too,
might be levied
without the appointment
of a single new officer
to collect
and receive it.
But the turnpike tolls,
being continually augmented
in this manner,
instead of facilitating
the inland
commerce
of the country,
as at present,
would soon
become
a very great incumbrance
upon it.
The expense
of transporting all
heavy goods
from one part
of the country to another,
would soon be so much
increased,
the market
for all such goods,
consequently,
would soon be so much
narrowed,
that their production
would be
in a great measure discouraged,
and
the most important branches
of the domestic industry
of the country
annihilated altogether.
Secondly,
A tax
upon carriages,
in proportion to their weight,
though a very equal tax
when applied
to the sole purpose
of repairing the roads,
is a very unequal one when
applied to any other purpose,
or to supply
the common exigencies
of the state.
When it
is applied
to the
sole purpose above mentioned,
each carriage
is supposed
to pay exactly for the wear
and tear which
that carriage occasions
of the roads.
But when it
is applied
to any other purpose,
each carriage
is supposed
to pay
for more than that wear
and tear,
and contributes
to the supply
of some other exigency
of the state.
But as the turnpike toll
raises the price
of goods in proportion
to their weight
and not to their value,
it is chiefly paid
by the consumers
of coarse and bulky,
not by those
of precious
and light commodities.
Whatever exigency
of the state,
therefore,
this tax
might be intended
to supply,
that exigency
would be chiefly supplied
at the expense
of the poor,
not of the rich;
at the expense of those
who are least able
to supply it,
not of those
who are most able.
Thirdly,
If government
should at any time
neglect the reparation
of the high-roads,
it would be still
more difficult,
than it
is at present,
to compel
the proper application
of any part
of the turnpike tolls.
A large revenue
might thus
be levied upon the people,
without any part of it
being applied to the
only purpose
to which a revenue
levied
in this
manner
ought ever to be applied.
If the meanness and poverty
of the trustees of turnpike
roads render it
sometimes difficult,
at present,
to oblige them
to repair their wrong;
their wealth and greatness
would render it ten
times more so in
the case
which is here supposed.
In France,
the funds
destined
for the reparation
of the high-roads
are
under the immediate direction
of the executive power.
Those funds consist,
partly in
a certain number of days labour,
which the country
people are
in most parts of Europe
obliged
to give
to the reparation
of the highways;
and partly in such
a portion
of the general revenue
of the state as the king
chooses
to spare
from his other expenses.
By the ancient law
of France,
as well as by
that of most other parts
of Europe,
the labour
of the country people
was under the direction
of a local
or provincial magistracy,
which had no
immediate dependency
upon the king's council.
But,
by the present practice,
both the labour
of the country people,
and whatever other
fund the king
may choose
to assign
for the reparation
of the high-roads in
any particular province
or generality,
are entirely
under the management
of the intendant;
an officer
who
is appointed
and removed
by the king's council
who receives his orders
from it,
and is
in constant correspondence
with it.
In the progress of despotism,
the authority
of the executive power gradually
absorbs
that of every other power
in the state,
and assumes to itself
the management of every branch
of revenue
which is destined
for any public purpose.
In France,
however,
the great post-roads,
the roads
which make the communication
between the principal towns
of the kingdom,
are in general
kept in good order;
and, in some provinces,
are even a good deal superior
to the greater part
of the turnpike roads
of England.
But what we call
the cross roads,
that is, the far greater part
of the roads
in the country,
are entirely neglected,
and are in many
places absolutely impassable
for any heavy carriage.
In some places
it is even dangerous
to travel on horseback,
and mules
are the only conveyance which
can safely be trusted.
The proud minister
of an ostentatious court,
may frequently take pleasure
in executing
a work
of splendour and magnificence,
such as a great highway,
which is frequently seen
by the principal nobility,
whose applauses not
only flatter his vanity,
but even contribute
to support his interest
at court.
But to execute a great number
of little works,
in which nothing
that can be done
can make any great appearance,
or excite the smallest degree
of admiration
in any traveller,
and which,
in short,
have nothing
to recommend them
but their extreme utility,
is a business
which appears,
in every respect,
too mean and paltry
to merit the attention
of so great a magistrate.
Under such an administration
therefore,
such works
are almost always entirely neglected.
In China,
and in several other governments
of Asia,
the executive power
charges itself both
with the reparation
of the high-roads,
and with the maintenance
of the navigable canals.
In the instructions
which are given
to the governor
of each province,
those objects,
it is said,
are constantly recommended
to him,
and the judgment which
the court
forms of his conduct
is very much
regulated by the attention which
he appears
to have paid
to this part
of his instructions.
This branch of public police,
accordingly,
is said
to be very much
attended to
in all those countries,
but particularly in China,
where the high-roads,
and still
more the navigable canals,
it is pretended,
exceed very much every thing
of the same kind which
is known in Europe.
The accounts of those works,
however,
which
have been transmitted
to Europe,
have generally been
drawn up
by weak
and wondering travellers;
frequently by stupid
and lying missionaries.
If they
had been examined
by more intelligent eyes,
and if the accounts of them
had been reported
by more faithful witnesses,
they
would not,
perhaps,
appear to be so wonderful.
The account which
Bernier
gives
of some works of this kind
in Indostan,
falls very short of
what had been reported
of them by other travellers,
more
disposed to the marvellous
than
he was.
It may too,
perhaps,
be in those countries,
as it is in France,
where the great roads,
the great communications,
which are likely
to be the subjects
of conversation
at the court
and in the capital,
are attended to,
and all the rest neglected.
In China,
besides,
in Indostan,
and in several other governments
of Asia,
the revenue of the sovereign
arises almost
altogether from a land tax
or land rent,
which rises or falls
with the rise
and fall
of the annual produce
of the land.
The great interest
of the sovereign,
therefore,
his revenue,
is in such countries necessarily
and immediately connected
with the cultivation
of the land,
with the greatness
of its produce,
and with the value
of its produce.
But in order to
render that produce
both as great and as
valuable as possible,
it is necessary
to procure
to it
as extensive a market
as possible,
and
consequently to establish
the freest,
the easiest,
and the least expensive
communication
between all
the different parts
of the country;
which can be done only
by means
of the best roads
and
the best navigable canals.
But the revenue
of the sovereign does not,
in any part of Europe,
arise chiefly
from a land tax
or land rent.
In all
the great kingdoms of Europe,
perhaps,
the greater part of it
may ultimately depend
upon the produce
of the land:
but that dependency
is neither so immediate nor
so evident.
In Europe,
therefore,
the sovereign
does not feel himself so directly
called upon
to promote the increase,
both in quantity and value
of the produce of the land,
or,
by maintaining good roads
and canals,
to provide
the most extensive market
for that produce.
Though it
should be true,
therefore,
what I
apprehend
is not a little doubtful,
that in some parts of Asia
this
department
of the public police
is very properly managed
by the executive power,
there
is not
the least probability that,
during the present state
of things,
it could be tolerably managed
by that power
in any part of Europe.
Even those public works,
which are of such
a nature that
they cannot afford any revenue
for maintaining themselves,
but of which the conveniency
is nearly confined
to some particular place
or district,
are always better
maintained
by a local or provincial revenue,
under the management
of a local and
provincial administration,
than by the general revenue
of the state,
of which
the executive power
must always have
the management.
Were the streets of London
to be lighted
and paved
at the expense
of the treasury,
is there
any probability that
they
would be so well
lighted and paved
as they are at present,
or even at so small
an expense?
The expense,
besides,
instead of being raised
by a local tax
upon the inhabitants
of each particular street,
parish,
or district in London,
would,
in this case,
be defrayed
out of the general revenue
of the state,
and would consequently be raised
by a tax upon all
the inhabitants
of the kingdom,
of whom the greater part
derive no sort
of benefit from the lighting
and paving
of the streets of London.
The abuses which
sometimes creep
into the local and
provincial administration
of a local and provincial revenue,
how enormous
soever
they may appear,
are in reality,
however,
almost always very trifling
in comparison of those which
commonly take place
in the administration
and expenditure
of the revenue
of a great empire.
They are,
besides,
much more easily corrected.
Under the local or
provincial administration
of the justices
of the peace
in Great Britain,
the six days labour which
the country
people are obliged
to give
to the reparation
of the highways,
is not always,
perhaps,
very judiciously applied,
but it
is scarce
ever exacted
with any circumstance
of cruelty or oppression.
In France,
under the administration
of the intendants,
the application
is not always more judicious,
and the exaction
is frequently
the most cruel and oppressive.
Such corvees,
as they are called,
make one
of the principal instruments
of tyranny
by which those officers
chastise any parish
or communeaute,
which has had
the misfortune
to fall
under their displeasure.
Of the public Works
and Institution
which are necessary
for facilitating
particular Branches of Commerce.
The object
of the public works
and institutions
above mentioned,
is to facilitate commerce
in general.
But in order to
facilitate some
particular branches of it,
particular
institutions are necessary,
which
again require
a particular and extraordinary
expense.
Some particular branches
of commerce
which are carried on
with barbarous
and uncivilized nations,
require
extraordinary protection.
An ordinary store
or counting-house
could give
little security
to the goods
of the merchants
who trade
to the western coast
of Africa.
To defend them
from the barbarous natives,
it is necessary
that the place
where they are deposited
should be in some measure
fortified.
The disorders
in the government of Indostan
have been supposed
to render a like
precaution necessary,
even among
that mild and gentle people;
and it was under pretence
of securing their persons
and property
from violence,
that both
the English
and French East India
companies were allowed
to erect
the first forts which
they possessed in
that country.
Among other nations,
whose vigorous government
will suffer no strangers
to possess any fortified place
within their territory,
it may be necessary
to maintain some ambassador,
minister,
or consul,
who may both
decide,
according to
their own customs,
the differences
arising among his own countrymen,
and,
in their disputes
with the natives,
may by means
of his public character,
interfere with more authority
and afford them
a more powerful protection
than
they
could expect
from any private man.
The interests of commerce
have frequently made it necessary
to maintain ministers
in foreign countries,
where the purposes either
of war or alliance
would not have required any.
The commerce
of the Turkey company first
occasioned the establishment
of an ordinary ambassador
at Constantinople.
The first English embassies
to Russia
arose altogether
from commercial interests.
The constant interference
with those interests,
necessarily
occasioned
between the subjects
of the different states
of Europe,
has probably introduced
the custom
of keeping,
in all neighbouring countries,
ambassadors
or ministers constantly resident,
even in the time
of peace.
This custom,
unknown to ancient times,
seems not
to be older than the end
of the fifteenth,
or beginning
of the sixteenth century;
that is,
than the time when commerce
first
began
to extend itself
to the greater part
of the nations of Europe,
and when they first
began
to attend to its interests.
It seems not unreasonable,
that
the extraordinary expense which
the protection
of any particular branch
of commerce
may occasion,
should be defrayed
by a moderate tax
upon that particular branch;
by a moderate fine,
for example,
to be paid
by the traders
when they first
enter into it;
or,
what is more equal,
by a particular duty
of so much
per cent.
upon the goods which
they either
import into,
or export out of,
the particular countries
with which
it is carried on.
The protection of trade,
in general,
from pirates and freebooters,
is said
to have given occasion
to the first institution
of the duties
of customs.
But,
if it was thought reasonable
to lay a general tax
upon trade,
in order to
defray the expense
of protecting trade
in general,
it should seem equally
reasonable
to lay a particular tax
upon a particular branch
of trade,
in order to
defray
the extraordinary expense
of protecting that branch.
The protection of trade,
in general,
has always been
considered as essential
to the defence
of the commonwealth,
and, upon that account,
a necessary part
of the duty
of the executive power.
The collection and application
of the general duties
of customs,
therefore,
have always been
left to that power.
But the protection
of any particular branch
of trade
is a part
of the general protection
of trade;
a part,
therefore,
of the duty
of that power;
and if nations
always acted consistently,
the particular duties
levied
for the purposes
of such particular protection,
should always have been left equally
to its disposal.
But in this respect,
as well as in many others,
nations
have not always acted
consistently;
and in the greater part
of the commercial states
of Europe,
particular companies
of merchants
have had the address
to persuade the legislature
to entrust
to them the performance
of this part
of the duty
of the sovereign,
together with all
the powers
which
are necessarily connected
with it.
These companies,
though they may,
perhaps,
have been useful
for the first introduction
of some branches
of commerce,
by making,
at their own expense,
an experiment which
the state
might not think it prudent
to make,
have in the long-run proved,
universally,
either burdensome or useless,
and have either
mismanaged or confined
the trade.
When those companies
do not trade
upon a joint stock,
but are obliged
to admit any person,
properly qualified,
upon paying a certain fine,
and agreeing
to submit
to the regulations
of the company,
each member
trading upon his own stock,
and at his own risk,
they
are called regulated companies.
When they
trade upon a joint stock,
each member
sharing
in the common profit or loss,
in proportion
to his share
in this stock,
they are called
joint-stock companies.
Such companies,
whether regulated
or joint-stock,
sometimes have,
and sometimes have not,
exclusive privileges.
Regulated
companies resemble,
in every respect,
the corporation of trades,
so common
in the cities and towns
of all
the different countries
of Europe;
and are a sort
of enlarged monopolies
of the same kind.
As no inhabitant
of a town
can exercise
an incorporated trade,
without first
obtaining
his freedom
in the incorporation,
so,
in most cases,
no subject of the state
can lawfully carry
on any branch
of foreign trade,
for which a regulated company
is established,
without first becoming
a member
of
that company.
The monopoly
is more or less strict,
according
as the terms of admission
are more or less difficult,
and according as the directors
of the company
have more or less authority,
or have it more
or less in their power
to manage
in such
a manner
as
to confine the greater part
of the trade
to themselves
and their particular friends.
In the most ancient
regulated companies,
the privileges
of apprenticeship
were the same as
in other corporations,
and entitled
the person
who had served his time
to a member
of the company,
to become himself a member,
either
without paying any fine,
or upon paying
a much smaller one
than what
was exacted of other people.
The usual corporation spirit,
wherever
the law
does not restrain it,
prevails
in all regulated companies.
When they
have been allowed
to act
according to
their natural genius,
they have always,
in order to
confine the competition to
as small a number
of persons as possible,
endeavoured
to subject the trade
to many burdensome regulations.
When the law
has restrained them
from doing this,
they have become altogether
useless and insignificant.
The regulated companies
for foreign commerce which
at present
subsist in Great Britain,
are
the ancient merchant-adventurers company,
now commonly called
the Hamburgh company,
the Russia company,
the Eastland company,
the Turkey company,
and the African company.
The terms
of admission
into the Hamburgh company
are now said
to be quite easy;
and the directors either
have it not in their power
to subject the trade
to any troublesome restraint
or regulations,
or, at least,
have not of late
exercised that power.
It has not always been so.
About the middle
of the last century,
the fine for admission
was fifty,
and at one time
one hundred pounds,
and the conduct
of the company
was said
to be extremely oppressive.
In 1643,
in 1645,
and in 1661,
the clothiers
and free traders
of the west
of England
complained of them
to parliament,
as of monopolists,
who confined the trade,
and oppressed
the manufactures
of the country.
Though
those complaints
produced no act of parliament,
they had probably intimidated
the company so far,
as to oblige them
to reform their conduct.
Since that time,
at least,
there
have been no complaints
against them.
By the 10th and 11th
of William III c.6,
the fine
for admission
into the Russia company
was reduced to five pounds;
and by the 25th
of Charles II c.7,
that for admission
into the Eastland company
to forty shillings;
while,
at the same time,
Sweden,
Denmark,
and Norway,
all the countries
on the north side
of the Baltic,
were exempted
from their exclusive charter.
The conduct of those companies
had probably given occasion
to those two acts
of parliament.
Before that time,
Sir Josiah Child
had represented
both these and the Hamburgh
company as extremely oppressive,
and imputed
to their bad management
the low state of the trade,
which
we at that time carried on
to the countries
comprehended
within their respective charters.
But though such companies
may not,
in the present times,
be very oppressive,
they
are certainly altogether
useless.
To be merely useless,
indeed,
is perhaps,
the highest eulogy
which
can ever justly be bestowed
upon a regulated company;
and all the three companies
above mentioned seem,
in their present state,
to deserve this eulogy.
The fine
for admission
into the Turkey company
was formerly twenty-five pounds
for all persons
under twenty-six years
of age,
and fifty pounds
for all persons above
that age.
Nobody
but mere merchants
could be admitted;
a restriction
which excluded all
shop-keepers
and retailers.
By a bye-law,
no British manufactures
could be exported
to Turkey
but in the general ships
of the company;
and as those ships
sailed always
from the port of London,
this restriction
confined the trade to
that expensive port,
and the traders to those
who lived
in London
and in its neighbourhood.
By another bye-law,
no
person living
within twenty miles of London,
and not free of the city,
could be admitted a member;
another restriction which,
joined to the foregoing,
necessarily
excluded all but the freemen
of London.
As the time for the loading
and sailing
of those general ships
depended altogether
upon the directors,
they
could easily fill them
with their own goods,
and those
of their particular friends,
to the exclusion of others,
who,
they
might pretend,
had made their proposals
too late.
In this state of things,
therefore,
this company was,
in every respect,
a strict and oppressive
monopoly.
Those
abuses gave occasion
to the act of the 26th
of George II c.18,
reducing
the fine
for admission to twenty pounds
for all persons,
without any distinction
of ages,
or any restriction,
either to mere merchants,
or to the freemen
of London;
and granting
to all such persons
the liberty
of exporting,
from all
the ports of Great Britain,
to any port in Turkey,
all British goods,
of which the exportation
was not prohibited,
upon paying
both the general duties
of customs,
and the particular duties
assessed
for defraying
the necessary expenses
of the company;
and submitting,
at the same time,
to the lawful authority
of the British ambassador
and consuls resident
in Turkey,
and to the bye-laws
of the company duly enacted.
To prevent any oppression
by those bye-laws,
it was
by the same act ordained,
that if any seven members
of the company
conceived themselves
aggrieved by any bye-law
which
should be enacted
after the passing
of this act,
they might appeal
to the board
of trade and plantations
(to the authority
of which a committee
of the privy council
has now succeeded),
provided such appeal
was brought
within twelve months
after the bye-law
was enacted;
and that,
if any seven members
conceived themselves
aggrieved by any bye-law
which had been enacted
before the passing
of this act,
they might bring
a like appeal,
provided
it was
within twelve months
after the day
on which this act
was to take place.
The experience of one year,
however,
may not always be sufficient
to discover to all
the members
of a great company
the pernicious tendency
of a particular bye-law;
and if several of them
should afterwards discover it,
neither the board of trade,
nor the committee of council,
can afford them any redress.
The object,
besides,
of the greater part
of the bye-laws
of all regulated companies,
as well as of all
other corporations,
is not so much
to oppress
those who are already members,
as to discourage others
from becoming so;
which may be done,
not only by a high fine,
but by many other contrivances.
The constant view of such
companies is always
to raise
the rate
of their own profit as high
as they can;
to keep the market,
both for the goods which
they export,
and for those which
they import,
as much
understocked as they can;
which can be done only
by restraining
the competition,
or by discouraging new adventurers
from entering
into the trade.
A fine,
even of twenty pounds,
besides,
though it may not,
perhaps,
be sufficient
to discourage any man from
entering
into the Turkey trade,
with an intention
to continue in it,
may be
enough
to discourage
a speculative merchant
from hazarding
a single adventure in it.
In all trades,
the regular established traders,
even though not incorporated,
naturally
combine to raise profits,
which are noway so likely
to be kept,
at all times,
down to their proper level,
as
by the occasional competition
of speculative adventurers.
The Turkey trade,
though in some measure
laid open
by this act of parliament,
is still considered
by many people as very far
from being altogether free.
The Turkey company
contribute
to maintain an ambassador
and two or three consuls,
who,
like other public ministers,
ought to be maintained altogether
by the state,
and the trade
laid open
to all
his majesty's subjects.
The different taxes
levied by the company,
for this
and other corporation purposes,
might afford
a revenue much more
than sufficient
to enable
a state
to maintain such ministers.
Regulated companies,
it was observed
by Sir Josiah Child,
though they
had frequently supported
public ministers,
had never maintained
any forts or garrisons
in the countries
to which they
traded;
whereas joint-stock companies
frequently had.
And, in reality,
the former
seem to be much more unfit
for this sort
of service than the latter.
First,
the directors
of a regulated company
have no particular interest
in the prosperity
of the general trade
of the company,
for the sake
of which
such forts
and garrisons are maintained.
The decay
of that general trade
may even frequently contribute
to the advantage
of their own private trade;
as,
by diminishing
the number
of their competitors,
it may enable them
both to buy cheaper,
and to sell dearer.
The directors
of a joint-stock company,
on the contrary,
having only
their share in the profits
which are made
upon the common stock
committed to their management,
have no
private trade of their own,
of which the interest
can be separated from
that of the general trade
of the company.
Their private interest
is connected
with the prosperity
of the general trade
of the company,
and with the maintenance
of the forts and garrisons
which are necessary
for its defence.
They
are more likely,
therefore,
to have
that
continual
and careful attention which
that maintenance
necessarily requires.
Secondly,
The directors
of a joint-stock company
have always the management
of a large capital,
the joint stock
of the company,
a part
of which they
may frequently employ,
with propriety,
in building,
repairing,
and maintaining
such necessary forts
and garrisons.
But the directors
of a regulated company,
having the management
of no common capital,
have no other fund to employ
in this way,
but the casual revenue arising
from the admission fines,
and from the
corporation duties
imposed
upon the trade
of the company.
Though they
had the same interest,
therefore,
to attend
to the maintenance
of such forts and garrisons,
they
can seldom have
the same ability
to render
that attention effectual.
The maintenance
of a public minister,
requiring scarce any attention,
and but a moderate
and limited expense,
is a business
much more suitable both
to the temper and abilities
of a regulated company.
Long after the time
of Sir Josiah Child,
however,
in 1750,
a regulated company
was established,
the present company
of merchants
trading to Africa;
which was expressly charged
at first
with the maintenance of all
the British forts
and garrisons that lie
between Cape Blanc
and the Cape of Good Hope,
and afterwards with
that of those only which lie
between Cape Rouge
and the Cape of Good Hope.
The act
which establishes this company
(the 23rd
of George II c.51 ),
seems
to have had
two distinct objects
in view;
first,
to restrain effectually
the oppressive
and monopolizing spirit
which is natural
to the directors
of a regulated company;
and, secondly,
to force them,
as much as possible,
to give an attention,
which is not natural
to them,
towards the maintenance
of forts and garrisons.
For the first
of these purposes,
the fine for admission
is limited
to forty shillings.
The company
is prohibited from
trading
in their corporate capacity,
or upon a joint stock;
from borrowing money
upon common seal,
or from laying
any restraints upon the trade,
which may be carried on
freely from all places,
and by all persons
being British subjects,
and paying the fine.
The government
is in a committee
of nine persons,
who meet at London,
but who
are chosen annually
by the freemen
of the company at London,
Bristol,
and Liverpool;
three from each place.
No
committeeman can be continued
in office
for more than three years
together.
Any committee-man
might be removed by the board
of trade and plantations,
now by a committee
of council,
after being heard
in his own defence.
The committee
are forbid
to export negroes from Africa,
or to import
any African goods
into Great Britain.
But as they
are charged
with the maintenance
of forts and garrisons,
they may,
for that purpose export
from Great Britain
to Africa goods and stores
of different kinds.
Out of the moneys which
they shall receive
from the company,
they are allowed a sum,
not
exceeding eight
hundred pounds,
for the salaries
of their clerks and agents
at London,
Bristol,
and Liverpool,
the house-rent
of their offices at London,
and all other expenses
of management,
commission,
and agency,
in England.
What remains of this sum,
after defraying these
different expenses,
they may divide
among themselves,
as compensation
for their trouble,
in what manner
they think proper.
By this constitution,
it might have been expected,
that the spirit of monopoly
would have
been effectually restrained,
and the first
of these purposes
sufficiently answered.
It would seem,
however,
that it
had not.
Though by the 4th
of George III c.20,
the fort of Senegal,
with all its dependencies,
had been invested
in the company of merchants
trading to Africa,
yet,
in the year following
(by the 5th
of George III c.44),
not only Senegal
and its dependencies,
but the whole coast,
from the port of Sallee,
in South Barbary,
to Cape Rouge,
was exempted
from the jurisdiction of
that company,
was vested in the crown,
and the trade to it
declared free
to all
his majesty's subjects.
The company
had been suspected
of restraining the trade and
of establishing some sort
of improper monopoly.
It is not,
however,
very easy
to conceive how,
under the regulations
of the 23d George II,
they
could do so.
In the printed debates
of the house of commons,
not always
the most authentic records
of truth,
I observe,
however,
that they
have been accused of this.
The members
of the committee of nine
being all merchants,
and the governors
and factors in
their different forts
and settlements
being all dependent upon them,
it is not unlikely
that the latter
might have given
peculiar attention
to the consignments
and commissions of the former,
which would establish
a real monopoly.
For the second
of these purposes,
the maintenance
of the forts and garrisons,
an annual sum
has been allotted to them
by parliament,
generally about £13,000.
For the proper application
of this sum,
the committee
is obliged
to account
annually to the cursitor baron
of exchequer;
which account
is afterwards
to be laid before parliament.
But parliament,
which gives
so little attention
to the application
of millions,
is not likely
to give much to
that of £13,000 a-year;
and the cursitor baron
of exchequer,
from his profession
and education,
is not likely
to be profoundly skilled
in the proper expense
of forts and garrisons.
The captains
of his majesty's navy,
indeed,
or any other
commissioned officers,
appointed
by the board of admiralty,
may inquire
into the condition
of the forts and garrisons,
and report their observations
to that board.
But that board
seems to have
no direct jurisdiction
over the committee,
nor any authority
to correct
those whose conduct
it may thus
inquire into;
and the captains
of his majesty's navy,
besides,
are not supposed
to be always deeply learned
in the science
of fortification.
Removal from an office,
which can be enjoyed only
for the term
of three years,
and of which
the lawful emoluments,
even during that term,
are so very small,
seems
to be
the utmost punishment
to which any committee-man
is liable,
for any fault,
except direct malversation,
or embezzlement,
either of the public money,
or of
that of the company;
and the fear
of the punishment
can never be a motive
of sufficient weight
to force
a continual and careful attention
to a business
to which he
has no other
interest
to attend.
The committee
are accused
of having sent out bricks
and stones
from England
for the reparation
of Cape Coast Castle,
on the coast of Guinea;
a business
for which parliament
had several times
granted
an extraordinary sum
of money.
These bricks
and stones, too,
which had thus
been sent
upon so long a voyage,
were said
to have been
of so bad a quality,
that it was necessary
to rebuild,
from the foundation,
the walls
which had been repaired
with them.
The forts and garrisons
which
lie north of Cape Rouge,
are not only maintained
at the expense
of the state,
but are
under the immediate government
of the executive power;
and why those
which
lie south of that cape,
and which, too,
are,
in part at least,
maintained
at the expense
of the state,
should be
under a different government,
it seems not very easy even
to imagine a good reason.
The protection
of the Mediterranean trade
was the original purpose
or pretence
of the garrisons
of Gibraltar and Minorca;
and the maintenance
and government
of those garrisons
have always been,
very properly,
committed,
not to the Turkey company,
but to the executive power.
In the extent of its dominion
consists,
in a great measure,
the pride and dignity
of that power;
and it
is not very likely
to fail in attention to
what is necessary
for the defence of
that dominion.
The garrisons
at Gibraltar and Minorca,
accordingly,
have never been neglected.
Though Minorca
has been twice taken,
and is now probably lost
for ever,
that disaster
has never been
imputed
to any neglect
in the executive power.
I would not,
however,
be understood
to insinuate,
that
either
of those expensive garrisons
was ever,
even in the smallest degree,
necessary for the purpose
for which they
were originally dismembered
from the Spanish monarchy.
That dismemberment,
perhaps,
never
served any other real purpose
than
to alienate
from England her natural
ally the king of Spain,
and to unite
the two principal branches
of the house
of Bourbon
in a
much stricter and more permanent
alliance
than the ties of blood
could ever have united them.
Joint-stock companies,
established either
by royal charter,
or by act of parliament,
are different
in several respects,
not only from regulated companies,
but from private copartneries.
First,
In a private copartnery,
no
partner without the consent
of the company,
can transfer his share
to another person,
or introduce a new member
into the company.
Each member,
however,
may,
upon proper warning,
withdraw from the copartnery,
and demand payment
from them of his share
of the common stock.
In a joint-stock company,
on the contrary,
no member can demand payment
of his share
from the company;
but each member can,
without their consent,
transfer his share
to another person,
and thereby introduce
a new member.
The value
of a share
in a joint stock
is always the price which
it will bring in the market;
and this
may be
either greater
or less in any proportion,
than the sum which
its owner stands
credited for
in the stock
of the company.
Secondly,
In a private copartnery,
each partner
is bound
for the debts contracted
by the company,
to the whole extent
of his fortune.
In a joint-stock company,
on the contrary,
each partner
is bound only to the extent
of his share.
The trade
of a joint-stock company
is always managed
by a court of directors.
This court,
indeed,
is frequently subject,
in many respects,
to the control
of a general court
of proprietors.
But the greater part
of these proprietors seldom
pretend
to understand any thing
of the business
of the company;
and when
the spirit of faction
happens not
to prevail among them,
give themselves
no trouble about it,
but receive contentedly
such halfyearly
or yearly dividend
as the directors
think proper
to make to them.
This
total exemption front trouble
and front risk,
beyond a limited sum,
encourages many people
to become
adventurers in joint-stock companies,
who would,
upon no account,
hazard their fortunes
in any private copartnery.
Such companies,
therefore,
commonly draw
to themselves
much greater stocks,
than any private copartnery
can boast of.
The trading stock
of the South Sea company
at one time amounted to
upwards of
thirty-three millions eight hundred thousand pounds.
The divided capital
of the Bank of England amounts,
at present,
to ten millions seven hundred
and eighty thousand pounds.
The directors of such companies,
however,
being the managers rather
of other people's money than
of their own,
it cannot well be expected
that
they should watch over
it
with the same anxious vigilance
with which the partners
in a private copartnery
frequently watch over
their own.
Like the stewards
of a rich man,
they
are apt
to consider attention
to small matters
as
not for their master's honour,
and very easily give themselves
a dispensation
from having it.
Negligence and profusion,
therefore,
must always prevail,
more or less,
in the management
of the affairs
of such a company.
It is upon this account,
that joint-stock companies
for foreign trade
have seldom been
able
to maintain the competition
against private adventurers.
They have,
accordingly,
very seldom succeeded
without an exclusive privilege;
and frequently have not succeeded
with one.
Without an exclusive privilege,
they have commonly mismanaged
the trade.
With an exclusive privilege,
they have
both mismanaged
and confined it.
The Royal African company,
the predecessors
of the present African company,
had an exclusive privilege
by charter;
but as that charter
had not been confirmed
by act of parliament,
the trade,
in consequence
of the declaration of rights,
was, soon
after the Revolution,
laid open
to all
his majesty's subjects.
The Hudson's Bay company are,
as to their legal rights,
in the same situation
as the Royal African company.
Their exclusive charter
has not been confirmed by act
of parliament.
The South Sea company,
as long as they continued
to be a trading company,
had an exclusive privilege
confirmed by act
of parliament;
as have likewise
the present united company
of merchants trading
to the East Indies.
The Royal African company
soon found that
they could not maintain
the competition
against private adventurers,
whom,
notwithstanding
the declaration of rights,
they continued
for some time
to call interlopers,
and to persecute as such.
In 1698,
however,
the private adventurers
were subjected
to a duty
of ten per cent.
upon almost all
the different branches
of their trade,
to be employed
by the company
in the maintenance
of their forts and garrisons.
But,
notwithstanding this
heavy tax,
the company
were still unable
to maintain the competition.
Their stock
and credit gradually declined.
In 1712,
their debts
had become so great,
that
a particular act of parliament
was thought necessary,
both for their security and
for
that of their creditors.
It was enacted,
that the resolution
of two-thirds
of these creditors
in number and
value should bind the rust,
both with regard to
the time
which should be allowed
to the company
for the payment
of their debts,
and with regard to
any other agreement which it
might be thought proper
to make
with them
concerning those debts.
In 1730,
their affairs
were in so great disorder,
that they
were altogether incapable
of maintaining their forts
and garrisons,
the sole purpose and pretext
of their institution.
From that year
till their final dissolution,
the parliament
judged it necessary
to allow the annual sum
of £10,000
for that purpose.
In 1732,
after having been
for many years losers
by the trade
of carrying negroes
to the West Indies,
they at last resolved
to give it up altogether;
to sell
to the private traders
to America
the negroes which
they purchased upon the coast;
awl to employ their servants
in a trade
to the inland parts
of Africa for gold dust,
elephants teeth,
dyeing drugs,.etc.
But their success in this
more confined trade
was not greater than
in their former extensive one.
Their affairs
continued
to go gradually to decline,
till at last,
being in every
respect a bankrupt company,
they were dissolved
by act of parliament,
and their forts and garrisons
vested
in the present regulated company
of merchants
trading to Africa.
Before the erection
of the Royal African company,
there
had been
three other joint-stock companies
successively established,
one after another,
for the African trade.
They
were all equally unsuccessful.
They all,
however,
had exclusive charters,
which,
though not confirmed
by act of parliament,
were in those days supposed
to convey
a real exclusive privilege.
The Hudson's Bay company,
before their misfortunes
in the late war,
had been much more fortunate
than the Royal African company.
Their necessary expense
is much smaller.
The whole number of people
whom
they maintain
in their different settlements
and habitations,
which they
have honoured
with the name of forts,
is said not
to exceed a hundred
and twenty persons.
This number,
however,
is sufficient
to prepare beforehand
the cargo
of furs and other goods
necessary
for loading their ships,
which,
on account of the ice,
can seldom remain above six
or eight weeks
in those seas.
This advantage
of having a cargo
ready prepared,
could not,
for several years,
be acquired
by private adventurers;
and without it
there seems
to be no possibility of
trading to Hudson's Bay.
The moderate capital
of the company,
which,
it is said,
does not exceed one hundred
and ten thousand pounds,
may,
besides,
be sufficient to enable them
to engross the whole,
or almost
the whole trade
and surplus produce,
of the miserable
though extensive country
comprehended
within their charter.
No private adventurers,
accordingly,
have ever attempted
to trade to
that country in competition
with them.
This company,
therefore,
have always enjoyed
an exclusive trade,
in fact,
though they
may have no right to it
in law.
Over and above all this,
the moderate capital
of this company
is said
to be divided
among a very small number
of proprietors.
But a joint-stock company,
consisting
of a small number
of proprietors,
with a moderate capital,
approaches very nearly
to the nature
of a private copartnery,
and may be capable of nearly
the same degree
of vigilance and attention.
It
is not to be wondered at,
therefore,
if,
in consequence
of these different advantages,
the Hudson's Bay company had,
before the late war,
been able
to carry
on their trade
with a considerable degree
of success.
It does not seem probable,
however,
that their profits
ever approached to what
the late Mr Dobbs
imagined them.
A much more sober
and judicious writer,
Mr Anderson,
author
of the Historical
and Chronological Deduction
of Commerce,
very justly
observes,
that upon examining
the accounts which
Mr Dobbs himself
has given
for several years together,
of their exports
and imports,
and upon making
proper allowances
for their extraordinary risk
and expense,
it does not appear
that their profits
deserve to be envied,
or that
they can much,
if at all,
exceed the ordinary profits
of trade.
The South Sea company
never had
any forts
or garrisons
to maintain,
and therefore
were entirely exempted
from one great expense,
to which
other joint-stock companies
for foreign trade
are subject;
but they
had an immense capital divided
among an immense number
of proprietors.
It
was naturally
to be expected,
therefore,
that folly,
negligence,
and profusion,
should prevail
in the whole management
of their affairs.
The knavery and extravagance
of their stock-jobbing projects
are sufficiently known,
and the explication of them
would be foreign
to the present subject.
Their mercantile projects
were not much better conducted.
The first trade which
they engaged in,
was that
of supplying
the Spanish West Indies
with negroes,
of which
(in consequence of
what was called
the Assiento Contract
granted them
by the treaty of Utrecht)
they had
the exclusive privilege.
But as it was not expected
that much profit
could be made by this trade,
both the Portuguese
and French companies,
who had enjoyed it
upon the same terms
before them,
having been ruined by it,
they
were allowed,
as compensation,
to send annually a ship
of a certain burden,
to trade directly
to the Spanish West Indies.
Of the ten voyages which
this annual ship
was allowed
to make,
they
are said
to have gained considerably
by one,
that of the Royal Caroline,
in 1731;
and to have been losers,
more or less,
by almost all the rest.
Their ill success
was imputed,
by their factors and agents,
to the extortion and oppression
of the Spanish government;
but was,
perhaps,
principally
owing
to the profusion and depredations
of those very factors
and agents;
some of whom
are said
to have acquired
great fortunes,
even in one year.
In 1734,
the company
petitioned the king,
that
they might be allowed
to dispose
of the trade and tonnage
of their annual ship,
on account
of the little profit which
they made by it,
and to accept of such
equivalent
as they
could obtain
from the king of Spain.
In 1724,
this company
had undertaken
the whale fishery.
Of this,
indeed,
they had no monopoly;
but as long as they
carried it on,
no other British subjects
appear
to have engaged in it.
Of the eight voyages which
their ships
made to Greenland,
they
were gainers by one,
and losers
by all the rest.
After their eighth
and last voyage,
when they
had sold their ships,
stores,
and utensils,
they found that
their whole loss
upon this branch,
capital
and interest included,
amounted to
upwards of £237,000.
In 1722,
this company
petitioned the parliament
to be allowed
to divide
their immense capital
of more than
thirty-three millions eight hundred thousand pounds,
the whole of which
had been lent to government,
into two equal parts;
the one half,
or upwards of £16,900,000,
to be put
upon the same footing
with other government annuities,
and not to be
subject to
the debts contracted,
or losses
incurred,
by the directors
of the company,
in the prosecution
of their mercantile projects;
the other half
to remain as before,
a trading stock,
and to be
subject to those debts
and losses.
The petition
was too reasonable
not to be granted.
In 1733,
they again petitioned
the parliament,
that three-fourths
of their trading stock
might be turned into
annuity stock,
and only one-fourth
remain as trading stock,
or exposed to the hazards
arising
from the bad management
of their directors.
Both their annuity
and trading stocks had,
by this time,
been reduced
more than two millions each,
by several
different payments
from government;
so that this fourth amounted
only to £3,662,784:8:6.
In 1748,
all the demands
of the company
upon the king of Spain,
in consequence
of the assiento contract,
were, by the treaty
of Aix-la-Chapelle,
given up for what
was supposed an equivalent.
An end
was put to their trade
with the Spanish West Indies;
the remainder
of their trading stock
was turned into
an annuity stock;
and the company
ceased,
in every respect,
to be a trading company.
It ought to be observed,
that in the trade which
the South Sea company
carried on by means
of their annual ship,
the only trade
by which it ever was expected
that they
could make
any considerable profit,
they were not
without competitors,
either
in the foreign
or in the home market.
At Carthagena,
Porto Bello,
and La Vera Cruz,
they had
to encounter the competition
of the Spanish merchants,
who brought
from Cadiz
to those markets European goods,
of the same kind
with the outward cargo
of their ship;
and in England
they had to encounter
that of the English merchants,
who imported
from Cadiz goods
of the Spanish West Indies,
of the same kind
with the inward cargo.
The goods,
both of the Spanish
and English merchants,
indeed,
were, perhaps,
subject to higher duties.
But the loss occasioned
by the negligence,
profusion,
and malversation
of the servants
of the company,
had probably been a tax
much heavier
than all those duties.
That
a joint-stock company
should be able
to carry
on successfully any branch
of foreign trade,
when private adventurers
can come
into any sort of open
and fair competition
with them,
seems contrary
to all experience.
The old English East India company
was established in 1600,
by a charter
from Queen Elizabeth.
In the first twelve voyages which
they fitted out for India,
they appear
to have traded
as a regulated company,
with separate stocks,
though
only in the general ships
of the company.
In 1612,
they united
into a joint stock.
Their charter
was exclusive,
and,
though not confirmed
by act of parliament,
was in those days supposed
to convey
a real exclusive privilege.
For many years,
therefore,
they
were not much
disturbed by interlopers.
Their capital,
which never exceeded £744,000,
and of which £50 was
a share,
was not so exorbitant,
nor
their dealings so extensive,
as to afford either a pretext
for gross negligence
and profusion,
or a cover
to gross malversation.
Notwithstanding
some extraordinary losses,
occassioned
partly by the malice
of the
Dutch East India
company,
and partly by other accidents,
they carried on
for many years
a successful trade.
But in process of time,
when the principles of liberty
were better understood,
it became every day more
and more doubtful,
how far a royal charter,
not confirmed
by act of parliament,
could convey
an exclusive privilege.
Upon this question
the decisions
of the courts of justice
were not uniform,
but varied
with the authority
of government,
and the humours
of the times.
Interlopers
multiplied upon them;
and towards the end
of the reign
of Charles II,
through the whole of
that of James II,
and during a part of
that of William III,
reduced them
to great distress.
In 1698,
a proposal
was made to parliament,
of advancing two millions
to government,
at eight per cent.
provided the subscribers
were erected
into a new East India company,
with exclusive privileges.
The old East India company
offered
seven hundred thousand pounds,
nearly the amount
of their capital,
at four per cent.
upon the same conditions.
But such
was at that time
the state of public credit,
that it
was more convenient
for government
to borrow two millions
at eight per cent.
than seven hundred thousand pounds
at four.
The proposal
of the new subscribers
was accepted,
and a new East India company
established in consequence.
The old East India company,
however,
had a right
to continue
their trade till 1701.
They had,
at the same time,
in the name
of their treasurer,
subscribed very artfully three hundred
and fifteen thousand pounds
into the stock
of the new.
By a negligence
in the expression
of the act of parliament,
which vested
the East India trade
in the subscribers
to this loan
of two millions,
it did not appear evident
that they were all obliged
to unite into a joint stock.
A few private traders,
whose subscriptions amounted
only to seven thousand two
hundred pounds,
insisted upon the privilege
of trading separately
upon their own
stocks,
and at their own risks.
The old East India company
had a right
to a separate trade
upon their own stock till 1701;
and they had likewise,
both before and after
that period,
a right,
like that
or other private traders,
to a separate trade
upon the £315,000,
which they
had subscribed
into the stock
of the new company.
The competition
of the two companies
with the private traders,
and with one another,
is said
to have
well nigh ruined both.
Upon a subsequent occasion,
in 1750,
when a proposal
was made to parliament
for putting the trade
under the management
of a regulated company,
and thereby laying it
in some measure open,
the East India company,
in opposition
to this proposal,
represented,
in very strong terms,
what had been,
at this time,
the miserable effects,
as they thought them,
of this competition.
In India,
they said,
it raised the price
of goods so high,
that they
were not worth the buying;
and in England,
by overstocking the market,
it sunk their price so low,
that no profit
could be made by them.
That
by a more plentiful supply,
to the great advantage
and conveniency
of the public,
it must have reduced
very much
the price
of India goods
in the English market,
cannot well be doubted;
but that
it should have raised
very much
their price
in the Indian market,
seems not very probable,
as all
the extraordinary demand which
that competition
could occasion
must have been
but as a drop of water
in the immense ocean
of Indian commerce.
The increase of demand,
besides,
though in the beginning
it may sometimes raise
the price
of goods,
never
fails
to lower it in the long-run.
It encourages production,
and thereby increases
the competition
of the producers,
who,
in order to
undersell one another,
have recourse to new divisions
or labour and
new improvements of art,
which
might never otherwise have been thought of.
The miserable effects
of which the company
complained,
were the cheapness
of consumption,
and the encouragement
given to production;
precisely
the two effects
which it
is the great business
of political
economy
to promote.
The competition,
however,
of which
they gave
this doleful account,
had not been allowed
to be of long continuance.
In 1702,
the two companies were,
in some measure,
united
by an indenture tripartite,
to which
the queen
was the third party;
and in 1708,
they were
by act of parliament,
perfectly
consolidated into one company,
by their present name
of the United Company of Merchants
trading to the East Indies.
Into this act
it was thought worth
while to insert a clause,
allowing
the separate traders
to continue
their trade
till Michaelmas 1711;
but at the same time
empowering the directors,
upon three years notice,
to redeem their little capital
of seven thousand two
hundred pounds,
and thereby to
convert the whole stock
of the company
into a joint stock.
By the same act,
the capital of the company,
in consequence
of a new loan
to government,
was augmented
from two millions
to three millions two hundred thousand pounds.
In 1743,
the company
advanced another million
to government.
But this million
being raised,
not by a call
upon the proprietors,
but by selling annuities
and contracting bond-debts,
it did not augment the stock
upon which
the proprietors
could claim a dividend.
It augmented,
however,
their trading stock,
it being equally liable
with the
other
three millions two hundred thousand pounds,
to the losses sustained,
and debts
contracted
by the company
in prosecution
of their mercantile projects.
From 1708,
or at least from 1711,
this company,
being delivered
from all competitors,
and fully established
in the monopoly
of the English commerce
to the East Indies,
carried on a successful trade,
and from their profits,
made annually
a moderate dividend
to their proprietors.
During the French war,
which began in 1741,
the ambition of Mr. Dupleix,
the French governor
of Pondicherry,
involved them
in the wars
of the Carnatic,
and in the politics
of the Indian princes.
After many signal successes,
and equally signal losses,
they at last lost Madras,
at that time
their principal settlement
in India.
It was restored
to them
by the treaty
of Aix-la-Chapelle;
and,
about this time
the spirit
of war and conquest
seems
to have taken possession
of their servants in India,
and never
since to have left them.
During the French war,
which began in 1755,
their arms
partook
of the general good fortune
of those
of Great Britain.
They defended Madras,
took Pondicherry,
recovered Calcutta,
and acquired
the revenues of a
rich and extensive territory,
amounting,
it was then said,
to
upwards of three millions a-year.
They remained
for several years
in quiet possession
of this revenue;
but in 1767,
administration laid claim to
their territorial acquisitions,
and the revenue
arising from them,
as of right belonging
to the crown;
and the company,
in compensation
for this claim,
agreed to pay
to government
£400,000 a-year.
They had,
before this,
gradually
augmented their dividend from
about six
to ten per cent.; that is,
upon their capital
of three millions two hundred thousand pounds,
they had increased it
by £128,000,
or had raised it
from one hundred
and ninety-two thousand
to three hundred
and
twenty thousand pounds a-year.
They were attempting
about this time
to raise it still further,
to twelve
and a-half per cent.,
which would have made
their annual payments
to their proprietors equal to
what they
had agreed to pay annually
to government,
or to £400,000 a-year.
But during the two years
in which their agreement
with government
was to take place,
they were restrained
from any further increase
of dividend
by two successive acts
of parliament,
of which the object
was to enable them
to make a speedier
progress in
the payment of their debts,
which were
at this time estimated at
upwards of six
or seven millions sterling.
In 1769,
they renewed their agreement
with government
for five years more,
and stipulated,
that during the course of
that period,
they
should be allowed gradually
to increase their dividend
to twelve
and a-half per cent;
never
increasing it,
however,
more than one per cent
in one year.
This increase of dividend,
therefore,
when
it had risen
to its utmost height,
could augment
their annual payments,
to their proprietors
and government
together,
but by £680,000,
beyond what they
had been
before
their late territorial acquisitions.
What the gross
revenue
of those territorial acquisitions
was supposed to amount to,
has already been mentioned;
and by an account
brought
by the Cruttenden East Indiaman
in 1769,
the neat revenue,
clear
of all deductions
and military charges,
was stated
at two millions forty-eight thousand seven hundred
and forty-seven pounds.
They
were said,
at the same time,
to possess another revenue,
arising partly from lands,
but chiefly from the customs
established
at their different settlements,
amounting to £439,000.
The profits
of their trade, too,
according to the evidence
of their chairman
before the house of commons,
amounted,
at this time,
to at least £400,000 a-year;
according to
that of their accountant,
to at least £500,000;
according to
the lowest account,
at least equal to
the highest dividend
that was
to be paid
to their proprietors.
So great
a revenue
might certainly have afforded
an augmentation
of £680,000
in their annual payments;
and,
at the same time,
have left
a large sinking fund,
sufficient
for the speedy reduction
of their debt.
In 1773,
however,
their debts,
instead of being reduced,
were augmented
by an arrear
to the treasury
in the payment
of the four hundred thousand pounds;
by another
to the custom-house
for duties unpaid;
by a large debt
to the bank,
for money borrowed;
and by a fourth,
for bills
drawn upon them from India,
and wantonly accepted,
to the amount of
upwards of
twelve hundred thousand pounds.
The distress which these
accumulated claims brought
upon them,
obliged them not only
to reduce all
at once their dividend
to six per cent.
but to throw themselves
upon the mercy of govermnent,
and to supplicate,
first,
a release
from the further payment
of the stipulated £400,000 a-year;
and, secondly,
a loan
of fourteen hundred thousand,
to save them
from immediate bankruptcy.
The great increase
of their fortune had,
it seems,
only served
to furnish their servants
with a pretext
for greater profusion,
and a cover
for greater malversation,
than in proportion
even to that increase
of fortune.
The conduct
of their servants in India,
and the general state
of their affairs both
in India and in Europe,
became the subject
of a parliamentary inquiry:
in consequence of which,
several very important alterations
were made in the constitution
of their government,
both at home and abroad.
In India,
their principal settlements
or Madras,
Bombay,
and Calcutta,
which
had before been altogether
independent
of one another,
were subjected
to a governor-general,
assisted
by a council
of four assessors,
parliament
assuming
to itself the first nomination
of this governor and council,
who were
to reside at Calcutta;
that city
having now become,
what Madras was before,
the most important
of the English settlements
in India.
The court
of the Mayor of Calcutta,
originally
instituted
for the trial
of mercantile causes,
which arose
in the city and neighbourhood,
had gradually extended
its jurisdiction
with the extension
of the empire.
It was now reduced
and confined
to the original purpose
of its institution.
Instead of it,
a new supreme court
of judicature was established,
consisting
of a chief justice
and three judges,
to be appointed
by the crown.
In Europe,
the qualification necessary
to entitle
a proprietor to vote
at their general courts
was raised,
from five hundred pounds,
the original price
of a share
in the stock
of the company,
to a thousand pounds.
In order to vote
upon this qualification, too,
it was declared necessary,
that he
should have possessed it,
if acquired
by his own purchase,
and not by inheritance,
for at least one year,
instead of six months,
the term requisite before.
The court
of twenty-four directors
had before been chosen annually;
but it was now enacted,
that each director should,
for the future,
be chosen for four years;
six of them,
however,
to go out of office
by rotation every year,
and not be capable
of being re-chosen
at the election
of the six new directors
for the ensuing year.
In consequence
of these alterations,
the courts,
both of the proprietors
and directors,
it was expected,
would be likely
to act
with more dignity and steadiness
than
they had usually done before.
But it seems impossible,
by any alterations,
to render those courts,
in any respect,
fit to govern,
or even
to share
in the government
of a great empire;
because the greater part
of their members
must always have too
little interest
in the prosperity of
that empire,
to give
any serious attention to what
may promote it.
Frequently a man of great,
sometimes
even a man of small fortune,
is willing
to purchase
a thousand pounds share
in India stock,
merely for the influence which
he expects
to aquire
by a vote
in the court of proprietors.
It gives him a share,
though not in the plunder,
yet in the appointment
of the plunderers of India;
the court of directors,
though they
make that appointment,
being necessarily more
or less under
the influence
of the proprietors,
who not
only elect those directors,
but sometimes over-rule
the appointments
of their servants
in India.
Provided
he can enjoy this influence
for a few years,
and thereby provide
for a certain number
of his friends,
he frequently cares little
about the dividend,
or even about the value
of the stock upon which
his vote is founded.
About the prosperity
of the great empire,
in the government
of which
that vote
gives him a share,
he seldom
cares at all.
No other sovereigns
ever were,
or,
from the nature of things,
ever
could be,
so perfectly indifferent
about the happiness or misery
of their subjects,
the improvement or waste
of their dominions,
the glory
or disgrace
of their administration,
as,
from irresistible moral causes,
the greater part
of the proprietors of such
a mercantile company are,
and necessarily must be.
This indifference, too,
was more likely
to be increased
than diminished
by some of the new regulations
which were made
in consequence
of the parliamentary inquiry.
By a resolution
of the house of commons,
for example,
it was declared,
that when the £1,400,000
lent to the company
by government,
should be paid,
and their bond-debts
be reduced to £1,500,000,
they
might then,
and not till then,
divide eight per cent.
upon their capital;
and that
whatever
remained
of their revenues
and neat profits at home
should be divided
into four parts;
three of them
to be paid
into the exchequer
for the use of the public,
and the fourth
to be reserved as a fund,
either
for the further reduction
of their bond-debts,
or for the discharge
of other
contingent exigencies which
the company
might labour under.
But if the company
were bad stewards
and bad sovereigns,
when the whole
of their neat revenue
and profits
belonged to themselves,
and were
at their own disposal,
they
were surely not likely
to be better when
three-fourths
of them
were to belong
to other people,
and the other fourth,
though
to be laid out
for the benefit
of the company,
yet to be so under
the inspection
and
with the approbation
of other people.
It might be more agreeable
to the company,
that
their own servants and dependants
should have either
the pleasure
of wasting,
or the profit
of embezzling,
whatever surplus
might remain,
after paying
the proposed dividend
of eight per cent.
than
that
it should come
into the hands
of a set
of people with whom
those resolutions
could scarce
fail to
set them in some measure
at variance.
The interest
of those servants
and dependants
might so far predominate
in the court
of proprietors,
as
sometimes to dispose it to support
the authors of depredations
which had been committed
in direct violation
of its own authority.
With the majority
of proprietors,
the support even
of the authority
of their own court
might sometimes be
a matter
of less consequence
than the support of those
who had set that authority
at defiance.
The regulations of 1773,
accordingly,
did not put an end
to the disorder
of the company's government
in India.
Notwithstanding that,
during a momentary fit
of good conduct,
they had
at one time collected
into the treasury
of Calcutta
more than £3,000,000 sterling;
notwithstanding that they
had afterwards extended
either their dominion
or their depredations
over a vast accession
of some of the richest
and most fertile countries
in India,
all was wasted and destroyed.
They found themselves altogether
unprepared to stop
or resist the incursion
of Hyder Ali;
and in consequence
of those disorders,
the company
is now (1784)
in greater distress than ever;
and, in order to
prevent immediate bankruptcy,
is once more
reduced
to supplicate the assistance
of government.
Different plans
have been proposed
by the different
parties in parliament
for the better management
of its affairs;
and all
those
plans
seem to agree in supposing,
what
was indeed always abundantly
evident,
that it is altogether unfit
to govern
its territorial possessions.
Even the company itself
seems to be convinced
of its own incapacity so far,
and seems,
upon that account
willing
to give them
up to government.
With the right
of possessing forts
and
garrisons in
distant and barbarous countries
is necessarily connected
the right
of making peace and war
in those countries.
The joint-stock companies,
which
have had the one right,
have constantly exercised
the other,
and have frequently had
it expressly conferred
upon them.
How unjustly,
how capriciously,
how cruelly,
they
have commonly exercised it,
is too well known
from recent experience.
When a company of merchants
undertake,
at their own risk
and expense,
to establish a new trade
with some remote
and barbarous nation,
it may not be unreasonable
to incorporate them
into a joint-stock company,
and to grant them,
in case of their success,
a monopoly
of the trade
for a certain number of years.
It
is
the easiest and most natural way
in which the state
can recompense them
for hazarding
a dangerous and expensive
experiment,
of which the public
is afterwards
to reap the benefit.
A temporary monopoly
of this kind
may be vindicated,
upon the same principles
upon which
a like
monopoly of a new machine
is granted to its inventor,
and that
of a new book
to its author.
But upon the expiration
of the term,
the monopoly ought
certainly to determine;
the forts and garrisons,
if it
was found necessary
to establish any,
to be taken
into the hands of government,
their value
to be paid to the company,
and the trade
to be laid open
to all
the subjects of the state.
By a perpetual monopoly,
all the other subjects
of the state
are taxed very absurdly
in two different ways:
first,
by the high price
of goods,
which,
in the case
of a free trade,
they
could buy much cheaper;
and, secondly,
by their total exclusion
from a branch
of business which
it might be
both convenient and profitable
for many
of them to carry on.
It is
for the most worthless
of all purposes, too,
that they
are taxed in this manner.
It is merely
to enable the company
to support the negligence,
profusion,
and malversation
of their own servants,
whose disorderly conduct
seldom
allows the dividend
of the company
to exceed
the ordinary rate
of profit in trades
which are altogether free,
and very frequently makes
a fall even a good deal
short
of that rate.
Without a monopoly,
however,
a joint-stock company,
it would appear
from experience,
cannot long
carry on any branch
of foreign trade.
To buy in one market,
in order to
sell with profit in another,
when there are
many competitors in both;
to watch over,
not only
the occasional variations
in the demand,
but
the much greater
and more frequent variations
in the competition,
or in the supply which
that demand is likely
to get from other people;
and to suit
with dexterity and judgment
both the quantity
and quality
of each assortment
of goods
to all these circumstances,
is a species of warfare,
of which the operations
are continually changing,
and which can scarce
ever be conducted successfully,
without such
an unremitting exertion of vigilance
and attention as
cannot long
be expected
from the directors
of a joint-stock company.
The East India company,
upon the redemption
of their funds,
and the expiration
of their exclusive privilege,
have a right,
by act of parliament,
to continue a corporation
with a joint stock,
and to trade
in their corporate capacity
to the East Indies,
in common
with the rest
of their fellow subjects.
But in this situation,
the superior vigilance
and attention
of a private adventurer
would,
in all probability,
soon
make them weary
of the trade.
An eminent French author,
of great knowledge
in matters
of political economy,
the Abbe Morellet,
gives a list
of fifty-five joint-stock companies
for foreign trade,
which
have been established
in different parts of Europe
since the year 1600,
and which,
according to him,
have all failed
from mismanagement,
notwithstanding
they had
exclusive privileges.
He has been misinformed
with regard to the history
of two or three
of them,
which were not
joint-stock companies
and have not failed.
But,
in compensation,
there
have been
several
joint-stock companies which
have failed,
and which he has omitted.
The only trades which
it seems possible
for a joint-stock company
to carry on successfully,
without an exclusive privilege,
are those,
of which all
the operations
are capable of
being reduced to what
is called a routine,
or to such
a uniformity of method as
admits
of little or no variation.
Of this kind is,
first,
the banking trade;
secondly,
the trade
of insurance
from fire and from sea risk,
and capture in time of war;
thirdly,
the trade
of making
and maintaining
a navigable cut
or canal;
and, fourthly,
the similar trade
of bringing water
for the supply
of a great city.
Though the principles
of the banking trade
may appear somewhat abstruse,
the practice
is capable of
being reduced
to strict rules.
To depart
upon any occasion
from those rules,
in consequence
of some flattering speculation
of extraordinary gain,
is almost always extremely
dangerous and frequently fatal
to the
banking company
which attempts it.
But the constitution
of joint-stock
companies
renders them in general,
more tenacious of established
rules
than any private copartnery.
Such companies,
therefore,
seem extremely well
fitted for this trade.
The principal banking companies
in Europe,
accordingly,
are joint-stock companies,
many of which
manage
their trade very successfully
without any exclusive privilege.
The bank of England
has no other
exclusive privilege,
except
that no other banking company
in England
shall consist
of more than six persons.
The two banks of Edinburgh
are joint-stock companies,
without any exclusive privilege.
The value of the risk,
either from fire,
or from loss by sea,
or by
capture,
though it cannot,
perhaps,
be calculated very exactly,
admits,
however,
of such a gross estimation,
as renders it,
in some degree,
reducible
to strict rule and method.
The trade of insurance,
therefore,
may be carried on
successfully by
a joint-stock company,
without any exclusive privilege.
Neither the London Assurance,
nor
the Royal Exchange Assurance
companies have
any such privilege.
When a navigable cut or canal
has been once made,
the management
of it
becomes quite simple and easy,
and it
is reducible
to strict rule and method.
Even the making of it
is so,
as it may be contracted for
with undertakers,
at so much a mile,
and so much a lock.
The same thing
may be said of a canal,
an aqueduct,
or a great pipe
for bringing water
to supply a great city.
Such under-takings,
therefore,
may be,
and accordingly
frequently are,
very successfully
managed by joint-stock companies,
without any exclusive privilege.
To establish
a joint-stock company,
however,
for any undertaking,
merely
because such
a company
might be capable
of managing it successfully;
or,
to exempt
a particular set of dealers from some of the general laws which
take place
with regard to
all their neighbours,
merely
because they
might be capable
of thriving,
if they
had such an exemption,
would certainly not be
reasonable.
To render
such an establishment
perfectly reasonable,
with the circumstance
of being reducible
to strict rule and method,
two other circumstances
ought to concur.
First,
it ought to appear
with the clearest evidence,
that
the undertaking
is of greater
and more general utility
than the greater part
of common trades;
and, secondly,
that
it requires a greater capital
than
can easily be collected
into a private copartnery.
If a moderate capital
were sufficient,
the great utility
of the undertaking
would not be
a sufficient reason
for establishing
a joint-stock company;
because,
in this case,
the demand for what
it was to produce,
would readily
and easily be supplied
by private adventurers.
In the
four trades above mentioned,
both
those circumstances concur.
The great and general utility
of the banking trade,
when prudently managed,
has been fully explained
in the second book
of this Inquiry.
But a public bank,
which is
to support public credit,
and, upon particular emergencies,
to advance to government
the whole produce of a tax,
to the amount,
perhaps,
of several millions,
a year or two before it
comes in,
requires a greater capital
than
can easily be collected
into any private copartnery.
The trade of insurance
gives great security
to the fortunes
of private people,
and,
by dividing
among a great many
that loss
which would ruin
an individual,
makes
it fall light and easy
upon the whole society.
In order to
give this security,
however,
it is necessary
that the insurers
should have
a very large capital.
Before the establishment
of the two joint-stock companies
for insurance in London,
a list,
it is said,
was laid
before the attorney-general,
of one hundred
and fifty private usurers,
who had failed
in the course of a few
years.
That
navigable cuts and canals,
and the works
which are sometimes necessary
for supplying
a great city with water,
are of great
and general utility,
while,
at the same time,
they frequently require
a greater
expense
than suits
the fortunes
of private people,
is sufficiently obvious.
Except the
four trades above mentioned,
I have not been able
to recollect any other,
in which all
the three circumstances requisite
for rendering reasonable
the establishment
of a joint-stock company
concur.
The English copper company
of London,
the lead-smelting company,
the glass-grinding company,
have not even
the pretext
of any great
or singular utility
in the object which
they pursue;
nor does the pursuit
of that object
seem to require any expense
unsuitable
to the fortunes
of many private men.
Whether the trade which
those companies carry on,
is reducible
to such strict rule
and method
as to render it fit
for the management
of a joint-stock company,
or whether they
have any reason
to boast
of their extraordinary profits,
I do not pretend to know.
The mine-adventurers company
has been long ago bankrupt.
A share
in the stock
of the British Linen company
of Edinburgh
sells,
at present,
very much below par,
though less so than it
did some years ago.
The joint-stock companies,
which are established
for the public-spirited purpose
of promoting some
particular manufacture,
over
and above managing
their own affairs ill,
to the diminution
of the general stock
of the society,
can,
in other respects,
scarce
ever fail
to do more harm than good.
Notwithstanding
the most upright intentions,
the unavoidable partiality
of their directors
to particular branches
of the manufacture,
of which the undertakers
mislead and impose upon them,
is a real discouragement
to the rest,
and necessarily breaks,
more or less,
that natural proportion which
would otherwise establish itself
between judicious industry
and profit,
and which,
to the general industry
of the country,
is of all
encouragements the greatest
and the most effectual.
Of the Expense
of the Institution
for the Education of Youth.
The institutions
for the education
of the youth may,
in the same manner,
furnish a revenue sufficient
for defraying
their own expense.
The fee or honorary,
which
the scholar
pays to the master,
naturally
constitutes a revenue
of this kind.
Even
where the reward
of the master
does not arise altogether
from this natural revenue,
it still is not necessary
that
it should be derived from
that general revenue
of the society,
of which the collection
and application are,
in most countries,
assigned
to the executive power.
Through the greater part
of Europe,
accordingly,
the endowment
of schools and colleges
makes either no charge upon
that general revenue,
or but a very small one.
It everywhere arises chiefly
from some local
or provincial revenue,
from the
rent of some landed estate,
or from the interest
of some sum of money,
allotted
and put
under the management
of trustees
for this particular purpose,
sometimes by
the sovereign himself,
and sometimes by some
private donor.
Have those public endowments
contributed in general,
to promote the end
of their institution?
Have
they contributed
to encourage the diligence,
and to improve the abilities,
of the teachers?
Have
they directed
the course of education
towards objects more useful,
both to the individual
and to the public,
than those to which
it would naturally have gone
of its own accord?
It should not seem
very difficult
to give
at least a probable answer
to each
of those questions.
In every profession,
the exertion
of the greater part of those
who exercise it,
is always
in proportion to the necessity
they are under
of making that exertion.
This necessity
is greatest
with those
to whom the emoluments
of their profession
are
the only source from which
they expect
their fortune,
or even their ordinary revenue
and subsistence.
In order to
acquire this fortune,
or even to get
this subsistence,
they must,
in the course
of a year,
execute a certain quantity
of work
of a known value;
and,
where the competition
is free,
the rivalship of competitors,
who are all endeavouring
to justle one another
out of employment,
obliges
every man
to endeavour
to execute his work
with a certain degree
of exactness.
The greatness of the objects
which are
to be acquired
by success in some particular
professions may,
no doubt,
sometimes
animate the exertions
of a few men
of extraordinary spirit
and ambition.
Great objects,
however,
are evidently not necessary,
in order to
occasion
the greatest exertions.
Rivalship and emulation
render excellency,
even in mean professions,
an object of ambition,
and frequently occasion
the very greatest exertions.
Great objects,
on the contrary,
alone
and unsupported
by the necessity
of application,
have seldom been sufficient
to occasion
any considerable exertion.
In England,
success
in the profession
of the law leads
to some very great
objects of ambition;
and yet how few men,
born to easy fortunes,
have ever in this country
been eminent in
that profession?
The endowments
of schools and colleges
have necessarily diminished,
more or less,
the necessity
of application
in the teachers.
Their subsistence,
so far
as it arises
from their salaries,
is evidently derived
from a fund,
altogether independent
of their success
and reputation
in their particular professions.
In some universities,
the salary
makes but a part,
and frequently
but a small part,
of the emoluments
of the teacher,
of which the greater part
arises
from the honoraries or fees
of his pupils.
The necessity of application,
though always more or less
diminished,
is not, in this case,
entirely taken away.
Reputation in his profession
is still
of some importance to him,
and he
still has some dependency
upon the affection,
gratitude,
and favourable report of those
who have attended
upon his instructions;
and these
favourable sentiments
he is likely
to gain
in no way so well
as by deserving them,
that is,
by the abilities and diligence
with which
he discharges every part
of his duty.
In other universities,
the teacher
is prohibited
from receiving any honorary
or fee
from his pupils,
and his salary
constitutes the whole
of the revenue which
he derives from his office.
His interest is,
in this case,
set as
directly in opposition
to his duty
as it
is possible to set it.
It
is the interest
of every man
to live as much
at his ease as he can;
and if his emoluments are
to be precisely the same,
whether he
does or does not perform
some very laborious duty,
it is certainly his interest,
at least as interest
is vulgarly understood,
either
to neglect it altogether,
or, if he
is subject to some authority
which will not suffer him
to do this,
to perform it in
as careless
and slovenly a manner
as that authority
will permit.
If he
is naturally active and
a lover of labour,
it is his interest
to employ
that activity in any way
from which
he can derive some advantage,
rather than
in the performance
of his duty,
from which
he can derive none.
If the authority to which he
is subject
resides in the body corporate,
the college,
or university,
of which he himself
is a member,
and in which the greater part
of the other members are,
like himself,
persons who either are,
or ought to be teachers,
they are likely
to make a common cause,
to be all very indulgent
to one another,
and every man to consent
that his neighbour
may neglect his duty,
provided he himself
is allowed
to neglect his own.
In the university of Oxford,
the greater part
of the public professors have,
for these many years,
given up
altogether even the pretence
of teaching.
If the authority to which he
is subject
resides,
not so much
in the body corporate,
of which
he is a member,
as
in some other extraneous persons,
in the bishop
of the diocese,
for example,
in the governor
of the province,
or, perhaps,
in some minister of state,
it is not,
indeed,
in this case,
very likely that
he will be suffered
to neglect
his duty altogether.
All that such superiors,
however,
can force him
to do,
is to attend upon his pupils
a certain number of hours,
that is,
to give a certain number
of lectures in the week,
or in the year.
What those
lectures shall be,
must still depend
upon the diligence
of the teacher;
and that diligence
is likely
to be proportioned
to the motives
which he has
for exerting it.
An extraneous jurisdiction
of this kind,
besides,
is liable
to be exercised both ignorantly
and capriciously.
In its nature,
it is arbitrary
and discretionary;
and the persons
who exercise it,
neither
attending
upon the lectures
of the teacher themselves,
nor perhaps understanding
the sciences
which it
is his business
to teach,
are seldom capable
of exercising it
with judgment.
From the insolence
of office, too,
they
are frequently indifferent
how they
exercise it,
and are very apt to censure
or deprive him
of his office wantonly and
without any
just cause.
The person
subject to such jurisdiction
is necessarily degraded by it,
and,
instead of being one
of the most respectable,
is rendered one
of the meanest and most
contemptible persons
in the society.
It is
by powerful protection only,
that
he
can effectually guard himself
against the bad usage
to which he
is at all times exposed;
and this protection
he is most likely
to gain,
not by ability or diligence
in his profession,
but by obsequiousness
to the will of his superiors,
and by being ready,
at all times,
to sacrifice to that
will the rights,
the interest,
and the honour
of the body corporate,
of which
he is a member.
Whoever
has attended
for any considerable time
to the administration
of a French university,
must have had occasion
to remark
the effects which
naturally result
from an arbitrary
and extraneous jurisdiction
of this kind.
Whatever
forces a certain number
of students
to any college or university,
independent
of the merit or reputation
of the teachers,
tends more
or less
to diminish the necessity
of that merit or reputation.
The privileges
of graduates in arts,
in law,
physic,
and divinity,
when they
can be obtained only
by residing
a certain number of years
in certain universities,
necessarily force
a certain number
of students to such universities,
independent
of the merit or reputation
of the teachers.
The privileges of graduates
are
a sort
of statutes of apprenticeship,
which
have contributed
to the improvement
of education
just
as the other statutes
of apprenticeship
have to that of arts
and manufactures.
The charitable foundations
of scholarships,
exhibitions,
bursaries,.etc.
necessarily attach
a certain number
of students to certain colleges,
independent
altogether of the merit
of those particular colleges.
Were the students
upon such charitable foundations
left free
to choose what college
they liked best,
such liberty
might perhaps contribute
to excite some emulation
among different colleges.
A regulation,
on the contrary,
which prohibited
even the independent members
of every particular college
from leaving it,
and going to any other,
without leave first
asked and obtained of
that which
they meant to abandon,
would tend very much
to extinguish
that emulation.
If in each college,
the tutor or teacher,
who was
to instruct each student
in all arts and sciences,
should not be voluntarily chosen
by the student,
but appointed
by the head
of the college;
and if,
in case of neglect,
inability,
or bad usage,
the student
should not be allowed
to change him for another,
without leave first
asked and obtained;
such
a regulation
would not only tend very much
to extinguish all emulation
among the different tutors
of the same college,
but to diminish very much,
in all of them,
the necessity
of diligence and of attention
to their respective pupils.
Such teachers,
though very well paid
by their students,
might be as much
disposed
to neglect them,
as those
who are not paid
by them at all or
who have no other recompense
but their salary.
If the teacher happens
to be a man
of sense,
it must be
an unpleasant thing
to him
to be conscious,
while he
is lecturing to his students,
that he
is either speaking
or reading nonsense,
or what
is very little better
than nonsense.
It must, too,
be unpleasant
to him
to observe,
that the greater part
of his students
desert his lectures;
or perhaps,
attend
upon them
with plain enough marks
of neglect,
contempt,
and derision.
If he is obliged,
therefore,
to give a certain number
of lectures,
these motives alone,
without any other interest,
might dispose him
to take some pains
to give tolerably good ones.
Several different expedients,
however,
may be fallen upon,
which will effectually blunt
the edge
of all
those incitements
to diligence.
The teacher,
instead of explaining
to his pupils himself
the science
in which he
proposes
to instruct them,
may read
some book upon it;
and if this book
is written
in a foreign and dead language,
by interpreting it
to them into their own,
or,
what would give him still
less trouble,
by making them
interpret it to him,
and by now
and then making
an occasional remark upon it,
he may flatter himself
that he
is giving a lecture.
The slightest degree
of knowledge and application
will enable him
to do this,
without exposing himself
to contempt or derision,
by saying any thing
that is really foolish,
absurd,
or ridiculous.
The discipline of the college,
at the same time,
may enable him
to force all
his pupils
to the most regular attendance
upon his sham lecture,
and
to maintain
the most decent and respectful
behaviour
during the whole time
of the performance.
The discipline
of colleges and universities
is in general contrived,
not for the benefit
of the students,
but for the interest,
or, more properly
speaking,
for the ease
of the masters.
Its object is,
in all cases,
to maintain the authority
of the master,
and,
whether he
neglects or performs his duty,
to oblige
the students
in all cases
to behave to him
as if he
performed it
with the greatest diligence
and ability.
It seems
to presume perfect wisdom
and virtue
in the one order,
and the greatest weakness
and folly
in the other.
Where the masters,
however,
really
perform their duty,
there
are no examples,
I believe,
that the greater part
of the students
ever neglect theirs.
No discipline
is ever requisite
to force attendance
upon lectures
which are really
worth the attending,
as is well known
wherever any such lectures
are given.
Force and restraint may,
no doubt,
be in some degree requisite,
in order to
oblige children,
or very young boys,
to attend
to those parts of education,
which it
is thought necessary for them
to acquire during that
early period of life;
but after twelve or
thirteen years
of age,
provided the master
does his duty,
force or restraint
can scarce
ever be necessary
to carry
on any part of education.
Such
is the generosity
of the greater part
of young men,
that so far
from being disposed to neglect
or despise the instructions
of their master,
provided
he shews some
serious intention
of being of use to them,
they are generally inclined
to pardon a great deal
of incorrectness
in the performance
of his duty,
and sometimes even
to conceal from the public
a good deal
of gross negligence.
Those parts of education,
it is to be observed,
for the teaching of which
there are
no public institutions,
are generally
the best taught.
When
a young man
goes to a fencing
or a dancing school,
he does not,
indeed,
always
learn to fence
or to dance very well;
but he seldom
fails of learning to fence or
to dance.
The good effects
of the riding school
are not commonly so evident.
The expense
of a riding school
is so great,
that in most places
it is a public institution.
The three most essential parts
of literary education,
to read,
write,
and account,
it still continues
to be more common
to acquire in private
than in public schools;
and it very seldom
happens,
that anybody
fails of acquiring them
to the degree
in which it
is necessary
to acquire them.
In England,
the public schools
are much less
corrupted
than the universities.
In the schools,
the youth
are taught,
or at least
may be taught,
Greek and Latin;
that is,
everything which the masters
pretend to teach,
or which it is expected
they
should teach.
In the universities,
the youth neither
are taught,
nor always can find
any proper means
of being taught the sciences,
which it
is
the business
of those
incorporated bodies
to teach.
The reward
of the schoolmaster,
in most cases,
depends principally,
in some cases almost entirely,
upon the fees or honoraries
of his scholars.
Schools
have no exclusive privileges.
In order to
obtain the honours
of graduation,
it is not necessary
that a person
should bring a certificate
of his having studied
a certain number of years
at a public school.
If,
upon examination,
he appears
to understand
what is taught there,
no questions
are asked
about the place
where he learnt it.
The parts of education
which are commonly taught
in universities,
it may perhaps be said,
are not very well taught.
But had it
not been
for those institutions,
they would not have
been commonly taught
at all;
and both
the individual and the public
would have suffered
a good deal
from the want of those
important parts
of education.
The present
universities of Europe
were originally,
the greater part of them,
ecclesiastical corporations,
instituted
for the education
of churchmen.
They were founded
by the authority
of the pope;
and were so entirely
under his immediate protection,
that their members,
whether masters or students,
had all of them
what was then called
the benefit of clergy,
that is,
were exempted
from the civil jurisdiction
of the countries
in which
their respective universities
were situated,
and were amenable
only to the
ecclesiastical tribunals.
What was taught
in the greater part
of those universities
was suitable
to the end
of their institution,
either theology,
or something
that was merely preparatory
to theology.
When Christianity
was first established by law,
a corrupted Latin
had become the common language
of all
the western parts of Europe.
The service of the church,
accordingly,
and the translation
of the Bible which
were read in churches,
were both in
that corrupted Latin;
that is,
in the common language
of the country,
After the irruption
of the barbarous nations
who overturned
the Roman empire,
Latin
gradually ceased
to be the language
of any part of Europe.
But the reverence
of the people
naturally preserves
the established forms
and ceremonies
of religion long
after
the
circumstances
which first introduced
and rendered them reasonable,
are no more.
Though Latin,
therefore,
was no
longer understood anywhere
by the great body
of the people,
the whole service
of the church
still continued
to be performed in
that language.
Two different languages
were thus established
in Europe,
in the same
manner as in ancient Egypt:
a language of the priests,
and a language of the people;
a sacred and a profane,
a learned
and an unlearned language.
But it
was necessary
that
the priests
should understand something of
that
sacred and learned language
in which they
were to officiate;
and the study
of the Latin language
therefore made,
from the beginning,
an essential part
of university education.
It was not so with
that either
of the Greek
or of the Hebrew language.
The infallible decrees
of the church
had pronounced
the Latin translation
of the Bible,
commonly
called the Latin Vulgate,
to have been equally dictated
by divine inspiration,
and therefore of equal authority
with the Greek
and Hebrew originals.
The knowledge
of those two languages,
therefore,
not being indispensably requisite
to a churchman,
the study of them
did not for along time
make a necessary part
of the common course
of university education.
There
are some Spanish universities,
I am assured,
in which
the study
of the Greek language
has never yet made any part
of that course.
The first reformers
found the Greek text
of the New Testament,
and even the Hebrew text
of the Old,
more favourable
to their opinions
than the vulgate translation,
which,
as
might naturally be supposed,
had been gradually accommodated
to support the doctrines
of the Catholic Church.
They set themselves,
therefore,
to expose the many errors of
that translation,
which
the Roman catholic clergy
were thus
put under the necessity
of defending or explaining.
But this
could not well be done
without some knowledge
of the original languages,
of which the study
was therefore
gradually introduced
into the greater part
of universities;
both of those which embraced,
and of those which rejected,
the doctrines
of the reformation.
The Greek language
was connected
with every part of
that classical learning,
which,
though at first
principally cultivated
by catholics and Italians,
happened
to come
into fashion much
about the same time
that the doctrines
of the reformation
were set on foot.
In the greater part
of universities,
therefore,
that language
was taught previous
to the study
of philosophy,
and as
soon as the student
had made some
progress in the Latin.
The Hebrew language
having no connection
with classical learning,
and,
except the Holy Scriptures,
being the language of not
a single book in any esteem
the study
of it
did not commonly commence till
after
that of philosophy,
and when
the student
had entered
upon the study of theology.
Originally,
the first rudiments,
both of the Greek
and Latin languages,
were taught in universities;
and in some universities
they still continue
to be so.
In others,
it is expected that
the student
should have previously acquired,
at least,
the rudiments
of one or both
of those languages,
of which the study
continues to make everywhere
a very considerable part
of university education.
The ancient Greek philosophy
was divided
into three great branches;
physics,
or natural philosophy;
ethics,
or moral philosophy;
and logic.
This general division
seems perfectly agreeable
to the nature
of things.
The great phenomena of nature,
the revolutions
of the heavenly bodies,
eclipses,
comets;
thunder and lightning,
and other extraordinary meteors;
the generation,
the life,
growth,
and dissolution
of plants and animals;
are objects which,
as
they necessarily excite
the wonder,
so they
naturally call
forth the curiosity of mankind
to inquire into their causes.
Superstition first
attempted
to satisfy this curiosity,
by referring all those
wonderful appearances
to the immediate agency
of the gods.
Philosophy
afterwards endeavoured
to account
for them
from more familiar causes,
or from such as mankind
were better
acquainted with,
than the agency
of the gods.
As those great phenomena
are the first objects
of human curiosity,
so the science
which
pretends
to explain them
must naturally have been
the first branch of philosophy
that was cuitivated.
The first philosophers,
accordingly,
of whom history
has preserved any account,
appear
to have been
natural philosophers.
In every age and country
of the world,
men
must have attended
to the characters,
designs,
and actions of one another;
and many reputable rules
and maxims
for the conduct of human life
must have been laid down
and approved of
by common consent.
As soon
as writing
came into fashion,
wise men,
or those
who fancied themselves such,
would naturally endeavour
to increase
the number of those
established and respected
maxims,
and to express
their own sense of what
was either proper
or improper conduct,
sometimes in
the more artificial form
of apologues,
like
what are called
the fables of Aesop;
and sometimes in
the more simple one
of apophthegms or
wise sayings,
like the proverbs of Solmnon,
the verses
of Theognis and Phocyllides,
and some part
of the works of Hesiod.
They
might continue in this manner,
for a long time,
merely
to multiply the number
of those maxims
of prudence and morality,
without even attempting
to arrange them
in any very distinct
or methodical order,
much less
to connect them together
by one or more
general principles,
from which
they were all deducible,
like effects
from their natural causes.
The beauty
of a systematical arrangement
of different observations,
connected by a few
common principles,
was first seen
in the rude essays
of those ancient
times towards
a system
of natural philosophy.
Something of the same kind
was afterwards attempted
in morals.
The maxims of common life
were arranged
in some methodical order,
and connected together by a few
common principles,
in the same manner as they
had attempted
to arrange
and connect the phenomena
of nature.
The science
which pretends
to investigate
and explain those
connecting principles,
is
what is properly called
Moral Philosophy.
Different authors
gave different systems,
both of natural
and moral philosophy.
But
the arguments by which they
supported those
different systems,
far from being always
demonstrations,
were frequently at best
but
very slender probabilities,
and sometimes mere sophisms,
which had no other foundation
but
the inaccuracy and ambiguity
of common language.
Speculative systems,
have,
in all ages
of the world,
been adopted
for reasons too frivolous
to have determined
the judgment
of any man
of common sense,
in a matter
of the smallest pecuniary interest.
Gross sophistry
has scarce
ever had any influence
upon the opinions of mankind,
except
in matters
of philosophy and speculation;
and in these
it has frequently had
the greatest.
The patrons
of each system
of natural and moral philosophy,
naturally
endeavoured
to expose the weakness
of the arguments adduced
to support
the systems
which were opposite
to their own.
In examining those arguments,
they
were necessarily led
to consider the difference
between a probable
and a demonstrative argument,
between a fallacious
and a conclusive one;
and logic,
or the science
of the general principles
of good and bad reasoning,
necessarily
arose
out of the observations which
a scrutiny
of this kind
gave
occasion to;
though,
in its origin,
posterior both
to physics and to ethics,
it was commonly taught,
not indeed in all,
but in the greater part
of the ancient schools
of philosophy,
previously to either
of those sciences.
The student,
it seems
to have been thought,
ought to understand
well the difference
between good
and bad reasoning,
before he
was led
to reason
upon subjects
of so great importance.
This ancient division
of philosophy
into three parts was,
in the greater part
of the universities of Europe,
changed for another
into five.
In the ancient philosophy,
whatever
was taught
concerning the nature either
of the human mind or
of the Deity,
made a part
of the system of physics.
Those beings,
in whatever
their essence
might be supposed
to consist,
were parts
of the great system
of the universe,
and parts, too,
productive
of the most important effects.
Whatever human reason
could either
conclude or conjecture
concerning them,
made,
as it were,
two chapters,
though no doubt
two
very important ones,
of the science which pretended
to give an account
of the origin and revolutions
of the great system
of the universe.
But in the universities
of Europe,
where philosophy
was taught only as subservient
to theology,
it was natural
to dwell longer
upon these two chapters than
upon any other
of the science.
They
were gradually more
and more extended,
and were divided
into many inferior chapters;
till at last the doctrine
of spirits,
of which so little
can be known,
came
to take up as much room
in the system
of philosophy
as the doctrine of bodies,
of which so much
can be known.
The doctrines
concerning those two subjects
were considered
as making
two distinct sciences.
What are called metaphysics,
or pneumatics,
were set in opposition
to physics,
and were cultivated not only
as the more sublime,
but,
for the purposes
of a particular profession,
as the more useful science
of the two.
The proper subject
of experiment and observation,
a subject
in which a careful attention
is capable
of making
so many useful discoveries,
was almost entirely neglected.
The subject in which,
after
a very few simple
and almost obvious truths,
the most careful attention
can discover
nothing but obscurity
and uncertainty,
and can
consequently produce nothing
but subtleties and sophisms,
was greatly cultivated.
When those two sciences
had thus
been set
in opposition to one another,
the comparison between them
naturally gave birth
to a third,
to
what was called ontology,
or
the science
which treated of the qualities
and attributes
which were common to both
the subjects
of the other two sciences.
But if subtleties and sophisms
composed the greater part
of the metaphysics
or pneumatics
of the schools,
they composed the whole
of this cobweb science
of ontology,
which was
likewise sometimes called metaphysics.
Wherein
consisted the happiness
and perfection
of a man,
considered not only
as an individual,
but as the member
of a family,
of a state,
and of the great society
of mankind,
was the object which
the ancient moral philosophy
proposed
to investigate.
In that philosophy,
the duties
of human life
were treated of as subservient
to the happiness and perfection
of human life,
But when moral,
as well as natural philosophy,
came to be taught only
as subservient
to theology,
the duties of human life
were treated of
as chiefly subservient
to the happiness
of a life
to come.
In the ancient philosophy,
the perfection of virtue
was represented
as necessarily productive,
to the person
who possessed it,
of the most perfect happiness
in this life.
In the modern philosophy,
it was frequently represented
as generally,
or rather as almost always,
inconsistent with any degree
of happiness in this life;
and heaven
was to be earned only
by penance and mortification,
by the austerities and abasement
of a monk,
not by the liberal,
generous,
and spirited conduct
of a man.
Casuistry,
and an ascetic morality,
made up,
in most cases,
the greater part
of the moral philosophy
of the schools.
By far the most important
of all the different branches
of philosophy
became in this manner
by far the most corrupted.
Such,
therefore,
was the common course
of philosophical education
in the greater part
of the universities
in Europe.
Logic
was taught first;
ontology
came in the second place;
pneumatology,
comprehending
the doctrine concerning
the nature
of the human soul
and of the Deity,
in the third;
in the fourth
followed
a debased system
of moral philosophy,
which was considered
as immediately connected
with the doctrines
of pneumatology,
with the immortality
of the human soul,
and with the rewards
and punishments which,
from the justice
of the Deity,
were to be expected
in a life
to come:
a short and superficial
system of physics
usually concluded
the course.
The alterations which
the universities
of Europe
thus introduced
into the ancient course
of philosophy
were all meant
for the education
of ecclesiastics,
and to render
it a more proper introduction
to the study of theology
But the additional quantity
of subtlety and sophistry,
the casuistry
and ascetic morality which
those alterations
introduced into it,
certainly
did not render it more
for the education
of gentlemen or men
of the world,
or more likely either
to improve
the understanding or
to mend the heart.
This course of philosophy is
what
still continues
to be taught
in the greater part
of the universities of Europe,
with more or less diligence,
according
as the constitution
of each particular university
happens
to render diligence more
or less necessary
to the teachers.
In some of the richest
and best endowed universities,
the tutors content themselves
with teaching
a few
unconnected shreds and parcels of this
corrupted course;
and even
these
they
commonly teach very negligently
and superficially.
The improvements which,
in modern times
have been made in several
different branches
of philosophy,
have not,
the greater part of them,
been made in universities,
though some,
no doubt,
have.
The greater part
of universities
have not even been
very forward
to adopt
those improvements after they
were made;
and several of those
learned societies
have chosen to remain,
for a long time,
the sanctuaries in which
exploded systems
and obsolete prejudices
found shelter and protection,
after they
had been hunted
out of every other corner
of the world.
In general,
the richest and best
endowed universities
have been slowest
in adopting
those improvements,
and the most averse
to permit
any considerable change
in the established plan
of education.
Those improvements
were more easily introduced
into some of the poorer
universities,
in which the teachers,
depending
upon their reputation
for the greater part
of their subsistence,
were obliged
to pay more attention
to the current opinions
of the world.
But though
the public schools
and universities
of Europe
were originally intended only
for the education
of a particular profession,
that of churchmen;
and though they
were not always very diligent
in instructing their pupils,
even in the sciences
which were supposed necessary
for
that profession;
yet they
gradually drew to themselves
the education
of almost all other people,
particularly of almost
all gentlemen
and men
of fortune.
No better method,
it seems,
could be fallen upon,
of spending,
with any advantage,
the long interval
between infancy and
that period of life
at which men
begin
to apply in good earnest
to the real business
of the world,
the business
which is
to employ them
during the remainder
of their days.
The greater part of
what
is taught
in schools and universities,
however,
does not seem
to be
the most proper preparation
for that business.
In England,
it becomes every day more
and more the custom
to send
young people
to travel in foreign countries
immediately upon
their leaving school,
and without sending them
to any university.
Our young people,
it is said,
generally return home much
improved by their travels.
A young man,
who goes abroad
at seventeen or eighteen,
and returns home
at one-and-twenty,
returns three or four years older
than
he was when he
went abroad;
and at that age
it is very difficult
not to improve a good deal
in three or four years.
In the course
of his travels,
he generally acquires
some knowledge
of one
or two foreign languages;
a knowledge,
however,
which is seldom sufficient
to enable him
either to
speak or write them
with propriety.
In other respects,
he commonly returns
home more conceited,
more unprincipled,
more dissipated,
and more incapable
of my serious application,
either to study
or to business,
than
he could well have become
in so short
a time
had he lived at home.
By travelling so very young,
by spending
in the most frivolous dissipation
the most previous years
of his life,
at a distance
from the inspection
and control
of his parents and relations,
every useful habit,
which
the earlier parts
of his education
might have had some
tendency
to form in him,
instead of being riveted
and confirmed,
is almost necessarily either
weakened or effaced.
Nothing but the
discredit into which
the universities
are allowing themselves
to fall,
could ever have brought
into repute so
very absurd a practice
as
that
of travelling
at this early period
of life.
By sending his son abroad,
a father
delivers himself,
at least for some time,
from so disagreeable an object
as that of a son unemployed,
neglected,
and going
to ruin before his eyes.
Such
have been the effects
of some of the modern institutions
for education.
Different plans
and different institutions
for education
seem to have taken place
in other ages and nations.
In the republics
of ancient Greece,
every free citizen
was instructed,
under the direction
of the public magistrate,
in gymnastic exercises
and in music.
By gymnastic exercises,
it was intended
to harden his body,
to sharpen his courage,
and to prepare him
for the fatigues and dangers
of war;
and as the Greek militia was,
by all accounts,
one of the best
that ever was in the world,
this part
of their public education
must have answered completely
the purpose
for which it was intended.
By the other part,
music,
it was proposed,
at least
by the philosophers
and historians,
who have given us an account
of those institutions,
to humanize the mind,
to soften the temper,
and to dispose it
for performing all the social
and moral duties
of public and private life.
In ancient Rome,
the exercises
of the Campus Martius
answered the same purpose
as those
of the Gymnasium
in ancient Greece,
and they
seem
to have answered it equally well.
But among the Romans
there was
nothing
which corresponded
to the musical education
of the Greeks.
The morals of the Romans,
however,
both in private
and public life,
seem to have been,
not only equal,
but,
upon the whole,
a good deal superior to those
of the Greeks.
That
they were superior
in private life,
we have the express testimony
of Polybius,
and of Dionysius of Halicarnassus,
two authors well acquainted
with both nations;
and the whole tenor
of the
Greek and Roman
history bears witness
to the superiority
of the public morals
of the Romans.
The good temper and moderation
of contending factions
seem
to be
the most essential circumstances
in the public morals
of a free people.
But the factions
of the Greeks
were almost always
violent and sanguinary;
whereas,
till the time of the Gracchi,
no blood had ever been
shed in any Roman faction;
and from the time
of the Gracchi,
the Roman republic
may be considered
as in reality dissolved.
Notwithstanding,
therefore,
the very respectable authority
of Plato,
Aristotle,
and Polybius,
and notwithstanding
the very ingenious reasons
by which
Mr. Montesquieu endeavours
to support that authority,
it seems probable
that the musical education
of the Greeks
had no great effect
in mending their morals,
since,
without any such education,
those of the Romans were,
upon the whole,
superior.
The respect
of those ancient sages
for the institutions
of their ancestors
had probably disposed them
to find much political wisdom
in
what was,
perhaps,
merely an ancient custom,
continued,
without interruption,
from the earliest period
of those societies,
to the times
in which
they had arrived
at a considerable degree
of refinement.
Music and dancing
are the great amusements
of almost all barbarous nations,
and the great accomplishments
which are supposed
to fit any man
for entertaining his society.
It is so at this day
among the negroes
on the coast of Africa.
It was so
among the ancient Celtes,
among the ancient Scandinavians,
and,
as we may learn from Homer,
among the ancient Greeks,
in the times
preceding the Trojan war.
When
the Greek tribes
had formed themselves
into little republics,
it was natural
that the study
of those accomplishments
should
for a long time make a part
of the public
and common education
of the people.
The masters
who instructed
the young people,
either
in music or in military exercises,
do not seem
to have been paid,
or even appointed
by the state,
either
in Rome
or even at Athens,
the Greek republic
of whose laws
and customs
we are the best informed.
The state
required that every free citizen
should fit himself for
defending it in war,
and should upon
that account,
learn his military exercises.
But it left him
to learn them
of such masters as he
could find;
and it
seems
to have advanced nothing
for this purpose,
but a public field or place
of exercise,
in which he should practise
and perform them.
In the early ages,
both of the Greek
and Roman republics,
the other parts of education
seem to have consisted
in learning to read,
write,
and account,
according to
the arithmetic of the times.
These accomplishments
the richer citizens
seem frequently
to have acquired at home,
by the assistance
of some domestic pedagogue,
who was,
generally,
either a slave or a freedman;
and the poorer citizens
in the schools
of such masters
as made a trade of teaching
for hire.
Such parts of education,
however,
were abandoned altogether
to the care
of the parents or guardians
of each individual.
It does not appear
that the state
ever assumed any inspection
or direction
of them.
By a law of Solon,
indeed,
the children
were acquitted from maintaining
those parents
who had neglected
to instruct them
in some profitable trade
or business.
In the progress of refinement,
when philosophy and rhetoric
came into fashion,
the better sort
of people used
to send their children
to the schools
of philosophers and rhetoricians,
in order to
be instructed
in these
fashionable sciences.
But those
schools
were not supported
by the public.
They were,
for a long time,
barely tolerated by it.
The demand
for philosophy and rhetoric was,
for a long time,
so small,
that
the first professed teachers
of either
could not find
constant employment
in any one city,
but were obliged
to travel about
from place to place.
In this manner
lived Zeno of Elea,
Protagoras,
Gorgias,
Hippias,
and many others.
As the demand increased,
the school,
both of philosophy and rhetoric,
became stationary,
first in Athens,
and afterwards in
several other cities.
The state,
however,
seems never
to have encouraged them
further,
than by assigning
to some of them
a particular place
to teach in,
which was sometimes done, too,
by private donors.
The state
seems
to have assigned the Academy
to Plato,
the Lyceum to Aristotle,
and the Portico
to Zeno of Citta,
the founder of the Stoics.
But Epicurus
bequeathed
his gardens
to his own school.
Till about the time
of Marcus Antoninus,
however,
no teacher appears
to have had any salary
from the public,
or to have had
any other emoluments,
but what
arose
from the honorarius or fees
of his scholars.
The bounty which
that philosophical emperor,
as we learn from Lucian,
bestowed
upon one
of the teachers of philosophy,
probably
lasted no longer
than his own life.
There
was nothing equivalent
to the privileges
of graduation;
and to have attended any
of those schools
was not necessary,
in order to
be permitted
to practise
any particular trade
or profession.
If the opinion
of their own utility
could not draw scholars
to them,
the law neither forced
anybody
to go to them,
nor rewarded anybody for
having gone to them.
The teachers
had no jurisdiction
over their pupils,
nor any other authority
besides
that
natural authority which
superior virtue
and
abilities
never fail
to procure from young people
towards those
who are entrusted
with any part
of their education.
At Rome,
the study of the civil law
made a part of the education,
not of the greater part
of the citizens,
but of some particular families.
The young people,
however,
who wished
to acquire knowledge
in the law,
had no public school
to go to,
and had no other method
of studying it,
than by frequenting
the company
of such of their relations and friends as
were supposed
to understand it.
It is,
perhaps,
worth
while to remark,
that
though the laws
of the twelve tables
were many of them
copied from those
of some ancient Greek republics,
yet law never seems
to have grown up
to be a science
in any republic
of ancient Greece.
In Rome
it became a science
very early,
and gave
a considerable degree
of illustration
to those citizens
who had the reputation
of understanding it.
In the republics
of ancient Greece,
particularly in Athens,
the ordinary courts
of justice consisted
of numerous,
and therefore disorderly,
bodies of people,
who frequently decided almost
at random,
or as clamour,
faction,
and party-spirit,
happened
to determine.
The ignominy
of an unjust decision,
when it
was to be divided
among five hundred,
a thousand,
or fifteen hundred people
(for some of
their courts
were so very numerous),
could not fall very heavy
upon any individual.
At Rome,
on the contrary,
the principal courts
of justice
consisted either
of a single judge,
or of a small number
of judges,
whose characters,
especially
as they
deliberated always in public,
could not fail
to be very much
affected
by any rash
or
unjust decision.
In doubtful cases such courts,
from their anxiety
to avoid blame,
would naturally endeavour
to shelter themselves
under the example or precedent
of the judges
who had sat before them,
either
in the same
or in some other court.
This attention
to practice and precedent,
necessarily
formed the Roman law into
that regular
and orderly system in which
it has been delivered down
to us;
and the like
attention
has had the like effects
upon the laws
of every other country
where
such attention
has taken place.
The superiority
of character
in the Romans over
that of the Greeks,
so much remarked
by Polybius
and
Dionysius of Halicarnassus,
was probably more
owing
to the better constitution
of their courts of justice,
than to any
of the circumstances
to which those authors
ascribe it.
The Romans
are said
to have been particularly
distinguished
for their superior respect
to an oath.
But the people who
were accustomed
to make oath
only before some diligent
and well informed court
of justice,
would naturally be
much more attentive to
what they swore,
than they
who were accustomed
to do the same thing
before mobbish
and disorderly assemblies.
The abilities,
both civil and military,
of the Greeks and Romans,
will readily be allowed
to have been
at least equal to those
of any modern nation.
Our prejudice
is perhaps
rather to overrate them.
But except in
what related
to military exercises,
the state
seems to have been
at no pains
to form those great abilities;
for I cannot be induced
to believe that
the musical education
of the Greeks
could be of much consequence
in forming them.
Masters,
however,
had been found,
it seems,
for instructing
the better sort
of people among those nations,
in every art
and science
in which the circumstances
of their society
rendered it
necessary or convenient
for them
to be instructed.
The demand
for such instruction
produced,
what it always produces,
the talent
for giving it;
and the emulation which
an unrestrained competition
never fails
to excite,
appears
to have brought
that talent
to a very high degree
of perfection.
In the attention which
the ancient philosophers
excited,
in the empire which
they acquired
over the opinions and principles
of their auditors,
in the faculty which
they possessed
of giving a certain tone
and character
to the conduct and conversation
of those auditors,
they appear to have been
much superior
to any modern teachers.
In modern times,
the diligence of public
teachers is more or less
corrupted
by the circumstances which
render them more
or less independent
of their success and reputation
in their particular professions.
Their salaries, too,
put the private teacher,
who would pretend
to come
into competition with them,
in the same state
with a merchant
who attempts
to trade without a bounty,
in competition with those
who trade
with a considerable one.
If he
sells his goods
at nearly the same price,
he cannot have
the same profit;
and poverty
and beggary at least,
if not bankruptcy
and ruin,
will infallibly be his lot.
If he attempts
to sell them much dearer,
he is likely
to have so few customers,
that
his circumstances
will not be much mended.
The privileges of graduation,
besides,
are
in many countries necessary,
or at least extremely convenient,
to most men
of learned professions,
that is,
to the far greater part
of those
who have occasion
for a learned education.
But those
privileges
can be obtained only
by attending
the lectures
of the public teachers.
The most careful attendance
upon the ablest instructions
of any private teacher
cannot always give
any title
to demand them.
It is from these
different causes
that the private teacher
of any of the sciences,
which are commonly taught
in universities,
is, in modern times,
generally
considered as
in the very lowest order
of men
of letters.
A man
of real abilities can scarce
find out
a more humiliating
or a more unprofitable employment
to turn them to.
The endowments
of schools and colleges
have in this manner not
only corrupted the diligence
of public teachers,
but have rendered it
almost impossible
to have
any good private ones.
Were there no
public institutions
for education,
no system,
no science,
would be taught,
for which
there was not some demand,
or which
the circumstances of the times
did not render it
either necessary or convenient,
or at least fashionable
to learn.
A private teacher
could never find his account
in teaching either
an exploded
and antiquated system
of a science acknowledged
to be useful,
or a science
universally believed
to be
a mere useless and pedantic heap
of sophistry and nonsense.
Such systems,
such sciences,
can subsist nowhere but
in those
incorporated societies
for education,
whose prosperity and revenue
are
in a great measure independent
of their industry.
Were there no
public institutions
for education,
a gentleman,
after going through,
with application and abilities,
the most complete course
of education which
the circumstances of the times
were supposed
to afford,
could not come
into the
world completely ignorant
of everything
which is the common subject
of conversation
among gentlemen and men
of the world.
There
are no public institutions
for the education of women,
and there is accordingly
nothing useless,
absurd,
or fantastical,
in the common course
of their education.
They
are taught
what their parents
or guardians
judge it
necessary or useful
for them
to learn,
and they
are taught nothing else.
Every part of their education
tends evidently
to some useful purpose;
either
to improve
the natural attractions
of their person,
or to
form their mind
to reserve,
to modesty,
to chastity,
and to economy;
to render them both likely to
became the mistresses
of a family,
and to behave properly
when they
have become such.
In every part
of her life,
a woman
feels some conveniency
or advantage from every part
of her education.
It seldom
happens that a man,
in any part
of his life,
derives
any conveniency
or advantage
from some of the most laborious
and troublesome parts
of his education.
Ought the public,
therefore,
to give no attention,
it may be asked,
to the education
of the people?
Or,
if it ought to give any,
what are the different parts
of education which
it ought to attend to
in the different orders
of the people?
and in what manner ought it
to attend to them?
In some cases,
the state of society
necessarily places
the greater part
of individuals
in such situations
as naturally form in them,
without any attention
of government,
almost all
the abilities
and virtues which
that state requires,
or perhaps can admit of.
In other cases,
the state of the society
does not place
the greater part
of individuals
in such situations;
and some
attention of government
is necessary,
in order to
prevent
the almost
entire corruption and degeneracy
of the great body
of the people.
In the progress
of the division of labour,
the employment
of the far greater part
of those
who live by labour,
that is, of the great body
of the people,
comes
to be confined to a few
very simple operations;
frequently to one or two.
But the understandings
of the greater part of men
are necessarily formed
by their ordinary employments.
The man
whose whole life
is spent
in performing
a few simple operations,
of which the effects, too,
are perhaps always the same,
or very nearly the same,
has no occasion
to exert his understanding,
or to exercise his invention,
in finding out expedients
for removing difficulties which
never occur.
He naturally loses,
therefore,
the habit of such exertion,
and generally becomes
as stupid and ignorant
as it is possible
for a human creature
to become.
The torpor
of his mind
renders him not only incapable
of relishing
or bearing a part
in any rational conversation,
but of conceiving any generous,
noble,
or tender sentiment,
and consequently of forming
any just judgment concerning many
even of the ordinary duties
of private life.
Of the great
and extensive interests
of his country
he is altogether incapable
of judging;
and unless
very particular pains
have been taken
to render him otherwise,
he is equally incapable
of defending
his country
in war.
The uniformity
of his stationary life
naturally corrupts
the courage of his mind,
and makes him
regard,
with abhorrence,
the irregular,
uncertain,
and adventurous life
of a soldier.
It corrupts even the activity
of his body,
and renders him incapable
of exerting his strength
with vigour and perseverance
in any other employment,
than that
to which he has been bred.
His dexterity
at his own particular
trade seems,
in this manner,
to be acquired
at the expense
of his intellectual,
social,
and martial virtues.
But in every improved
and civilized society,
this
is
the state
into which the labouring poor,
that is,
the great body of the people,
must necessarily fall,
unless
government takes some pains
to prevent it.
It
is otherwise
in the barbarous societies,
as they are commonly called,
of hunters,
of shepherds,
and even of husbandmen in
that
rude state
of husbandry
which precedes the improvement
of
manufactures,
and the extension
of foreign commerce.
In such societies,
the varied occupations
of every man
oblige every man
to exert his capacity,
and to invent expedients
for removing difficulties
which
are continually occurring.
Invention
is kept alive,
and the mind
is not suffered
to fall into
that drowsy stupidity,
which,
in a civilized society,
seems to benumb
the understanding
of almost all
the inferior ranks of people.
In those barbarous societies,
as they are called,
every man,
it has already been observed,
is a warrior.
Every man, too,
is in some measure
a statesman,
and can form
a tolerable judgment
concerning the interest
of the society,
and the conduct of those
who govern it.
How far their chiefs
are good
judges in peace,
or good leaders in war,
is obvious
to the observation
of almost every single man
among them.
In such a society,
indeed,
no man can well acquire
that improved
and
refined understanding which
a few men
sometimes possess
in a more civilized state.
Though in a rude society
there is a good deal
of variety
in the occupations
of every individual,
there
is not a great deal in those
of the whole society.
Every man does,
or is capable of doing,
almost every thing
which any other man does,
or is capable of being.
Every man
has a considerable degree
of knowledge,
ingenuity,
and invention
but scarce any man
has a great degree.
The degree,
however,
which is commonly possessed,
is generally sufficient
for conducting
the whole simple business
of the society.
In a civilized state,
on the contrary,
though there is little variety
in the occupations
of the greater part
of individuals,
there
is an almost infinite variety
in those
of the
whole society These
varied occupations present
an almost infinite variety
of objects
to the contemplation
of those few,
who,
being attached
to no
particular occupation themselves,
have leisure and
inclination
to examine the occupations
of other people.
The contemplation
of so great a variety
of objects necessarily
exercises
their minds
in endless comparisons
and combinations,
and renders
their understandings,
in an extraordinary degree,
both acute anti comprehensive.
Unless those few,
however,
happen to be placed
in some very particular
situations,
their great abilities,
though honourable
to themselves,
may contribute very little
to the good government
or happiness
of their society.
Notwithstanding
the great abilities
of those few,
all the nobler parts
of the human character
may be,
in a great measure,
obliterated
and extinguished
in the great body
of the people.
The education
of the common people
requires,
perhaps,
in a
civilized and commercial
society,
the attention of the public,
more than that
of people
of some rank and fortune.
People
of some rank and fortune
are generally eighteen
or nineteen years
of age
before they
enter upon
that particular business,
profession,
or trade,
by which they
propose
to distinguish themselves
in the world.
They have,
before that,
full time
to acquire,
or at least
to fit themselves
for afterwards acquiring,
every accomplishment
which can recommend them
to the public esteem,
or render them worthy of it.
Their parents or guardians
are generally sufficiently
anxious
that
they should be so accomplished,
and are in most cases,
willing enough
to lay out
the expense
which is necessary
for that purpose.
If they
are not always properly educated,
it is
seldom
from the want
of expense
laid out upon their education,
but from the
improper application
of
that expense.
It is seldom
from the want of masters,
but from the negligence
and incapacity of the masters
who are to be had,
and from the difficulty,
or rather
from the impossibility,
which there is,
in the present state
of things,
of finding any better.
The employments, too,
in which people
of some rank or fortune
spend the greater part
of their lives,
are not, like those
of the common people,
simple and uniform.
They
are almost all of them
extremely complicated,
and such as exercise
the head
more than the hands.
The understandings of those
who are engaged
in such employments,
can seldom grow torpid
for want
of exercise.
The employments
of people
of some rank and fortune,
besides,
are seldom such as
harass them
from morning to night.
They generally have
a good deal
of leisure,
during which
they may perfect themselves
in every branch,
either
of useful
or ornamental knowledge,
of which
they may have laid
the foundation,
or for which
they may have acquired
some taste
in the earlier part
of life.
It
is otherwise
with the common people.
They have little time
to spare for education.
Their parents
can scarce
afford to maintain them,
even in infancy.
As soon
as they are able
to work,
they must apply
to some trade,
by which
they can earn
their subsistence.
That trade, too,
is generally so simple
and uniform,
as to give little exercise
to the understanding;
while,
at the same time,
their labour
is both so constant
and so severe,
that
it leaves them little leisure
and less inclination
to apply to,
or even to think
of any thing else.
But though the common
people cannot,
in any civilized society,
be so well
instructed
as people of some rank
and fortune;
the most essential parts
of education,
however,
to read,
write,
and account,
can be acquired at so early
a period of life,
that the greater part,
even of those
who are
to be bred
to the lowest occupations,
have time
to acquire them
before they
can be employed
in those occupations.
For a very small expense,
the public
can facilitate,
can encourage
and can even impose
upon almost
the whole body of the people,
the necessity
of acquiring those
most essential parts
of education.
The public
can facilitate this acquisition,
by establishing
in every parish
or district a little school,
where children maybe
taught
for a reward so moderate,
that even
a common
labourer may afford it;
the master
being partly,
but not wholly,
paid by the public;
because,
if he was wholly,
or even principally,
paid by it,
he would soon learn
to neglect his business.
In Scotland,
the establishment
of such parish schools
has taught almost
the whole common people to read,
and a very great proportion
of them
to write and account.
In England,
the establishment
of charity schools
has had an effect
of the same kind,
though not so universally,
because the establishment
is not so universal.
If,
in those little schools,
the books
by which the children
are taught to read,
were a little more instructive
than
they
commonly are;
and if,
instead of a little smattering
in Latin,
which
the children
of the common people
are sometimes taught
there,
and which can scarce
ever be
of any use to them,
they
were instructed
in the elementary parts
of geometry and mechanics;
the literary education
of this rank of people
would,
perhaps,
be as complete as
can be.
There
is scarce a common trade,
which does not afford
some opportunities
of applying
to it the principles
of geometry and mechanics,
and which would not,
therefore,
gradually
exercise
and improve the common
people
in those principles,
the necessary introduction
to the most sublime,
as
well as
to the most useful sciences.
The public
can encourage the acquisition
of those
most essential parts
of education,
by giving small premiums,
and little badges
of distinction,
to the children
of the common people
who excel in them.
The public
can impose
upon almost the whole body
of the people the necessity
of acquiring
the most essential parts
of education,
by obliging every man
to undergo an examination
or probation
in them,
before he
can obtain the freedom in any
corporation,
or be allowed
to set up any trade,
either
in a village
or town corporate.
It was in this manner,
by facilitating
the acquisition
of their
military
and gymnastic exercises,
by encouraging it,
and even by imposing
upon the whole body
of the people the necessity
of learning those exercises,
that the Greek
and Roman republics
maintained
the martial spirit
of their respective citizens.
They facilitated
the acquisition
of those exercises,
by appointing a certain place
for learning and
practising them,
and by granting
to certain masters
the privilege
of teaching
in that place.
Those
masters
do not appear
to have had either salaries
or
exclusive privileges
of any kind.
Their reward
consisted altogether in what
they got from their scholars;
and a citizen,
who had learnt
his exercises
in the public gymnasia,
had no sort
of legal advantage
over one
who had learnt them privately,
provided
the latter
had learned them equally well.
Those republics
encouraged
the acquisition
of those exercises,
by bestowing
little premiums
and badges
of distinction upon those
who excelled in them.
To have gained a prize
in the Olympic,
Isthmian,
or Nemaean games,
gave illustration,
not only to the person
who gained it,
but to his whole family
and kindred.
The obligation
which every citizen
was under,
to serve
a certain number of years,
if called upon,
in the armies
of the republic,
sufficiently
imposed the necessity
of learning those exercises,
without which
he could not be fit for
that service.
That in the progress
of improvement,
the practice
of military exercises,
unless government
takes
proper pains to support it,
goes gradually
to decay,
and, together with it,
the martial spirit
of the great body
of the people,
the example of modern
Europe
sufficiently demonstrates.
But the security of every
society
must always depend,
more or less,
upon the martial spirit
of the great body
of the people.
In the present times,
indeed,
that martial spirit alone,
and unsupported
by a well-disciplined
standing army,
would not,
perhaps,
be sufficient
for the defence and security
of any society.
But where every citizen
had the spirit of a soldier,
a smaller standing army
would surely be requisite.
That spirit,
besides,
would necessarily diminish very much
the dangers to liberty,
whether real
or imaginary,
which are commonly apprehended
from a standing army.
As it would very much
facilitate
the operations of
that army
against a foreign invader;
so it
would obstruct them as much,
if unfortunately
they should ever be directed
against the constitution
of the state.
The ancient institutions
of Greece and Rome
seem to have been
much more effectual
for maintaining
the martial spirit
of the great body
of the people,
than the establishment of
what are called
the militias of modern times.
They
were much more simple.
When they
were once established,
they executed themselves,
and it
required little or no attention
from government
to maintain them
in the most perfect vigour.
Whereas
to maintain,
even in tolerable execution,
the complex regulations
of any modern militia,
requires
the continual and painful
attention
of government,
without which
they are constantly falling
into total neglect and disuse.
The influence,
besides,
of the ancient institutions,
was much more universal.
By means of them,
the whole body of the people
was completely instructed
in the use of arms;
whereas
it
is but a very small part
of them
who can ever be
so instructed
by the regulations
of any modern militia,
except,
perhaps,
that of Switzerland.
But a coward,
a man incapable either
of defending
or of revenging himself,
evidently wants one
of the most essential parts
of the character of a man.
He is as much
mutilated and deformed
in his mind
as another
is in his body,
who is either
deprived
of some of
its most essential members,
or has lost
the use of them.
He is evidently
the more wretched
and miserable
of the two;
because happiness and misery,
which
reside altogether in the mind,
must necessarily depend more
upon the healthful or unhealthful,
the mutilated or
entire state of the mind,
than upon that of the body.
Even though
the martial spirit
of the people
were of no use
towards the defence
of the society,
yet,
to prevent that sort
of mental mutilation,
deformity,
and wretchedness,
which cowardice
necessarily involves in it,
from spreading themselves
through the great body
of the people,
would still deserve
the most serious attention
of government;
in the same manner
as it would deserve
its most serious attention
to prevent a leprosy,
or any other loathsome
and offensive disease,
though neither mortal nor
dangerous,
from spreading itself
among them;
though,
perhaps,
no other public good
might result from such attention,
besides the prevention
of so great a public evil.
The same thing
may be said
of the gross ignorance
and stupidity which,
in a civilized society,
seem so frequently
to benumb the understandings
of all
the inferior ranks of people.
A man
without the proper use
of the intellectual faculties
of a man,
is, if possible,
more contemptible than
even a coward,
and seems
to be mutilated
and deformed
in a still more essential part
of the character
of human nature.
Though the state
was to derive no advantage
from the instruction
of the inferior ranks
of people,
it would still deserve
its attention
that they
should not
be altogether uninstructed.
The state,
however,
derives no
inconsiderable advantage
from their instruction.
The more
they are instructed,
the less liable
they are
to the delusions
of enthusiasm and superstition,
which,
among ignorant
nations frequently occasion
the most dreadful disorders.
An instructed
and intelligent people,
besides,
are always more decent
and orderly
than an
ignorant and stupid one.
They feel themselves,
each individually,
more respectable,
and more likely
to obtain the respect
of their lawful superiors,
and they are,
therefore,
more
disposed
to respect those superiors.
They
are more disposed
to examine,
and more capable
of seeing through,
the interested complaints
of faction and sedition;
and they are,
upon that account,
less apt to be misled
into any wanton
or unnecessary opposition
to the measures
of government.
In free countries,
where the safety of government
depends very much
upon the favourable judgment which
the people
may form of its conduct,
it
must surely be
of the highest importance,
that
they should not be disposed
to judge rashly or
capriciously concerning it.
Of the Expense
of the Institutions
for the Instruction of People
of all Ages.
The institutions
for the instruction
of people of all ages,
are chiefly those
for religious instruction.
This
is a species of instruction,
of which the object
is not so much
to render
the people
good citizens in this
world,
as to prepare them
for another
and a better world
in the life
to come.
The teachers of the doctrine
which contains
this instruction,
in the same manner as
other teachers,
may either
depend altogether
for their subsistence
upon the
voluntary contributions
of their hearers;
or they
may derive it
from some other fund,
to which the law
of their country
may entitle them;
such as a landed estate,
a tythe
or land tax,
an established salary
or stipend.
Their exertion,
their zeal and industry,
are likely
to be much greater
in the former situation than
in the latter.
In this respect,
the teachers
of a new religion
have always had
a considerable advantage
in attacking those ancient
and established systems,
of which the clergy,
reposing themselves
upon their benefices,
had neglected
to keep
up the fervour
of faith and devotion
in the great body
of the people;
and having given themselves
up to indolence,
were become altogether incapable
of making
any vigorous exertion
in defence even
of their own establishment.
The clergy
of an established
and well endowed religion
frequently become men
of learning and elegance,
who possess all
the virtues of gentlemen,
or which
can recommend them
to the esteem of gentlemen;
but they are apt
gradually to lose
the qualities,
both good and bad,
which gave them authority
and influence
with the inferior ranks
of people,
and which
had perhaps been
the original causes
of the success and establishment
of their religion.
Such a clergy,
when attacked
by a set
of popular and bold,
though perhaps stupid
and ignorant enthusiasts,
feel themselves
as perfectly defenceless
as the indolent,
effeminate,
and full fed nations
of the southern parts
of Asia,
when they
were invaded by the active,
hardy,
and hungry Tartars
of the north.
Such a clergy,
upon such an emergency,
have commonly no other resource
than
to call
upon the civil magistrate
to persecute,
destroy,
or drive
out their adversaries,
as
disturbers of the public peace.
It was thus
that
the Roman catholic clergy called
upon the civil magistrate
to persecute the protestants,
and the church of England
to persecute the dissenters;
and that
in general
every religious sect,
when it has once enjoyed,
for a century or two,
the security
of a legal establishment,
has found itself
incapable of making
any vigorous defence
against any new sect
which chose
to attack its doctrine
or discipline.
Upon such occasions,
the advantage,
in point
of learning and good writing,
may sometimes be on the side
of the established church.
But the arts of popularity,
all the arts
of gaining proselytes,
are constantly on the side
of its adversaries.
In England,
those arts
have been long neglected
by the well endowed clergy
of the established church,
and are at present chiefly
cultivated
by the dissenters
and by the methodists.
The independent provisions,
however,
which in many places
have been made
for dissenting teachers,
by means
of voluntary subscriptions,
of trust rights,
and other evasions
of the law,
seem very much
to have abated the zeal
and activity
of those teachers.
They have many of them
become very learned,
ingenious,
and respectable men;
but they
have
in general ceased
to be very popular preachers.
The methodists,
without half
the learning
of the dissenters,
are much more in vogue.
In the church
of Rome
the industry and zeal
of the inferior clergy
are kept more alive
by the powerful motive
of self-interest,
than perhaps in any
established
protestant church.
The parochial clergy
derive many of them,
a very considerable part
of their subsistence
from the voluntary oblations
of the people;
a source of revenue,
which confession
gives them many opportunities
of improving.
The mendicant orders
derive their whole subsistence
from such oblations.
It is with them as
with the hussars
and light infantry
of some armies;
no plunder,
no pay.
The parochial clergy
are like those teachers
whose reward
depends partly
upon their salary,
and partly upon the fees
or honoraries which
they get from their pupils;
and these must always depend,
more or less,
upon their industry
and reputation.
The mendicant orders
are like those teachers
whose subsistence
depends altogether
upon their industry.
They
are obliged,
therefore,
to use
every art
which can animate the devotion
of the common people.
The establishment
of the two great mendicant orders
of St Dominic
and St. Francis,
it is observed by Machiavel,
revived,
in the thirteenth
and fourteenth centuries,
the languishing faith
and devotion
of the catholic church.
In Roman catholic countries,
the spirit of devotion
is supported altogether
by the monks,
and by the poorer parochial clergy.
The great dignitaries
of the church,
with all the accomplishments
of gentlemen and men
of the world,
and sometimes with those
of men
of learning,
are careful
to maintain
the necessary discipline
over their inferiors,
but seldom
give themselves any trouble
about the instruction
of the people.
"Most of the arts
and professions in a state,"
says by far
the most illustrious philosopher
and historian
of the present age,
"are of such a nature,
that,
while they
promote the interests
of the society,
they
are also useful or agreeable
to some individuals;
and, in that case,
the constant rule
of the magistrate,
except,
perhaps,
on the first introduction
of any art,
is, to leave the profession
to itself,
and trust its encouragement
to the individuals
who reap the benefit of it.
The artizans,
finding
their profits
to rise
by the favour
of their customers,
increase,
as much as possible,
their skill and industry;
and as matters
are not disturbed
by any injudicious tampering,
the commodity
is always sure
to be
at all
times nearly proportioned
to the demand.
"But there are also
some callings which,
though
useful and even necessary
in a state,
bring no advantage or pleasure
to any individual;
and the supreme power
is obliged
to alter its conduct
with regard to
the retainers
of those professions.
It must give them
public encouragement
in order to their subsistence;
and it
must provide against
that negligence
to which they
will naturally be subject,
either
by annexing
particular honours
to profession,
by establishing
a long subordination of ranks,
and a strict dependence,
or by some other expedient.
The persons
employed in the finances,
fleets,
and magistracy,
are instances
of this order of men.
"It may naturally be thought,
at first sight,
that the ecclesiastics
belong to the first class,
and that their encouragement,
as well as that
of lawyers and physicians,
may safely be entrusted
to the liberality
of individuals,
who are attached
to their doctrines,
and who
find benefit or consolation
from their spiritual ministry
and assistance.
Their industry
and vigilance will,
no doubt,
be whetted
by such an additional motive;
and their skill
in the profession,
as well as their address
in governing
the minds of the people,
must receive daily increase,
from their increasing practice,
study,
and attention.
"But if we
consider
the matter more closely,
we shall find that this
interested diligence
of the clergy
is
what every wise legislator
will study
to prevent;
because,
in every religion
except the true,
it is highly pernicious,
and it
has even a natural tendency
to pervert the truth,
by infusing into it
a strong mixture
of superstition,
folly,
and delusion.
Each ghostly practitioner,
in order to
render himself
more precious and sacred
in the eyes of his retainers,
will inspire them
with the most violent abhorrence
of all other sects,
and continually endeavour,
by some novelty,
to excite the languid devotion
of his audience.
No regard
will be paid to truth,
morals,
or decency,
in the doctrines inculcated.
Every tenet
will be adopted that best
suits
the disorderly affections
of the human frame.
Customers
will be drawn
to each conventicle
by new industry
and address,
in practising
on the passions and credulity
of the populace.
And, in the end,
the civil magistrate
will find
that he
has dearly paid
for his intended frugality,
in saving
a fixed establishment
for the priests;
and that,
in reality,
the most decent and advantageous
composition,
which
he can make
with the spiritual guides,
is
to bribe their indolence,
by assigning
stated salaries
to their profession,
and rendering it superfluous
for them
to be farther active,
than
merely to prevent their flock
from straying
in quest of new pastors.
And in this
manner
ecclesiastical establishments,
though commonly
they arose
at first from religious views,
prove
in the end advantageous
to the political interests
of society."
But whatever
may have been
the good or bad effects
of the independent provision
of the clergy,
it has,
perhaps,
been very seldom
bestowed
upon them
from any view
to those effects.
Times
of violent religious controversy
have generally been times
of equally violent political
faction.
Upon such occasions,
each political party
has either found it,
or imagined it,
for his interest,
to league itself
with some one or other
of the contending
religious sects.
But this
could be done only
by adopting,
or, at least,
by favouring
the tenets of
that particular sect.
The sect
which had the good fortune
to be leagued
with the conquering party necessarily
shared
in the victory of its ally,
by whose favour
and protection
it was soon enabled,
in some degree,
to silence
and subdue all
its adversaries.
Those adversaries
had generally leagued themselves
with the enemies
of the conquering party,
and were,
therefore the enemies
of that party.
The clergy
of this particular sect
having thus
become complete masters
of the field,
and their influence
and authority
with the great body
of the people
being in its highest vigour,
they were powerful enough
to overawe the chiefs
and leaders
of their own party,
and
to oblige the civil magistrate
to respect their opinions
and inclinations.
Their first demand
was generally that
he should silence
and subdue all
their adversaries;
and their second,
that he
should bestow
an independent provision
on themselves.
As they
had generally contributed
a good deal
to the victory,
it seemed not unreasonable
that they
should have some share in
the spoil.
They
were weary,
besides,
of humouring the people,
and of depending
upon their caprice
for a subsistence.
In making this demand,
therefore,
they consulted
their own ease and comfort,
without troubling themselves
about the effect which
it might have,
in future times,
upon the influence and authority
of their order.
The civil magistrate,
who could comply
with their demand
only by giving them something
which
he would have chosen much
rather to take,
or to keep to himself,
was seldom very forward
to grant it.
Necessity,
however,
always
forced him
to submit at last,
though
frequently not
till after many delays,
evasions,
and affected
excuses.
But if politics
had never called
in the aid
of religion,
had the conquering party never
adopted the tenets
of one sect more than those
of another,
when it
had gained the victory,
it
would probably have dealt equally
and impartially
with all the different sects,
and have allowed every man
to choose his own priest,
and his own religion,
as he thought proper.
There
would,
and, in this case,
no doubt,
have been,
a great multitude
of religious sects.
Almost
every different congregation
might probably have had
a little sect
by itself,
or have entertained some
peculiar tenets of its own.
Each teacher,
would,
no doubt,
have felt himself
under the necessity
of making the utmost exertion,
and of using every art,
both
to preserve and
to increase the number
of his disciples.
But as every other teacher
would have felt himself
under the same necessity,
the success
of no one teacher,
or sect of teachers,
could have been very great.
The interested and active zeal
of religious
teachers
can be
dangerous and troublesome only
where
there is either
but one sect tolerated
in the society,
or where the whole
of a large society
is divided
into two
or three great sects;
the teachers of each acting
by concert,
and under a regular discipline
and subordination.
But that zeal
must be altogether innocent,
where the society
is divided
into two or three hundred,
or, perhaps,
into as
many thousand small sects,
of which no one
could be considerable enough
to disturb
the public tranquillity.
The teachers of each sect,
seeing themselves
surrounded
on all sides
with more adversaries
than friends,
would be obliged
to learn
that candour and moderation
which are so seldom
to be found
among the teachers
of those great sects,
whose tenets,
being supported
by the civil magistrate,
are held
in veneration
by almost all the inhabitants
of extensive kingdoms
and empires,
and who,
therefore,
see nothing
round them but followers,
disciples,
and humble admirers.
The teachers
of each little sect,
finding themselves almost alone,
would be obliged
to respect those
of almost every other sect;
and the concessions which
they would mutually find
in both convenient
and agreeable
to make one to another,
might in time,
probably
reduce the doctrine
of the greater part
of them to
that
pure and rational religion,
free from every mixture
of absurdity,
imposture,
or fanaticism,
such as wise men have,
in all ages
of the world,
wished
to see established;
but such as positive law has,
perhaps,
never yet established,
and probably
never will establish
in any country;
because,
with regard to religion,
positive law
always has been,
and probably
always will be,
more or less
influenced
by popular superstition
and enthusiasm.
This plan
of ecclesiastical government,
or, more properly,
of no ecclesiastical government,
was what the sect
called Independents
(a sect,
no doubt,
of very wild enthusiasts),
proposed
to establish
in England
towards the end
of the civil war.
If it
had been established,
though
of a very unphilosophical origin,
it would probably,
by this time,
have been productive
of the most philosophical
good temper
and moderation
with regard to every sort
of religious principle.
It has been established
in Pennsylvania,
where,
though the quakers
happen
to be the most numerous,
the law,
in reality,
favours no one sect
more than another;
and it is there said
to have been productive
of this
philosophical good temper
and moderation,
But though this
equality of treatment
should not be productive
of this good temper
and moderation
in all,
or even in the greater part
of the religious sects
of a particular country;
yet,
provided those sects
were sufficiently numerous,
and each
of them consequently too small
to disturb
the public tranquillity,
the excessive zeal of each
for its particular tenets
could not well be productive
of any very hurtful effects,
but,
on the contrary,
of several good ones;
and if the government
was perfectly decided,
both to let them all alone,
and to oblige them all
to let alone one another,
there
is little danger
that they
would not
of their own accord,
subdivide themselves fast enough,
so as
soon to become sufficiently
numerous.
In every civilized society,
in every society
where the distinction
of ranks
has once been completely
established,
there
have been always
two different schemes
or systems
of morality current
at the same time;
of which
the one
may be called
the strict or austere;
the other the liberal,
or, if you will,
the loose system.
The former
is generally admired
and revered
by the common people;
the latter
is commonly more
esteemed and adopted by what
are called
the people of fashion.
The degree
of disapprobation
with which
we ought to mark the vices
of levity,
the vices
which are apt
to arise from great prosperity,
and from the excess
of gaiety and good humour,
seems
to constitute
the principal distinction
between those
two opposite schemes
or systems.
In the
liberal or loose system,
luxury,
wanton,
and even disorderly mirth,
the pursuit
of pleasure
to some degree
of intemperance,
the breach of chastity,
at least
in one
of the two sexes,.etc. provided
they are not accompanied
with gross indecency,
and do not lead
to falsehood and injustice,
are generally treated
with a good deal
of indulgence,
and are easily either
excused
or pardoned altogether.
In the austere system,
on the contrary,
those excesses
are regarded
with the utmost abhorrence
and detestation.
The vices of levity
are always ruinous
to the common people,
and
a single week's
thoughtlessness and dissipation
is often sufficient
to undo a poor workman
for ever,
and to drive him,
through despair,
upon committing
the most enormous crimes.
The wiser and better sort
of the common people,
therefore,
have always
the utmost abhorrence
and detestation
of such excesses,
which
their experience tells them
are so immediately fatal
to people
of their condition.
The disorder and extravagance
of several years,
on the contrary,
will not always ruin
a man of fashion;
and people of that rank
are very apt
to consider the power
of indulging
in some degree of excess,
as one
of the advantages
of their fortune;
and the liberty
of doing so
without censure or reproach,
as one
of the privileges which
belong to their station.
In people
of their own station,
therefore,
they regard
such excesses with
but a small degree
of disapprobation,
and censure them either very slightly
or
not at all.
Almost all religious sects
have begun
among the common people,
from whom
they have generally drawn
their earliest,
as well as
their most numerous proselytes.
The austere system
of morality has,
accordingly,
been adopted
by those sects
almost constantly,
or with very few exceptions;
for there have been some.
It was the system
by which they could best
recommend themselves
to that order of people,
to whom they first
proposed their plan
of reformation upon what
had been before established.
Many of them,
perhaps
the greater part of them,
have even endeavoured
to gain credit
by refining
upon this austere system,
and by carrying it
to some degree
of folly and extravagance;
and this
excessive rigour
has frequently recommended them,
more than any thing else,
to the respect and veneration
of the common people.
A man
of rank and fortune is,
by his station,
the distinguished member
of a great society,
who attend
to every part of his conduct,
and who
thereby oblige him
to attend
to every part of it himself.
His authority
and consideration
depend very much
upon the respect which
this society bears to him.
He dares not do anything
which would disgrace
or discredit him in it;
and he
is obliged
to a very strict observation
of that species
of morals,
whether liberal or austere,
which
the general consent
of this society
prescribes
to persons
of his rank and fortune.
A man of low condition,
on the contrary,
is far from being
a distinguished member
of any great society.
While he
remains in a country village,
his conduct
may be attended to,
and he may be obliged
to attend to it himself.
In this situation,
and in this situation only,
he may have
what is called
a character
to lose.
But as soon
as he comes
into a great city,
he is sunk
in obscurity and darkness.
His conduct
is observed
and attended to by nobody;
and he is,
therefore,
very likely
to neglect it himself,
and to abandon himself
to every sort
of low profligacy and vice.
He
never emerges so effectually
from this obscurity,
his conduct
never excites
so much the attention
of any respectable society,
as by his becoming
the member
of a small religious sect.
He from that moment
acquires a degree
of consideration which
he never had before.
All his brother sectaries are,
for the credit
of the sect,
interested
to observe his conduct;
and,
if he
gives occasion to any scandal,
if he
deviates very much
from those
austere morals which
they almost
always require of one another,
to punish him by what
is always
a very severe punishment,
even where no evil
effects attend it,
expulsion or excommunication
from the sect.
In little religious sects,
accordingly,
the morals
of the common people
have been almost always remarkably
regular
and orderly;
generally much more
so than
in the established church.
The morals
of those little sects,
indeed,
have frequently been
rather disagreeably rigorous
and unsocial.
There
are
two very easy
and effectual remedies,
however,
by whose joint operation
the state might,
without violence,
correct
whatever
was unsocial
or disagreeably rigorous
in the morals of all
the little sects into which
the country was divided.
The first of those remedies
is the study
of science and philosophy,
which
the state
might render almost universal
among all people
of middling
or more than middling rank
and fortune;
not by giving salaries
to teachers in order to
make them negligent and idle,
but by instituting some sort
of probation,
even in the higher
and more difficult sciences,
to be undergone
by every person
before he
was permitted
to exercise
any liberal profession,
or before he
could be received
as a candidate
for any honourable office,
of trust
or profit.
if the state imposed
upon this order
of men the necessity
of learning,
it would have no occasion
to give itself any trouble
about providing them
with proper teachers.
They
would soon find better teachers
for themselves,
than any whom
the state
could provide for them.
Science
is the great antidote
to the poison
of enthusiasm and superstition;
and where
all the superior ranks
of people
were secured from it,
the inferior ranks
could not be much
exposed to it.
The second of those remedies
is the frequency and gaiety
of public diversions.
The state,
by encouraging,
that is, by giving
entire liberty
to all
those who,
from their own interest,
would attempt,
without scandal or indecency,
to amuse
and divert the people
by painting,
poetry,
music,
dancing;
by all sorts
of dramatic representations
and exhibitions;
would easily dissipate,
in the greater part
of them,
that melancholy
and gloomy humour
which is almost always
the nurse
of popular superstition
and enthusiasm.
Public
diversions have always been
the objects
of dread and hatred
to all the fanatical promoters
of those popular frenzies.
The gaiety
and good humour which
those diversions
inspire,
were altogether inconsistent
with that temper of mind
which was fittest
for their purpose,
or which
they could best
work upon.
Dramatic representations,
besides,
frequently
exposing
their artifices
to public ridicule,
and sometimes
even to public execration,
were, upon that account,
more than all other diversions,
the objects
of their peculiar abhorrence.
In a country
where the law
favoured the teachers
of no one
religion more than those
of another,
it would not be necessary
that any
of them
should have
any particular
or immediate dependency
upon the sovereign
or executive power;
or that
he should have anything
to do either
in appointing or
in dismissing them
from their offices.
In such a situation,
he would have
no occasion
to give himself any concern
about them,
further than
to keep the peace among them,
in the same manner
as among the rest
of his subjects,
that is,
to hinder them from persecuting,
abusing,
or oppressing one another.
But it
is quite
otherwise in countries
where there is
an established
or governing religion.
The sovereign can
in this case
never be secure,
unless he
has the means
of influencing
in a considerable degree
the greater part
of the teachers of
that religion.
The clergy
of every established church
constitute
a great incorporation.
They can act in concert,
and pursue their interest
upon one plan,
and with one spirit as much
as if they
were under the direction
of one man;
and they are
frequently, too,
under such direction.
Their interest
as an incorporated body
is never the same with
that of the sovereign,
and is sometimes
directly opposite
to it.
Their great interest
is to maintain their authority
with the people,
and this authority
depends
upon the supposed certainty
and importance
of the whole doctrine which
they inculcate,
and upon the supposed necessity
of adopting every part of it
with the most implicit faith,
in order to
avoid eternal misery.
Should the sovereign
have the imprudence
to appear
either
to deride,
or doubt himself
of the most trifling part
of their doctrine,
or from humanity,
attempt
to protect
those
who did either
the one or the other,
the punctilious honour
of a clergy,
who have no sort
of dependency upon him,
is immediately provoked
to proscribe him
as a profane person,
and to employ all the terrors
of religion,
in order to
oblige the people
to transfer their allegiance
to some more orthodox
and obedient prince.
Should
he oppose any
of their pretensions
or usurpations,
the danger
is equally great.
The princes
who have dared in this
manner
to rebel against the church,
over and above this crime
of rebellion,
have generally been charged, too,
with the additional crime
of heresy,
notwithstanding
their solemn protestations
of their faith,
and humble submission
to every tenet which
she thought proper
to prescribe to them.
But the authority of religion
is superior
to every other authority.
The fears which
it suggests
conquer all other fears.
When
the authorized teachers
of religion
propagate
through the great body
of the people,
doctrines subversive
of the authority
of the sovereign,
it is by violence only,
or by the force
of a standing army,
that he
can maintain his authority.
Even
a standing army
cannot in this case
give him any lasting security;
because if the soldiers
are not foreigners,
which can seldom be the case,
but drawn
from the great body
of the people,
which must almost always be
the case,
they
are likely
to be soon corrupted
by those very doctrines.
The revolutions which
the turbulence
of the Greek clergy
was continually occasioning
at Constantinople,
as long
as
the eastern empire subsisted;
the convulsions which,
during the course
of several centuries,
the turbulence
of the Roman clergy
was continually occasioning
in every part of Europe,
sufficiently
demonstrate how
precarious and insecure
must always be the situation
of the sovereign,
who has
no proper means of influencing
the clergy of the
established and
governing religion
of his country.
Articles of faith,
as
well as all
other spiritual matters,
it is evident enough,
are not
within the proper department
of a temporal sovereign,
who,
though he
may be very well qualified
for protecting,
is seldom supposed
to be so
for instructing the people.
With regard to such matters,
therefore,
his authority
can seldom be sufficient
to counterbalance
the united authority
of the clergy
of the established church.
The public tranquillity,
however,
and his own security,
may frequently depend
upon the doctrines which
they may think proper
to propagate
concerning such matters.
As he
can seldom directly oppose
their decision,
therefore,
with proper weight
and authority,
it is necessary
that
he should be able
to influence it;
and he
can influence it
only by the fears
and expectations which
he may excite
in the greater part
of the individuals
of the order.
Those fears and expectations
may consist
in the fear
of deprivation
or other punishment,
and in the expectation
of further preferment.
In all Christian churches,
the benefices of the clergy
are a sort of freeholds,
which
they enjoy,
not during pleasure,
but during life
or good behaviour.
If they
held them
by a more precarious tenure,
and were
liable to be turned out
upon every slight
disobligation either
of the sovereign
or of his ministers,
it would perhaps be impossible
for them
to maintain their authority
with the people,
who would then consider them
as mercenary dependents
upon the court,
in the sincerity
of whose instructions
they could
no longer have
any confidence.
But should
the sovereign attempt irregularly,
and by violence,
to deprive any number
of clergymen
of their freeholds,
on account,
perhaps,
of their having propagated,
with more than ordinary zeal,
some factious
or seditious doctrine,
he would only render,
by such persecution,
both them
and their doctrine
ten times more popular,
and therefore ten times
more troublesome and dangerous,
than they had been before.
Fear
is in almost all
cases a wretched instrument
of govermnent,
and ought in particular
never
to be employed
against any order of men
who have
the smallest pretensions
to independency.
To attempt
to terrify them,
serves
only to irritate
their bad humour,
and to confirm them
in an opposition,
which more gentle usage,
perhaps,
might easily induce them
either
to soften,
or to lay aside altogether.
The violence which
the French government usually employed
in order to
oblige all their parliaments,
or sovereign courts
of justice,
to enregister
any unpopular edict,
very seldom succeeded.
The means
commonly employed,
however,
the imprisonment
of all the refractory members,
one would think,
were forcible enough.
The princes
of the house of Stuart
sometimes employed
the like means
in order to influence
some of the members
of the parliament of England,
and they
generally found them equally
intractable.
The parliament of England
is now managed
in another manner;
and a very small experiment,
which
the duke of Choiseul made,
about twelve years ago,
upon the parliament of Paris,
demonstrated sufficiently
that all the parliaments
of France
might have been managed still more easily
in the same manner.
That experiment
was not pursued.
For though management
and persuasion
are always
the easiest and safest instruments
of government
as force and violence
are the worst
and the most dangerous;
yet such,
it seems,
is the natural insolence
of man,
that he almost
always disdains
to use the good instrument,
except when he cannot
or dare not use the bad one.
The French government
could and durst use force,
and therefore
disdained
to use management
and persuasion.
But there is no order
of men,
it appears
I believe,
from the experience
of all ages,
upon whom
it is
so dangerous
or rather so perfectly ruinous,
to employ force and violence,
as upon the respected clergy
of an established church.
The rights,
the privileges,
the personal liberty
of every individual ecclesiastic,
who is
upon good terms
with his own order,
are,
even in
the most despotic governments,
more
respected
than those
of any other person of
nearly equal rank and fortune.
It is so in
every gradation of despotism,
from that
of the
gentle and mild government
of Paris,
to that
of the
violent and furious
government
of Constantinople.
But though this order of men
can scarce
ever be forced,
they
may be managed as
easily as any other;
and the security
of the sovereign,
as well as
the public tranquillity,
seems
to depend very much
upon the means
which he has
of managing them;
and those means
seem to consist altogether
in the preferment
which he
has to bestow upon them.
In the ancient constitution
of the Christian church,
the bishop
of each diocese
was elected
by the joint votes
of the clergy
and of the people
of the episcopal city.
The people
did not long
retain their right
of election;
and while they did retain it,
they almost always acted
under the influence
of the clergy,
who,
in such spiritual matters,
appeared
to be their natural guides.
The clergy,
however,
soon
grew weary of the trouble
of managing them,
and found it easier
to elect
their own bishops themselves.
The abbot,
in the same manner,
was elected by the monks
of the monastery,
at least
in the greater part
of abbacies.
All
the inferior
ecclesiastical benefices comprehended
within the diocese
were collated by the bishop,
who bestowed them
upon such ecclesiastics as he
thought proper.
All church preferments
were in this manner
in the disposal
of the church.
The sovereign,
though he
might have
some indirect influence
in those elections,
and though it
was sometimes
usual to ask both
his consent
to elect,
and his approbation
of the election,
yet had no direct
or sufficient means
of managing the clergy.
The ambition
of every clergyman
naturally led him
to pay court,
not so much
to his sovereign
as to his own order,
from which only
he could expect preferment.
Through the greater part
of Europe,
the pope
gradually drew to himself,
first the collation
of almost all bishoprics
and abbacies,
or of
what were called
consistorial benefices,
and afterwards,
by various machinations
and pretences,
of the greater part
of inferior benefices
comprehended within each diocese,
little more
being left
to the bishop than what
was barely necessary
to give him
a decent authority
with his own clergy.
By this arrangement
the condition of the sovereign
was still worse than it
had been before.
The clergy of all
the different countries
of Europe
were thus formed
into a sort
of spiritual army,
dispersed
in different quarters indeed,
but
of which all the movements
and operations
could now be directed
by one head,
and conducted
upon one uniform plan.
The clergy
of each particular country
might be considered
as a particular detachment of
that army,
of which the operations
could easily be supported
and seconded
by all
the other detachments quartered
in the
different countries round
about.
Each detachment
was not only independent
of the sovereign
of the country
in which it was quartered,
and by which it
was maintained,
but dependent
upon a foreign sovereign,
who could at any time
turn
its arms
against the sovereign of
that particular country,
and support them
by the arms
of all
the other detachments.
Those
arms were the most formidable
that can well be imagined.
In the ancient state
of Europe,
before the establishment
of arts
and manufactures,
the wealth of the clergy
gave them the same sort
of influence
over the common people which
that of the great barons
gave them
over their respective vassals,
tenants,
and retainers.
In the great landed estates,
which the mistaken piety both
of princes
and private persons
had bestowed upon the church,
jurisdictions
were established,
of the same kind with those
of the great barons,
and for the same reason.
In those great landed estates,
the clergy,
or their bailiffs,
could easily keep the peace,
without the support
or assistance either
of the king
or of any other person;
and neither
the king nor any other person
could keep the peace
there without the support
and assistance
of the clergy.
The jurisdictions
of the clergy,
therefore,
in their particular baronies
or manors,
were equally independent,
and equally exclusive
of the authority
of the king's courts,
as those
of the great temporal lords.
The tenants
of the clergy were,
like those
of the great barons,
almost all tenants at will,
entirely dependent
upon their immediate lords,
and, therefore,
liable
to be called out at pleasure,
in order to fight
in any quarrel
in which the clergy
might think proper
to engage them.
Over and above the rents
of those estates,
the clergy
possessed
in the tithes
a very large portion
of the rents
of all
the other estates
in every kingdom of Europe.
The revenues
arising from both
those species
of rents were,
the greater part of them,
paid in kind,
in corn,
wine,
cattle,
poultry,.etc.
The quantity
exceeded greatly
what the clergy
could themselves consume;
and there were
neither arts nor
manufactures,
for the produce
of which
they could exchange
the surplus.
The clergy
could derive advantage
from this
immense surplus in no other way
than by employing it,
as the great barons
employed the like surplus
of their revenues,
in the
most profuse hospitality,
and in the most extensive charity.
Both the hospitality
and the charity
of the ancient clergy,
accordingly,
are said
to have been very great.
They not
only maintained almost
the whole poor
of every kingdom,
but many knights and gentlemen
had frequently no other means
of subsistence
than by travelling about
from monastery to monastery,
under pretence of devotion,
but in reality
to enjoy the hospitality
of the clergy.
The retainers
of some particular
prelates
were often
as numerous as those
of the greatest lay-lords;
and the retainers
of all the clergy
taken together were,
perhaps,
more numerous than those
of all the lay-lords.
There
was always much more union
among the clergy than
among the lay-lords.
The former
were
under a regular discipline
and subordination
to the papal authority.
The latter
were
under no regular discipline
or subordination,
but almost
always equally jealous
of one another,
and of the king.
Though
the tenants and retainers
of the clergy,
therefore,
had both together
been less numerous than those
of the great lay-lords,
and their tenants
were probably much less numerous,
yet their union
would have rendered them
more formidable.
The hospitality and charity
of the clergy, too,
not only gave them
the command
of a great temporal force,
but increased very much
the weight
of their spiritual weapons.
Those virtues
procured them
the highest respect
and veneration
among all
the inferior ranks of people,
of whom many
were constantly,
and almost all occasionally,
fed by them.
Everything
belonging
or related
to so popular an order,
its possessions,
its privileges,
its doctrines,
necessarily
appeared sacred
in the eyes
of the common people;
and every violation of them,
whether real or pretended,
the highest act
of sacrilegious wickedness
and profaneness.
In this state of things,
if
the sovereign frequently found it
difficult
to resist the confederacy
of a few
of the great nobility,
we cannot wonder
that
he should find it still more
so to resist the united force
of the clergy
of his own dominions,
supported by
that of the clergy
of all
the neighbouring dominions.
In such circumstances,
the wonder is,
not that he
was sometimes obliged
to yield,
but that
he ever was able
to resist.
The privileges
of the clergy
in those ancient times
(which to us,
who live in the present
times,
appear the most absurd),
their total exemption
from the secular jurisdiction,
for example,
or what in England
was called
the benefit of clergy,
were the natural,
or rather the necessary,
consequences
of this state of things.
How dangerous
must
it have been
for the sovereign
to attempt
to punish a clergyman
for any crime
whatever,
if his order
were disposed
to protect him,
and to represent
either
the proof as insufficient
for convicting so holy a man,
or
the punishment as too severe
to be inflicted upon one
whose person
had been rendered sacred
by religion?
The sovereign
could,
in such circumstances,
do no better than
leave him
to be tried
by the ecclesiastical courts,
who,
for the honour
of their own order,
were interested
to restrain,
as much as possible,
every member of it
from committing
enormous crimes,
or even from giving occasion
to such gross scandal
as might disgust
the minds of the people.
In the state
in which things were,
through the greater part
of Europe,
during the tenth,
eleventh,
twelfth,
and thirteenth centuries,
and for some time both
before and after
that period,
the constitution
of the church of Rome
may be considered
as
the most formidable
combination that
ever was formed
against the authority
and security
of civil government,
as
well as against the liberty,
reason,
and happiness of mankind,
which can flourish only
where civil government
is able
to protect them.
In that constitution,
the grossest delusions
of superstition
were supported
in such a manner
by the private interests
of so great
a number of people,
as put them
out of all danger
from any assault
of human reason;
because,
though human reason
might,
perhaps,
have been able
to unveil,
even to
the eyes
of the common people,
some of the delusions
of superstition,
it could never have dissolved
the ties
of private interest.
Had this constitution
been attacked
by no other enemies
but the feeble efforts
of human reason,
it must have endured
for ever.
But that
immense and well-built fabric,
which all the wisdom
and virtue
of man
could never have shaken,
much less
have overturned,
was, by the natural course
of things,
first
weakened,
and
afterwards in part destroyed;
and is now likely,
in the course of a few
centuries more,
perhaps,
to crumble
into ruins altogether.
The gradual improvements
of arts,
manufactures,
and commerce,
the same causes
which destroyed the power
of the great barons,
destroyed,
in the same manner,
through the greater part
of Europe,
the whole temporal
manufactures,
and commerce,
the clergy,
like the great barons,
found something
for which
they could exchange
their rude produce,
and thereby discovered
the means
of spending
their whole revenues
upon their own persons,
without giving
any considerable share
of them to other people.
Their charity
became gradually less extensive,
their hospitality less liberal,
or less profuse.
Their retainers
became consequently less
numerous,
and, by degrees,
dwindled away altogether.
The clergy, too,
like the great barons,
wished
to get a better rent
from their landed estates,
in order to
spend it,
in the same manner,
upon the gratification
of their own private vanity
and folly.
But this increase of rent
could be
got only by granting leases
to their tenants,
who thereby became,
in a great measure,
independent of them.
The ties
of interest,
which bound the inferior ranks
of people to the clergy,
were in this manner
gradually broken
and dissolved.
They
were even broken
and dissolved sooner
than those
which bound the same ranks
of people
to the great barons;
because the benefices
of the church
being,
the greater part of them,
much smaller
than the estates
of the great barons,
the possessor of each benefice
was much sooner able
to spend the whole
of its revenue
upon his own person.
During the greater part
of the fourteenth
and fifteenth centuries,
the power
of the great barons was,
through the greater part
of Europe,
in full vigour.
But the temporal power
of the clergy,
the absolute command
which they
had once had
over the great body
of the people
was very much decayed.
The power of the church was,
by that time,
very nearly reduced,
through the greater part
of Europe,
to
what arose
from their spiritual authority;
and even that spiritual authority
was much weakened,
when it
ceased
to be supported
by the charity and hospitality
of the clergy.
The inferior ranks of people
no longer looked
upon that order
as they had done before;
as the comforters
of their distress,
and the relievers
of their indigence.
On the contrary,
they
were provoked
and disgusted by the vanity,
luxury,
and expense
of the richer clergy,
who appeared
to spend
upon their own pleasures
what had always before been
regarded
as the patrimony
of the poor.
In this situation of things,
the sovereigns
in the different states
of Europe
endeavoured
to recover
the influence
which they
had once had
in the disposal
of the great benefices
of the church;
by procuring
to the deans and chapters
of each diocese
the restoration
of their ancient right
of electing the bishop;
and to the monks
of each abbacy
that
of electing the abbot.
The re-establishing
this ancient order
was the object
of several statutes
enacted
in England
during the course
of the fourteenth century,
particularly of
what is called
the statute
of provisors;
and of the pragmatic sanction,
established
in France
in the fifteenth century.
In order to
render the election valid,
it was necessary
that the sovereign
should
both consent
to it before hand,
and afterwards approve
of the person elected;
and though
the election
was still supposed
to be free,
he had,
however all
the indirect means which
his situation
necessarily afforded him,
of influencing the clergy
in his own dominions.
Other regulations,
of a similar tendency,
were established
in other parts
of Europe.
But the power of the pope,
in the collation
of the great benefices
of the church,
seems,
before the reformation,
to have been nowhere
so effectually
and so universally restrained
as
in France and England.
The concordat afterwards,
in the sixteenth century,
gave to the kings
of France the absolute right
of presenting
to all the great,
or what
are called the consistorial,
benefices
of the Gallican church.
Since the establishment
of the pragmatic sanction
and of the concordat,
the clergy of France
have in general
shewn less respect
to the decrees
of the papal court,
than the clergy
of any other catholic country.
In all the disputes which
their sovereign
has had with the pope,
they
have almost constantly taken part
with the former.
This independency
of the clergy
of France
upon the court of Rome
seems
to be principally founded
upon the pragmatic sanction
and the concordat.
In the earlier periods
of the monarchy,
the clergy of France
appear to have been
as much devoted
to the pope as those
of any other country.
When Robert,
the second prince
of the Capetian race,
was most unjustly excommunicated
by the court
of Rome,
his own servants,
it is said,
threw the victuals
which came
from his table
to the dogs,
and refused
to taste any thing
themselves
which had been polluted
by the contact
of a person
in his situation.
They
were taught to do so,
it
may very safely be presumed,
by the clergy
of his own dominions.
The claim
of collating
to the great benefices
of the church,
a claim
in defence
of which the court of Rome
had frequently shaken,
and sometimes overturned,
the thrones
of some
of the greatest sovereigns
in Christendom,
was in this manner either
restrained
or modified,
or given up altogether,
in many different parts
of Europe,
even before the time
of the reformation.
As the clergy
had now less influence
over the people,
so the state
had more influence
over the clergy.
The clergy,
therefore,
had both less power,
and less inclination,
to disturb the state.
The authority
of the church of Rome
was in this state
of declension,
when the disputes which
gave birth to the reformation
began in Germany,
and soon spread themselves
through every part of Europe.
The new doctrines
were everywhere received
with a high degree
of popular favour.
They were propagated with all
that enthusiastic zeal
which commonly animates
the spirit
of
party,
when it
attacks
established authority.
The teachers
of those doctrines,
though perhaps,
in other respects,
not more learned
than many of the divines
who defended
the established church,
seem in general
to have been better
acquainted
with ecclesiastical history,
and with the origin
and progress
of
that system
of opinions
upon which
the authority
of the church was established;
and they
had thereby the advantage
in almost every dispute.
The austerity of their manners
gave them authority
with the common people,
who contrasted
the strict regularity
of their conduct
with the disorderly lives
of the greater part
of their own clergy.
They possessed, too,
in a much higher degree
than their adversaries,
all the arts
of popularity
and of gaining proselytes;
arts which
the lofty
and dignified sons
of the church
had long neglected,
as being
to them
in a great measure useless.
The reason
of the new doctrines
recommended them to some,
their novelty to many;
the hatred and contempt
of the established clergy
to a still greater number:
but the zealous,
passionate,
and fanatical,
though
frequently coarse
and rustic eloquence,
with which
they
were almost everywhere inculcated,
recommended them to
by far the greatest number.
The success
of the new doctrines
was almost everywhere so great,
that the princes,
who at that time happened
to be
on bad terms
with the court of Rome,
were, by means of them,
easily enabled,
in their own dominions,
to overturn the church,
which
having lost the respect
and veneration
of the inferior ranks
of people,
could make
scarce any resistance.
The court of Rome
had disobliged some of the
smaller princes
in the northern parts
of Germany,
whom it
had probably considered
as too insignificant
to be worth the managing.
They universally,
therefore,
established the reformation
in their own dominions.
The tyranny of Christiern II.,
and of Troll archbishop
of Upsal,
enabled Gustavus Vasa
to expel them both
from Sweden.
The pope
favoured
the tyrant and the archbishop,
and Gustavus Vasa
found no difficulty
in establishing
the reformation in Sweden.
Christiern II.
was afterwards deposed
from the throne
of Denmark,
where his conduct
had rendered him as odious as
in Sweden.
The pope,
however,
was still disposed
to favour him;
and Frederic of Holstein,
who had mounted the throne
in his stead,
revenged himself,
by following
the example of Gustavus Vasa.
The magistrates
of Berne and Zurich,
who had no particular quarrel
with the pope,
established with great
ease the reformation
in their respective cantons,
where
just before
some of the clergy had,
by an imposture
somewhat grosser
than ordinary,
rendered the whole order
both odious and contemptible.
In
this
critical
situation of its affairs
the papal court
was at sufficient pains
to cultivate the friendship
of the powerful sovereigns
of France and Spain,
of whom
the latter
was at that time emperor
of Germany.
With their assistance,
it was enabled,
though
not without great difficulty,
and much bloodshed,
either
to suppress altogether,
or to obstruct very much,
the progress
of the reformation
in their dominions.
It was well enough
inclined, too,
to be complaisant to the king
of England.
But from the circumstances
of the times,
it could not be so
without giving offence
to a still greater sovereign,
Charles V,
king of Spain and emperor
of Germany.
Henry VIII,
accordingly,
though he
did not embrace himself
the greater part
of the doctrines
of the reformation,
was yet enabled,
by their general prevalence,
to suppress all
the monasteries,
and to abolish the authority
of the church
of Rome in his dominions.
That
he should go so far,
though he went no further,
gave some satisfaction
to the patrons
of the reformation,
who,
having
got possession
of the government
in the reign
of his son and successor
completed,
without any difficulty,
the work which Henry VIII
had begun.
In some countries,
as in Scotland,
where the government
was weak,
unpopular,
and not
very firmly established,
the reformation
was strong enough
to overturn,
not only the church,
but the state likewise,
for attempting
to support the church.
Among the followers
of the reformation,
dispersed in all
the different countries
of Europe,
there
was no general tribunal,
which,
like that
of the court of Rome,
or an oecumenical council,
could settle
all disputes among them,
and,
with irresistible authority,
prescribe to all of them
the precise limits
of orthodoxy.
When the followers
of the reformation
in one country,
therefore,
happened
to differ
from their brethren in another,
as they
had no common judge
to appeal to,
the dispute
could never be decided;
and many such disputes
arose among them.
Those
concerning the government
of the church,
and the right
of conferring
ecclesiastical benefices,
were perhaps
the most interesting
to the peace and welfare
of civil society.
They
gave birth,
accordingly,
to the two principal parties
or sects
among the followers
of the reformation,
the Lutheran
and Calvinistic sects,
the only sects among them,
of which the doctrine
and discipline
have ever yet been
established by law
in any part of Europe.
The followers of Luther,
together with
what is called
the church of England,
preserved more or less
of the episcopal government,
established subordination
among the clergy,
gave
the sovereign the disposal
of all the bishoprics,
and
other consistorial benefices
within his dominions,
and thereby rendered him
the real head of the church;
and without depriving
the bishop
of the right
of collating
to the smaller benefices
within his diocese,
they,
even to those benefices,
not only admitted,
but favoured
the right of presentation,
both in the sovereign
and in all
other
lay patrons.
This system
of church government was,
from the beginning,
favourable
to peace and good order,
and to submission
to the civil sovereign.
It has never,
accordingly,
been
the occasion of any tumult or
civil commotion
in any country
in which it
has once been
established.
The church of England,
in particular,
has always valued herself,
with great reason,
upon the unexceptionable loyalty
of her principles.
Under such a government,
the clergy naturally
endeavour
to recommend themselves
to the sovereign,
to the court,
and to the nobility
and gentry
of the country,
by whose influence
they chiefly expect
to obtain preferment.
They pay court
to those patrons,
sometimes,
no doubt,
by the vilest flattery
and assentation;
but frequently, too,
by cultivating all those arts
which best
deserve,
and which
are therefore
most likely to gain them,
the esteem
of people
of rank and fortune;
by their knowledge
in all the different branches
of useful
and ornamental learning,
by the decent liberality
of their manners,
by the social good humour
of their conversation,
and by their avowed contempt
of those absurd
and hypocritical austerities which
fanatics
inculcate and pretend
to practise,
in order to draw
upon themselves
the veneration,
and upon the greater part
of men
of rank and fortune,
who avow that they
do not practise them,
the abhorrence
of the common people.
Such a clergy,
however,
while they
pay their court in this
manner
to the higher ranks
of life,
are very apt
to neglect altogether
the means
of maintaining their influence
and authority
with the lower.
They are listened to,
esteemed,
and respected
by their superiors;
but before their inferiors
they
are frequently incapable
of defending,
effectually,
and to the conviction
of such hearers,
their own sober
and moderate doctrines,
against the most
ignorant enthusiast
who chooses
to attack them.
The followers of Zuinglius,
or more properly those
of Calvin,
on the contrary,
bestowed
upon the people
of each parish,
whenever the church
became vacant,
the right
of electing their own pastor;
and established,
at the same time,
the most perfect equality
among the clergy.
The former part
of this institution,
as long
as it remained in vigour,
seems to have been productive
of nothing but disorder
and confusion,
and to have tended equally
to corrupt the morals both
of the clergy
and of the people.
The latter part
seems never
to have had
any effects but what
were perfectly agreeable.
As long as the people
of each parish
preserved
the right
of electing their own pastors,
they acted almost
always under the influence
of the clergy,
and generally of
the most factious and fanatical
of the order.
The clergy,
in order to
preserve
their influence in those
popular elections,
became,
or affected
to become,
many of them,
fanatics themselves,
encouraged fanaticism
among the people,
and gave the preference almost
always to the most fanatical
candidate.
So small
a matter
as the appointment
of a parish priest,
occasioned almost always
a violent contest,
not only in one parish,
but in all
the neighbouring parishes
who seldom failed
to take part in the quarrel.
When
the parish happened
to be situated
in a great city,
it divided all
the inhabitants
into two parties;
and when that city
happened,
either
to constitute itself
a little republic,
or to be the head
and capital
of a little republic,
as in the case
with many
of the considerable cities
in Switzerland and Holland,
every paltry dispute
of this kind,
over and above exasperating
the animosity
of all
their other factions,
threatened
to leave behind it,
both a new schism
in the church,
and a new faction
in the state.
In those small republics,
therefore,
the magistrate
very soon found it necessary,
for the sake
of preserving the public peace,
to assume
to himself the right
of presenting
to all vacant benefices.
In Scotland,
the most extensive country
in which this
presbyterian form of church government
has ever been established,
the rights of patronage
were in effect
abolished
by the act
which established presbytery
in the beginning
of the reign
of William III.
That act,
at least,
put in the power
of certain classes
of people in each parish
to purchase,
for a very small price,
the right
of electing their own pastor.
The constitution which
this act
established,
was allowed
to subsist for
about two-and-twenty years,
but was abolished by the 10th
of queen Anne,
ch.12,
on account
of the confusions
and disorders which this
more popular mode
of election
had almost everywhere occasioned.
In so extensive
a country as Scotland,
however,
a tumult in a remote parish
was not so likely
to give disturbance
to government as
in a smaller state.
The 10th
of queen
Anne restored the rights
of patronage.
But though,
in Scotland,
the law
gives the benefice,
without any exception
to the person
presented by the patron;
yet the church
requires sometimes
(for she
has not in this respect
been very uniform
in her decisions)
a certain concurrence
of the people,
before she
will confer upon the presentee
what is called
the cure of souls,
or
the ecclesiastical jurisdiction
in the parish.
She sometimes,
at least,
from an affected concern
for the peace of the parish,
delays the settlement
till this concurrence
can be procured.
The private tampering
of some of the neighbouring
clergy,
sometimes to procure,
but more frequently to prevent
this concurrence,
and the popular arts which
they cultivate,
in order to
enable them
upon such occasions
to tamper more effectually,
are perhaps the causes which
principally keep up
whatever remains
of the old fanatical spirit,
either
in the clergy
or in the people
of Scotland.
The equality which
the presbyterian form
of church government
establishes among the clergy,
consists,
first,
in the equality
of authority
or
ecclesiastical jurisdiction;
and, secondly,
in the equality of benefice.
In all presbyterian churches,
the equality of authority
is perfect;
that of benefice
is not so.
The difference,
however,
between one benefice and another,
is seldom so considerable,
as commonly
to tempt the possessor
even of the small one
to pay court to his patron,
by the vile arts
of flattery and assentation,
in order to
get a better.
In all
the presbyterian churches,
where
the rights of patronage
are thoroughly established,
it is
by nobler and better arts,
that the established clergy
in general
endeavour
to gain the favour
of their superiors;
by their learning,
by the irreproachable regularity
of their life,
and by the faithful
and diligent discharge
of their duty.
Their patrons even frequently
complain
of the independency
of their spirit,
which they are apt
to construe
into ingratitude
for past favours,
but which,
at worse,
perhaps,
is seldom anymore than that
indifference
which naturally arises
from the consciousness
that
no further favours
of the kind
are ever
to be expected.
There
is scarce,
perhaps,
to be found anywhere
in Europe,
a more learned,
decent,
independent,
and respectable set of men,
than the greater part
of the presbyterian clergy
of Holland,
Geneva,
Switzerland,
and Scotland.
Where the church benefices
are all nearly equal,
none of them
can be very great;
and this mediocrity
of benefice,
though it may be,
no doubt,
carried too far,
has,
however,
some very agreeable effects.
Nothing but exemplary morals
can give dignity
to a man
of small fortune.
The vices
of levity and vanity
necessarily render him
ridiculous,
and are,
besides,
almost
as ruinous
to him
as they
are to the common people.
In his own conduct,
therefore,
he is obliged
to follow
that system
of morals which
the common people
respect the most.
He gains their esteem
and affection,
by that plan
of life which
his own interest
and situation
would lead him
to follow.
The common people look
upon him with
that kindness with which we
naturally regard
one who
approaches somewhat
to our own condition,
but who,
we think,
ought to be in a higher.
Their kindness
naturally provokes
his kindness.
He becomes careful
to instruct them,
and attentive to assist
and relieve them.
He does not even despise
the prejudices of people
who are disposed
to be so favourable to him,
and never treats them
with those
contemptuous and arrogant airs,
which
we so often meet with
in the proud dignitaries
of opulent
and well endowed churches.
The presbyterian clergy,
accordingly,
have more influence
over the minds
of the common people,
than perhaps the clergy
of any
other established church.
It is,
accordingly,
in presbyterian countries only,
that
we ever find the common
people converted,
without persecution completely,
and almost to a man,
to the established church.
In countries where church
benefices are,
the greater part of them,
very moderate,
a chair in a university
is generally
a better establishment
than a church benefice.
The universities have,
in this case,
the picking and chusing
of their members
from all
the churchmen of the country,
who,
in every country,
constitute
by far
the most numerous class
of men
of letters.
Where church benefices,
on the contrary,
are many
of them very considerable,
the church
naturally draws
from the universities
the greater part
of their eminent men
of letters;
who generally find some patron,
who does himself honour
by procuring them church
preferment.
In the former situation,
we are likely
to find the universities
filled
with the most eminent men
of letters
that
are to be found
in the country.
In the latter,
we are likely
to find few
eminent men among them,
and those few
among the youngest members
of the society,
who are likely, too,
to be drained away from it,
before they
can have acquired experience
and knowledge
enough
to be
of much use to it.
It is observed
by Mr. de Voltaire,
that father Porée,
a jesuit of no great eminence
in the republic of letters,
was the only professor
they had ever had in France,
whose works
were worth the reading.
In a country
which has produced
so many eminent men
of letters,
it must appear somewhat singular,
that scarce one of them
should have been a professor
in a university.
The famous Cassendi was,
in the beginning of his life,
a professor
in the university of Aix.
Upon the first dawning
of his genius,
it was represented to him,
that by going into the church
he could easily find
a much more quiet
and comfortable subsistence,
as well as a better situation
for pursuing his studies;
and he
immediately followed the advice.
The observation of Mr. de
Voltaire may be applied,
I believe,
not only to France,
but
to all
other Roman Catholic countries.
We very rarely find in any
of them
an eminent man of letters,
who is
a professor in a university,
except,
perhaps,
in the professions
of law and physic;
professions from which
the church
is not so likely
to draw them.
After the church of Rome,
that of England
is by far
the richest
and best endowed church
in Christendom.
In England,
accordingly,
the church
is continually draining
the universities
of all
their best and ablest members;
and
an old college tutor
who is known and distinguished
in Europe
as an eminent man of letters,
is as
rarely to be found there as
in any Roman catholic country,
In Geneva,
on the contrary,
in the protestant cantons
of Switzerland,
in the protestant countries
of Germany,
in Holland,
in Scotland,
in Sweden,
and Denmark,
the most eminent men
of letters
whom those countries
have produced,
have,
not all indeed,
but the far greater part
of them,
been professors
in universities.
In those countries,
the universities
are continually draining
the church
of all
its most eminent men
of letters.
It may,
perhaps,
be worth
while to remark,
that,
if we except the poets,
a few orators,
and a few historians,
the far greater part
of the other eminent men
of letters,
both of Greece and Rome,
appear to have been
either public
or private teachers;
generally either
of philosophy or of rhetoric.
This remark
will be found
to hold true,
from the days
of Lysias and Isocrates,
of Plato and Aristotle,
down to those
of Plutarch and Epictetus,
Suetonius,
and Quintilian.
To impose
upon any man the necessity
of teaching,
year after year,
in any particular branch
of science
seems in reality
to be
the most effectual method
for rendering him completely master
of it himself.
By being obliged
to go every year
over the same ground,
if he
is good for any thing,
he necessarily becomes,
in a few years,
well acquainted
with every part of it,
and if,
upon any particular point,
he should form too
hasty an opinion one year,
when he comes,
in the course
of his lectures
to reconsider
the same subject
the year thereafter,
he is very likely
to correct it.
As to be
a teacher of science
is certainly
the natural employment
of a mere man
of letters;
so is it likewise,
perhaps,
the education
which is most likely
to render him
a man of solid
learning and knowledge.
The mediocrity of church
benefices naturally tends
to draw
the greater part of men
of letters in the country
where it takes place,
to the employment
in which
they can be the most useful
to the public,
and at the same time
to give them
the best education,
perhaps,
they
are capable of receiving.
It tends
to render their learning
both as solid as possible,
and as useful as possible.
The revenue
of every established church,
such parts of it
excepted
as may arise
from particular lands
or manors,
is a branch,
it ought to be observed,
of the general revenue
of the state,
which is thus
diverted
to a purpose very different
from the defence
of the state.
The tithe,
for example,
is a real land tax,
which puts it
out of the power
of the proprietors of land
to contribute so largely
towards the defence
of the state
as they
otherwise might be able
to do.
The rent of land,
however,
is, according to some,
the sole fund;
and, according to others,
the principal fund,
from which,
in all great monarchies,
the exigencies of the state
must be ultimately supplied.
The more of this fund
that is given to the church,
the less,
it is evident,
can be spared to the state.
It
may be laid down
as a certain maxim,
that all other things
being supposed equal,
the richer the church,
the poorer
must necessarily be,
either the sovereign
on the one hand,
or the people on the other;
and, in all cases,
the less able
must
the state be
to defend itself.
In several
protestant countries,
particularly in all
the protestant cantons
of Switzerland,
the revenue
which anciently belonged
to the Roman catholic church,
the tithes and church
lands,
has been found a fund
sufficient,
not only
to afford competent salaries
to the established clergy,
but to defray,
with little or no addition,
all the other expenses
of the state.
The magistrates
of the powerful canton
of Berne,
in particular,
have accumulated,
out of the savings
from this fund,
a very large sum,
supposed
to amount to several millions;
part
or which
is deposited
in a public treasure,
and part
is placed at interest in
what are called
the public funds
of the different indebted nations
of Europe;
chiefly in those
of France and Great Britain.
What may be the amount
of the whole expense which
the church,
either of Berne,
or of any other protestant
canton,
costs the state,
I do not pretend to know.
By a very exact account
it appears,
that,
in 1755,
the whole revenue
of the clergy
of the church of Scotland,
including their glebe
or church lands,
and the
rent of their manses
or dwelling-houses,
estimated according to
a reasonable valuation,
amounted
only to £68,514:1:5 1/12d.
This very moderate revenue
affords a decent subsistence
to nine hundred
and fortyfour ministers.
The whole expense
of the church,
including what
is occasionally laid out
for the building and reparation
of churches,
and of the manses
of ministers,
cannot well be supposed
to exceed eighty
or
eighty-five thousand pounds a-year.
The most opulent church
in Christendom
does not maintain
better the uniformity
of faith,
the fervour of devotion,
the spirit of order,
regularity,
and austere morals,
in the great body
of the people,
than this
very poorly endowed church
of Scotland.
All the good effects,
both civil and religious,
which
an established church
can be supposed
to produce,
are produced
by it as completely as
by any other.
The greater part
of the protestant churches
of Switzerland,
which,
in general,
are not better
endowed
than the church of Scotland,
produce
those effects
in a still higher degree.
In the greater part
of the protestant cantons,
there
is not
a single person
to be found,
who does not profess himself
to be
of the established church.
If he professes himself
to be of any other,
indeed,
the law
obliges him
to leave the canton.
But so severe,
or, rather,
indeed,
so oppressive
a law,
could never have been executed
in such free countries,
had not the diligence
of the
clergy beforehand converted
to the established church
the whole body of the people,
with the exception of,
perhaps,
a few individuals only.
In some parts of Switzerland,
accordingly,
where,
from the accidental union
of a protestant and Roman
catholic country,
the conversion
has not been so complete,
both religions
are not only tolerated,
but established by law.
The proper performance
of every service
seems to require,
that
its pay
or recompence should be,
as exactly as possible,
proportioned
to the nature
of the service.
If any service
is very much underpaid,
it is very apt
to suffer
by the meanness and incapacity
of the greater part of those
who are employed in it.
If it
is very much overpaid,
it is apt
to suffer,
perhaps still more,
by their negligence
and idleness.
A man of a large revenue,
whatever may be
his profession,
thinks
he ought to live
like other men
of large revenues;
and to spend a great part
of his time in festivity,
in vanity,
and in dissipation.
But in a clergyman,
this train
of life not only consumes
the time
which ought to be employed
in the duties
of his function,
but in the eyes
of the common people,
destroys almost entirely
that sanctity
of character,
which can alone
enable him
to perform those duties
with proper weight
and authority.
Of the Expense
of supporting
the Dignity
of the Sovereign.
Over and above the expenses
necessary
for enabling
the sovereign
to perform his several duties,
a certain expense
is requisite
for the support
of his dignity.
This expense
varies,
both
with the different periods
of improvement,
and with the different forms
of government.
In an opulent
and improved society,
where all
the different orders of people
are growing every day
more expensive
in their houses,
in their furniture,
in their tables,
in their dress,
and in their equipage;
it cannot well be expected
that
the sovereign
should alone hold out
against the fashion.
He naturally,
therefore,
or rather necessarily,
becomes more expensive
in all those
different articles too.
His dignity
even seems
to require that
he should become so.
As,
in point of dignity,
a monarch
is more
raised above
his subjects
than the chief magistrate
of any republic
is ever supposed
to be above
his fellow-citizens;
so a greater expense
is necessary
for supporting
that higher dignity.
We naturally expect
more splendour
in the court
of a king,
than in the mansion-house
of a doge
or burgo-master.
The expense
of defending the society,
and that
of supporting
the dignity
of the chief magistrate,
are both laid out
for the general benefit
of the whole society.
It is reasonable,
therefore,
that they
should be defrayed
by the general contribution
of the whole society;
all
the different members contributing,
as nearly as possible,
in proportion
to their respective abilities.
The expense
of the administration
of justice, too,
may no doubt
be considered as laid out
for the benefit
of the whole society.
There
is no impropriety,
therefore,
in its being defrayed
by the general contribution
of the whole society.
The persons,
however,
who give occasion
to this expense,
are those who,
by their injustice in one way
or another,
make it necessary
to seek redress or protection
from the courts
of justice.
The persons,
again,
most immediately
benefited by this expense,
are those whom the courts
of justice either
restore to their rights,
or maintain in their rights.
The expense
of the administration
of justice,
therefore,
may very properly be defrayed
by the particular contribution
of one or other,
or both,
of those two different sets
of persons,
according
as different occasions
may require,
that is, by the fees
of court.
It cannot be necessary
to have recourse
to the general contribution
of the whole society,
except
for the conviction
of those criminals
who have not themselves
any estate or fund sufficient
for paying those fees.
Those local
or provincial expenses,
of which the benefit
is local or provincial
(what is laid out,
for example,
upon the police
of a particular town
or district),
ought to be defrayed
by a local or provincial revenue,
and ought to be no burden
upon the general revenue
of the society.
It is unjust
that the whole society
should contribute
towards an expense,
of which
the benefit
is confined
to a part
of the society.
The expense
of maintaining
good roads
and communications is,
no doubt,
beneficial
to the whole society,
and may,
therefore,
without any injustice,
be defrayed
by the general contributions
of the whole society.
This expense,
however,
is most immediately
and directly beneficial
to those
who travel
or carry goods
from one place to another,
and to those
who consume such goods.
The turnpike
tolls in England,
and the duties
called peages
in other countries,
lay it altogether upon those
two different sets of people,
and thereby discharge
the general
revenue
of the society
from a very considerable burden.
The expense
of the institutions
for education
and religious instruction,
is likewise,
no doubt,
beneficial to the whole society,
and may,
therefore,
without injustice,
be defrayed
by the general contribution
of the whole society.
This expense,
however,
might,
perhaps,
with equal propriety,
and even with some advantage,
be defrayed altogether by those
who receive
the immediate benefit
of such education
and instruction,
or by the
voluntary contribution
of those
who think
they have occasion for either
the one or the other.
When the institutions,
or public works,
which are beneficial
to the whole society,
either
cannot be maintained altogether,
or are not maintained altogether,
by the contribution
of such particular members
of the society
as
are most immediately benefited
by them;
the deficiency must,
in most cases,
be made up
by the general contribution
of the whole society.
The general revenue
of the society,
over
and above defraying
the expense
of defending the society,
and of supporting
the dignity
of the chief magistrate,
must make up
for the deficiency of many
particular branches
of revenue.
The sources
of this general
or public revenue,
I shall endeavour
to explain
in the following chapter.
OF THE SOURCES
OF THE GENERAL
OR PUBLIC REVENUE
OF THE SOCIETY.
The revenue which must defray,
not only the expense
of defending the society
and of supporting
the dignity
of the chief magistrate,
but all
the other necessary expenses
of government,
for which the constitution
of the state
has not provided
any particular revenue
may be drawn,
either,
first,
from some fund
which peculiarly belongs
to the sovereign or commonwealth,
and which
is independent of the revenue
of the people;
or, secondly,
from the revenue
of the people.
Of the Funds,
or Sources,
of Revenue,
which may peculiarly belong
to the Sovereign
or Commonwealth.
The funds,
or sources,
of revenue,
which may peculiarly belong
to the sovereign or commonwealth,
must consist,
either
in stock,
or in land.
The sovereign,
like,
any other owner of stock,
may derive
a revenue from it,
either
by employing it himself,
or by lending it.
His revenue is,
in the one case,
profit,
in the other interest.
The revenue
of a Tartar or Arabian chief
consists in profit.
It arises principally
from the milk
and increase
of his own herds
and flocks,
of which he
himself superintends
the management,
and is the principal shepherd
or herdsman
of his own horde or tribe.
It is,
however,
in
this
earliest and rudest state of civil
government only,
that profit
has ever made
the principal part
of the public revenue
of a monarchical state.
Small republics
have sometimes derived
a considerable revenue
from the profit
of mercantile projects.
The republic of Hamburgh
is said
to do so from the profits
of a public wine-cellar and apothecary's shop.
(See Memoires
concernant les Droits et
Impositions en Europe,
tome i.
page 73.
This work
was compiled by the order
of the court,
for the use
of a commission employed
for some years
past in considering
the proper means
for reforming
the finances of France.
The account
of the French taxes,
which takes up three volumes
in quarto,
may be regarded
as perfectly authentic.
That of those
of other European
nations
was compiled
from such
information
as the French ministers
at the different courts
could procure.
It is much shorter,
and probably not
quite so exact
as that
of the French taxes.)
That state
cannot be very great,
of which the sovereign
has leisure
to carry
on the trade
of a wine-merchant
or an apothecary.
The profit of a public bank
has been a source
of revenue
to more considerable states.
It has been so,
not only to Hamhurgh,
but to Venice and Amsterdam.
A revenue of this kind
has even by some people
been thought not
below the attention
of so great an empire as
that of Great Britain.
Reckoning
the ordinary dividend
of the bank
of England
at five and a-half per cent.,
and its capital
at ten millions seven hundred
and eighty thousand pounds,
the neat annual profit,
after paying
the expense of management,
must amount,
it is said,
to five hundred
and
ninety-two thousand nine
hundred pounds.
Government,
it is pretended,
could borrow
this capital
at three per cent. interest,
and,
by taking the management
of the bank
into its own
hands,
might make a clear profit
of two hundred
and
sixty-nine thousand five hundred
pounds a-year.
The orderly,
vigilant,
and parsimonious administration
of such aristocracies
as those
of Venice and Amsterdam,
is extremely proper,
it appears from experience,
for the management
of a mercantile project
of this kind.
But whether such
a government us
that of England,
which,
whatever may be its virtues,
has never been famous
for good economy;
which,
in time
of peace,
has generally conducted itself
with the
slothful and negligent
profusion
that is,
perhaps,
natural to monarchies;
and,
in time of war,
has constantly acted with all
the thoughtless extravagance
that democracies
are apt to fall into,
could be safely trusted
with the management
of such a project,
must at least
be a good deal
more doubtful.
The post-office
is properly
a mercantile project.
The government
advances the expense
of establishing
the different offices,
and of buying
or hiring the necessary horses
or carriages,
and is repaid,
with a large profit,
by the duties upon
what is carried.
It is,
perhaps,
the only mercantile project
which
has been successfully managed by,
I believe,
every sort of government.
The capital
to be advanced is not
very considerable.
There
is no mystery
in the business.
The returns
are not only certain
but immediate.
Princes,
however,
have frequently engaged
in many other mercantile projects,
and have been willing,
like private persons,
to mend their fortunes,
by becoming adventurers
in the common branches
of trade.
They have
scarce ever succeeded.
The profusion
with which
the affairs of princes
are always managed,
renders
it almost impossible that
they should.
The agents of a prince
regard the wealth
of their master
as inexhaustible;
are careless at what price
they buy,
are careless at what price
they sell,
are careless at what
expense
they transport his goods
from one place to another.
Those agents
frequently live
with the profusion of princes;
and sometimes, too,
in spite of that profusion,
and by a proper method
of making
up their accounts,
acquire the fortunes
of princes.
It was thus,
as we
are told by Machiavel,
that the agents
of Lorenzo of Medicis,
not
a prince of mean abilities,
carried on his trade.
The republic of Florence
was several times
obliged
to pay the debt into which
their extravagance
had involved him.
He found it convenient,
accordingly
to give
up the business of merchant,
the business
to which
his family
had originally owed
their fortune,
and,
in the latter part
of his life,
to employ both what
remained of that fortune,
and the revenue of the state,
of which
he had the disposal,
in projects and expenses
more suitable
to his station.
No two characters
seem more inconsistent
than those
of trader and sovereign.
If the trading spirit
of the
English East India company
renders them very bad sovereigns,
the spirit of sovereignty
seems
to have rendered them equally
bad traders.
While they
were traders only,
they managed
their trade successfully,
and were able to pay
from their profits
a moderate dividend
to the proprietors
of their stock.
Since they
became sovereigns,
with a revenue which,
it is said,
was originally
more than three millions sterling,
they have been obliged
to beg the ordinary assistance
of government,
in order to
avoid immediate bankruptcy.
In their former situation,
their servants in India
considered themselves
as the clerks of merchants;
in their present situation,
those servants
consider themselves
as the ministers
of sovereigns.
A state
may sometimes derive some part
of its public revenue
from the interest
of money,
as well as from the profits
of stock.
If it
has amassed a treasure,
it may lend a part
of that treasure,
either to foreign states,
or to its own subjects.
The canton
of Berne
derives a considerable revenue
by lending a part
of its treasure
to foreign states,
that is,
by placing it
in the public funds
of the different indebted nations
of Europe,
chiefly in those
of France and England.
The security of this revenue
must depend,
first,
upon the security
of the funds
in which it is placed,
or upon the good faith
of the government
which has the management
of them;
and, secondly,
upon the certainty
or probability
of the continuance
of peace
with the debtor nation.
In the case
of a war,
the very first act
of hostility
on the part
of the debtor nation
might be the forfeiture
of the funds
of its credit or.
This policy
of lending money
to foreign states is,
so far as I
know peculiar to the canton
of Berne.
The city of Hamburgh
(See Memoire
concernant les Droites et
Impositions en Europe tome i
p. 73.)has
established
a sort of public pawn-shop,
which lends money
to the subjects
of the state,
upon pledges,
at six per cent. interest.
This pawn-shop,
or lombard,
as it is called,
affords a revenue,
it is pretended,
to the state,
of a hundred
and fifty thousand crowns,
which,
at four and sixpence
the crown,
amounts
to £33,750 sterling.
The government
of Pennsylvania,
without amassing any treasure,
invented a method of lending,
not money,
indeed,
but what is equivalent
to money,
to its subjects.
By advancing
to private people,
at interest,
and upon land security
to double the value,
paper bills of credit,
to be redeemed
fifteen years after
their date;
and,
in the mean time,
made transferable
from hand to hand,
like banknotes,
and declared
by act of assembly
to be a legal tender
in all payments
from one inhabitant
of the province to another,
it raised a moderate revenue,
which went a considerable way
towards defraying
an annual expense
of
about £4,500,
the whole ordinary expense of
that frugal
and orderly government.
The success
of an expedient
of this kind
must have depended
upon three different circumstances:
first,
upon the demand
for some other instrument
of commerce,
besides gold and silver money,
or upon the demand for such
a quantity of consumable stock as
could not be had
without sending abroad
the greater part
of their gold
and silver money,
in order to purchase it;
secondly,
upon the good credit
of the government which
made use of this expedient;
and, thirdly,
upon the moderation
with which it was used,
the whole value
of the paper bills
of credit
never
exceeding
that of the gold
and silver money which
would have been necessary for
carrying on their circulation,
had there been no paper bills
of credit.
The same expedient was,
upon different occasions,
adopted
by several
other American colonies;
but,
from want of this moderation,
it produced,
in the greater part
of them,
much more disorder
than conveniency.
The unstable and perishable nature
of stock and credit,
however,
renders them unfit
to be trusted to
as the principal funds of
that sure,
steady,
and permanent revenue,
which can alone
give security and dignity
to government.
The government
of no great nation,
that was advanced
beyond the shepherd state,
seems ever
to have derived
the greater part
of its public revenue
from such sources.
Land
is a fund
of more stable
and permanent nature;
and the rent of public lands,
accordingly,
has been
the principal source
of the public revenue
of many
a great nation
that was much advanced
beyond the shepherd state.
From the produce
or rent of the public lands,
the ancient republics
of Greece and Italy derived
for a long
the the greater part
of
that revenue
which defrayed
the necessary expenses
of the commonwealth.
The rent of the crown lands
constituted
for a long time
the greater part
of the revenue
of the ancient sovereigns
of Europe.
War,
and the preparation for war,
are
the two circumstances which,
in modern times,
occasion the greater part
of the necessary expense
or all great states.
But in the ancient republics
of Greece and Italy,
every citizen
was a soldier,
and both served,
and prepared himself
for service,
at his own expense.
Neither
of those two circumstances,
therefore,
could occasion
any very considerable expense
to the state.
The rent
of a very moderate landed estate
might be fully sufficient
for defraying all
the other necessary expenses
of government.
In the ancient monarchies
of Europe,
the manners
and customs of the time
sufficiently prepared
the great body
of the people for war;
and when they took the field,
they were,
by the condition
of their feudal tenures,
to be maintained either
at their own expense,
or at
that of their immediate lords,
without bringing
any new charge
upon the sovereign.
The other expenses
of government were,
the greater part of them,
very moderate.
The administration of justice,
it has been shewn,
instead of being
a cause of expense
was a source of revenue.
The labour
of the country people,
for three days before,
and for three days after,
harvest,
was thought a fund sufficient
for making
and
maintaining all the bridges,
highways,
and other public works,
which
the commerce of the country
was supposed
to require.
In those days
the principal expense
of the sovereign
seems
to have consisted
in the maintenance
of his own family
and household.
The officers of his household,
accordingly,
were then
the great officers of state.
The lord treasurer
received his rents.
The lord steward
and lord chamberlain
looked after the expense
of his family.
The care of his stables
was committed
to the lord constable
and the lord marshal.
His houses
were all built in the form
of castles,
and seem
to have been
the principal fortresses which
he possessed.
The keepers of those houses
or castles
might be considered as a sort
of military governors.
They seem
to have been
the only military officers
whom
it was necessary
to maintain
in time of peace.
In these circumstances,
the rent
of a great landed estate
might,
upon ordinary occasions,
very well
defray all
the necessary expenses
of government.
In the present state
of the greater part
of the civilized monarchies
of Europe,
the rent of all
the lands in the country,
managed as they
probably would be,
if they all
belonged to one proprietor,
would scarce,
perhaps,
amount
to the ordinary revenue which
they levy
upon the people
even in peaceable times.
The ordinary revenue
of Great Britain,
for example,
including not only what
is necessary
for defraying
the current expense
of the year,
but for paying
the interest
of the public debts,
and for sinking a part
of the capital
of those debts,
amounts to
upwards of ten millions a-year.
But the land tax,
at four shillings
in the pound,
falls short
of two millions a-year.
This land tax,
as it is called however,
is supposed
to be one-fifth,
not only of the
rent of all the land,
but of
that of all the houses,
and of the interest
of all
the capital stock
of Great Britain,
that part of it
only excepted which is either
lent to the public,
or employed as farming stock
in the cultivation of land.
A very considerable part
of the produce
of this tax
arises from the
rent of houses and
the interest
of capital stock.
The land tax of the city
of London,
for example,
at four shillings
in the pound,
amounts to £123,399:
6:
7;
that of the city
of Westminster to £63,092:
1:
5;
that of the palaces
of Whitehall and St. James's,
to £30,754:
6:
3.
A certain proportion
of the land tax is,
in the same manner,
assessed
upon all the other cities
and towns corporate
in the kingdom;
and arises almost altogether,
either from the
rent of houses,
or from
what is supposed
to be
the interest
of trading and capital stock.
According to the estimation,
therefore,
by which
Great Britain
is rated to the land tax,
the whole mass
of revenue arising from the
rent of all the lands,
from that
of all the houses,
and from the interest
of all the capital stock,
that part of it
only excepted which is either
lent to the public,
or employed
in the cultivation of land,
does not exceed ten millions
sterling a-year,
the ordinary revenue
which government levies
upon the people,
even in peaceable times.
The estimation
by which
Great Britain
is rated
to the land tax is,
no doubt,
taking the whole kingdom
at an average,
very much
below the real value;
though in several
particular counties and districts
it is said
to be nearly
equal to that value.
The rent
of the lands alone,
exclusive of
that of houses
and of the interest
of stock,
has by many people
been estimated
at twenty millions;
an estimation
made in a great measure
at random,
and which,
I apprehend,
is as
likely to be above as
below the truth.
But if the lands
of Great Britain,
in the present state
of their cultivation,
do not afford a rent
of more than
twenty millions a-year,
they could not well afford
the half,
most probably not
the fourth part
of
that rent,
if they all
belonged
to a single proprietor,
and were put
under the negligent,
expensive,
and oppressive management
of his factors and agents.
The crown lands
of Great Britain
do not at present
afford
the fourth part of the rent
which could probably be drawn
from them
if they
were the property
of private persons.
If the crown lands
were more extensive,
it is probable,
they
would be still worse managed.
The revenue which
the great body of the people
derives from land is,
in proportion,
not to the rent,
but to the produce
of the land.
The whole annual produce
of the land of every country,
if we except
what is reserved for seed,
is either
annually consumed
by the great body
of the people,
or exchanged
for something else
that is consumed by them.
Whatever
keeps
down the produce
of the land below what
it would otherwise rise to,
keeps
down the revenue
of the great body
of the people,
still more than it
does that
of the proprietors of land.
The rent of land,
that portion of the produce
which belongs
to the proprietors,
is scarce
anywhere in Great Britain
supposed
to be
more than a third part
of the whole produce.
If the land which,
in one state of cultivation,
affords a revenue
of ten millions sterling a-year,
would in another
afford a rent
of twenty millions;
the rent being,
in both cases,
supposed
a third part
of the produce,
the revenue of the proprietors
would be less than
it otherwise might be,
by ten millions a-year only;
but the revenue
of the great hotly
of the people
would be less than
it otherwise might be,
by thirty millions a-year,
deducting only what
would be necessary for seed.
The population of the country
would be less
by the number
of people
which thirty millions a-year,
deducting always the seed,
could maintain,
according to
the particular mode
of living,
and expense
which might take place
in the different ranks
of men,
among whom
the remainder
was distributed.
Though there is not
at present
in Europe,
any civilized state
of any kind which
derives the greater part
of its public revenue
from the
rent of lands
which are the property
of the state;
yet,
in all
the great monarchies
of Europe,
there
are still many large tracts
of land which
belong to the crown.
They
are generally forest,
and sometimes forests where,
after
travelling several miles,
you will
scarce find a single tree;
a mere waste and loss
of country,
in respect both
of produce and population.
In every great monarchy
of Europe,
the sale of the crown
lands would produce
a very large sum
of money,
which,
if applied
to the payment
of the public debts,
would deliver from mortgage
a much greater revenue
than any which those lands
have even afforded
to the crown.
In countries where lands,
improved
and cultivated very highly,
and yielding,
at the time of sale,
as great a rent
as can easily be
got from them,
commonly sell
at thirty years purchase;
the unimproved,
uncultivated,
and low-rented crown lands,
might well be expected
to sell at forty,
fifty,
or sixty years purchase.
The crown
might immediately enjoy
the revenue which
this great price
would redeem from mortgage.
In the course of a few years,
it would probably enjoy
another
revenue.
When the crown lands
had become private property,
they
would,
in the course of a few years,
become well improved
and well cultivated.
The increase of their produce
would increase the population
of the country,
by augmenting the revenue
and consumption
of the people.
But the revenue which
the crown
derives
from the duties or custom
and excise,
would necessarily increase
with the revenue and consumption
of the people.
The revenue which,
in any civilized monarchy,
the crown
derives from the crown lands,
though it appears
to cost nothing
to individuals,
in reality costs more
to the society
than perhaps any
other equal revenue which
the crown enjoys.
It would,
in all cases,
be for the interest
of the society,
to replace
this revenue
to the crown
by some other equal revenue,
and to divide the lands
among the people,
which could not well be done
better,
perhaps,
than by exposing them
to public sale.
Lands,
for the purposes
of pleasure and magnificence,
parks,
gardens,
public walks,.etc. possessions
which
are everywhere considered
as causes
of expense,
not as sources of revenue,
seem
to be the only lands which,
in a
great and civilized monarchy,
ought to belong
to the crown.
Public stock and public lands,
therefore,
the two sources of revenue
which may peculiarly belong
to the sovereign
or commonwealth,
being both improper
and insufficient funds
for defraying
the necessary expense
of any great
and civilized state;
it remains
that this expense must,
the greater part of it,
be defrayed
by taxes
of one kind or another;
the people contributing a part
of their own private revenue,
in order to make
up a public revenue
to the sovereign
or commonwealth.
The private revenue
of individuals,
it has been shown
in the first book
of this Inquiry,
arises,
ultimately from
three different sources;
rent,
profit,
and wages.
Every tax
must finally be paid
from some one or other
of those
three different sources
of revenue,
or from all
of them indifferently.
I shall endeavour
to give
the best account
I can,
first,
of those taxes which,
it is intended
should fall upon rent;
secondly,
of those which,
it is intended
should fall upon profit;
thirdly,
of those which,
it is intended
should fall upon wages;
and fourthly,
of those which,
it is intended
should fall indifferently
upon all those
three different sources
of private revenue.
The particular consideration
of each of these
four different sorts of taxes
will divide the second part
of the present chapter
into four articles,
three of which
will require
several other subdivisions.
Many of these taxes,
it will appear
from the following review,
are not finally paid
from the fund,
or source of revenue,
upon which
it is intended
they should fall.
Before I
enter
upon the examination
of particular taxes,it
is necessary to premise
the four following maximis
with regard to
taxes in general.
1.
The subjects of every state
ought to contribute
towards the support
of the government,
as nearly as possible,
in proportion
to their respective abilities;
that is,
in proportion
to the revenue which
they respectively enjoy
under the protection
of the state.
The expense
of government
to the individuals
of a great nation,
is like the expense
of management
to the joint tenants
of a great estate,
who are all obliged
to contribute
in proportion
to their respective
interests in the estate.
In the observation
or neglect of this maxim,
consists
what is called the equality
or inequality
of taxation.
Every tax,
it must be observed once
for all,
which falls finally
upon one
only of the three sorts
of revenue above mentioned,
is necessarily unequal,
in so far
as it
does not affect
the other two.
In the following examination
of different taxes,
I shall seldom take
much farther notice
of this sort of inequality;
but shall,
in most cases,
confine
my observations to
that inequality
which is occasioned
by a particular tax
falling unequally upon
that particular sort
of private revenue which
is affected by it.
2.
The tax which each individual
is bound
to pay,
ought to be
certain and not arbitrary.
The time of payment,
the manner of payment,
the quantity
to be paid,
ought all
to be clear and plain
to the contributor,
and to every other person.
Where it is otherwise,
every person subject to
the tax
is put more or less in
the power
of the tax-gatherer,
who can either
aggravate the tax
upon any obnoxious contributor,
or extort,
by the terror
of such aggravation,
some present or perquisite
to himself.
The uncertainty of taxation
encourages the insolence,
and favours the corruption,
of an order of men
who are naturally unpopular,
even
where they
are neither insolent nor corrupt.
The certainty of
what each individual
ought to pay is,
in taxation,
a matter
of so great importance,
that
a very considerable degree
of inequality,
it appears,
I believe,
from the experience
of all nations,
is not near so great
an evil
as a very small degree
of uncertainty.
3.
Every tax
ought to be levied
at the time,
or in the manner,
in which it
is most likely
to be convenient
for the contributor
to pay it.
A tax upon the
rent of land or of houses,
payable at the same term
at which
such rents are usually paid,
is levied at the time
when it
is most likely
to be convenient
for the contributor
to pay;
or when he
is most likely
to have wherewithall
to pay.
Taxes
upon such consumable goods
as are articles of luxury,
are all finally paid
by the consumer,
and generally in a manner
that is very convenient
for him.
He pays them
by little and little,
as he has occasion
to buy the goods.
As he
is at liberty too,
either
to buy or not to buy,
as he
pleases,
it must be
his own fault
if he
ever suffers
any considerable inconveniency
from such taxes.
4.
Every tax
ought to be so contrived,
as both
to take out
and to keep
out of the pockets
of the people as little
as possible,
over and above what it
brings
into the public treasury
of the state.
A tax
may either
take out or keep
out of the pockets
of the people
a great deal
more than it
brings
into the public treasury,
in the four following ways.
First,
the levying of it
may require a great number
of officers,
whose salaries
may eat
up the greater part
of the produce
of the tax,
and whose perquisites
may impose another
additional tax
upon the people.
Secondly,
it may obstruct the industry
of the people,
and discourage them
from applying
to certain branches
of business
which might give maintenance
and employment
to great multitudes.
While it obliges
the people
to pay,
it may thus
diminish,
or perhaps destroy,
some of the funds
which
might enable them more easily
to do so.
Thirdly,
by the forfeitures
and other penalties which
those unfortunate
individuals incur,
who attempt
unsuccessfully to evade the tax,
it may frequently ruin them,
and thereby put an end
to the benefit which
the community
might have received
from the employment
of their capitals.
An injudicious tax
offers a great temptation to
smuggling.
But the penalties of smuggling
must arise in proportion
to the temptation.
The law,
contrary
to all
the ordinary principles
of justice,
first
creates the temptation,
and then punishes
those who yield to it;
and it
commonly enhances
the punishment, too,
in proportion
to the very
circumstance which ought
certainly to alleviate it,
the temptation
to commit the crime.
(See Sketches
of the
History of Man page 474,
and Seq.)
Fourthly,
by subjecting the people
to the frequent visits
and the odious examination
of the tax-gatherers,
it may expose them
to much unnecessary trouble,
vexation,
and oppression;
and though vexation
is not,
strictly
speaking,
expense,
it is certainly equivalent
to the expense at which
every man
would be
willing
to redeem himself from it.
It is
in some one or other
of these four different ways,
that taxes
are frequently
so much more burdensome
to the people than
they
are beneficial
to the sovereign.
The evident justice
and utility
of the foregoing maxims
have recommended them,
more or less,
to the attention
of all nations.
All nations have endeavoured,
to the best
of their judgment,
to render
their taxes as equal as they
could contrive;
as certain,
as convenient
to the contributor,
both the time and the mode
of payment,
and in proportion
to the revenue which
they brought to the prince,
as little burdensome
to the people.
The following short review
of some of the principal taxes which
have taken place
in different ages
and countries,
will show,
that the endeavours of all
nations have not
in this respect
been equally successful.
Taxes
upon the Rent of Land.
A tax upon the
rent of land
may either
be imposed according to
a certain canon,
every district
being valued
at a curtain rent,
which valuation
is not afterwards
to be altered;
or it
may be imposed
in such a manner,
as to vary
with every variation
in the real rent
of the land,
and to rise
or fall
with the improvement
or declension
of its cultivation.
A land tax which,
like that of Great Britain,
is assessed
upon each district
according to
a certain invariable canon,
though it
should be equal at the time
of its first establishment,
necessarily
becomes unequal
in process of time,
according to
the unequal degrees
of improvement or neglect
in the cultivation
of the different parts
of the country.
In England,
the valuation,
according to which
the different counties
and parishes
were assessed
to the land tax
by the 4th
of William and Mary,
was very unequal
even at its first establishment.
This tax,
therefore,
so far
offends
against the first
of the four maxims
above mentioned.
It is perfectly agreeable
to the other three.
It is perfectly certain.
The time
of payment for the tax,
being the same
as that for the rent,
is as convenient as it
can be to the contributor.
Though the landlord is,
in all cases,
the real contributor,
the tax
is commonly advanced
by the tenant,
to whom the landlord
is obliged
to allow
it in the payment
of the rent.
This tax
is levied
by a much smaller number
of officers than any
other
which affords nearly
the same revenue.
As the tax upon each district
does not rise
with the rise of the rent,
the sovereign
does not share in the profits
of the landlord's improvements.
Those improvements
sometimes contribute,
indeed,
to the discharge
of the other landlords
of the district.
But the aggravation
of the tax,
which
this may sometimes occasion
upon a particular estate,
is always so very small,
that it
never can discourage
those improvements,
nor keep
down the produce
of the land below what
it would otherwise rise to.
As it has no tendency
to diminish the quantity,
it can have none
to raise the price
of that produce.
It does not obstruct
the industry
of the people;
it subjects the landlord
to no other inconveniency
besides the unavoidable one
of paying the tax.
The advantage,
however,
which
the land-lord
has derived
from the invariable constancy
of the valuation,
by which all the lands
of Great Britain
are rated to the land-tax,
has been principally owing
to some
circumstances altogether extraneous
to the nature
of the tax
It has been owing in part,
to the great prosperity
of almost every part
of the country,
the rents
of almost all the estates
of Great Britain
having,
since the time
when this valuation
was first established,
been continually rising,
and scarce any of them
having fallen.
The landlords,
therefore,
have almost all gained
the difference
between the tax which
they would have paid,
according to the present
rent of their estates,
and that which
they
actually pay according to
the ancient valuation.
Had the state of the country
been different,
had rents
been gradually falling
in consequence
of the declension
of cultivation,
the landlords
would almost all have lost
this difference.
In the state of things
which has happened
to take place
since
the revolution,
the constancy of the valuation
has been advantageous
to the landlord and hurtful
to the sovereign.
In a different state
of things
it might have been advantageous
to the sovereign and hurtful
to the landlord.
As the tax is made payable
in money,
so the valuation of the land
is expressed in money.
Since the establishment
of this valuation,
the value of silver
has been pretty uniform,
and there has been
no alteration
in the standard
of the coin,
either
as to weight or fineness.
Had silver
risen considerably
in its value,
as it seems to have done
in the course
of the two centuries
which preceded
the discovery
of the mines
of America,
the constancy of the valuation
might have proved very oppressive
to the landlord.
Had silver fallen considerably
in its value,
as it certainly did for
about a century at least
after the discovery
of those mines,
the same constancy
of valuation
would have reduced very much
this branch
of the revenue
of the sovereign.
Had
any considerable alteration
been made in the standard
of the money,
either
by sinking the same quantity
of silver
to a lower denomination,
or by raising it
to a higher;
had an ounce of silver,
for example,
instead of being coined
into five shillings
and two pence,
been coined either into pieces
which bore
so low
a denomination as two shillings
and seven pence,
or into pieces
which bore
so high
a one as ten shillings
and four pence,
it would,
in the one case,
have hurt
the revenue of the proprietor,
in the other
that of the sovereign.
In circumstances,
therefore,
somewhat different
from those which
have actually taken place,
this
constancy of valuation
might have been
a very great inconveniency,
either
to the contributors
or to the commonwealth.
In the course of ages,
such circumstances,
however,
must at some time or other
happen.
But though empires,
like all
the other works of men,
have all hitherto proved mortal,
yet every empire aims
at immortality.
Every constitution,
therefore,
which it is meant
should be
as permanent
as the empire itself,
ought to be convenient,
not in
certain circumstances only,
but in all circumstances;
or ought to be suited,
not to those circumstances
which are transitory,
occasional,
or accidental,
but to those
which are necessary,
and therefore
always the same.
A tax upon the
rent of land,
which
varies
with every variation
of the rent,
or which rises
and falls according to
the improvement
or neglect of cultivation,
is recommended by
that sect of men of letters
in France,
who call themselves
the economists,
as the most equitable
of all taxes.
All taxes,
they pretend,
fall ultimately upon the
rent of land,
and ought,
therefore,
to be imposed equally
upon the fund
which must finally pay them.
That all taxes
ought to fall
as equally as possible
upon the fund
which must finally pay them,
is certainly true.
But without entering
into the disagreeable discussion
of the metaphysical arguments
by which they
support
their very ingenious theory,
it will sufficiently appear,
from the following review,
what are the taxes which
fall finally upon the
rent of the land,
and what
are those which
fall finally
upon some other fund.
In the Venetian territory,
all the arable lands
which are given
in lease to farmers
are taxed
at a tenth of the rent.
(Memoires
concernant les Droits,
p. 240,
241.)
The leases
are recorded
in a public register,
which is kept
by the officers
of revenue in each province
or district.
When
the proprietor
cultivates his own
lands,
they are valued according to
an equitable estimation,
and he
is allowed a deduction
of one-fifth
of the tax;
so that for such land
he
pays only eight
instead of ten per cent.
of the
supposed rent.
A land-tax of this kind
is certainly more equal
than the land-tax
of England.
It might not,
perhaps,
be altogether so certain,
and the assessment of the tax
might frequently occasion
a good deal more trouble
to the landlord.
It might, too,
be a good deal more expensive
in the levying.
Such a system
of administration,
however,
might,
perhaps,
be contrived,
as would
in a great measure both
prevent this uncertainty,
and moderate this expense.
The landlord and tenant,
for example,
might jointly be obliged
to record their lease
in a public register.
Proper penalties
might be enacted
against concealing
or misrepresenting
any of the
conditions;
and if part
of those penalties
were to be paid
to either
of the two parties who
informed
against
and convicted the other
of such concealment
or misrepresentation,
it
would effectually deter them
from
combining together in order to
defraud the public revenue.
All the conditions
of the lease
might be sufficiently known
from such a record.
Some landlords,
instead of raising
the rent,
take a fine
for the renewal
of the lease.
This practice is,
in most cases,
the expedient
of a spendthrift,
who,
for a sum
of ready money
sells a future revenue
of much greater value.
It is,
in most cases,
therefore,
hurtful to the landlord;
it is frequently hurtful
to the tenant;
and it is always hurtful
to the community.
It frequently takes
from the tenant so great
a part of his capital,
and thereby diminishes
so much his ability
to cultivate the land,
that
he finds it more difficult
to pay
a small rent than it
would otherwise have been
to pay a great one.
Whatever
diminishes
his ability
to cultivate,
necessarily
keeps down,
below what
it would otherwise have been,
the most important part
of the revenue
of the community.
By rendering
the tax upon such
fines a good deal heavier
than
upon the ordinary rent,
this hurtful practice
might be discouraged,
to the no small advantage
of all
the different parties concerned,
of the landlord,
of the tenant,
of the sovereign,
and of the whole community.
Some leases
prescribe to the tenant
a certain mode of cultivation,
and a certain succession
of crops,
during the whole continuance
of the lease.
This condition,
which is generally the effect
of the landlord's conceit
of his own superior knowledge
(a conceit in most cases
very ill-founded),
ought
always to be considered
as an additional rent,
as a rent in service,
instead of
a rent in money.
In order to
discourage the practice,
which is generally
a foolish one,
this species of rent
might be valued rather high,
and consequently taxed somewhat
higher
than common money-rents.
Some landlords,
instead of
a rent in money,
require a rent in kind,
in corn,
cattle,
poultry,
wine,
oil, etc.;
others,
again,
require a rent in service.
Such rents
are always more hurtful
to the tenant than beneficial
to the landlord.
They either take more,
or keep more
out of the pocket
of the former,
than
they put into
that of the latter.
In every country
where they take place,
the tenants
are poor and beggarly,
pretty much according to
the degree
in which
they take place.
By valuing,
in the same manner,
such rents rather high,
and consequently taxing them somewhat
higher
than common money-rents,
a practice
which is hurtful
to the whole community,
might,
perhaps,
be sufficiently discouraged.
When
the landlord chose to occupy himself
a part
of his own
lands,
the rent
might be valued according to
an equitable arbitration
of the farmers and landlords
in the neighbourhood,
and a moderate
abatement of the tax
might be granted to him,
in the same manner
as in the Venetian territory,
provided
the rent of the lands which
he occupied
did not exceed
a certain sum.
It is of importance
that
the landlord
should be encouraged
to cultivate a part
of his own land.
His capital
is generally greater than
that of the tenant,
and, with less skill,
he can frequently raise
a greater produce.
The landlord
can afford to try experiments,
and is generally disposed
to do so.
His unsuccessful experiments occasion
only a moderate loss
to himself.
His successful
ones contribute
to the improvement
and better cultivation
of the whole country.
It might be of importance,
however,
that
the abatement of the tax
should encourage him
to cultivate
to a certain extent only.
If the landlords should,
the greater part of them,
be tempted
to farm the whole
of their own lands,
the country
(instead of sober
and industrious tenants,
who are bound
by their own interest
to cultivate
as well as their capital
and skill
will allow them)
would be filled
with idle
and profligate bailiffs,
whose abusive management
would soon degrade
the cultivation,
and reduce the annual produce
of the land,
to the diminution,
not only of the revenue
of their masters,
but
of the most important part
of
that of the whole society.
Such a system
of administration might,
perhaps,
free a tax
of this kind
from any degree
of uncertainty,
which could occasion
either oppression
or inconveniency
to the contributor;
and might,
at the same time,
serve
to introduce
into the common management
of land such
a plan of policy as
might contribute
a good deal
to the general improvement and
good cultivation
of the country.
The expense
of levying a land-tax,
which varied
with every variation
of the rent,
would,
no doubt,
be somewhat
greater than
that of levying one
which
was always rated according to
a fixed valuation.
Some additional expense
would necessarily be incurred,
both
by the different register-offices
which it
would be proper
to establish
in the different districts
of the country,
and
by the different valuations
which
might occasionally be made
of the lands which
the proprietor chose
to occupy himself.
The expense of all this,
however,
might be very moderate,
and much below
what is incurred
in the levying
of many other taxes,
which
afford
a very inconsiderable revenue
in comparison of
what might easily be drawn
from a tax of this kind.
The discouragement which
a variable land-tax of this kind
might give to the improvement
of land,
seems
to be
the most important objection
which can be made to it.
The landlord
would certainly be
less disposed
to improve,
when the sovereign,
who contributed nothing
to the expense,
was to share
in the profit
of the improvement.
Even this objection
might,
perhaps,
be obviated,
by allowing the landlord,
before he
began his improvement,
to ascertain,
in conjunction
with the officers of revenue,
the actual value
of his lands,
according to
the equitable arbitration
of a certain number
of landlords and farmers
in the neighbourhood,
equally
chosen by both parties:
and by rating him,
according to this valuation,
for such
a number of years as
might be fully sufficient
for his complete indemnification.
To draw the attention
of the sovereign
towards the improvement
of the land,
from a regard
to the increase
of his own revenue,
is one
or the principal advantages
proposed by this species
of land-tax.
The term,
therefore,
allowed,
for the indemnification
of the landlord,
ought not
to be
a great deal longer than what
was necessary
for that purpose,
lest the remoteness
of the interest
should discourage
too much this attention.
It had better,
however,
be somewhat too long,
than in any respect too
short.
No
incitement to the attention
of the sovereign
can ever
counterbalance
the smallest discouragement to
that of the landlord.
The attention of the sovereign
can be,
at best,
but
a very general
and vague consideration of
what is likely
to contribute
to the better cultivation
of the greater part
of his dominions.
The attention of the landlord
is a particular
and minute consideration
of
what
is likely
to be
the most advantageous application
of every inch
of ground upon his estate.
The principal attention
of the sovereign
ought to be,
to encourage,
by every
means in his power,
the attention both
of the landlord
and of the farmer,
by allowing both to pursue
their own interest
in their own way,
and according to
their own judgment;
by giving to both
the most perfect security that
they shall enjoy
the full recompence
of their own industry;
and by procuring
to both
the most extensive market
for every part
of their produce,
in consequence
of establishing
the easiest
and safest communications,
both by land and by water,
through every part
of his own dominions,
as well as
the most unbounded freedom
of exportation
to the dominions
of all other princes.
If,
by such a system
of administration,
a tax of this kind
could be so
managed as to give,
not only no discouragement,
but,
on the contrary,
some
encouragement to the improvement
or land,
it does not appear likely
to occasion
any other inconveniency
to the landlord,
except
always the unavoidable one
of being obliged
to pay the tax.
In all the variations
of the state
of the society,
in the improvement
and in the declension
of agriculture;
in all the variations
in the value of silver,
and in all those
in the standard
of the coin,
a tax of this kind
would,
of its own accord,
and without any attention
of government,
readily
suit itself
to the actual situation
of things,
and would be equally just
and equitable
in all those
different changes.
It would,
therefore,
be much more proper
to be established
as a
perpetual and unalterable
regulation,
or as
what is called
a fundamental law
of the commonwealth,
than any tax
which was always
to be levied according to
a certain valuation.
Some states,
instead of
the simple and obvious expedient
of a register of leases,
have had recourse
to the
laborious and expensive one
of an actual survey
and valuation
of all
the lands in the country.
They have suspected,
probably,
that the lessor and lessee,
in order to
defraud the public revenue,
might combine
to conceal the real terms
of the lease.
Doomsday-book
seems to have been the result
of a very accurate survey
of this kind.
In the ancient dominions
of the king of Prussia,
the land-tax
is assessed
according to an actual survey
and valuation,
which
is reviewed
and altered
from time to time.
(Memoires concurent les
Droits,.etc. tom,
i. p. 114, 115,
116,
etc.)
According to that valuation,
the lay
proprietors
pay from twenty
to twenty-five per cent.
of their revenue;
ecclesiastics
from forty
to forty-five per cent.
The survey and valuation
of Silesia
was made
by order
of the present king,
it is said,
with great accuracy.
According to that valuation,
the lands
belonging
to the bishop of Breslaw
are taxed
at twenty-five per cent.
of their rent.
The other revenues
of the ecclesiastics
of both religions
at fifty per cent.
The commanderies
of the Teutonic order,
and of that of Malta,
at forty per cent. Lands
held by a noble tenure,
at thirty-eight
and one-third per cent. Lands
held by a base tenure,
at thirty-five
and one-third per cent.
The survey and valuation
of Bohemia
is said
to have been
the work
of more than a hundred years.
It
was not perfected
till after the peace of 1748,
by the orders
of the present empress queen.
(Id. tom i. p.85,
84.)
The survey
of the duchy of Milan,
which was begun
in the time
of Charles VI.,
was not perfected till
after 1760
It is esteemed one
of the most accurate
that has ever been made.
The survey
of Savoy and Piedmont
was executed
under the orders
of the late king
of Sardinia.
(Id. p. 280, etc.;
also p,
287..etc. to 316.)
In the dominions
of the king of Prussia,
the revenue of the church
is taxed much higher than
that of lay proprietors.
The revenue of the church is,
the greater part of it,
a burden upon the
rent of land.
It seldom
happens
that any part of it
is applied
towards the improvement
of land;
or is so
employed as to contribute,
in any respect,
towards increasing the revenue
of the great body
of the people.
His Prussian majesty
had probably,
upon that account,
thought
it reasonable that
it should contribute
a good deal more towards
relieving
the exigencies of the state.
In some countries,
the lands of the church
are exempted from all taxes.
In others,
they are taxed more lightly
than other lands.
In the duchy of Milan,
the lands which the church
possessed before 1575,
are rated
to the tax
at a third only
or their value.
In Silesia,
lands
held by a noble tenure
are taxed
three per cent. higher
than those
held by a base tenure.
The honours
and privileges
of different kinds annexed
to the former,
his Prussian majesty
had probably imagined,
would sufficiently compensate
to the proprietor
a small aggravation
of the tax;
while,
at the same time,
the humiliating inferiority
of the latter
would be in some measure
alleviated,
by being taxed
somewhat more lightly.
In other countries,
the system of taxation,
instead of alleviating,
aggravates this inequality.
In the dominions
of the king of Sardinia,
and in those provinces
of France
which are subject to
what is called
the real or predial
taille,
the tax falls altogether
upon the lands
held by a base tenure.
Those
held by a noble one
are exempted.
A land tax assessed
according to a general survey
and valuation,
how equal soever
it may be at first,
must,
in the course
of a very moderate period
of time,
become unequal.
To prevent its becoming
so would require
the continual and painful
attention
of government to all
the variations
in the state and
produce of every different
farm in the country.
The governments of Prussia,
of Bohemia,
of Sardinia,
and of the duchy
of Milan,
actually
exert an attention
of this kind;
an attention so unsuitable
to the nature of government,
that it
is not likely
to be of long continuance,
and which,
if it is continued,
will probably,
in the long-run,
occasion much more trouble
and vexation
than it
can possibly bring relief
to the contributors.
In 1666,
the generality of Montauban
was assessed
to the
real or predial taille,
according,
it is said,
to a very exact survey
and valuation.
(Memoires
concernant les
Droits,.etc. tom. ii p. 139,
etc.)
By 1727,
this assessment
had become altogether unequal.
In order to remedy
this inconveniency,
government
has found no better expedient,
than
to impose
upon the whole generality
an additional tax
of a hundred
and twenty thousand livres.
This additional tax
is rated
upon all
the different districts
subject to the taille
according to
the old assessment.
But it
is levied only
upon those which,
in the actual state
of things,
are by
that assessment under-taxed;
and it
is applied
to the relief of those which,
by the same assessment,
are over-taxed.
Two districts,
for example,
one of which ought,
in the actual state
of things,
to be taxed at nine hundred,
the other
at eleven hundred livres,
are, by the old assessment,
both taxed
at a thousand livres.
Both these districts are,
by the additional tax,
rated
at eleven hundred livres each.
But this additional tax
is levied only
upon the district under-charged,
and it is applied altogether
to the relief of
that overcharged,
which consequently pays only
nine hundred livres.
The government neither gains nor
loses by the additional tax,
which is applied altogether
to remedy the inequalities
arising
from the old assessment.
The application
is pretty much
regulated according to
the discretion
of the intendant
of the generality,
and must,
therefore,
be
in a great measure arbitrary.
Taxes
which are proportioned,
not in the Rent,
but
to the Produce of Land.
Taxes
upon the produce
of land are,
In reality,
taxes upon the rent;
and though they
may be originally advanced
by the farmer,
are finally paid
by the landlord.
When a certain portion
of the produce
is to be paid away
for a tax,
the farmer
computes as well as he can,
what the value
of this portion is,
one year with another,
likely to amount to,
and he
makes
a proportionable abatement in
the rent which
he agrees
to pay to the landlord.
There
is no farmer
who
does not compute
beforehand
what the church tythe,
which is a land tax
of this kind,
is, one year with another,
likely to amount to.
The tythe,
and every other land tax
of this kind,
under the appearance
of perfect equality,
are very unequal taxes;
a certain portion
of the produce
being
in differrent situations,
equivalent
to a very different portion
of the rent.
In some very rich lands,
the produce
is so great,
that
the one half of it
is fully sufficient
to replace
to the farmer his capital
employed in cultivation,
together
with the ordinary profits
of farming stock
in the neighbourhood.
The other half,
or,
what comes to the same thing,
the value of the other half,
he could afford
to pay as
rent to the landlord,
if there was no tythe.
But if a tenth
of the produce
is taken
from him
in the way of tythe,
he must require an abatement
of the fifth part
of his rent,
otherwise he cannot get
back his capital
with the ordinary profit.
In this case,
the rent of the landlord,
instead of amounting
to a half,
or five-tenths
of the whole produce,
will amount
only to four-tenths
of it.
In poorer lands,
on the contrary,
the produce
is sometimes so small,
and the expense
of cultivation so great,
that
it requires four-fifths
of the whole produce,
to replace to the farmer
his capital
with the ordinary profit.
In this case,
though there was no tythe,
the rent of the landlord
could amount
to no more than
one-fifth
or two-tenths
of the whole produce.
But if the farmer
pays one-tenth
of the produce
in the way of tythe,
he must require
an equal abatement
of the
rent of the landlord,
which will thus
be reduced
to one-tenth
only of the whole produce.
Upon the rent of rich
lands the tythe
may sometimes be a tax
of no more than
one-fifth part,
or four shillings
in the pound;
whereas upon
that of poorer lands,
it may sometimes be
a tax of one half,
or of ten shillings
in the pound.
The tythe,
as it
is frequently
a very unequal tax
upon the rent,
so it
is always
a great discouragement,
both to the improvements
of the landlord,
and to the cultivation
of the farmer.
The one
cannot venture
to make the most important,
which are generally
the most expensive improvements;
nor the other
to raise the most valuable,
which are generally, too,
the most expensive crops;
when the church,
which lays out no part
of the expense,
is to share so very largely
in the profit.
The cultivation of madder was,
for a long time,
confined
by the tythe
to the United Provinces,
which,
being presbyterian countries,
and upon that account
exempted
from this destructive tax,
enjoyed a sort of monopoly of
that useful dyeing drug
against the rest of Europe.
The late attempts
to introduce the culture
of this plant into England,
have been made only
in consequence of the statute,
which enacted that
five shillings
an acre
should be received
in lieu of all manner
of tythe upon madder.
As through the greater part
of Europe,
the church,
so in
many different countries
of Asia,
the state,
is principally supported
by a land tax,
proportioned not to the rent,
but to the produce
of the land.
In China,
the principal revenue
of the sovereign
consists
in a tenth part
of the produce of all
the lands of the empire.
This tenth part,
however,
is estimated so very moderately,
that,
in many provinces,
it is said not
to exceed a thirtieth part
of the ordinary produce.
The land tax
or land
rent
which used
to be paid
to the Mahometan government
of Bengal,
before that country
fell into the hands
of the
English East India company,
is said
to have amounted to
about a fifth part
of the produce.
The land tax of ancient
Egypt is said
likewise
to have amounted
to a fifth part.
In Asia,
this sort
of land tax
is said
to interest the sovereign
in the improvement
and cultivation
of land.
The sovereigns of China,
those
of Bengal
while under
the Mahometan govermnent,
and those of ancient Egypt,
are said,
accordingly,
to have been extremely attentive
to the making
and maintaining
of good roads
and navigable canals,
in order to increase,
as much as possible,
both
the quantity
and value
of every part
of the produce
of the land,
by procuring
to every part of it
the most extensive market which
their own dominions
could afford.
The tythe of the church
is divided into such small
portions that no one
of its proprietors
can have any interest
of this kind.
The parson of a parish
could never find his account,
in making a road or canal
to a distant part
of the country,
in order to
extend the market
for the produce
of his own particular parish.
Such taxes,
when destined
for the maintenance
of the state,
have some advantages,
which may serve
in some measure
to balance
their inconveniency.
When destined
for the maintenance
of the church,
they are attended
with nothing but inconveniency.
Taxes
upon the produce of land
may be levied,
either in kind,
or,
according to
a certain valuation
in money.
The parson of a parish,
or a gentleman
of small
fortune
who lives upon his estate,
may sometimes,
perhaps
find some advantage
in receiving,
the one his tythe,
and the other his rent,
in kind.
The quantity
to be collected,
and the district within which
it is to be collected,
are so small,
that they both
can oversee,
with their own eyes,
the collection and disposal
of every part of
what is due to them.
A gentleman of great fortune,
who lived in the capital,
would be
in danger of suffering much
by the neglect,
and more by the fraud,
of his factors and agents,
if the rents
of an estate
in a distant province
were to be paid
to him in this manner.
The loss
of the sovereign,
from the abuse and depredation
of his tax-gatherers,
would necessarily be
much greater.
The servants
of the most careless private person are,
perhaps,
more under the eye
of their master than those
of the most careful prince;
and a public revenue,
which was paid in kind,
would suffer so much
from the mismanagement
of the collectors,
that a very small part of
what
was levied upon the people
would ever arrive
at the treasury
of the prince.
Some part
of the public revenue
of China,
however,
is said
to be paid in this manner.
The mandarins
and other tax-gatherers will,
no doubt,
find their advantage
in continuing
the practice of a payment,
which is so much more liable
to abuse than any payment
in money.
A tax
upon the produce of land,
which is levied in money,
may be levied,
either
according to a valuation,
which varies with all
the variations
of the market price;
or according to
a fixed valuation,
a bushel of wheat,
for example,
being always valued
at one
and the same money price,
whatever may be the state
of the market.
The produce
of a tax levied
in the former way
will vary only according to
the variations
in the real produce
of the land,
according to the improvement
or neglect of cultivation.
The produce
of a tax levied
in the latter way
will vary,
not only according to
the variations
in the produce
of the land,
but according both to those
in the value
of the precious metals,
and those
in the quantity
of those metals
which is
at different times
contained
in coin
of the same denomination.
The produce of the former
will always bear
the same proportion
to the value
of the real produce
of the land.
The produce
of the latter may,
at different times,
bear
very different proportions
to that value.
When,
instead either
of a certain portion
of the produce of land,
or of the price
of a certain portion,
a certain sum of money
is to be paid
in full compensation
for all tax or tythe;
the tax
becomes,
in this case,
exactly of the same nature
with the land tax
of England.
It neither rises nor falls
with the
rent of the land.
It neither
encourages nor
discourages improvement.
The tythe
in the greater part
of those parishes which pay
what is called a modus,
in lieu of all other tythe
is a tax of this kind.
During the Mahometan government
of Bengal,
instead of the
payment in kind
of the fifth part
of the produce,
a modus,
and, it is said,
a very moderate one,
was established
in the greater part
of the districts or zemindaries
of the country.
Some of the servants
of the East India company,
under pretence
of restoring
the public revenue
to its proper value,
have,
in some provinces,
exchanged
this modus
for a payment in kind.
Under their management,
this change
is likely both
to discourage cultivation,
and to give new opportunities
for abuse
in the collection
of the public revenue,
which has fallen very much
below what
it was said
to have been when it
first fell
under the management
of the company.
The servants
of the company may,
perhaps,
have profited by the change,
but at the expense,
it is probable,
both of their masters
and of the country.
Taxes
upon the Rent of Houses.
The rent of a house
may be distinguished
into two parts,
of which the one
may very properly be called the
building-rent;
the other
is commonly called
the ground-rent.
The building-rent
is
the interest
or profit of the capital
expended
in building the house.
In order to
put the trade
of a builder
upon a level
with other trades,
it is necessary that this
rent
should be sufficient,
first,
to pay him
the same interest which
he would have
got for his capital,
if he
had lent it
upon good security;
and, secondly,
to keep the house
in constant repair,
or,
what comes to the same thing,
to replace,
within a certain term
of years,
the capital
which had been employed
in building it.
The building-rent,
or the ordinary profit
of building,
is, therefore,
everywhere
regulated
by the ordinary interest
of money.
Where
the market rate of interest
is four per cent.
the rent of a house,
which,
over and above paying the
ground-rent,
affords six
or six
and a-half per cent.
upon the whole expense
of building,
may,
perhaps,
afford a sufficient profit
to the builder.
Where
the market rate of interest
is five per cent.
it may perhaps require seven
or seven
and a half per cent.
If,
in proportion
to the interest of money,
the trade of the builders
affords at any time
much greater profit than this,
it will soon draw
so much capital
from other trades as
will reduce
the profit
to its proper level.
If it
affords
at any time much less
than this,
other
trades will soon draw
so much capital
from it
as will again raise
that profit.
Whatever
part of the whole rent
of a house
is over and above
what is sufficient
for affording
this reasonable profit,
naturally
goes to the ground-rent;
and,
where the owner
of the ground
and the owner of the building
are two different persons,
is, in most cases,
completely paid
to the former.
This surplus
rent
is the price which
the inhabitant of the house
pays for some real
or supposed advantage
of the situation.
In country houses,
at a distance
from any great town,
where there is plenty
of ground to chuse upon,
the ground-rent
is scarce anything,
or no more than
what
the ground which the house stands
upon
would pay,
if employed in agriculture.
In country villas,
in the neighbourhood
of some great town,
it is sometimes a good deal
higher;
and the peculiar conveniency
or beauty
of situation
is there frequently
very well paid for.
Ground-rents
are generally highest
in the capital,
and in those particular parts
of it
where there happens
to be the greatest demand
for houses,
whatever
be the reason of that demand,
whether for trade and business,
for pleasure and society,
or for mere vanity
and fashion.
A tax upon house-rent,
payable by the tenant,
and proportioned
to the whole rent
of each house,
could not,
for any considerable time
at least,
affect
the building-rent.
If the builder
did not get
his reasonable profit,
he would be obliged
to quit the trade;
which,
by raising the demand
for building,
would,
in a short time,
bring back his profit
to its proper level with
that of other trades.
Neither
would such a tax
fall altogether upon the
ground-rent;
but it
would divide itself
in such a manner,
as to fall partly
upon the inhabitant
of the house,
and partly upon the owner
of the ground.
Let us
suppose,
for example,
that
a particular person judges
that
he can afford
for house-rent all expense
of sixty pounds a-year;
and let us
suppose, too,
that a tax
of four shillings
in the pound,
or of one-fifth,
payable by the inhabitant,
is laid upon house-rent.
A house of sixty pounds
rent will,
in that case,
cost him
seventy-two pounds a-year,
which is
twelve pounds more than
he thinks
he can afford.
He will,
therefore,
content himself
with a worse house,
or a house
of fifty pounds rent,
which,
with the additional ten pounds
that he
must pay for the tax,
will make up the sum
of sixty pounds a-year,
the expense which
he judges
he can afford,
and,
in order to pay the tax,
he will give
up a part
of the
additional conveniency which
he might have had
from a house
of ten pounds a-year
more rent.
He will give up,
I say,
a part
of this
additional conveniency;
for he will seldom be obliged
to give up the whole,
but will,
in consequence of the tax,
get a better house
for fifty pounds a-year,
than he could have
got if
there had been no tax
for as a tax
of this kind,
by taking away
this particular competitor,
must diminish the competition
for houses of sixty pounds rent,
so it must likewise
diminish it
for those of fifty pounds rent,
and in the same manner
for those
of all other rents,
except the lowest rent,
for which
it would for some time
increase the competition.
But the rents of every class
of houses
for which the competition
was diminished,
would necessarily be more
or less reduced.
As no part of this reduction,
however,
could
for any considerable time
at least,
affect
the building-rent,
the whole of it must,
in the long-run,
necessarily fall upon the
ground-rent.
The final payment
of this tax,
therefore,
would fall partly
upon the inhabitant
of the house,
who,
in order to pay his share,
would be obliged
to give
up a part
of his conveniency;
and partly upon the owner
of the ground,
who,
in order to pay his share,
would be obliged
to give
up a part
of his revenue.
In what proportion
this
final payment
would be divided between them,
it is not,
perhaps,
very easy to ascertain.
The division
would probably be
very different
in different circumstances,
and a tax of this kind
might,
according to those
different circumstances,
affect very unequally,
both the inhabitant
of the house
and the owner
of the ground.
The inequality
with which a tax of this
kind
might fall
upon the owners
of different ground-rents,
would arise altogether
from the accidental inequality
of this division.
But the inequality with which
it might fall
upon the inhabitants
of different houses,
would arise,
not only from this,
but from another cause.
The proportion
of the expense of house-rent
to the whole expense
of living,
is different
in the different degrees
of fortune.
It is,
perhaps,
highest in the highest degree,
and it
diminishes gradually
through the inferior degrees,
so as in general
to be lowest
in the lowest degree.
The necessaries of life
occasion the great expense
of the poor.
They find it difficult
to get food,
and the greater part
of their little revenue
is spent
in getting it.
The luxuries and vanities
of life
occasion the principal expense
of the rich;
and a magnificent house
embellishes and sets off
to the best advantage all
the other luxuries
and vanities which
they possess.
A tax upon house-rents,
therefore,
would in general
fall heaviest upon the rich;
and in this sort
of inequality
there would not,
perhaps,
be any thing
very unreasonable It
is not very unreasonable
that the rich
should contribute
to the public expense,
not only in proportion
to their revenue,
but something
more than in
that proportion.
The rent of houses,
though it in some respects
resembles
the rent of land,
is in one respect essentially
different
from it.
The rent of land
is paid
for the use
of a productive subject.
The land
which pays it produces it.
The rent of houses
is paid
for the use
of an unproductive subject.
Neither the house,
nor the ground which
it stands upon,
produce anything.
The person
who pays the rent,
therefore,
must draw it
from some other source
of revenue,
distinct from and independent
of this subject.
A tax upon the
rent of houses,
so far
as it falls
upon the inhabitants,
must be drawn
from the same source as the
rent itself,
and must be paid
from their revenue,
whether
derived
from the wages of labour,
the profits of stock,
or the rent of land.
So far
as it falls
upon the inhabitants,
it is one
of those taxes which fall,
not upon one only,
but indifferently upon all
the three different sources
of revenue;
and is,
in every respect,
of the same nature as a tax
upon any other sort
of consumable commodities.
In general,
there
is not perhaps,
any one article
of expense or consumption
by which the liberality
or narrowness
of a man's whole expense
can be better
judged of than
by his house-rent.
A proportional tax
upon this particular article
of expense
might,
perhaps,
produce
a more considerable revenue
than any which
has hitherto been
drawn from it
in any part of Europe.
If the tax,
indeed,
was very high,
the greater part of people
would endeavour
to evade
it as
much as they could,
by contenting themselves
with smaller houses,
and by turning
the greater part
of their expense
into some other channel.
The rent of houses
might easily be ascertained
with sufficient accuracy,
by a policy
of the same kind with
that
which would be necessary
for ascertaining
the ordinary rent of land.
Houses not inhabited
ought to pay no tax.
A tax upon them
would fall altogether
upon the proprietor,
who would thus
be taxed for a subject
which afforded him
neither conveniency nor revenue.
Houses
inhabited by the proprietor
ought to be rated,
not according to
the expense which
they might have cost
in building,
but according to
the rent which
an equitable arbitration
might judge them likely
to bring
if leased to a tenant.
If rated according to
the expense which
they might have cost
in building,
a tax
of three or four shillings
in the pound,
joined with other taxes,
would ruin almost all
the rich and great families
of this,
and, I believe,
of every other civilized
country.
Whoever
will examine
with attention
the different town
and country houses
of some of the richest
and greatest families
in this country,
will find that,
at the rate
of only six and a-half,
or seven per cent.
upon the original expense
of building,
their house-rent
is nearly equal to
the whole neat rent
of their estates.
It is the accumulated expense
of several
successive generations,
laid out upon objects
of great beauty and magnificence,
indeed,
but,
in proportion to what they cost,
of very small exchangeable value.
(Since the first publication
of this book,
a tax
nearly upon
the above-mentioned principles
has been imposed.)
Ground-rents
are
a still more proper subject
of taxation than the
rent of houses.
A tax upon ground-rents
would not raise
the rent of houses;
it would fall altogether
upon the owner of the
ground-rent,
who
acts always as a monopolist,
and exacts
the greatest rent
which can be
got for the use
of his ground.
More
or less can be
got for it,
according
as the competitors
happen to be
richer or poorer,
or can afford
to gratify their fancy
for a particular spot
of ground
at a greater
or smaller expense.
In every country,
the greatest number
of rich
competitors
is in the capital,
and it
is there accordingly that
the highest ground-rents
are always
to be found.
As the wealth
of those competitors
would in no respect
be increased by a tax
upon ground-rents,
they
would not probably be disposed
to pay more
for the use
of the ground.
Whether
the tax was to be advanced
by the inhabitant
or by the owner
of the ground,
would be of little importance.
The more
the inhabitant was obliged
to pay for the tax,
the less
he would incline
to pay for the ground;
so that the final payment
of the tax
would fall altogether
upon the owner of the
ground-rent.
The ground-rents
of uninhabited houses
ought to pay no tax.
Both ground-rents,
and the ordinary rent
of land,
are a species
of revenue which the owner,
in many cases,
enjoys
without any care or attention
of his own.
Though a part of this revenue
should be taken from him
in order to
defray the expenses
of the state,
no
discouragement
will thereby be given
to any sort
of industry.
The annual produce
of the land
and labour of the society,
the real wealth and revenue
of the great body
of the people,
might be the same
after such a tax as
before.
Ground-rents,
and the ordinary rent
of land,
are therefore,
perhaps,
the species of revenue
which can best bear
to have
a peculiar tax
imposed upon them.
Ground-rents seem,
in this respect,
a more proper subject
of peculiar taxation,
than
even the ordinary rent
of land.
The ordinary rent of land is,
in many cases,
owing partly,
at least,
to the attention
and good management
of the landlord.
A very heavy tax
might discourage,
too much,
this attention
and good management.
Ground-rents,
so far
as they
exceed the ordinary rent
of land,
are altogether owing
to the good government
of the sovereign,
which,
by protecting
the industry either
of the whole people
or of the inhabitants
of some particular place,
enables them
to pay
so much more
than its real value
for the ground which
they build their houses upon;
or to make
to its owner so much more
than compensation
for the loss which
he might sustain
by this use of it.
Nothing
can be more reasonable,
than that a fund,
which owes its existence
to the good government
of the state,
should be taxed peculiarly,
or should contribute something
more than the greater part
of other funds,
towards the support of
that government.
Though,
in many different countries
of Europe,
taxes
have been imposed upon the
rent of houses,
I do not know
of any in which ground-rents
have been considered
as a separate subject
of taxation.
The contrivers of taxes have,
probably,
found
some difficulty in ascertaining
what part of the rent
ought to be considered as
ground-rent,
and what part
ought to be considered
as building-rent.
It should not,
however,
seem very difficult
to distinguish
those two parts of the
rent from one another.
In Great Britain
the rent of houses
is supposed
to be taxed
in the same proportion
as the rent of land,
by
what is called
the annual land tax.
The valuation,
according to
which each different parish
and district
is assessed to this tax,
is always the same.
It was originally extremely
unequal,
and it still continues
to be so.
Through the greater part
of the kingdom
this tax falls
still more lightly upon the
rent of houses than upon
that of land.
In some few districts only,
which
were originally rated high,
and in which the rents
of houses
have fallen considerably,
the land tax
of three or four shillings
in the pound
is said
to amount
to an equal proportion
of the real rent
of houses.
Untenanted houses,
though
by law subject to the tax,
are, in most districts,
exempted from it
by the favour
of the assessors;
and this exemption
sometimes occasions
some little variation
in the rate
of particular houses,
though
that of the district
is always the same.
Improvements of rent,
by new buildings,
repairs,.etc.
go
to the discharge
of the district,
which occasions still
further variations
in the rate
of particular houses.
In the province of Holland,
(Memoires
concernant les
Droits,.etc. p.
223.) every house
is taxed
at two and
a-half per cent.
of its value,
without any regard,
either to the rent which
it actually pays,
or to the circumstance
of its being tenanted
or untenanted.
There
seems to be a hardship
in obliging
the proprietor
to pay a tax
for an untenanted house,
from which
he can derive no revenue,
especially
so very heavy a tax.
In Holland,
where
the market rate of interest
does not exceed
three per cent.,
two
and a-half per cent.
upon the whole value
of the house must,
in most cases,
amount to
more than a third of the
building-rent,
perhaps of the whole rent.
The valuation,
indeed,
according to which
the houses are rated,
though very unequal,
is said
to be always
below the real value.
When a house is rebuilt,
improved,
or enlarged,
there
is a new valuation,
and the tax
is rated accordingly.
The contrivers
of the several taxes which
in England have,
at different times,
been imposed upon houses,
seem to have imagined
that there was
some great difficulty
in ascertaining,
with tolerable exactness,
what was the real rent
of every house.
They have regulated
their taxes,
therefore,
according to
some more obvious circumstance,
such as they
had probably imagined
would,
in most cases,
bear some proportion to the rent.
The first tax of this kind
was hearth-money;
or a tax
of two shillings
upon every hearth.
In order to
ascertain
how many
hearths
were in the house,
it was necessary
that the tax-gatherer
should enter every room
in it.
This odious visit
rendered the tax odious.
Soon after the Revolution,
therefore,
it
was abolished
as a badge of slavery.
The next tax of this kind
was a tax
of two shillings
upon every dwelling-house inhabited.
A house
with ten windows
to pay four shillings more.
A house
with twenty windows
and upwards to pay
eight shillings.
This tax
was afterwards so far altered,
that houses
with twenty windows,
and with less than thirty,
were ordered
to pay ten shillings,
and those
with thirty windows
and upwards to pay
twenty shillings.
The number of windows can,
in most cases,
be counted from the outside,
and, in all cases,
without entering
every room in the house.
The visit
of the tax-gatherer,
therefore,
was less offensive
in this tax than
in the hearth-money.
This tax
was afterwards repealed,
and in the room of it
was established
the window-tax,
which has undergone
two several alterations
and augmentations.
The window tax,
as it stands
at present (January 1775),
over and above the duty
of three shillings
upon every house in England,
and of one shilling
upon every house in Scotland,
lays a duty
upon every window,
which in England
augments gradually
from twopence,
the lowest rate
upon houses
with not more than
seven windows,
to two shillings,
the highest rate
upon houses
with twenty-five windows
and upwards.
The principal objection
to all such taxes
is their inequality;
an inequality
of the worst kind,
as they
must frequently fall much heavier
upon the poor than
upon the rich.
A house of ten pounds
rent in a country town,
may sometimes have more windows
than a house
of five hundred pounds
rent in London;
and though the inhabitant
of the former
is likely
to be a much poorer man
than
that of the latter,
yet,
so far as his contribution
is regulated
by the window tax,
he must contribute more
to the support
of the state.
Such taxes are,
therefore,
directly contrary
to the first
of the four maxims
above mentioned.
They do not seem
to offend much
against any
of the other three.
The natural tendency
of the window tax,
and of all other taxes
upon houses,
is to lower rents.
The more
a man
pays for the tax,
the less,
it is evident,
he can afford
to pay for the rent.
Since the imposition
of the window tax,
however,
the rents of houses have,
upon the whole,
risen more or less,
in almost every town
and village
of Great Britain,
with which I am acquainted.
Such
has been,
almost everywhere,
the increase
of the demand for houses,
that it
has raised
the rents
more than the window tax
could sink them;
one of the many proofs
of the great prosperity
of the country,
and of the increasing revenue
of its inhabitants.
Had it
not been for the tax,
rents
would probably have risen still
higher.
Taxes upon Profit,
or upon the Revenue
arising from Stock.
The revenue
or profit
arising
from stock naturally
divides itself into two parts;
that which pays the interest,
and which
belongs
to the owner
of the stock;
and that
surplus part
which is over and above
what is necessary
for paying the interest.
This
latter part of profit
is evidently
a subject not taxable directly.
It is the compensation,
and, in most cases,
it is no
more than
a very moderate compensation
for the risk
and trouble
of employing the stock.
The employer
must have this compensation,
otherwise he cannot,
consistently with
his own interest,
continue the employment.
If he was taxed directly,
therefore,
in proportion
to the whole profit,
he would be obliged
either
to raise the rate
of his profit,
or to charge the tax
upon the interest of money;
that is,
to pay less interest.
If he
raised the rate
of his profit
in proportion to the tax,
the whole tax,
though it
might be advanced by him,
would be finally paid
by one or other
of two different sets
of people,
according to
the different ways
in which he
might employ
the stock
of which
he had the management.
If he
employed
it as a farming stock,
in the cultivation of land,
he could raise the rate
of his profit
only by retaining
a greater portion,
or,
what comes to the same thing,
the price
of a greater portion,
of the produce
of the land;
and as
this could be done only
by a reduction of rent,
the final payment
of the tax
would fall upon the landlord.
If he
employed
it
as
a mercantile
or manufacturing stock,
he could raise the rate
of his profit
only by raising
the price of his goods;
in which case,
the final payment of the tax
would fall altogether
upon the consumers
of those goods.
If he
did not raise the rate
of his profit,
he would be obliged
to charge
the whole tax
upon that part of it
which was allotted
for the interest of money.
He could afford less interest
for
whatever stock he borrowed,
and the whole weight
of the tax
would,
in this case,
fall ultimately
upon the interest
of money.
So far
as he
could not relieve himself
from the tax
in the one way,
he would be obliged
to relieve himself
in the other.
The interest of money seems,
at first sight,
a subject equally capable of
being taxed directly
as the rent of land.
Like the rent of land,
it is a neat produce,
which remains,
after completely compensating
the whole risk
and trouble
of employing the stock.
As a tax upon the
rent of land
cannot raise rents,
because
the neat produce
which remains,
after replacing
the stock of the farmer,
together
with his reasonable profit,
cannot be greater
after the tax
than before it,
so,
for the same reason,
a tax
upon the interest of money
could not raise the rate
of interest;
the quantity
of stock or money
in the country,
like the quantity of land,
being supposed
to remain
the same
after the tax
as before it.
The ordinary rate of profit,
it has been shewn,
in the first book,
is everywhere regulated
by the quantity
of stock
to be employed,
in proportion
to the quantity
of the employment,
or of the business
which must be done by it.
But the quantity
of the employment,
or of the business
to be done by stock,
could neither
be increased nor diminished
by any tax
upon the interest of money.
If the quantity
of the stock
to be employed,
therefore,
was neither
increased nor diminished by it,
the ordinary rate of profit
would necessarily remain
the same.
But the portion
of this profit,
necessary
for compensating the risk
and trouble of the employer,
would likewise
remain the same;
that risk
and trouble
being in no respect
altered.
The residue,
therefore,
that portion
which belongs
to the owner
of the stock,
and which
pays the interest of money,
would necessarily remain
the same too.
At first sight,
therefore,
the interest of money
seems to be a subject
as fit
to be taxed directly
as the rent of land.
There are,
however,
two different circumstances,
which
render the interest
of money
a much less proper subject
of direct taxation than the
rent of land.
First,
the quantity
and value of the land
which any man possesses,
can never be a secret,
and can always be ascertained
with great exactness.
But the whole amount
of the capital stock which
he possesses
is almost always a secret,
and can scarce
ever be ascertained
with tolerable exactness.
It is liable,
besides,
to almost continual variations.
A year seldom passes away,
frequently not
a month,
sometimes scarce a single day,
in which it does not rise
or fall more or less.
An inquisition
into every man's private
circumstances,
and an inquisition which,
in order to
accommodate the tax to them,
watched over all
the fluctuations
of his fortune,
would be a source
of such continual and endless
vexation as no person
could support.
Secondly,
land
is a subject
which cannot be removed;
whereas stock easily may.
The proprietor of land
is necessarily
a citizen
of the particular country
in which his estate lies.
The proprietor of stock
is properly
a citizen of the world,
and
is not necessarily attached
to any particular country.
He would be
apt to abandon
the country
in which
he was exposed
to a vexatious inquisition,
in order to
be assessed
to a burdensome tax;
and would remove
his stock
to some other country,
where he could either
carry on his business,
or enjoy his fortune more
at his ease.
By removing his stock,
he would put an end
to all
the industry
which it
had maintained
in the country which
he left.
Stock
cultivates land;
stock
employs labour.
A tax
which tended to drive
away stock
from any particular country,
would so far tend
to dry
up every source of revenue,
both to the sovereign
and to the society.
Not only the profits
of stock,
but the rent of land,
and the wages of labour,
would necessarily be more
or less
diminished by its removal.
The nations,
accordingly,
who have attempted
to tax the revenue
arising from stock,
instead of any severe inquisition
of this kind,
have been obliged
to content themselves
with some very loose,
and, therefore,
more or
less arbitrary estimation.
The extreme inequality
and uncertainty
of a tax assessed
in this manner,
can be compensated only
by its extreme moderation;
in consequence of which,
every man
finds himself
rated so very much
below his real revenue,
that
he gives himself
little disturbance
though his neighbour
should be rated somewhat
lower.
By
what is called
the land tax in England,
it was intended
that the stock
should be taxed
in the same proportion
as land.
When
the tax upon land
was at four shillings
in the pound,
or at one-fifth of the
supposed rent,
it was intended that stock
should be taxed at one-fifth
of the supposed interest.
When the present annual land
tax was first imposed,
the legal rate of interest
was six per cent.
Every hundred pounds stock,
accordingly,
was supposed
to be taxed
at twenty-four shillings,
the fifth part
of six pounds.
Since the legal rate
of interest
has been reduced
to five per cent.
every hundred pounds stock
is supposed
to be taxed
at twenty shillings only.
The sum
to be raised,
by
what is called
the land tax,
was divided
between the country
and the principal towns.
The greater
part of it
was laid upon the country;
and of
what
was laid upon the towns,
the greater part
was assessed upon the houses.
What remained
to be assessed upon the stock
or trade of the towns
(for the stock
upon the land
was not meant
to be taxed)
was very much
below the real value
of that stock
or trade.
Whatever inequalities,
therefore,
there
might be
in the original assessment,
gave little disturbance.
Every parish and district
still continues
to be rated for its land,
its houses,
and its stock,
according to
the original assessment;
and
the almost universal prosperity
of the country,
which,
in most places,
has raised very much
the value
of all these,
has rendered
those inequalities
of still less importance now.
The rate, too,
upon each district,
continuing always the same,
the uncertainty of this tax,
so far
as it might
he assessed
upon the stock
of any individual,
has been very much diminished,
as well as rendered
of much less consequence.
If the greater part
of the lands of England
are not rated
to the land tax
at half their actual value,
the greater part
of the stock
of England is,
perhaps,
scarce rated
at the fiftieth part
of its actual value.
In some towns,
the whole land tax
is assessed upon houses;
as in Westminster,
where stock
and trade are free.
It is otherwise in London.
In all countries,
a severe inquisition
into the circumstances
of private
persons
has been carefully avoided.
At Hamburg,
(Memoires
concernant les Droits,
tom. i,
p.74)
every inhabitant
is obliged
to pay to the state
one fourth per cent.
of all that
he possesses;
and as the wealth
of the people
of Hamburg
consists principally
in stock,
this tax maybe
considered
as a tax upon stock.
Every man assesses himself,
and,
in the presence
of the magistrate,
puts annually
into the public coffer
a certain sum of money,
which
he declares upon oath,
to be
one fourth per cent.
of all that
he possesses,
but without declaring
what it amounts to,
or being liable
to any examination
upon that subject.
This tax
is generally supposed
to be paid
with great fidelity.
In a small republic,
where the people
have entire confidence
in their magistrates,
are convinced
of the necessity
of the tax
for the support
of the state,
and believe
that it
will be faithfully applied
to that purpose,
such conscientious
and voluntary payment
may sometimes be expected.
It is not peculiar
to the people
of Hamburg.
The canton of Underwald,
in Switzerland,
is frequently ravaged
by storms and inundations,
and it
is thereby exposed
to extraordinary expenses.
Upon such occasions the people
assemble,
and every one
is said
to declare
with the greatest frankness
what he is worth,
in order to
be taxed accordingly.
At Zurich,
the law orders,
that in cases of necessity,
every one
should be taxed in proportion
to his revenue;
the amount
of which he is obliged
to declare upon oath.
They have no suspicion,
it is said,
that any
of their fellow citizens
will deceive them.
At Basil,
the principal revenue
of the state
arises
from a small custom
upon goods exported.
All the citizens make oath,
that
they will pay
every three months all the taxes
imposed by law.
All merchants,
and even all inn-keepers,
are trusted
with keeping themselves
the account
of the goods which
they sell,
either
within or without the territory.
At the end
of every three months,
they send this account
to the treasurer,
with the amount
of the tax computed
at the bottom of it.
It is not suspected that
the revenue
suffers by this confidence.
(Memoires
concernant les Droits,
tom. i p. 163,
167,171.)
To oblige every citizen
to declare publicly upon oath,
the amount of his fortune,
must not,
it seems,
in those Swiss cantons,
be reckoned a hardship.
At Hamburg
it would be reckoned
the greatest.
Merchants
engaged
in the hazardous projects
of trade,
all tremble at the thoughts
of being obliged,
at all times,
to expose the real state
of their circumstances.
The ruin of their credit,
and the miscarriage
of their projects,
they foresee,
would too often be
the consequence.
A sober
and parsimonious people,
who are strangers
to all such projects,
do not feel that they
have occasion
for any such concealment.
In Holland,
soon after the exaltation
of the late prince
of Orange
to the stadtholdership,
a tax
of two per cent.
or the fiftieth penny,
as it was called,
was imposed
upon the whole substance
of every citizen.
Every citizen assesed himself,
and paid his tax,
in the same manner
as at Hamburg,
and it was in general
supposed
to have been paid
with great fidelity.
The people
had at that time
the greatest affection
for their new government,
which they
had just established by a
general insurrection.
The tax
was to be paid but once,
in order to
relieve the state
in a particular exigency.
It was,
indeed,
too heavy
to be permanent.
In a country
where the market rate
of interest
seldom
exceeds three per cent.,
a tax
of two per cent. amounts
to thirteen shillings
and four pence
in the pound,
upon the highest
neat revenue which
is commonly drawn from stock.
It is a tax which
very few people could pay,
without encroaching more or less
upon their capitals.
In a particular exigency,
the people may,
from great public zeal,
make a great effort,
and give up even
a part of their capital,
in order to
relieve the state.
But it
is impossible
that
they should continue
to do so
for any considerable time;
and if they did,
the tax
would soon ruin them so completely,
as
to render them altogether incapable
of supporting the state.
The tax upon stock,
imposed
by the land tax bill
in England,
though it
is proportioned
to the capital,
is not intended
to diminish or,
take away any part of
that capital.
It is meant only
to be a tax
upon the interest of money,
proportioned to that upon the
rent of land;
so that
when
the latter
is at four shillings
in the pound,
the former
may be
at four shillings
in the pound too.
The tax at Hamburg,
and the still
more moderate taxes
of Underwald and Zurich,
are meant,
in the same manner,
to be taxes,
not upon the capital,
but upon the interest
or neat revenue of stock.
That of Holland was meant
to be a tax
upon the capital.
Taxes
upon the Profit
of particular Employments.
In some countries,
extraordinary taxes
are imposed upon the profits
of stock;
sometimes
when employed
in particular branches
of trade,
and sometimes
when employed
in agriculture.
Of the former kind,
are in England,
the tax
upon hawkers and pedlars,
that upon hackney-coaches
and chairs,
and that which
the keepers
of ale-houses pay
for a licence
to retail ale
and spiritous liquors.
During the late war,
another tax of the same kind
was proposed upon shops.
The war
having been undertaken,
it was said,
in defence
of the trade
of the country,
the merchants,
who were to profit by it,
ought to contribute
towards the support of it.
A tax,
however,
upon the profits
of stock
employed
in any particular branch
of trade,
can never fall finally
upon the dealers
(who must
in all ordinary cases have
their reasonable profit,
and,
where the competition
is free,
can seldom have
more than
that profit),
but always upon the consumers,
who must be obliged
to pay
in the price
of the goods
the tax which the dealer advances;
and generally with some overcharge.
A tax of this kind,
when it
is proportioned
to the trade
of the dealer,
is finally paid
by the consumer,
and occasions no oppression
to the dealer.
When it
is not so proportioned,
but is
the same upon all dealers,
though in this case, too,
it is finally paid
by the consumer,
yet it favours the great,
and occasions some oppression
to the small dealer.
The tax
of five shillings a-week
upon every hackney coach,
and that
of ten shillings a-year
upon every hackney chair,
so far as it
is advanced
by the different keepers
of such coaches
and chairs,
is exactly enough proportioned
to the extent
of their respective dealings.
It neither
favours the great,
nor oppresses
the smaller dealer.
The tax
of twenty shillings a-year
for a licence
to sell ale;
of forty shillings
for a licence
to sell spiritous liquors;
and of forty shillings more
for a licence
to sell wine,
being the same
upon all retailers,
must necessarily give
some advantage to the great,
and occasion some oppression
to the small dealers.
The former
must find it more easy
to get back the tax
in the price
of their goods
than the latter.
The moderation of the tax,
however,
renders this inequality
of less importance;
and it may to many people
appear not improper
to give some discouragement
to the multiplication
of little ale-houses.
The tax upon shops,
it was intended,
should be
the same upon all shops.
It
could not well have been otherwise.
It would have been impossible
to proportion,
with tolerable exactness,
the tax
upon a shop to the extent
of the trade
carried on in it,
without such
an inquisition as
would have been altogether
insupportable
in a free country.
If the tax
had been considerable,
it would have oppressed
the small,
and forced almost
the whole retail trade
into the hands
of the great dealers.
The competition of the former
being taken away,
the latter
would have enjoyed
a monopoly of the trade;
and,
like all other monopolists,
would soon have
combined to raise
their profits much beyond what
was necessary
for the payment
of the tax.
The final payment,
instead of falling
upon the shop-keeper,
would have fallen
upon the consumer,
with a considerable overcharge
to the profit
of the shop-keeper.
For these reasons,
the project
of a tax upon shops
was laid aside,
and in the room of it
was substituted the subsidy,
1759.
What in France
is called the personal taille,
is perhaps,
the most important tax
upon the profits
of stock employed
in agriculture,
that is levied in any part
of Europe.
In the
disorderly state of Europe,
during the prevalence
of the feudal government,
the sovereign
was obliged
to content himself with taxing
those
who were too weak to refuse
to pay taxes.
The great lords,
though willing
to assist him
upon particular emergencies,
refused
to subject themselves
to any constant tax,
and he was not
strong enough
to force them.
The occupiers of land all
over Europe were,
the greater part of them,
originally bond-men.
Through the greater part
of Europe,
they were gradually emancipated.
Some of them
acquired the property
of landed estates,
which
they held
by some base
or ignoble tenure,
sometimes under the king,
and sometimes under
some other great lord,
like the ancient copy-holders
of England.
Others,
without acquiring
the property,
obtained leases
for terms of years,
of the lands which
they occupied
under their lord,
and thus
became less dependent
upon him.
The great lords
seem to have beheld
the degree
of prosperity and independency,
which this inferior order
of men
had thus come to enjoy,
with a
malignant and contemptuous
indignation,
and willingly consented
that
the sovereign
should tax them.
In some countries,
this tax
was confined
to the lands
which were held
in property
by an ignoble tenure;
and, in this case,
the taille
was said to be real.
The land tax
established
by the late king
of Sardinia,
and the taille
in the provinces of Languedoc,
Provence,
Dauphine,
and Britanny;
in the generality
of Montauban,
and in the elections
of Agen and Condom,
as
well as
in some other districts
of France;
are taxes
upon lands
held in property
by an ignoble tenure.
In other countries,
the tax
was laid
upon the supposed profits
of all
those who held,
in farm
or lease,
lands
belonging to other people,
whatever
might be
the tenure
by which the proprietor
held them;
and in this case,
the taille
was said to be personal.
In the greater part
of those provinces
of France,
which are called the countries
of elections,
the taille
is of this kind.
The real taille,
as it
is imposed only
upon a part
of the lands
of the country,
is necessarily an unequal,
but it
is not always
an arbitrary tax,
though it is so
upon some occasions.
The personal taille,
as it is intended
to be proportioned
to the profits
of a certain class
of people,
which can only be guessed at,
is necessarily
both arbitrary and unequal.
In France,
the personal taille
at present (1775) annually
imposed
upon the twenty generalities,
called the countries
of elections,
amounts to 40,107,239 livres,
16 sous.
(Memoires
concernant les Droits,
etc tom. ii,
p.17.)
the proportion
in which this sum
is assessed
upon those
different provinces,
varies from year to year,
according to the reports
which are made
to the king's council
concerning the goodness
or badness
of the crops,
as
well as other circumstances,
which may
either increase
or diminish
their respective abilities
to pay.
Each generality
is divided
into a certain number
of elections;
and
the proportion in which
the sum
imposed
upon the whole generality
is divided
among those different elections,
varies likewise
from year to year,
according to
the reports
made
to the council concerning
their respective abilities.
It seems impossible,
that the council,
with the best intentions,
can ever proportion,
with tolerable exactness,
either of these
two assessments
to the real abilities
of the province or district
upon which
they are respectively laid.
Ignorance and misinformation
must always,
more or less,
mislead
the most upright council.
The proportion which each parish
ought to support of what
is assessed
upon the whole election,
and that which each individual
ought to support of what
is assessed
upon his particular parish,
are both
in the same manner varied
from year to year,
according
as circumstances
are supposed
to require.
These circumstances
are judged of,
in the one case,
by the officers
of the election,
in the other,
by those of the parish;
and both
the one and the other are,
more or less,
under the direction
and influence of the intendant.
Not only ignorance
and misinformation,
but friendship,
party animosity,
and private resentment,
are said frequently
to mislead such assessors. N
o man
subject to such a tax,
it is evident,
can ever be certain,
before he
is assessed,
of what he is to pay.
He cannot even be certain
after he
is assessed.
If any person
has been taxed
who
ought to have been exempted,
or if any person
has been taxed
beyond his proportion,
though both
must pay in the mean time,
yet if they
complain,
and make good
their complaints,
the whole parish
is reimposed next year,
in order to
reimburse them.
If any of the contributors
become bankrupt or insolvent,
the collector
is obliged
to advance his tax;
and the whole parish
is reimposed next year,
in order to
reimburse the collector.
If the collector himself
should become bankrupt,
the parish which elects him
must answer for his conduct
to the receiver-general
of the election.
But,
as it
might be troublesome
for the receiver
to prosecute the whole parish,
he takes
at his choice five or six
of the richest contributors,
and obliges them
to make good what
had been lost
by the insolvency
of the collector.
The parish
is afterwards reimposed,
in order to
reimburse those five or six.
Such reimpositions
are always over and above
the taille
of the particular year
in which
they are laid on.
When
a tax
is imposed
upon the profits
of stock
in a particular branch
of trade,
the traders
are all careful
to bring no more
goods to market than what
they can sell
at a price sufficient
to reimburse them
from advancing the tax.
Some of them
withdraw a part
of their stocks
from the trade,
and the market
is more sparingly supplied than before.
The price of the goods
rises,
and the final payment
of the tax
falls upon the consumer.
But when a tax
is imposed
upon the profits
of stock employed
in agriculture,
it is not the interest
of the farmers
to withdraw any part
of their stock from
that employment.
Each farmer
occupies
a certain quantity of land,
for which he
pays rent.
For the proper cultivation
of this land,
a certain quantity of stock
is necessary;
and by withdrawing any part
of this necessary quantity,
the farmer
is not likely
to be more able
to pay either
the rent or the tax.
In order to pay the tax,
it can never be
his interest
to diminish the quantity
of his produce,
nor
consequently to supply
the market more sparingly
than before.
The tax,
therefore,
will never enable him
to raise the price
of his produce,
so as to reimburse himself,
by throwing
the final payment
upon the consumer.
The farmer,
however,
must have
his reasonable profit
as
well as every other dealer,
otherwise he
must give up the trade.
After the imposition
of a tax of this kind,
he can get
this reasonable profit
only by paying less
rent to the landlord.
The more
he is obliged
to pay
in the way of tax,
the less
he can afford
to pay
in the way of rent.
A tax of this kind,
imposed
during the currency
of a lease,
may,
no doubt,
distress or ruin the farmer.
Upon the renewal
of the lease,
it must always fall
upon the landlord.
In the countries
where
the personal taille
takes place,
the farmer
is commonly assessed
in proportion
to the stock which
he appears
to employ in cultivation.
He is,
upon this account,
frequently afraid
to have a good team
of horses or oxen,
but endeavours
to cultivate
with the meanest
and most wretched instruments
of husbandry
that he can.
Such
is his distrust
in the justice
of his assessors,
that he counterfeits poverty,
and wishes
to appear scarce able
to pay anything,
for fear
of being obliged
to pay too much.
By this miserable policy,
he does not,
perhaps,
always
consult
his own interest
in the most effectual manner;
and he
probably loses more
by the diminution
of his produce,
than he saves by that
of his tax.
Though,
in consequence
of this wretched cultivation,
the market is,
no doubt,
somewhat worse supplied;
yet the small rise
of price which
this may occasion,
as it
is not likely even
to indemnify the farmer
for the diminution
of his produce,
it is still less likely
to enable him to pay more
rent to the landlord.
The public,
the farmer,
the landlord,
all suffer more
or less by this
degraded cultivation.
That
the personal taille tends,
in many different ways,
to discourage cultivation,
and consequently to dry
up the principal source
of the wealth
of every great country,
I have already had occasion
to observe
in the third book
of this Inquiry.
What are called poll-taxes
in the southern provinces
of North America,
and the West India islands,
annual taxes
of so much a-head
upon every negro,
are properly taxes
upon the profits
of a certain species
of stock
employed in agriculture.
As the planters,
are the greater part of them,
both farmers and landlords,
the final payment of the tax
falls
upon them
in their quality of landlords,
without any retribution.
Taxes of so much
a head upon the bondmen
employed in cultivation,
seem anciently
to have been common all
over Europe.
There
subsists at present a tax
of this kind
in the empire
of Russia.
It is probably
upon this account
that poll-taxes of all kinds
have often been
represented as badges
of slavery.
Every tax,
however,
is, to the person
who pays it,
a badge,
not of slavery,
but of liberty.
It denotes
that he
is subject to government,
indeed;
but that,
as he has some property,
he cannot himself be
the property
of a master.
A poll tax upon slaves
is altogether different
from a poll-tax
upon freemen.
The latter
is paid
by the persons upon whom
it is imposed;
the former,
by a different set
of persons.
The latter
is either altogether arbitrary,
or altogether unequal,
and, in most cases,
is both
the one and the other;
the former,
though in some respects
unequal,
different slaves
being of different values,
is in no respect arbitrary.
Every master,
who knows the number
of his own slaves,
knows exactly
what he has to pay.
Those different taxes,
however,
being called
by the same name,
have been considered as
of the same nature.
The taxes which in Holland
are imposed
upon men and maid servants,
are taxes,
not upon stock,
but upon expense;
and so far resemble the taxes
upon consumable commodities.
The tax
of a
guinea
a-head for every man-servant,
which has lately been
imposed in Great Britain,
is of the same kind.
It falls heaviest
upon the middling rank.
A man of two hundred a-year
may keep
a single man-servant.
A man of ten thousand a-year
will not keep fifty.
It does not affect
the poor.
Taxes
upon the profits of stock,
in particular employments,
can never affect
the interest of money.
Nobody
will lend
his money
for less interest to those
who exercise the taxed,
than to those
who exercise
the untaxed employments.
Taxes upon the revenue
arising
from stock in all employments,
where the government attempts
to levy them with any degree
of exactness,
will,
in many cases,
fall upon the interest
of money.
The vingtieme,
or twentieth penny,
in France,
is a tax
of the same kind with
what is called
the land tax in England,
and is assessed,
in the same manner,
upon the revenue
arising upon land,
houses,
and stock.
So far
as it affects stock,
it is assessed,
though not with great rigour,
yet with much more
exactness
than that part
of the land tax
in England
which is imposed
upon the same fund.
It,
in many cases,
falls altogether
upon the interest of money.
Money
is frequently sunk in France,
upon
what are called contracts
for the constitution
of a rent;
that is,
perpetual annuities,
redeemable
at any time
by the debtor,
upon payment
of the sum originally advanced,
but of which this redemption
is not exigible
by the creditor
except in particular cases.
The vingtieme
seems not
to have raised the rate
of those annuities,
though it
is exactly levied
upon them all.
Taxes
upon the Capital Value of Lands,
Houses,
and Stock.
While property
remains in
the possession
of the same person,
whatever
permanent taxes
may have been imposed
upon it,
they have never been
intended
to diminish
or take away any part
of its capital value,
but only some part
of the revenue arising
from it.
But
when property changes hands,
when it
is transmitted either
from the dead
to the living,
or from the living
to the living,
such taxes
have frequently been
imposed upon it
as necessarily take away
some part
of its capital value.
The transference
of all sorts
of property
from the dead
to the living,
and that of immoveable property
of land and houses
from the living
to the living,
are transactions
which are
in their nature either public
and notorious,
or such as
cannot be long concealed.
Such transactions,
therefore,
may be taxed directly.
The transference
of stock or moveable property,
from the living
to the living,
by the lending of money,
is frequently
a secret transaction,
and may always be made so.
It cannot easily,
therefore,
be taxed directly.
It has been taxed indirectly
in two different ways;
first,
by requiring that the deed,
containing
the obligation
to repay,
should be written
upon paper or parchment
which had paid
a certain stamp duty,
otherwise
not to be valid;
secondly,
by requiring,
under the like penalty
of invalidity,
that
it should be recorded either
in a public
or secret register,
and by imposing certain duties
upon such registration.
Stamp duties,
and duties of registration,
have frequently been
imposed likewise
upon the deeds
transferring property
of all kinds
from the dead
to the living,
and upon those
transferring
immoveable property
from the living
to the living;
transactions
which
might easily have been taxed
directly.
The vicesima hereditatum,
or the twentieth penny
of inheritances,
imposed
by Augustus
upon the ancient Romans,
was a tax
upon the transference
of property
from the dead
to the living.
Dion Cassius,
( Lib.
55.
See also Burman. de
Vectigalibus Pop.
Rom. cap. xi.
and Bouchaud de
l'impot
du vingtieme sur les successions.)
the author
who writes
concerning it
the least indistinctly,
says,
that it
was imposed
upon all successions,
legacies and donations,
in case of death,
except upon those
to the nearest relations,
and to the poor.
Of the same kind
is the Dutch tax
upon successions.
(See Memoires
concernant les
Droits,.etc. tom i,
p. 225.)
Collateral
successions
are taxed according to
the degree
of relation,
from five to thirty per cent.
upon the whole value
of the succession.
Testamentary donations,
or legacies to collaterals,
are subject to
the like duties.
Those from husband to wife,
or from wife
to husband,
to the fiftieth penny.
The luctuosa hereditas,
the mournful succession
of ascendants to descendants,
to the twentieth penny only.
Direct successions,
or those
of descendants to ascendants,
pay no tax.
The death of a father,
to such of his children
as live
in the same house
with him,
is seldom attended
with any increase,
and frequently with
a considerable diminution
of revenue;
by the loss
of his industry,
of his office,
or of some life-rent estate,
of which
he may have been
in possession.
That tax
would be cruel and oppressive,
which aggravated their loss,
by taking from them
any part of his succession.
It may,
however,
sometimes
be otherwise
with those children,
who,
in the language
of the Roman law,
are said
to be emancipated;
in that of the Scotch law,
to be foris-familiated;
that is,
who have received
their portion,
have
got families of their own,
and are supported
by funds separate and independent
of those
of their father.
Whatever
part of his succession
might come to such children,
would be
a real addition
to their fortune,
and might,
therefore,
perhaps,
without more inconveniency
than
what attends all duties
of this kind,
be liable to some tax.
The casualties
of the feudal law
were taxes
upon the transference of land,
both from the dead
to the living,
and from the living
to the living.
In ancient times,
they constituted,
in every part of Europe,
one of the principal branches
of the revenue
of the crown.
The heir
of every immediate vassal
of the crown
paid a certain duty,
generally a year's rent,
upon receiving
the investiture
of the estate.
If the heir
was a minor,
the whole rents
of the estate,
during the continuance
of the minority,
devolved to the superior,
without any other charge
besides
the maintenance of the minor,
and the payment
of the widow's dower,
when there happened
to be a dowager
upon the land.
When
the minor
came to de of age,
another tax,
called relief,
was still
due to the superior,
which generally amounted likewise
to a year's rent.
A long minority,
which,
in the present times,
so frequently disburdens
a great estate
of all its incumbrances,
and restores
the family
to their ancient splendour,
could in those times
have no such effect.
The waste,
and not
the disincumbrance
of the estate,
was the common effect
of a long minority.
By a feudal law,
the vassal
could not alienate
without the consent
of his superior,
who generally extorted a fine
or composition
on granting it.
This fine,
which was at first arbitrary,
came,
in many countries,
to be regulated
at a certain portion
of the price
of the land.
In some countries,
where the greater part
of the other feudal customs
have gone into disuse,
this tax upon the alienation
of land still continues
to make
a very considerable branch
of the revenue
of the sovereign.
In the canton of Berne
it
is so high as a sixth part
of the price
of all noble fiefs,
and a tenth part of
that of all ignoble ones.
(Memoires
concernant les Droits,
etc,
tom.i p.154)
In the canton of Lucern,
the tax
upon the sale of land
is not universal,
and takes place only
in certain districts.
But if any person
sells his land
in order to remove
out of the territory,
he pays ten per cent.
upon the whole price
of the sale. (id. p.157.)
Taxes of the same kind,
upon the sale either
of all lands,
or of lands
held by certain tenures,
take place
in many other countries,
and make a more
or less considerable branch
of the revenue
of the sovereign.
Such transactions
may be taxed indirectly,
by means either
of stamp duties,
or of duties
upon registration;
and those duties either may,
or may not,
be proportioned
to the value
of the subject
which is transferred.
In Great Britain,
the stamp duties
are higher or lower,
not so much
according to
the value of the property
transferred
(an eighteen-penny
or half-crown stamp
being sufficient
upon a bond
for the largest sum
of money),
as according to
the nature of the deed.
The highest
do not exceed six pounds
upon every sheet of paper,
or skin of parchment;
and these
high duties
fall chiefly
upon grants from the crown,
and upon certain law proceedings,
without any
regard
to the value of the subject.
There are,
in Great Britain,
no duties
on the registration
of deeds or writings,
except the fees
of the officers
who keep the register;
and these
are seldom more than
a reasonable recompence
for their labour.
The crown
derives no revenue
from them.
In Holland
(Memoires
concernant les
Droits,.etc. tom. i. p 223, 224,
225.) there
are both stamp duties
and duties
upon registration;
which in some cases are,
and in some
are not,
proportioned
to the value
of the property transferred.
All testaments
must be written
upon stamped paper,
of which the price
is proportioned
to the property
disposed of;
so that
there are stamps which cost
from three pence
or three stivers a-sheet,
to three hundred florins,
equal to
about twenty-seven pounds
ten shillings
of our money.
If the stamp
is of an inferior price
to what
the testator
ought to have made use of,
his succession
is confiscated.
This
is over and above all
their other taxes
on succession.
Except bills of exchange,
and some other mercantile bills,
all other deeds,
bonds,
and contracts,
are subject to a stamp duty.
This duty,
however,
does not rise
in proportion to the value
of the subject.
All sales
of land
and of houses,
and all mortgages upon either,
must be registered,
and, upon registration,
pay a duty
to the state
of two and a-half per cent.
upon the amount
of the price
or of the mortgage.
This duty
is extended
to the sale
of all ships and vessels
of more than two tons burden,
whether decked or undecked.
These,
it seems,
are considered as a sort
of houses upon the water.
The sale of moveables,
when it
is ordered
by a court of justice,
is subject to the like duty
of two
and a-half per cent.
In France,
there
are both stamp duties
and duties
upon registration.
The former
are considered as a branch
of the aids of excise,
and, in the provinces
where
those duties take place,
are levied by the
excise officers.
The latter
are considered as a branch
of the domain
of the crown
and are levied
by a different set
of officers.
Those modes
of taxation
by stamp duties and
by duties
upon registration,
are of very modern invention.
In the course
of little more than
a century,
however,
stamp
duties have,
in Europe,
become almost universal,
and duties
upon registration extremely
common.
There
is no art
which one government sooner
learns of another,
than that
of draining money
from the pockets
of the people.
Taxes
upon the transference
of property
from the dead
to the living,
fall finally,
as well as immediately,
upon the persons
to whom the property
is transferred.
Taxes
upon the sale of land
fall altogether
upon the seller.
The seller
is almost
always under the necessity
of selling,
and must,
therefore,
take such
a price as he
can get.
The buyer
is scarce
ever under the necessity
of buying,
and will,
therefore,
only
give such
a price as he likes.
He considers
what the land will cost him,
in tax and price together.
The more
he is obliged
to pay
in the way of tax,
the less
he will be disposed
to give
in the way of price.
Such taxes,
therefore,
fall almost
always upon a necessitous person,
and must,
therefore,
be frequently
very cruel and oppressive.
Taxes
upon the sale
of new-built houses,
where
the building
is sold
without the ground,
fall generally upon the buyer,
because
the builder
must generally have
his profit;
otherwise he
must give up the trade.
If he advances the tax,
therefore,
the buyer
must generally repay it
to him.
Taxes
upon the sale
of old houses,
for the same reason
as those
upon the sale of land,
fall generally
upon the seller;
whom,
in most cases,
either conveniency or necessity
obliges
to sell.
The number
of new-built houses
that are annually brought
to market,
is more or less
regulated by the demand.
Unless the demand
is such as
to afford
the builder his profit,
after paying all expenses,
he will build
no more houses.
The number
of old houses which
happen at any time
to come
to market,
is regulated by accidents,
of which the greater part
have no relation
to the demand.
Two
or three great bankruptcies
in a mercantile town,
will bring
many houses to sale,
which must be sold for what
can be
got for them.
Taxes
upon the sale of ground-rents
fall altogether
upon the seller,
for the same reason
as those
upon the sale of lands.
Stamp duties,
and duties
upon the registration
of bonds and contracts
for borrowed money,
fall altogether
upon the borrower,
and, in fact,
are always paid by him.
Duties
of the same kind
upon law proceedings
fall upon the suitors.
They reduce to both
the capital value
of the subject
in dispute.
The more it costs
to acquire any property,
the less
must be the neat value
of it
when acquired.
All
taxes upon the transference
of property
of every kind,
so far as they
diminish the capital value of
that property,
tend
to diminish
the funds
destined
for the maintenance
of productive labour.
They
are all more
or
less unthrifty taxes that increase
the revenue of the sovereign,
which seldom
maintains
any but
unproductive labourers,
at the expense of the capital
of the people,
which maintains none
but productive.
Such taxes,
even when they
are proportioned
to the value
of the property transferred,
are still unequal;
the frequency of transference
not being always equal
in property of equal value.
When they
are not proportioned
to this value,
which is the case
with the greater part
of the stamp duties
and duties
of registration,
they
are still more so.
They
are in no respect arbitrary,
but are,
or may be,
in all cases,
perfectly clear and certain.
Though they
sometimes fall upon the person
who is not very able
to pay,
the time of payment is,
in most cases,
sufficiently convenient
for him.
When the payment
becomes due,
he must,
in most cases,
have the more
to pay.
They
are levied
at very little expense,
and in general
subject the contributors
to no other inconveniency,
besides
always the unavoidable one
of paying the tax.
In France,
the stamp duties
are not much
complained of.
Those of registration,
which
they call the Controle,
are.
They give occasion,
it is pretended,
to much extortion
in the officers
of the farmers-general
who collect the tax,
which is
in a great
measure arbitrary and uncertain.
In the greater part
of the libels which
have been written
against the present system
of finances
in France,
the abuses
of the controle make
a principal article.
Uncertainty,
however,
does not seem
to be necessarily inherent
in the nature
of such taxes.
If the popular complaints
are well founded,
the abuse
must arise,
not so much
from the nature
of the tax
as from the want
of precision and distinctness
in the words of the edicts
or laws which
impose it.
The registration of mortgages,
and in general
of all rights
upon immoveable property,
as it gives great security
both
to creditors and purchasers,
is extremely advantageous
to the public.
That of the greater part
of deeds
of other kinds,
is frequently
inconvenient
and even dangerous
to individuals,
without any advantage
to the public.
All registers which,
it is acknowledged,
ought to be kept secret,
ought certainly
never to exist.
The credit
of individuals ought
certainly
never to depend
upon so very slender
a security,
as the probity and religion
of the inferior officers
of revenue.
But where
the fees of registration
have been made a source
of revenue to the sovereign,
register-offices
have commonly been
multiplied without end,
both for the deeds
which ought to be registered,
and for those
which ought not.
In France
there are several
different sorts
of secret registers.
This abuse,
though not
perhaps a necessary,
it must be acknowledged,
is a very natural effect
of such taxes.
Such stamp duties
as those
in England
upon cards and dice,
upon newspapers
and periodical pamphlets,.etc.
are properly
taxes upon consumption;
the final payment falls
upon the persons
who use
or consume such commodities.
Such stamp duties
as those
upon licences to retail ale,
wine,
and spiritous liquors,
though intended,
perhaps,
to fall
upon the profits
of the retailers,
are likewise
finally paid
by the consumers
of those liquors.
Such taxes,
though called
by the same name,
and levied
by the same officers,
and in the same manner
with the stamp duties
above mentioned
upon the transference
of property,
are, however,
of a quite different nature,
and fall
upon quite different funds.
Taxes
upon the Wages of Labour.
The wages
of the inferior classes
of work men,
I have endeavoured to show
in the first book
are everywhere necessarily regulated
by two different circumstances;
the demand for labour,
and the ordinary
or average price
of provisions.
The demand for labour,
according as it happens
to be either
increasing stationary
or declining;
or to require an increasing,
stationary,
or declining population,
regulates
the subsistence
of the labourer,
and determines in what degree
it shall be either liberal,
moderate,
or scanty.
The ordinary average price
of provisions
determines
the quantity of money
which must be paid
to the workman,
in order to
enable him,
one year with another,
to purchase this liberal,
moderate,
or scanty subsistence.
While the demand
for the labour
and the price of provisions,
therefore,
remain the same,
a direct tax
upon the wages of labour
can have no other effect,
than
to raise them somewhat higher
than the tax.
Let us
suppose,
for example,
that,
in a particular place,
the demand for labour
and the price of provisions
were such as
to render
ten shillings a-week
the ordinary wages of labour;
and that
a tax of one-fifth,
or four shillings
in the pound,
was imposed upon wages.
If the demand for labour
and the price of provisions
remained the same,
it would still be necessary
that the labourer should,
in that place,
earn such a subsistence as
could be bought only
for ten shillings a-week;
so that,
after paying the tax,
he should have
ten shillings a-week free wages.
But,
in order to
leave him such free wages,
after paying such a tax,
the price of labour must,
in that place,
soon rise,
not to
twelve shillings a week only,
but to twelve and sixpence;
that is,
in order to
enable him
to pay a tax of one-fifth,
his wages
must necessarily soon rise,
not one-fifth part only,
but one-fourth.
Whatever was the proportion
of the tax,
the wages of labour must,
in all cases rise,
not only in that proportion,
but in a higher proportion.
If the tax for example,
was one-tenth,
the wages of labour
must necessarily soon rise,
not one-tenth part only,
but one-eighth.
A direct tax
upon the wages of labour,
therefore,
though the labourer might,
perhaps,
pay it
out of his hand,
could not properly be said
to be even advanced by him;
at least if the demand
for labour
and the average price
of provisions
remained
the same
after the tax
as before it.
In all such cases,
not only the tax,
but something
more than the tax,
would in reality
be advanced
by the person
who immediately employed him.
The final payment
would,
in different cases,
fall upon different persons.
The rise which such
a tax
might occasion
in the wages
of manufacturing labour
would be advanced
by the master manufacturer,
who would both
be entitled
and obliged to charge it,
with a profit,
upon the price
of his goods.
The final payment
of this rise of wages,
therefore,
together
with the additional profit
of the master manufacturer
would fall upon the consumer.
The rise which such
a tax
might occasion
in the wages
of country labour
would be advanced
by the farmer,
who,
in order to
maintain the same number
of labourers as
before,
would be obliged
to employ a greater capital.
In order to
get back this greater capital,
together
with the ordinary profits
of stock,
it would be necessary
that he
should retain
a larger portion,
or,
what comes
to the same thing,
the price
of a larger portion,
of the produce
of the land,
and, consequently,
that
he should pay less
rent to the landlord.
The final payment
of this rise of wages,
therefore,
would,
in this case,
fall upon the landlord,
together
with the additional profit
of the farmer
who had advanced it.
In all cases,
a direct tax
upon the wages
of labour must,
in the long-run,
occasion
both a greater reduction
in the
rent of land,
and a greater rise in
the price
of manufactured goods than
would have followed
from the proper assessment
of a sum equal to
the produce of the tax,
partly upon
the rent of land,
and partly upon consumable commodities.
If direct
taxes
upon the wages of labour
have not always occasioned
a proportionable
rise in those wages,
it
is because
they
have generally occasioned
a considerable fall
in the demand of labour.
The declension of industry,
the decrease
of employment for the poor,
the diminution
of the annual produce
of the land
and labour of the country,
have generally been
the effects of such taxes.
In consequence of them,
however,
the price of labour
must always be higher than it
otherwise would have been
in the actual state
of the demand;
and this enhancement of price,
together
with the profit of those
who advance it,
must always be finally paid
by the landlords
and consumers.
A tax
upon the wages
of country labour
does not raise the price
of the rude produce
of land
in proportion to the tax;
for the same reason
that a tax
upon the farmer's profit
does not raise that price in
that proportion.
Absurd and destructive as such
taxes are,
however,
they take place
in many countries.
In France,
that part of the taille
which is charged
upon the industry
of workmen and day-labourers
in country villages,
is properly a tax
of this kind.
Their wages
are computed according to
the common rate
of the district
in which
they reside;
and, that
they may be as
little liable as possible
to any overcharge,
their yearly gains
are estimated
at no
more than two hundred working days
in the year.
(Memoires
concernant les
Droits,.etc. tom. ii. p. 108.)
The tax of each individual
is varied from year to year,
according to
different circumstances,
of which the collector
or the commissary,
whom intendant
appoints
to assist him,
are the judges.
In Bohemia,
in consequence
of the alteration
in the system
of finances
which was begun in 1748,
a very heavy tax
is imposed upon the industry
of artificers.
They are divided
into four classes.
The highest class
pay a hundred florins a year,
which,
at two-and-twenty pence
half penny a-florin,
amounts to £9:7:6.
The second class
are taxed at seventy;
the third at fifty;
and the fourth,
comprehending artificers
in villages,
and the lowest class of those
in towns,
at twenty-five florins.
(Memoires
concemant les Droits,.etc.
tom. iii. p. 87.)
The recompence
of ingenious artists,
and of men
of liberal professions,
I have endeavoured
to show in the first book,
necessarily
keeps a certain proportion
to the emoluments
of inferior trades.
A tax upon this recompence,
therefore,
could have no other effect
than to raise it somewhat
higher
than
in proportion
to the tax.
If it
did not rise in this manner,
the ingenious arts
and the liberal professions,
being;
no longer
upon a level
with other trades,
would be so much deserted,
that they
would soon return
to that level.
The emoluments of offices
are not,
like those
of trades and professions,
regulated
by the free competition
of the market,
and do not,
therefore,
always
bear a just proportion to
what the nature
of the employment requires.
They are,
perhaps,
in most countries,
higher than it
requires;
the persons
who have the administration
of government
being generally disposed
to regard both themselves
and their immediate dependents,
rather more than enough.
The emoluments of offices,
therefore,
can,
in most cases,
very well bear
to be taxed.
The persons,
besides,
who enjoy public offices,
especially the more lucrative,
are, in all countries,
the objects of general envy;
and a tax
upon their emoluments,
even though it
should be somewhat higher than
upon any other sort
of revenue,
is always
a very popular tax.
In England,
for example,
when,
by the land-tax,
every other
sort of revenue was supposed
to be assessed
at four shillings
in the pound,
it was very popular
to lay
a real tax
of five shillings and sixpence
in the pound
upon the salaries
of offices
which exceeded
a hundred pounds a-year;
the pensions
of the younger branches
of the royal family,
the pay
of the officers
of the army and navy,
and a few others less
obnoxious
to envy,
excepted.
There
are in England
no other direct taxes
upon the wages of labour.
Taxes
which it is intended
should fall indifferently
upon every different
Species of Revenue.
The taxes
which it is intended
should fall indifferently
upon every different species
of revenue,
are capitation taxes,
and taxes
upon consumable commodities.
Those
must be paid indifferently,
from whatever revenue
the contributors may possess;
from
the rent of their land,
from the profits
of their stock,
or from the wages
of their labour.
Capitation taxes,
if it
is attempted
to proportion them
to the fortune or revenue
of each contributor,
become altogether arbitrary.
The state of a man's fortune
varies from day to day;
and,
without an inquisition,
more intolerable than any tax,
and renewed
at least once every year,
can only be guessed at.
His assessment,
therefore,
must,
in most cases,
depend
upon the good or bad humour
of his assessors,
and must,
therefore,
be altogether
arbitrary and uncertain.
Capitation taxes,
if they are proportioned,
not to the supposed fortune,
but to the rank
of each contributor,
become altogether unequal;
the degrees of fortune
being frequently unequal
in the same degree
of rank.
Such taxes,
therefore,
if it
is attempted
to render them equal,
become altogether
arbitrary and uncertain;
and if it is attempted
to render them
certain and not arbitrary,
become altogether unequal.
Let the tax
be light or heavy,
uncertainty
is always a great grievance.
In a light tax,
a considerable degree
of inequality
may be supported;
in a heavy one,
it is altogether intolerable.
In the different poll-taxes which
took place
in England during the reign
of William III,
the contributors were,
the greater part of them,
assessed
according to
the degree of their rank;
as dukes,
marquises,
earls,
viscounts,
barons,
esquires,
gentlemen,
the eldest and youngest sons
of peers,.etc.
All shop-keepers
and tradesmen worth
more than three
hundred pounds,
that is,
the better sort of them,
were subject to
the same assessment,
how great
soever might be
the difference
in their fortunes.
Their rank
was more
considered than their fortune.
Several of those who,
in the first poll-tax,
were rated according to
their supposed fortune
were afterwards rated according to
their rank.
Serjeants,
attorneys,
and proctors at law,
who,
in the first poll-tax,
were assessed
at three shillings
in the pound
of their supposed income,
were afterwards assessed
as gentlemen.
In the assessment
of a tax
which was not very heavy,
a considerable degree
of inequality
had been found less insupportable
than any degree
of uncertainty.
In the capitation
which has been levied
in France,
without-any interruption,
since the beginning
of the present century,
the highest orders of people
are rated according to
their rank,
by an invariable tariff;
the lower orders of people,
according to
what is supposed
to be their fortune,
by an assessment
which varies
from year to year.
The officers
of the king's court,
the judges,
and other officers
in the superior courts
of justice,
the officers of the troops,
etc are assessed
in the first manner.
The inferior ranks
of people in the provinces
are assessed
in the second.
In France,
the great
easily submit
to a considerable degree
of inequality
in a tax which,
so far
as it affects them,
is not
a very heavy one;
but could not brook
the arbitrary assessment
of an intendant.
The inferior ranks
of people must,
in that country,
suffer patiently
the usage which
their superiors
think proper
to give them.
In England,
the different poll-taxes
never produced
the sum
which had been expected
from them,
or which it was supposed
they
might have produced,
had they been exactly levied.
In France,
the capitation
always produces
the sum expected from it.
The mild government
of England,
when it
assessed the different ranks
of people
to the poll-tax,
contented itself with
what that assessment
happened
to produce,
and required no compensation
for the loss which
the state might sustain,
either by those
who could not pay,
or by those
who would not pay
(for there were many such),
and who,
by the indulgent execution
of the law,
were not forced
to pay.
The more severe government
of France assesses
upon each
generality a certain sum,
which the intendant
must find as he can.
If any province
complains
of being assessed too high,
it may,
in the assessment
of next year,
obtain
an abatement proportioned
to the overcharge
of the year
before;
but it
must pay in the mean time.
The intendant,
in order to
be sure
of finding the sum assessed
upon his generality,
was empowered to assess it
in a larger sum,
that the failure or inability
of some of the contributors
might be compensated
by the overcharge
of the rest;
and till 1765,
the fixation
of this surplus assessment
was left altogether
to his discretion.
In that year,
indeed,
the council
assumed this power to itself.
In the capitation
of the provinces,
it is observed
by the perfectly well
informed author
of the Memoirs
upon the Impositions
in France,
the proportion
which falls upon the nobility,
and upon those
whose privileges
exempt them from the taille,
is the least considerable.
The largest falls
upon those
subject to the taille,
who are assessed
to the capitation
at so much a-pound
of what they pay
to that other tax.
Capitation taxes,
so far as they
are levied
upon the lower ranks
of people,
are direct taxes
upon the wages of labour,
and are attended with all
the inconveniencies
of such taxes.
Capitation
taxes are levied
at little expense;
and,
where they
are rigorously exacted,
afford a very sure revenue
to the state.
It is upon this account that,
in countries where the case,
comfort,
and security
of the inferior ranks
of people
are little
attended to,
capitation
taxes are very common.
It is in general,
however,
but a small part
of the public revenue,
which,
in a great empire,
has ever been
drawn from such taxes;
and
the greatest sum which they
have ever afforded,
might always have been found
in some
other way much more convenient
to the people.
Taxes
upon Consumable Commodities.
The impossibility
of taxing the people,
in proportion
to their revenue,
by any capitation,
seems
to have given occasion
to the invention
of taxes
upon consumable commodities.
The state
not knowing how to tax,
directly and proportionably,
the revenue of its subjects,
endeavours
to tax it
indirectly by taxing
their expense,
which,
it is supposed,
will,
in most cases,
be nearly in proportion
to their revenue.
Their expense
is taxed,
by taxing
the consumable commodities
upon which
it is laid out.
Consumable commodities
are either necessaries
or luxuries.
By necessaries
I understand,
not only
the commodities
which are indispensibly necessary
for the support
of life,
but whatever
the custom of the country
renders it indecent
for creditable people,
even of the lowest order,
to be without.
A linen shirt,
for example,
is, strictly speaking,
not a necessary of life.
The Greeks and Romans lived,
I suppose,
very comfortably,
though they
had no linen.
But in the present times,
through the greater part
of Europe,
a creditable day-labourer
would be ashamed
to appear in public
without a linen shirt,
the want of which
would be supposed
to denote that
disgraceful degree of poverty,
which,
it is presumed,
nobody
can well fall into
without extreme bad conduct.
Custom,
in the same manner,
has rendered
leather shoes a necessary
of life
in England.
The poorest creditable person,
of either sex,
would be ashamed
to appear in public
without them.
In Scotland,
custom
has rendered them a necessary
of life
to the lowest order of men;
but
not to the same order
of women,
who may,
without any discredit,
walk about barefooted.
In France,
they
are necessaries neither
to men nor to women;
the lowest rank
of both sexes
appearing there publicly,
without any discredit,
sometimes in wooden shoes,
and sometimes barefooted.
Under necessaries,
therefore,
I comprehend,
not only
those things which nature,
but those things which
the established rules
of decency
have rendered necessary
to the lowest rank
of people.
All other things
I call luxuries,
without meaning,
by this appellation,
to throw the smallest degree
of reproach
upon the temperate use
of them.
Beer and ale,
for example,
in Great Britain,
and wine,
even in the wine countries,
I call luxuries.
A man of any rank may,
without any reproach,
abstain totally
from tasting such liquors.
Nature
does not render them necessary
for the support
of life;
and custom
nowhere renders it indecent
to live without them.
As the wages of labour
are everywhere regulated,
partly by the demand for it,
and partly by the average price
of the necessary articles
of subsistence;
whatever
raises this average price
must necessarily raise
those wages;
so that the labourer
may still be able
to purchase
that quantity of those
necessary articles which
the state
of the demand for labour,
whether increasing,
stationary,
or declining,
requires that
he should have.
(See book i.chap. 8)
A tax
upon those articles
necessarily raises their price
somewhat
higher
than the amount
of the tax,
because the dealer,
who advances the tax,
must generally get it back,
with a profit.
Such a tax must,
therefore,
occasion a rise
in the wages of labour,
proportionable
to this rise of price.
It
is thus
that a tax
upon the necessaries of life
operates exactly
in the same manner
as a direct tax
upon the wages of labour.
The labourer,
though he
may pay it
out of his hand,
cannot,
for any considerable time
at least,
be properly said even
to advance it.
It must always,
in the long-run,
be advanced to him
by his immediate employer,
in the advanced state
of wages.
His employer,
if he is a manufacturer,
will charge
upon the price
of his goods
the rise of wages,
together with a profit,
so that the final payment
of the tax,
together with this overcharge,
will fall upon the consumer.
If his employer
is a farmer,
the final payment,
together
with a like overcharge,
will fall upon the
rent of the landlord.
It is otherwise
with taxes upon what I
call luxuries,
even upon those of the poor.
The rise
in the price
of the taxed commodities,
will not necessarily occasion any
rise in
the wages of labour.
A tax upon tobacco,
for example,
though a luxury of the poor,
as well as of the rich,
will not raise wages.
Though it
is taxed
in England at three times,
and in France at fifteen
times its original price,
those high duties
seem to have no effect
upon the wages of labour.
The same thing maybe
said of the taxes
upon tea and sugar,
which,
in England and Holland,
have become luxuries
of the lowest ranks
of people;
and of those upon chocolate,
which,
in Spain,
is said
to have become so.
The different taxes which,
in Great Britain,
have,
in the course
of the present century,
been imposed
upon spiritous liquors,
are not supposed
to have had any effect
upon the wages of labour.
The rise
in the price of porter,
occasioned
by an additional tax
of three shillings
upon the barrel
of strong beer,
has not raised the wages
of common labour
in London.
These
were about eighteen pence
or twenty pence a-day
before the tax,
and they are not more now.
The high price of such
commodities
does not necessarily diminish
the ability
of the inferior ranks
of people
to bring up families.
Upon the sober
and industrious poor,
taxes
upon such commodities act
as sumptuary laws,
and dispose them
either
to moderate,
or to refrain altogether
from the use
of superfluities which
they can no longer
easily afford.
Their ability
to bring up families,
in consequence of this
forced frugality,
instead of being diminished,
is frequently,
perhaps,
increased by the tax.
It
is the sober
and industrious poor
who generally bring
up the most numerous families,
and who
principally supply the demand
for useful labour.
All the poor,
indeed,
are not sober and industrious;
and the dissolute
and disorderly might continue
to indulge themselves
in the use
of such commodities,
after this rise of price,
in the same manner as
before,
without regarding
the distress which this
indulgence
might bring
upon their families.
Such disorderly persons,
however,
seldom rear up numerous families,
their children
generally perishing
from neglect,
mismanagement,
and the scantiness
or unwholesomeness
of their food.
If by the strength
of their constitution,
they survive
the hardships
to which the bad conduct
of their parents exposes them,
yet the example of
that
bad conduct commonly corrupts
their morals;
so that,
instead of being useful
to society by their industry,
they become
public nuisances
by their vices and disorders.
Through the advanced price
of the luxuries
of the poor,
therefore,
might increase
somewhat the distress
of such disorderly families,
and thereby diminish somewhat
their ability
to bring
up children,
it would not probably diminish
much
the useful population
of the country.
Any rise in
the average price
of necessaries,
unless it
be compensated
by a proportionable
rise in
the wages of labour,
must necessarily diminish,
more or less,
the ability
of the poor
to bring up numerous families,
and, consequently,
to supply the demand
for useful labour;
whatever may be the state
of that demand,
whether increasing,
stationary,
or declining;
or such as
requires an increasing,
stationary,
or declining population.
Taxes upon luxuries
have no tendency
to raise the price
of any other commodities,
except
that of the commodities taxed.
Taxes upon necessaries,
by raising
the wages of labour,
necessarily
tend
to raise
the price of all
manufactures,
and
consequently to diminish
the extent
of their sale
and consumption.
Taxes upon luxuries
are finally paid
by the consumers
of the commodities taxed,
without any retribution.
They fall indifferently
upon every species
of revenue,
the wages of labour,
the profits of stock,
and the rent of land.
Taxes upon necessaries,
so far as they
affect the labouring poor,
are finally paid,
partly by landlords,
in the
diminished rent
of their lands,
and partly by rich consumers,
whether landlords or others,
in the advanced price
of manufactured goods;
and always with
a considerable overcharge.
The advanced price of such
manufactures
as are real necessaries
of life,
and are destined
for the consumption
of the poor,
of coarse woollens,
for example,
must be compensated
to the poor
by a farther advancement
of their wages.
The middling
and superior ranks
of people,
if they
understood
their own interest,
ought
always
to oppose all taxes
upon the necessaries of life,
as well as all taxes
upon the wages of labour.
The final payment of both
the one and the other
falls altogether
upon themselves,
and always with
a considerable overcharge.
They fall heaviest
upon the landlords,
who always pay
in a double capacity;
in that of landlords,
by the reduction,
of their rent;
and in
that of rich consumers,
by the increase
of their expense.
The observation
of Sir Matthew Decker,
that certain taxes are,
in the price
of certain goods,
sometimes
repeated and accumulated four
or five times,
is perfectly
just with regard to taxes
upon the necessaries
of life.
In the price of leather,
for example,
you must pay not
only for the tax
upon the leather
of your own shoes,
but for a part of
that upon those
of the shoemaker
and the tanner.
You must pay, too,
for the tax
upon the salt,
upon the soap,
and upon the candles which those
workmen
consume
while employed
in your service;
and for the tax
upon the leather,
which the saltmaker,
the soap-maker,
and the candle-maker
consume,
while employed
in their service.
In Great Britain,
the principal taxes
upon the necessaries of life,
are those
upon the four commodities
just now mentioned,
salt,
leather,
soap,
and candles.
Salt
is a very ancient
and a very universal subject
of taxation.
It was taxed
among the Romans,
and it
is so at present in,
I believe,
every part of Europe.
The quantity
annually consumed
by any individual
is so small,
and may be purchased so gradually,
that nobody,
it seems
to have been thought,
could feel very sensibly
even
a pretty heavy tax upon it.
It is in England
taxed
at three shillings
and fourpence a bushel;
about three times
the original price
of the commodity.
In some other countries,
the tax
is still higher.
Leather
is a real necessary of life.
The use of linen
renders soap such.
In countries where the winter
nights
are long,
candles
are a necessary instrument
of trade.
Leather and soap
are in Great Britain
taxed
at three halfpence a-pound;
candles at a penny;
taxes which,
upon the original price
of leather,
may amount to
about eight
or ten per cent.; upon that
of soap,
to about twenty
or five-and-twenty
per cent.; and upon
that of candles to
about fourteen
or
fifteen per cent.; taxes which,
though lighter
than that upon salt,
are still very heavy.
As all
those
four commodities
are real necessaries of life,
such heavy taxes upon them
must increase
somewhat the expense
of the sober
and industrious poor,
and must consequently raise more
or
less the wages
of their labour.
In a country
where the winters
are so cold as
in Great Britain,
fuel is,
during that season,
in the strictest sense
of the word,
a necessary of life,
not only for the purpose
of dressing victuals,
but
for the comfortable subsistence
of many different sorts
of workmen
who work within doors;
and coals
are the cheapest
of all fuel.
The price of fuel
has so important an influence
upon
that of labour,
that all over Great Britain,
manufactures
have confined themselves principally
to the coal
counties;
other parts of the country,
on account
of the high price
of this necessary article,
not being
able to work so cheap.
In some
manufactures,
besides,
coal
is a necessary instrument
of trade;
as in those of glass,
iron,
and all other metals.
If a bounty
could in any case
be reasonable,
it might perhaps be
so upon the transportation
of coals
from those parts
of the country
in which
they abound,
to those
in which they are wanted.
But the legislature,
instead of a bounty,
has imposed
a tax
of three shillings
and threepence a-ton
upon coals
carried coastways;
which,
upon most sorts of coal,
is more than sixty per cent.
of the original price
at the coal pit.
Coals
carried,
either
by land
or by inland navigation,
pay no duty.
Where they
are naturally cheap,
they are consumed duty free;
where they
are naturally dear,
they are loaded
with a heavy duty.
Such taxes,
though they
raise the price
of subsistence,
and consequently
the wages of labour,
yet they
afford a considerable revenue
to government,
which
it might not be easy
to find in any other way.
There may,
therefore,
be good reasons for
continuing them.
The bounty
upon the exportation of corn,
so far us
it tends,
in the actual state
of tillage,
to raise the price of
that necessary article,
produces
all the like bad effects;
and instead of affording
any revenue,
frequently occasions
a very great expense
to government.
The high duties
upon the importation
of foreign corn,
which,
in years of moderate plenty,
amount to a prohibition;
and the absolute prohibition
of the importation,
either of live cattle,
or of salt provisions,
which takes place
in the ordinary state
of the law,
and which,
on account of the scarcity,
is at present
suspended
for a limited time
with regard to Ireland
and the British plantations,
have all had the bad effects
of taxes upon the necessaries
of life,
and produce no revenue
to government.
Nothing
seems necessary
for the repeal
of such regulations,
but to convince the public
of the futility of
that system in consequence
of which they
have been established.
Taxes
upon the necessaries of life
are much higher
in many other countries
than
in Great Britain.
Duties upon flour and meal
when ground at the mill,
and upon bread
when baked
at the oven,
take place in many countries.
In Holland the money-price
of the:
bread
consumed in towns
is supposed
to be doubled by means
of such taxes.
In lieu of
a part of them,
the people
who live in the country,
pay every year
so much a-head,
according to
the sort
of bread
they are supposed
to consume.
Those who
consume wheaten bread
pay
three guilders fifteen stivers;
about six shillings
and ninepence halfpenny.
Those,
and some other taxes
of the same kind,
by raising
the price of labour,
are said
to have ruined
the greater part
of the manufactures
of Holland
(Memoires
concernant les
Droits,.etc. p. 210,
211.).
Similar taxes,
though not quite so heavy,
take place in the Milanese,
in the states of Genoa,
in the duchy of Modena,
in the duchies of Parma,
Placentia,
and Guastalla,
and the Ecclesiastical state.
A French
author (Le Reformateur)
of some note,
has proposed
to reform the finances
of his country,
by substituting
in the room
of the greater part
of other taxes,
this most ruinous
of all taxes.
There
is nothing so absurd,
says Cicero,
which has not sometimes been
asserted by some philosophers.
Taxes upon butcher's meat
are still more common
than those
upon bread.
It may indeed be doubted,
whether butcher's meat
is any where a necessary
of life.
Grain and other vegetables,
with the help of milk,
cheese,
and butter,
or oil,
where butter
is not
to be had,
it is known from experience,
can,
without any butcher's meat,
afford the most plentiful,
the most wholesome,
the most nourishing,
and the most invigorating diet.
Decency
nowhere requires
that any man
should eat butcher's meat,
as it in most places
requires that
he should wear a linen
shirt
or
a pair of leather shoes.
Consumable commodities,
whether
necessaries or luxuries,
may be taxed
in two different ways.
The consumer
may either pay an annual sum
on account
of his using
or consuming goods
of a certain kind;
or the goods
may be taxed
while they
remain
in the hands of the dealer,
and before they
are delivered
to the consumer.
The consumable goods
which
last
a considerable time
before they
are consumed altogether,
are most properly taxed
in the one way;
those
of which the consumption
is either immediate
or more speedy,
in the other.
The coach-tax and plate
tax are examples
of the former method
of imposing;
the greater part
of the other duties of
excise and customs,
of the latter.
A coach may,
with good management,
last ten or twelve years.
It might be taxed,
once for all,
before
it comes
out of the hands
of the coach-maker.
But it
is certainly more convenient
for the buyer
to pay four pounds a-year
for the privilege
of keeping a coach,
than
to pay all
at once forty or
forty-eight pounds additional price
to the coach-maker;
or a sum equivalent to what
the tax is likely
to cost him during the time
he uses the same coach.
A service
of plate
in the same manner,
may last
more than a century.
It is certainly-easier
for the consumer
to pay five shillings a-year
for every hundred ounces
of plate,
near one per cent.
of the value,
than
to redeem
this long annuity
at five-and-twenty
or thirty years purchase,
which would enhance
the price
at least five-and-twenty
or thirty per cent.
The different taxes
which affect houses,
are certainly more
conveniently paid
by moderate annual payments,
than by a heavy tax
of equal value
upon the first building
or sale of the house.
It was
the well-known proposal
of Sir Matthew Decker,
that all commodities,
even those
of which
the consumption
is either immediate or speedy,
should be taxed
in this manner;
the dealer advancing nothing,
but
the consumer paying
a certain annual sum
for the licence
to consume certain goods.
The object of his scheme
was to promote all
the different branches
of foreign trade,
particularly
the carrying trade,
by taking away all duties
upon importation and exportation,
and thereby enabling
the merchant
to employ his whole capital
and credit
in the purchase
of goods and
the freight of ships,
no part of either
being diverted
towards the advancing
of taxes,
The project,
however,
of taxing,
in this manner,
goods
of immediate
or speedy consumption,
seems liable
to the four following
very important objections.
First,
the tax
would be more unequal,
or not so well proportioned
to the expense and consumption
of the different contributors,
as in the way
in which
it is commonly imposed.
The taxes upon ale,
wine,
and spiritous liquors,
which are advanced
by the dealers,
are finally paid
by the different consumers,
exactly in proportion
to their respective consumption.
But if the tax
were to be paid
by purchasing a licence
to drink those liquors,
the sober
would,
in proportion
to his consumption,
be taxed much more heavily
than the drunken consumer.
A family
which exercised
great hospitality,
would be taxed much more lightly
than one
who entertained fewer guests.
Secondly,
this mode of taxation,
by paying for an annual,
half-yearly,
or quarterly licence
to consume certain goods,
would diminish very much one
of the principal conveniences
of taxes
upon goods of speedy consumption;
the piece-meal payment.
In the price
of threepence halfpenny,
which is at present
paid for a pot
of porter,
the different taxes upon malt,
hops,
and beer,
together
with the
extraordinary profit which
the brewer charges
for having advanced than,
may perhaps amount to
about three halfpence.
If a workman
can conveniently spare those
three halfpence,
he buys a pot of porter.
If he cannot,
he contents himself
with a pint;
and, as a penny saved
is a penny got,
he
thus gains
a farthing by his temperance.
He pays the tax piece-meal,
as he
can afford to pay it,
and when he
can afford to pay it,
and every act of payment
is perfectly voluntary,
and what he
can avoid if he chuses
to do so.
Thirdly,
such taxes
would operate less
as sumptuary laws.
When
the licence
was once purchased,
whether
the purchaser
drunk much or drunk little,
his tax
would be the same.
Fourthly,
if a workman
were to pay all at once,
by yearly,
half-yearly,
or quarterly payments,
a tax equal to
what he at present pays,
with little
or no inconveniency,
upon all
the different pots and pints
of porter which
he drinks in any such period
of time,
the sum
might frequently distress him very much.
This mode of taxation,
therefore,
it seems evident,
could never,
without the most grievous
oppression,
produce
a revenue nearly equal to what
is derived
from the present mode
without any oppression.
In several countries,
however,
commodities
of an
immediate or very speedy
consumption
are taxed in this manner.
In Holland,
people pay so much a-head
for a licence
to drink tea.
I
have already mentioned a tax
upon bread,
which,
so far as it
is consumed
in farm houses
and country villages,
is there levied
in the same manner.
The duties of excise
are imposed chiefly
upon goods of home produce,
destined for home consumption.
They are imposed only
upon a few sorts
of goods
of the most general use.
There
can never be any doubt,
either concerning the goods
which are
subject to those duties,
or concerning the particular duty
which each species
of goods
is subject to.
They fall almost
altogether upon what
I call luxuries,
excepting always
the four duties
above mentioned,
upon salt,
soap,
leather,
candles,
and perhaps
that upon green glass.
The duties of customs
are much more ancient
than those of
excise.
They seem
to have been called customs,
as denoting
customary payments,
which had been
in use for time immemorial.
They appear
to have been originally considered
as taxes
upon the profits
of merchants.
During the barbarous times
of feudal anarchy,
merchants,
like all
the other inhabitants
of burghs,
were considered
as little better
than emancipated bondmen,
whose persons
were despised,
and whose gains were envied.
The great nobility,
who had consented
that
the king
should tallage the profits
of their own tenants,
were not unwilling
that
he should tallage likewise
those
of an order of men whom
it was much less
their interest
to protect.
In those ignorant times,
it was not understood,
that
the profits of merchants
are
a subject not taxable directly;
or that the final payment
of all such taxes
must fall,
with a considerable overcharge,
upon the consumers.
The gains
of alien
merchants
were looked
upon more unfavourably
than those
of English merchants.
It was natural,
therefore,
that
those of the former
should be taxed more heavily
than those
of the latter.
This distinction
between the duties
upon aliens and those
upon English merchants,
which was begun
from ignorance,
has been continued
front the spirit of monopoly,
or in order to
give
our own merchants an advantage,
both in the home
and in the foreign market.
With this distinction,
the ancient duties of customs
were imposed equally
upon all sorts of goods,
necessaries
as well its luxuries,
goods
exported
as well as goods imported.
Why should the dealers
in one sort
of goods,
it seems
to have been thought,
be more
favoured than those
in another?
or why
should the merchant exporter
be more
favoured
than the merchant importer?
The ancient customs
were divided
into three branches.
The first,
and, perhaps,
the most ancient
of all those duties,
was that
upon wool and leather.
It seems to have been chiefly
or altogether
an exportation duty.
When
the woollen manufacture
came to be established
in England,
lest the king
should lose any part
of his customs
upon wool
by the exportation
of woollen cloths,
a like duty
was imposed upon them.
The other two branches were,
first,
a duty upon wine,
which
being imposed
at so much a-ton,
was called a tonnage;
and, secondly,
a duty
upon all other goods,
which
being imposed
at so much a-pound
of their supposed value,
was called a poundage.
In the forty-seventh year
of Edward III,
a duty
of sixpence in the pound
was imposed upon all goods
exported
and imported,
except wools,
wool-felts,
leather,
and wines
which were
subject to particular duties.
In the fourteenth
of Richard II,
this duty
was raised to one shilling
in the pound;
but,
three years afterwards,
it was again reduced
to sixpence.
It was raised
to eightpence
in the second year
of Henry IV;
and,
in the fourth
of the same prince,
to one shilling.
From this time
to the ninth year
of William III,
this duty
continued
at one shilling
in the pound.
The duties
of tonnage and poundage
were generally granted
to the king
by one and
the same act of parliament,
and were called
the subsidy
of tonnage and poundage.
The subsidy of poundage
having continued
for so long a time
at one shilling
in the pound,
or at five percent,
a subsidy came,
in the language
of the customs,
to denote a general duty
of this kind
of five per cent.
This subsidy,
which is now called
the old subsidy,
still
continues
to be levied,
according to
the book of rates
established
by the twelfth
of Charles II.
The method
of ascertaining,
by a book of rates,
the value
of goods
subject to this duty,
is said
to be older
than the time
of James I.
The new subsidy,
imposed
by the ninth and tenth
of William III,
was
an additional five per cent.
upon the greater part
of goods.
The one-third and the
two-third subsidy made up
between them another
five per cent.
of which
they were proportionable parts.
The subsidy of 1747
made a fourth five per cent.
upon the greater part
of goods;
and that of 1759,
a fifth
upon some particular sorts
of goods.
Besides those five subsidies,
a great variety of other
duties have occasionally been
imposed
upon particular sorts
of goods,
in order
sometimes
to relieve the exigencie's
of the state,
and sometimes
to regulate the trade
of the country,
according to
the principles
of the mercantile system.
That system
has come gradually more
and more
into fashion.
The old subsidy
was imposed indifferently
upon exportation,
as
well as importation.
The four subsequent subsidies,
as well as
the other duties which
have since been occasionally
imposed
upon particular sorts
of goods,
have,
with a few exceptions,
been laid altogether
upon importation.
The greater part
of the ancient duties
which had been imposed
upon the exportation
of the goods
of home produce
and manufacture,
have either
been lightened
or taken away altogether.
In most cases,
they have been taken away.
Bounties
have even been
given
upon the exportation
of some of them.
Drawbacks, too,
sometimes of the whole,
and, in most cases,
of a part
of the duties
which are paid
upon the importation
of foreign goods,
have been granted
upon their exportation.
Only half the duties
imposed
by the old subsidy
upon importation,
are drawn back
upon exportation;
but the whole of those
imposed
by the latter subsidies
and other
imposts are,
upon the greater parts
of the goods,
drawn back
in the same manner.
This growing favour
of exportation,
and discouragement
of importation,
have suffered only
a few exceptions,
which
chiefly concern
the materials of some
manufactures.
These
our merchants and manufacturers
are willing
should come as
cheap as possible
to themselves,
and as
dear as possible
to their rivals and competitors
in other countries.
Foreign materials are,
upon this account,
sometimes
allowed
to be imported duty-free;
spanish wool,
for example,
flax,
and raw linen yarn.
The exportation
of the materials
of home produce,
and of those
which are
the particular produce
of our colonies,
has sometimes been prohibited,
and sometimes subjected
to higher duties.
The exportation
of English wool
has been prohibited.
That of beaver skins,
of beaver wool,
and of gum-senega,
has been subjected
to higher duties;
Great Britain,
by the conquests
of Canada and Senegal,
having
got almost
the monopoly
of those commodities.
That
the mercantile system
has not been very favourable
to the revenue
of the great body
of the people,
to the annual produce
of the land
and labour of the country,
I have endeavoured
to show
in the fourth book
of this Inquiry.
It seems not
to have been more favourable
to the revenue
of the sovereign;
so far,
at least,
as that revenue
depends upon the duties
of customs.
In consequence of that system,
the importation
of several sorts of goods
has been prohibited altogether.
This prohibition has,
in some cases,
entirely prevented,
and in others
has very much diminished,
the importation
of those commodities,
by reducing the importers
to the necessity
of smuggling.
It has entirely prevented
the importation
of foreign wollens;
and it has very much
diminished
that of foreign silks
and velvets,
In both cases,
it has entirely annihilated
the revenue of customs
which might have been levied
upon such importation.
The high duties which
have been imposed
upon the importation
of many different sorts
of foreign
goods in order to
discourage their consumption
in Great Britain,
have,
in many cases,
served only
to encourage smuggling,
and, in all cases,
have reduced the revenues
of the customs below
what more
moderate duties
would have afforded.
The saying of Dr. Swift,
that in the arithmetic
of the customs,
two and two,
instead of making four,
make sometimes only one,
holds perfectly true
with regard to
such heavy duties,
which
never could have been imposed,
had not
the mercantile system
taught us,
in many cases,
to employ taxation
as an instrument,
not of revenue,
but of monopoly.
The bounties
which are sometimes given
upon the exportation
of home produce
and manufactures,
and the drawbacks
which are paid
upon the re-exportation
of the greater part
of foreign goods,
have given occasion
to many frauds,
and to a species
of smuggling,
more destructive
of the public revenue
than any other.
In order to
obtain the bounty or drawback,
the goods,
it is well known,
are sometimes shipped,
and sent to sea,
but soon
afterwards clandestinely
re-landed
in some other part
of the country.
The defalcation
of the revenue
of customs
occasioned
by bounties and drawbacks,
of which a great part
are obtained fraudulently,
is very great.
The gross produce
of the customs,
in the year
which ended on the 5th
of January 1755,
amounted to £5,068,000.
The bounties
which were paid
out of this revenue,
though in that year
there was no bounty
upon corn,
amounted to £167,806.
The drawbacks
which were paid
upon debentures and certificates,
to £2,156,800.
Bounties and drawbacks
together amounted to £2,324,600.
In consequence
of these deductions,
the revenue
of the customs amounted
only to £2,743,400;
from which
deducting £287,900
for the expense of management,
in salaries and other
incidents,
the neat revenue
of the customs for
that year
comes out
to be £2,455,500.
The expense of management,
amounts,
in this manner,
to between five
and six per cent.
upon the gross revenue
of the customs;
and to something
more than ten per cent.
upon
what remains of that revenue,
after deducting what
is paid away
in bounties and drawbacks.
Heavy duties
being imposed
upon almost
all goods imported,
our merchant importers
smuggle as much,
and make entry of
as little as they can.
Our merchant exporters,
on the contrary,
make entry of more than they
export;
sometimes out of vanity,
and to pass for great dealers
in goods which pay no duty gain
a bounty back.
Our exports,
in consequence
of these different frauds,
appear upon the custom-house
books greatly
to overbalance our imports,
to the unspeakable comfort
of those politicians,
who measure
the national prosperity by
what they
call the balance of trade.
All goods imported,
unless particularly exempted,
and such exemptions
are not very numerous,
are liable
to some duties of customs.
If any goods are imported,
not mentioned
in the book of rates,
they are taxed at 4s:9¾d
for every twenty shillings value,
according to
the oath of the importer,
that is, nearly
at five subsidies,
or five poundage duties.
The book of rates
is extremely comprehensive,
and enumerates
a great variety of articles,
many of them little used,
and, therefore,
not well known.
It is,
upon this account,
frequently uncertain
under what article
a particular sort of goods
ought to be classed,
and, consequently what duty
they ought to pay.
Mistakes with regard to
this sometimes ruin
the custom-house officer,
and frequently occasion
much trouble,
expense,
and vexation to the importer.
In point of perspicuity,
precision,
and distinctness,
therefore,
the duties of customs
are much inferior to those of
excise.
In order that
the greater part
of the members
of any society
should contribute
to the public revenue,
in proportion
to their respective expense,
it does not seem necessary
that every single article of
that expense
should be taxed.
The revenue
which is levied
by the duties of
excise
is supposed
to fall as
equally upon the contributors
as
that which
is levied
by the duties of customs;
and the duties of excise
are imposed
upon a few articles
only of the most general
used and consumption.
It has been
the opinion of many people,
that,
by proper management,
the duties of customs
might likewise,
without any loss
to the public revenue,
and with great advantage
to foreign trade,
be confined
to a few articles only.
The foreign articles,
of the most general use
and consumption
in Great Britain,
seem at present
to consist chiefly
in foreign wines and brandies;
in some of the productions
of America
and the West Indies,
sugar,
rum,
tobacco,
cocoa-nuts,.etc. and
in some of those
of the East Indies,
tea,
coffee,
china-ware,
spiceries of all kinds,
several sorts
of piece-goods,.etc.
These different articles
afford,
the greater part
of the perhaps,
at present,
revenue
which is drawn
from the duties of customs.
The taxes which at present
subsist upon foreign
manufactures,
if you except those
upon the few
contained
in the foregoing enumeration,
have,
the greater part of them,
been imposed for the purpose,
not of revenue,
but of monopoly,
or to give our own merchants
an advantage
in the home market.
By removing all prohibitions,
and by subjecting all foreign
manufactures
to such moderate taxes,
as it
was found from experience,
afforded upon each article
the greatest revenue
to the public,
our own workmen
might still have
a considerable advantage
in the home market;
and many articles,
some of which at present
afford no revenue
to government,
and others
a very inconsiderable one,
might afford
a very great one.
High taxes,
sometimes by diminishing
the consumption
of the taxed commodities,
and sometimes by encouraging
smuggling frequently
afford a smaller revenue
to government than
what might be drawn
from more moderate taxes.
When
the diminution of revenue
is the effect
of the diminution
of consumption,
there
can be but one remedy,
and that is
the lowering
of the tax.
When the diminution of revenue
is the effect
of the
encouragement given to smuggling,
it may,
perhaps,
be remedied in two ways;
either
by diminishing
the temptation
to smuggle,
or by increasing
the difficulty
of smuggling.
The temptation
to smuggle
can be diminished only
by the lowering
of the tax;
and the difficulty
of smuggling
can be increased only
by establishing
that system of administration
which is most proper
for preventing it.
The excise laws,
it appears,
I believe,
from experience,
obstruct
and embarrass the operations
of the smuggler
much more effectually
than those
of the customs.
By introducing
into the customs
a system of
administration as similar to
that of the
excise as the nature
of the different duties
will admit,
the difficulty
of smuggling
might be very much increased.
This alteration,
it has been supposed
by many people,
might very easily be brought about.
The importer
of commodities liable
to any duties
of customs,
it has been said,
might,
at his option,
be allowed
either to carry them
to his own private warehouse;
or to lodge them
in a warehouse,
provided either
at his own expense or at
that of the public,
but under the key
of the custom-house officer,
and never to be opened but
in his presence.
If the merchant
carried them
to his own private warehouse,
the duties
to be immediately paid,
and never
afterwards to be drawn back;
and that warehouse
to be
at all times
subject to the visit
and examination
of the custom-house officer,
in order to
ascertain how far the quantity
contained in it
corresponded with
that for which the duty
had been paid.
If he
carried them
to the public warehouse,
no duty to be paid
till they
were taken out
for home consumption.
If taken out for exportation,
to be duty-free;
proper security
being always given
that
they should be so exported.
The dealers
in those
particular commodities,
either by wholesale or retail,
to be
at all times
subject to the visit
and examination
of the custom-house officer;
and to be obliged to justify,
by proper certificates,
the payment
of the duty
upon the whole quantity contained
in their shops or warehouses.
What
are called the
excise duties upon rum
imported,
are at present
levied in this manner;
and the same system
of administration might,
perhaps,
be extended
to all
duties upon goods imported;
provided always that
those duties were,
like the duties of excise,
confined
to a few sorts
of goods
of the most general use
and consumption.
If they
were extended
to almost all sorts
of goods,
as at present,
public warehouses
of sufficient extent
could not easily be provided;
and goods
of a very delicate nature,
or of which
the preservation
required much care
and attention,
could not safely be trusted
by the
merchant in any warehouse
but his own.
If,
by such a system
of administration,
smuggling
to any considerable extent
could be prevented,
even under pretty high duties;
and if every duty
was occasionally either
heightened or lowered
according
as it was most likely,
either the one way
or the other,
to afford the greatest revenue
to the state;
taxation
being always employed
as an instrument of revenue,
and never of monopoly;
it seems not improbable
that a revenue,
at least equal to the present
neat revenue
of the customs,
might be drawn
from duties
upon the importation
of only a few sorts
of goods
of the most general use
and consumption;
and that
the duties of customs
might thus
be brought
to the same degree
of simplicity,
certainty,
and precision,
as those of excise.
What the revenue at present
loses
by drawbacks
upon the re-exportation
of foreign goods,
which are afterwards re-landed
and consumed at home,
would,
under this system,
be saved altogether.
If to this
saving,
which would alone
be very considerable,
were added the abolition
of all bounties
upon the exportation
of home produce;
in all cases
in which those bounties
were not
in reality drawbacks
of some duties of
excise
which had before been advanced;
it cannot well be doubted,
but that
the neat revenue of customs
might,
after an alteration
of this kind,
be fully equal to
what it
had ever been before.
If,
by such a change of system,
the public revenue
suffered no loss,
the trade
and manufactures
of the country
would certainly gain
a very considerable advantage.
The trade in the commodities
not taxed,
by far
the greatest number
would be perfectly free,
and might be carried on to
and
from all parts
of the world
with every possible advantage.
Among those commodities
would be comprehended all
the necessaries of life,
and all
the materials of manufacture.
So far
as the free importation
of the necessaries of life
reduced
their average money price
in the home market,
it would reduce
the money price
of labour,
but without reducing in any
respect its real recompence.
The value of money
is in proportion
to the quantity
of the necessaries
of life which
it will purchase.
That of the necessaries
of life
is altogether independent
of the quantity
of money
which can be had for them.
The reduction
in the money price
of labour
would necessarily be attended
with a proportionable one in
that of all home
manufactures,
which would thereby gain
some advantage
in all foreign markets.
The price
of some
manufactures
would be reduced,
in a still greater proportion,
by the free importation
of the raw materials.
If raw silk
could be imported
from China and Indostan,
duty-free,
the silk manufacturers
in England
could greatly undersell those
of both France and Italy.
There
would be no occasion
to prohibit
the importation
of foreign silks and velvets.
The cheapness of their goods
would secure
to our own workmen,
not only the possession
of a home,
but a very great command
of the foreign market.
Even the trade
in the commodities
taxed,
would be carried on
with much more advantage
than at present.
If those commodities
were delivered
out of the public warehouse
for foreign exportation,
being in this case
exempted from all taxes,
the trade in them
would be perfectly free.
The carrying trade,
in all sorts of goods,
would,
under this system,
enjoy
every possible advantage.
If these commodities
were delivered out
for home consumption,
the importer
not being obliged to advance
the tax till he
had an opportunity
of selling his goods,
either to some dealer,
or to some consumer,
he could always afford
to sell them cheaper
than if he
had been obliged
to advance it
at the moment of importation.
Under the same taxes,
the foreign trade
of consumption,
even in the taxed commodities,
might in this manner
be carried on with much more
advantage than it
is at present.
It was the object
of the famous
excise scheme
of Sir Robert Walpole,
to establish,
with regard to
wine and tobacco,
a system not very unlike
that which is here proposed.
But though the bill
which was then brought
into Parliament,
comprehended those
two commodities only,
it was generally supposed
to be meant
as an introduction
to a more extensive scheme
of the same kind.
Faction,
combined
with the interest
of smuggling merchants,
raised so violent,
though so unjust a clamour,
against that bill,
that the minister
thought proper to drop it;
and, from a dread
of exciting
a clamour of the same kind,
none of
his successors
have dared
to resume the project.
The duties upon foreign luxuries,
imported for home consumption,
though they
sometimes fall upon the poor,
fall principally
upon people
of middling
or more than middling fortune.
Such are,
for example,
the duties upon foreign wines,
upon coffee,
chocolate,
tea,
sugar,.etc.
The duties
upon the cheaper luxuries
of home produce,
destined for home consumption,
fall pretty
equally upon people
of all ranks,
in proportion
to their respective expense.
The poor pay
the duties upon malt,
hops,
beer,
and ale,
upon their own consumption;
the rich,
upon both
their own consumption
and
that of their servants.
The whole consumption
of the inferior ranks
of people,
or of those
below the middling rank,
it must be observed,
is, in every country,
much greater,
not only in quantity,
but in value,
than that of the middling,
and of those above
the middling rank.
The whole expense
of the inferior
is much greater titan
that of the superior ranks.
In the first place,
almost the whole capital
of every country
is annually distributed
among the inferior ranks
of people,
as the wages
of productive labour.
Secondly,
a great part of the revenue,
arising from both
the rent of land and
the profits of stock,
is annually distributed
among the same rank,
in the wages and maintenance
of menial servants,
and other unproductive labourers.
Thirdly,
some part
of the profits of stock
belongs to the same rank,
as a revenue arising
from the employment
of their small capitals.
The amount of the profits
annually made
by small shopkeepers,
tradesmen,
and retailers of all kinds,
is everywhere very considerable,
and makes
a very considerable portion
of the annual produce.
Fourthly and lastly,
some part even of the
rent of land
belongs to the same rank;
a considerable part to those
who are somewhat
below the middling rank,
and a small part even
to the lowest rank;
common labourers
sometimes possessing
in property an acre or two
of land.
Though the expense of those
inferior ranks of people,
therefore,
taking them individually,
is very small,
yet the whole mass of it,
taking them collectively,
amounts always to
by much the largest portion
of the whole expense
of the society;
what remains
of the annual produce
of the land
and labour of the country,
for the consumption
of the superior ranks,
being always much less,
not only in quantity,
but in value.
The taxes upon expense,
therefore,
which
fall chiefly upon
that of the superior ranks
of people,
upon the smaller portion
of the annual produce,
are likely
to be much less productive
than either
those which
fall indifferently
upon the expense
of all ranks,
or even those which
fall chiefly upon
that of the inferior ranks,
than either those which
fall indifferently
upon the whole annual produce,
or those which
fall chiefly
upon the larger portion
of it.
The excise upon the materials
and manufacture
of home-made fermented
and spirituous liquors,
is, accordingly,
of all
the different taxes
upon expense,
by far the most productive;
and this branch of the
excise falls very much,
perhaps principally,
upon the expense
of the common people.
In the year
which ended on the 5th
of July 1775,
the gross produce
of this branch of the
excise amounted
to £3,341,837:9:9.
It must always be remembered,
however,
that it is the luxuries,
and not the necessary expense
of the inferior ranks
of people,
that ought
ever to be taxed.
The final payment
of any tax
upon their necessary expense,
would fall altogether
upon the superior ranks
of people;
upon the smaller portion
of the annual produce,
and not upon the greater.
Such a tax must,
in all cases,
either raise the wages
of labour,
or lessen the demand for it.
It could not raise the wages
of labour,
without throwing
the final payment
of the tax
upon the superior ranks
of people.
It could not lessen
the demand
for labour,
without lessening
the annual produce
of the land
and labour of the country,
the fund upon which all taxes
must be finally paid.
Whatever
might be
the state to which a tax
of this kind reduced
the demand for labour,
it must always raise wages
higher
than
they otherwise would be
in that state;
and the final payment
of this enhancement
of wages must,
in all cases,
fall upon the superior ranks
of people.
Fermented liquors
brewed,
and spiritous liquors
distilled,
not for sale,
but for private use,
are not
in Great Britain liable
to any duties of
excise.
This exemption,
of which the object
is to save private families
from the odious visit
and examination
of the tax-gatherer,
occasions the burden
of those duties
to fall frequently much lighter
upon the rich
than upon the poor.
It is not,
indeed,
very common
to distil for private use,
though it is done
sometimes.
But in the country,
many middling and almost all rich
and great families,
brew their own beer.
Their strong beer,
therefore,
costs them
eight shillings a-barrel
less than it
costs the common brewer,
who must have his profit
upon the tax,
as well as upon all
the other expense which
he advances.
Such families,
therefore,
must drink
their beer
at least nine
or
ten shillings a-barrel cheaper
than any
liquor
of the same quality can be
drank by the common people,
to whom it
is everywhere more convenient
to buy their beer,
by little and little,
from the brewery
or the ale-house.
Malt,
in the same manner,
that is made for the use
of a private family,
is not liable
to the visit or examination
of the tax-gatherer but,
in this case
the family
must compound
at seven shillings
and sixpence a-head
for the tax.
Seven shillings and sixpence
are equal to
the excise
upon ten bushels of malt;
a quantity
fully equal to
what all
the different members
of any sober family,
men,
women,
and children,
are, at an average,
likely to consume.
But
in rich and great families,
where country hospitality
is much practised,
the malt liquors
consumed
by the members
of the family make
but a small part
of the consmnption
of the house.
Either
on account of this composition,
however,
or for other reasons,
it is not near so common
to malt as
to brew for private use.
It is difficult
to imagine
any equitable reason,
why those who either
brew or distil
for private use
should not be subject to
a composition
of the same kind.
A greater revenue than
what is at present
drawn from all
the heavy taxes upon malt,
beer,
and ale,
might be raised,
it has frequently been said,
by a much lighter tax
upon malt;
the opportunities
of defrauding the revenue
being much greater
in a brewery than
in a malt-house;
and those
who brew for private use
being exempted
from all duties or composition
for duties,
which is not
the case with those
who malt for private use.
In the porter brewery
of London,
a quarter of malt
is commonly brewed
into more than two barrels
and a-half,
sometimes into three barrels
of porter.
The different taxes
upon malt amount
to six shillings a-quarter;
those
upon strong ale and beer
to eight shillings a-barrel.
In the porter brewery,
therefore,
the different taxes upon malt,
beer,
and ale,
amount to
between twenty-six
and thirty shillings
upon the produce
of a quarter of malt.
In the country brewery
for common country sale,
a quarter of malt
is seldom brewed
into less than two barrels
of strong,
and one barrel of small beer;
frequently into two barrels
and a-half
of strong beer.
The different taxes
upon small beer amount
to one shilling
and fourpence a-barrel.
In the country brewery,
therefore,
the different taxes upon malt,
beer,
and ale,
seldom amount
to less than
twenty-three shillings
and fourpence,
frequently to
twenty-six shillings,
upon the produce
of a quarter of malt.
Taking the whole kingdom
at an average,
therefore,
the whole amount
of the duties upon malt,
beer,
and ale,
cannot be estimated
at less than twenty-four
or twenty-five shillings
upon the produce
of a quarter of malt.
But by taking off all
the different duties
upon beer and ale,
and by trebling the malt tax,
or by raising it
from six
to eighteen shilling's
upon the quarter of malt,
a greater revenue,
it is said,
might be raised
by this single tax,
than
what is at present
drawn
from all those
heavier taxes.
Under the old malt tax,
indeed,
is comprehended a tax
of four shillings
upon the hogshead
of cyder,
and another
of ten shillings
upon the barrel of mum.
In 1774,
the tax
upon cyder
produced only £3,083:6:8.
It
probably fell somewhat short
of its usual amount;
all the different taxes
upon cyder,
having,
that year,
produced less than ordinary.
The tax upon mum,
though much heavier,
is still less productive,
on account
of the smaller consumption of
that liquor.
But to balance
whatever may be
the ordinary amount
of those two taxes,
there
is comprehended under what
is called the country
excise,
first,
the old
excise
of six shillings
and eightpence
upon the hogshead
of cyder;
secondly,
a like tax
of six shillings and eightpence
upon the hogshead of verjuice;
thirdly,
another
of eight shillings and ninepence
upon the hogshead of vinegar;
and, lastly,
a fourth tax
of elevenpence
upon the gallon
of mead or metheglin.
The produce
of those different taxes
will probably much more
than counterbalance
that of the duties imposed,
by
what is called
the annual malt tax,
upon cyder and mum.
Malt
is consumed,
not only in the brewery
of beer and ale,
but in the manufacture
of low wines and spirits.
If the malt tax
were to be raised
to eighteen shillings
upon the quarter,
it might be necessary
to make some
abatement in the different
excises
which are imposed
upon those particular sorts
of low wines and spirits,
of which malt
makes any part
of the materials.
In
what are called malt spirits,
it
makes commonly
but a third part
of the materials;
the other two-thirds
being either raw barley,
or one-third barley
and one-third wheat.
In the distillery
of malt spirits,
both the opportunity
and the temptation
to smuggle are
much greater than either
in a brewery
or in a malt-house;
the opportunity,
on account
of the smaller bulk
and greater value
of the commodity,
and the temptation,
on account
of the superior height
of the duties,
which amounted
to 3s 10 2/3d
upon the gallon of spirits.
(Though the duties
directly imposed
upon proof spirits amount
only to 2s 6d per gallon,
these,
added
to the duties
upon the low wines,
from which
they are distilled,
amount to 3s 10 2/3d.
Both low wines and proof
spirits are,
to prevent frauds,
now rated according to
what they
gauge in the wash.)
By increasing
the duties upon malt,
and reducing those
upon the distillery,
both the opportunities
and the temptation
to smuggle
would be diminished,
which might occasion
a still further augmentation
of revenue.
It has for some time
past been the policy
of Great Britain
to discourage the consumption
of spiritous liquors,
on account
of their supposed tendency
to ruin the health and
to corrupt the morals
of the common people.
According to this policy,
the abatement
of the taxes
upon the distillery
ought not
to be so great as
to reduce,
in any respect,
the price of those liquors.
Spiritous liquors
might remain as dear as ever;
while,
at the same time,
the wholesome
and invigorating liquors
of beer and ale
might be considerably reduced
in their price.
The people
might thus
be in part relieved
from one of the burdens
of which they at present
complain the most;
while,
at the same time,
the revenue
might be considerably augmented.
The objections
of Dr. Davenant
to this alteration
in the present system of
excise duties,
seem to be
without foundation.
Those objections are,
that the tax,
instead of dividing itself,
as at present,
pretty
equally upon the profit
of the maltster,
upon that
of the brewer and upon
that of the retailer,
would so far
as it affected profit,
fall altogether upon
that of the maltster;
that
the maltster
could not so easily get
back the amount
of the tax
in the advanced price
of his malt,
as the brewer and retailer
in the advanced price
of their liquor;
and that so heavy
a tax upon malt
might reduce the rent
and profit of barley land.
No tax can ever reduce,
for any considerable time,
the rate
of profit
in any particular trade,
which must always keep
its level with other
trades in the neighbourhood.
The present duties upon malt,
beer,
and ale,
do not affect the profits
of the dealers
in those commodities,
who all
get back
the tax
with an additional profit,
in the enhanced price
of their goods.
A tax,
indeed,
may render
the goods upon which
it is imposed
so dear,
as to diminish the consumption
of them.
But the consumption of malt
is in malt liquors;
and a tax
of eighteen shillings
upon the quarter of malt
could not well render
those liquors dearer
than the different taxes,
amounting
to twenty-four
or twenty-five shillings,
do at present.
Those liquors,
on the contrary,
would probably become cheaper,
and the consumption of them
would be more likely
to increase
than to diminish.
It is not very easy
to understand
why it
should be more difficult
for the maltster
to get back eighteen shillings
in the advanced price
of his malt,
than it
is at present
for the brewer
to get back twenty-four
or twenty-five,
sometimes thirty shillings,
in that of his liquor.
The maltster,
indeed,
instead of a tax
of six shillings,
would be obliged
to advance one
of eighteen shilling
upon every quarter of malt.
But the brewer
is at present
obliged
to advance a tax
of twenty-four or twentyfive,
sometimes thirty shillings,
upon every quarter
of malt which
he brews.
It could not be
more inconvenient
for the maltster
to advance a lighter tax,
than it
is at present for the brewer
to advance a heavier one.
The maltster
does not always keep
in his granaries
a stock of malt,
which
it will require a longer time
to dispose of
than the stock
of beer and ale which
the brewer
frequently keeps
in his cellars.
The former,
therefore,
may frequently get
the returns
of his money
as soon as the latter.
But whatever inconveniency
might arise to the maltster
from being obliged
to advance a heavier tax,
it could easily be remedied,
by granting him
a few months longer credit than
is at present commonly
given to the brewer.
Nothing
could reduce the rent
and profit of barley land,
which did not reduce
the demand
for barley.
But a change of system,
which reduced the duties
upon a quarter of malt
brewed into beer and ale,
from twentyfour
and twenty-five shillings
to eighteen shillings,
would be more likely
to increase than
diminish that demand.
The rent
and profit of barley land,
besides,
must always be nearly
equal to those
of other equally fertile
and equally
well cultivated land.
If they were less,
some part of the barley land
would soon be turned
to some other purpose;
and if they were greater,
more
land would soon be turned
to the raising
of barley.
When
the ordinary price
of any particular produce
of land
is at what
may be called
a monopoly price,
a tax upon it
necessarily reduces the rent
and profit of the land
which grows it.
A tax
upon the produce
of those precious vineyards,
of which the wine falls
so much short
of the effectual demand,
that
its price
is always above
the natural proportion to
that of the produce of other
equally fertile
and equally
well cultivated land,
would necessarily reduce the
rent
and profit
of those vineyards.
The price of the wines
being already
the highest
that could be
got for the quantity
commonly sent
to market,
it could not be raised higher
without diminishing
that quantity;
and the quantity
could not be diminished
without still greater loss,
because the lands
could not be turned
to any
other
equally valuable produce.
The whole weight of the tax,
therefore,
would fall upon the rent
and profit;
properly upon
the rent of the vineyard.
When it
has been proposed
to lay any new tax
upon sugar,
our sugar
planters
have frequently complained
that the whole weight
of such taxes
fell not upon the consumer,
but upon the producer;
they
never having been able
to raise
the price
of their sugar
after the tax higher
than it
was before.
The price had,
it seems,
before the tax,
been a monopoly price;
and the arguments
adduced to show
that sugar
was an improper subject
of taxation,
demonstrated perhaps
that it
was a proper one;
the gains of monopolists,
whenever
they can be come at,
being certainly of all
subjects the most proper.
But the ordinary price
of barley
has never been
a monopoly price;
and the rent
and profit of barley land
have never been above
their natural proportion
to those
of other equally fertile
and equally
well cultivated land.
The different taxes which
have been imposed upon malt,
beer,
and ale,
have never lowered
the price of barley;
have never reduced the rent
and profit of barley land.
The price of malt
to the brewer
has constantly risen
in proportion
to the taxes
imposed upon it;
and those taxes,
together
with the different duties
upon beer and ale,
have constantly
either raised the price,
or,
what comes to the same thing,
reduced the quality
of those commodities
to the consumer.
The final payment
of those taxes
has fallen constantly
upon the consumer,
and not upon the producer.
The only people likely
to suffer
by the change
of system here proposed,
are those
who brew
for their own private use.
But the exemption,
which this superior rank
of people at present
enjoy,
from very heavy taxes
which are paid
by the poor labourer
and artificer,
is surely
most unjust and unequal,
and ought to be taken away,
even though this change
was never
to take place.
It has probably been
the interest
of this
superior order of people,
however,
which has hitherto prevented
a change of system
that could not well fail
both to increase the revenue
and
to relieve the people.
Besides such duties
as those of custom
and excise above mentioned,
there
are
several others which affect the price
of goods more unequally
and more indirectly.
Of this kind
are the duties,
which,
in French,
are called peages,
which
in old Saxon times
were called the duties
of passage,
and which
seem
to have been originally established
for the same purpose
as our turnpike tolls,
or the tolls
upon our canals
and navigable rivers,
for the maintenance
of the road
or of the navigation.
Those duties,
when applied to such purposes,
are most properly imposed
according to
the bulk
or weight
of the goods.
As they
were originally local
and provincial duties,
applicable
to local and
provincial purposes,
the administration
of them was,
in most cases,
entrusted
to the particular town,
parish,
or lordship,
in which they were levied;
such communities
being,
in some way or other,
supposed
to be accountable
for the application.
The sovereign,
who is altogether unaccountable,
has in many countries assumed
to himself
the administration
of those duties;
and though he
has in most cases
enhanced very much the duty,
he has in many
entirely neglected
the application.
If the turnpike tolls
of Great Britain
should ever
become one
of the resources
of government,
we may learn,
by the example
of many other nations,
what would probably be
the consequence.
Such tolls,
no doubt,
are finally paid
by the consumer;
but the consumer
is not taxed
in proportion to his expense,
when he pays,
not according to the value,
but according to
the bulk or weight of
what he consumes.
When such duties are imposed,
not according to the bulk
or weight,
but according to
the supposed value
of the goods,
they become properly a sort
of inland customs
or excise,
which
obstruct very much
the most important
of all branches
of commerce,
the interior commerce
of the country.
In some small states,
duties similar
to those passage
duties are imposed
upon goods
carried across the territory,
either by land or by water,
from one foreign country
to another.
These
are in some countries called
transit-duties.
Some of the little Italian states
which are situated
upon the Po,
and the rivers which run
into it,
derive some revenue
from duties of this kind,
which are paid altogether
by foreigners,
and which,
perhaps,
are the only duties
that one state
can impose
upon the subjects of another,
without obstruction
in any respect,
the industry or commerce
of its own.
The most important transit-duty
in the world,
is
that levied
by the king
of Denmark
upon all merchant ships which
pass through the Sound.
Such taxes upon luxuries,
as the greater part
of the duties of customs
and excise,
though they all
fall indifferently
upon every different species
of revenue,
and are paid finally,
or without any retribution,
by whoever
consumes
the commodities upon which
they are imposed;
yet they
do not always fall equally or
proportionally upon the revenue
of every individual.
As every man's humour
regulates
the degree of his consumption,
every man
contributes
rather according to
his humour,
than proportion
to his revenue:
the profuse
contribute more,
the parsimonious less,
than their proper proportion.
During the minority
of a man
of great fortune,
he contributes commonly
very little,
by his consumption,
towards the support
of that state
from whose protection
he derives a great revenue.
Those
who live in another country,
contribute nothing
by their consumption
towards the support
of the government of
that country,
in which
is situated
the source of their revenue.
If in this
latter country
there should be no land tax,
nor any considerable duty
upon the transference either
of moveable
or immoveable property,
as is the case in Ireland,
such absentees
may derive a great revenue
from the protection
of a government,
to the support
of which they
do not contribute
a single shilling.
This inequality
is likely
to be greatest in a country
of which the government is,
in some respects,
subordinate and dependant upon
that of some other.
The people
who possess
the most extensive property
in the dependant,
will,
in this case,
generally chuse
to live in
the governing country.
Ireland
is precisely in this situation;
and we
cannot therefore wonder,
that
the proposal
of a tax upon absentees
should be so very popular in
that country.
It might,
perhaps,
be a little difficult to
ascertain either what sort,
or what degree of absence,
would subject a man
to be taxed as an absentee,
or at what
precise time
the tax
should either begin or end.
If you except,
however,
this very peculiar situation,
any inequality
in the contribution
of individuals
which can arise
from such taxes,
is much more than compensated
by the very
circumstance which occasions
that inequality;
the circumstance
that
every man's contribution
is altogether voluntary;
it being altogether
in his power,
either
to consume,
or not to consume,
the commodity
taxed.
Where such taxes,
therefore,
are properly assessed,
and upon proper commodities,
they are paid with less
grumbling than any other.
When they
are advanced
by the merchant
or manufacturer,
the consumer,
who finally pays them,
soon
comes
to confound them
with the price
of the commodities,
and almost forgets
that he pays any tax.
Such taxes are,
or may be,
perfectly certain;
or may be assessed,
so as
to leave no doubt
concerning either
what ought to be paid,
or when it
ought to be paid;
concerning either
the quantity or the time
of payment.
What ever uncertainty
there may sometimes be,
either
in the duties
of customs in Great Britain,
or in other duties
of the same kind
in other countries,
it cannot arise
from the nature
of those duties,
but from the
inaccurate or unskilful
manner
in which
the law that imposes them
is expressed.
Taxes upon luxuries
generally are,
and always may be,
paid piece-meal,
or in proportion
as the contributors
have occasion
to purchase
the goods upon which
they are imposed.
In the time and mode
of payment,
they are,
or may be,
of all taxes
the most convenient.
Upon the whole,
such taxes,
therefore,
are perhaps as agreeable
to the three first
of the
four general maxims
concerning taxation,
as any other.
They offend
in every respect
against the fourth.
Such taxes,
in proportion to what they
bring
into the public treasury
of the state,
always
take out,
or keep out,
of the pockets
of the people,
more than almost any other taxes.
They seem
to do this in all
the four different ways
in which it
is possible
to do it.
First,
the levying of such taxes,
even when imposed
in the most judicious manner,
requires a great number
of custom-house
and excise officers,
whose salaries
and perquisites
are a real tax
upon the people,
which brings nothing
into the treasury
of the state.
This expense,
however,
it must be acknowledged,
is more
moderate in Great Britain
than in most other countries.
In the year
which ended on the 5th
of July, 1775,
the gross produce
of the different duties,
under the management
of the commissioners of
excise in England,
amounted to £5,507,308:18:8¼,
which was levied
at an expense
of little more than five
and a-half per cent.
From this gross produce,
however,
there
must be deducted
what was paid away
in bounties and drawbacks
upon the exportation
of exciseable goods,
which will reduce
the neat produce
below five millions.
(The neat produce of
that year,
after deducting all expenses
and allowances,
amounted to £4,975,652:19:6.)
The levying
of the salt duty,
and excise duty,
but
under a different management,
is much more expensive.
The neat revenue
of the customs
does not amount
to two millions and a-half,
which is levied
at an expense
of more than ten per cent.,
in the salaries
of officers and other incidents.
But the perquisites
of custom-house
officers
are everywhere
much greater than
their salaries;
at some ports
more than double
or triple those salaries.
If the salaries of officers,
and other incidents,
therefore,
amount
to more than ten per cent.
upon the neat revenue
of the customs,
the whole expense
of levying that revenue
may amount,
in salaries and perquisites
together,
to more than twenty
or thirty per cent.
The officers of
excise
receive few or no perquisites;
and the administration
of that branch
of the revenue
being
of more recent establishment,
is in general less
corrupted than
that of the customs,
into which length of time
has introduced
and authorised many abuses.
By charging upon malt
the whole revenue which
is at present
levied
by the different duties
upon malt and malt liquors,
a saving,
it is supposed,
of more than £50,000,
might be made
in the annual expense of the
excise.
By confining the duties
of customs
to a few sorts
of goods,
and by levying
those duties according to
the excise laws,
a much greater saving
might probably be made
in the annual expense
of the customs.
Secondly,
such taxes necessarily occasion
some obstruction
or discouragement
to certain branches
of industry.
As they always raise
the price
of the commodity taxed,
they so far discourage
its consumption,
and consequently
its production.
If it
is a commodity of home growth
or manufacture,
less
labour comes to be employed
in raising
and producing it.
If it
is
a foreign commodity of which
the tax increases
in this manner the price,
the commodities
of the same kind which
are made at home
may thereby,
indeed,
gain some advantage
in the home market,
and
a greater quantity
of domestic industry
may thereby be turned
toward preparing them.
But though this rise
of price
in a foreign commodity,
may encourage domestic industry
in one particular branch,
it necessarily discourages
that industry
in almost every other.
The dearer
the Birmingham manufacturer
buys his foreign wine,
the cheaper
he necessarily sells that part
of his hardware
with which,
or,
what comes to the same thing,
with the price of which,
he buys it.
That part of his hardware,
therefore,
becomes of less value
to him,
and he has less encouragement
to work at it.
The dearer
the consumers
in one country pay
for the surplus produce
of another,
the cheaper
they necessarily sell
that part
of their own surplus produce
with which,
or,
what comes to the same thing,
with the price of which,
they buy it.
That part
of their own surplus
produce
becomes
of less value to them,
and they
have less encouragement
to increase its quantity.
All
taxes upon consumable commodities,
therefore,
tend to reduce the quantity
of productive labour below
what it otherwise would be,
either
in preparing
the commodities
taxed,
if they are home commodities,
or in preparing
those
with which they are purchased,
if they
are foreign commodities.
Such taxes, too,
always
alter,
more or less,
the natural direction
of national industry,
and turn it
into a channel
always different from,
and generally less advantageous,
than that in which
it would have run
of its own accord.
Thirdly,
the hope
of evading such taxes
by smuggling,
gives frequent occasion
to forfeitures
and other penalties,
which
entirely ruin the smuggler;
a person who,
though no doubt highly blameable
for violating
the laws of his country,
is frequently incapable
of violating those
of natural justice,
and would have been,
in every respect,
an excellent citizen,
had not
the laws of his country
made that
a crime
which nature never meant
to be so.
In those
corrupted governments,
where there is
at least a general suspicion
of much unnecessary expense,
and great misapplication
of the public revenue,
the laws
which guard
it are little respected.
Not many people
are scrupulous about smuggling,
when,
without perjury,
they
can find an easy and safe
opportunity
of doing so.
To pretend
to have any scruple
about buying
smuggled goods,
though
a manifest encouragement
to the violation
of the revenue laws,
and to the perjury which almost
always attends it,
would,
in most countries,
be regarded as one
of those pedantic pieces
of hypocrisy which,
instead of gaining credit
with anybody,
serve
only to expose
the person
who affects
to practise them
to the suspicion
of being a greater knave
than most
of his neighbours.
By this indulgence
of the public,
the smuggler
is often encouraged
to continue a trade,
which he
is thus taught
to consider as
in some measure innocent;
and when the severity
of the revenue laws
is ready
to fall upon him,
he is frequently disposed
to defend with violence,
what he
has been accustomed
to regard
as his just property.
From
being at first,
perhaps,
rather imprudent than criminal,
he at last too
often becomes one
of the hardiest
and most determined violators
of the laws
of society.
By the ruin of the smuggler,
his capital,
which had before been
employed
in maintaining
productive labour,
is absorbed either
in the revenue
of the state,
or in
that of the revenue officer;
and is employed
in maintaining unproductive,
to the diminution
of the general capital
of the society,
and of the useful industry which
it
might otherwise have maintained.
Fourthly,
such taxes,
by subjecting at least
the dealers
in the taxed commodities,
to the frequent visits
and odious examination
of the tax-gatherers,
expose them sometimes,
no doubt,
to some degree of oppression,
and always to much trouble
and vexation;
and though vexation,
as has already been said,
is not strictly speaking expense,
it is certainly equivalent
to the expense at which
every man
would be
willing
to redeem himself from it.
The laws of excise,
though more effectual
for the purpose
for which they
were instituted,
are, in this respect,
more vexatious than those
of the customs.
When
a merchant
has imported
goods subject to certain duties
of customs;
when he
has paid those duties,
and lodged
the goods in his warehouse;
he is not,
in most cases,
liable
to any further trouble
or vexation
from the custom-house officer.
It is otherwise
with goods subject to duties
of
excise.
The dealers
have
no respite
from the continual visits
and examination
of the
excise officers.
The duties of excise are,
upon this account,
more unpopular than those
of the customs;
and so
are the officers
who levy them.
Those officers,
it is pretended,
though in general,
perhaps,
they do their duty fully
as well as those
of the customs;
yet,
as that duty
obliges them
to be frequently very troublesome
to some of their neighbours,
commonly
contract a certain hardness
of character,
which the others
frequently have not.
This observation,
however,
may very probably be
the mere suggestion
of fraudulent dealers,
whose smuggling
is either
prevented
or detected
by their diligence.
The inconveniencies,
however,
which are,
perhaps,
in some degree inseparable
from taxes
upon consumable communities,
fall as light
upon the people
of Great Britain
as upon those of any
other country
of which the government
is nearly as expensive.
Our state
is not perfect,
and might be mended;
but it is as good,
or better,
than that of most
of our neighbours.
In consequence of the notion,
that duties upon consumable
goods
were taxes
upon the profits of merchants,
those duties have,
in some countries,
been repeated
upon every successive sale
of the goods.
If the profits
of the merchant-importer
or merchant-manufacturer
were taxed,
equality
seemed to require
that those
of all the middle buyers,
who intervened
between either
of them and the consumer,
should likewise
be taxed.
The famous alcavala
of Spain
seems to have been established
upon this principle.
It was at first
a tax
of ten per cent.
afterwards of fourteen per cent.
and
it is
at present only six per cent.
upon the sale
of every sort
of property
whether moveable or immoveable;
and it is repeated
every time
the property is sold.
(Memoires
concernant les
Droits,.etc. tom. i,
p. 15)
The levying of this tax
requires a multitude
of revenue officers,
sufficient
to guard the transportation
of goods,
not
only from one province to another,
but from one shop to another.
It subjects,
not only the dealers
in some sorts of goods,
but those in all sorts,
every farmer,
every manufacturer,
every merchant and shopkeeper,
to the continual visit
and examination
of the tax-gatherers.
Through the greater part
of the country in which a tax
of this kind
is established,
nothing
can be produced
for distant sale.
The produce
of every part
of the country
must be proportioned
to the consumption
of the neighbourhood.
It is to the alcavala,
accordingly,
that
Ustaritz imputes
the ruin of the manufactures
of Spain.
He might have imputed to it,
likewise,
the declension of agriculture,
it being imposed not
only upon
manufactures,
but upon the rude produce
of the land.
In the kingdom of Naples,
there
is a similar tax
of three per cent.
upon the value
of all contracts,
and consequently upon
that of all contracts
of sale.
It is both lighter
than the Spanish tax,
and the greater part
of towns and parishes
are allowed
to pay a composition
in lieu of it.
They levy
this composition in what manner
they please,
generally in a way
that gives no interruption
to the interior commerce
of the place.
The Neapolitan tax,
therefore,
is not
near so ruinous
as the Spanish one.
The uniform system
of taxation,
which,
with a few exception
of no great consequence,
takes place
in all the different parts
of the united kingdom
of Great Britain,
leaves the interior commerce
of the country,
the inland and coasting trade,
almost entirely free.
The inland trade
is almost perfectly free;
and the greater part of goods
may be carried
from one end
of the kingdom
to the other,
without requiring any permit
or let-pass,
without being
subject to question,
visit or examination,
from the revenue officers.
There
are a few exceptions,
but they
are such as
can give no interruption
to any important branch
of inland commerce
of the country.
Goods
carried coastwise,
indeed,
require certificates
or coast-cockets.
If you except coals,
however,
the rest
are almost all duty-free.
This freedom
of interior commerce,
the effect
of the uniformity
of the system of taxation,
is perhaps one
of the principal causes
of the prosperity
of Great Britain;
every great country
being necessarily
the best
and most extensive market
for the greater part
of the productions
of its own industry.
If the same freedom
in consequence
of the same uniformity,
could be extended
to Ireland and
the plantations,
both the grandeur
of the state,
and the prosperity
of every part
of the empire,
would probably be still
greater than
at present.
In France,
the different revenue laws which
take place
in the different provinces,
require a multitude of revenue
officers
to surround,
not only the frontiers
of the kingdom,
but those
of almost each
particular province,
in order either
to prevent the importation
of certain goods,
or to subject it
to the payment
of certain duties,
to the no small interruption
of the interior commerce
of the country.
Some provinces are allowed
to compound for the gabelle,
or salt tax;
others
are exempted
from it altogether.
Some
provinces
are exempted
from the exclusive sale
of tobacco,
which
the farmers-general
enjoy
through the greater part
of the kingdom.
The aides,
which
correspond to the
excise in England,
are very different
in different provinces.
Some
provinces
are exempted from them,
and pay a composition
or equivalent.
In those in which
they take place,
and are in farm,
there
are many local duties which
do not extend
beyond a particular town
or district.
The traites,
which
correspond to our customs,
divide the kingdom
into three great parts;
first,
the provinces subject to
the tariff
of 1664,
which are called the provinces
of the five great farms,
and under which
are comprehended Picardy,
Normandy,
and the greater part
of the interior provinces
of the kingdom;
secondly,
the provinces subject to
the tariff
of 1667,
which are called the provinces
reckoned foreign,
and under which
are comprehended
the greater part
of the frontier provinces;
and, thirdly,
those provinces
which are said
to be treated as foreign,
or which,
because they
are allowed a free commerce
with foreign countries,
are, in their commerce
with the other provinces
of France,
subjected
to the same duties
as other foreign countries.
These
are Alsace,
the three bishoprics of Mentz,
Toul,
and Verdun,
and the three cities
of Dunkirk,
Bayonne,
and Marseilles.
Both in the provinces
of the five great farms
(called so
on account
of an ancient division
of the duties
of customs
into five great branches,
each of which
was originally
the subject
of a particular farm,
though they
are now all united into one),
and in those
which are said
to be reckoned foreign,
there
are many local duties which
do not extend
beyond a particular town
or district.
There
are some such
even in the provinces
which are said
to be treated as foreign,
particularly in
the city of Marseilles.
It is unnecessary
to observe
how much both the restraints
upon the interior commerce
of the country,
and the number
of the revenue officers,
must be multiplied,
in order to guard
the frontiers of those
different provinces
and districts
which are
subject to such different systems
of taxation.
Over and above
the general restraints
arising
from this complicated system
of revenue laws,
the commerce of wine
(after corn,
perhaps,
the most important production
of France)
is,
in the greater part
of the provinces,
subject to particular restraints
arising from the favour
which has been shown
to the vineyards
of particular provinces
and districts above those
of others.
The provinces most famous
for their wines,
it will be found,
I believe,
are those in which the trade
in
that article
is subject to
the fewest restraints
of this kind.
The extensive market
which such provinces
enjoy,
encourages
good management both
in the cultivation
of their vineyards,
and in the subsequent preparation
of their wines.
Such various
and complicated revenue
laws are not peculiar
to France.
The little duchy
of Milan
is divided into six provinces,
in each of which
there is
a different system
of taxation,
with regard to several
different sorts
of consumable goods.
The still smaller territories
of the duke of Parma
are divided
into three or four,
each of which has,
in the same manner,
a system of its own.
Under such absurd management,
nothing
but the great fertility
of the soil,
and happiness of the climate,
could preserve such countries
from soon relapsing
into the lowest state
of poverty and barbarism.
Taxes upon consumable
commodities
may either
he levied
by an administration,
of which
the officers
are appointed by govermnent,
and are immediately accountable
to government,
of which the revenue must,
in this case,
vary from year to year,
according to
the occasional variations
in the produce
of the tax;
or they
may be let in farm
for a rent certain,
the farmer
being allowed
to appoint his own officers,
who,
though obliged
to levy the tax
in the manner
directed by the law,
are
under his immediate inspection,
and are immediately accountable
to him.
The best and most frugal
way of levying
a tax
can never be by farm.
Over and above
what is necessary for paying
the stipulated rent,
the salaries of the officers,
and the whole expense
of administration,
the farmer
must always draw
from the produce
of the tax a certain profit,
proportioned at least
to the advance which
he makes,
to the risk which
he runs,
to the trouble
which he is at,
and to the knowledge
and skill which
it requires
to manage so very
complicated a concern.
Government,
by establishing
an administration
under their own
immediate inspection,
of the same kind with
that which
the farmer establishes,
might
at least save this profit,
which is almost always
exorbitant.
To
farm any considerable branch
of the public revenue
requires either
a great capital,
or a great credit;
circumstances
which would alone
restrain the competition
for such an undertaking
to a very small number
of people.
Of the few
who have this capital
or credit,
a still smaller number
have
the necessary knowledge or experience;
another
circumstance
which restrains
the competition
still further.
The very few
who are in condition
to become competitors,
find it more
for their interest
to combine together;
to become copartners,
instead of competitors;
and,
when the farm
is set up
to auction,
to offer no
rent
but what is much
below the real value.
In countries
where
the public revenues
are in farm,
the farmers
are generally
the most opulent people.
Their wealth
would alone
excite the public indignation;
and the vanity which almost
always accompanies
such upstart fortunes,
the foolish ostentation
with which they
commonly display that wealth,
excite
that indignation still more.
The farmers
of the public revenue
never find the laws
too severe,
which
punish any attempt
to evade the payment
of a tax.
They have no bowels
for the contributors,
who are not their subjects,
and whose universal bankruptcy,
if it should happen
the day after the farm
is expired,
would not
much affect their interest.
In the greatest exigencies
of the state,
when the anxiety
of the sovereign
for the exact
payment of his revenue
is necessarily the greatest,
they seldom fail to complain,
that without laws more rigorous
than those
which actually took place,
it will be impossible
for them
to pay even the usual rent.
In those moments
of public distress,
their commands
cannot be disputed.
The revenue laws,
therefore,
become gradually more
and more severe.
The most sanguinary
are always
to be found
in countries where
the greater part
of the public revenue
is in farm;
the mildest,
in countries
where it
is levied
under the immediate inspection
of the sovereign.
Even a bad sovereign
feels more compassion
for his people than
can ever be expected
from the farmers
of his revenue.
He knows
that the permanent grandeur
of his family
depends
upon the prosperity
of his people,
and he
will never knowingly ruin
that prosperity
for the sake
of any momentary interest
of his own.
It is otherwise
with the farmers
of his revenue,
whose grandeur
may frequently be
the effect of the ruin,
and not of the prosperity,
of his people.
A tax
is sometimes not only farmed
for a certain rent,
but the farmer has,
besides,
the monopoly of the commodity
taxed.
In France,
the duties
upon tobacco and salt
are levied in this manner.
In such cases,
the farmer,
instead of one,
levies two exorbitant profits
upon the people;
the profit of the farmer,
and
the still more exorbitant one
of the monopolist.
Tobacco
being a luxury,
every man
is allowed
to buy or not to buy
as he chuses;
but salt being a necessary,
every man
is obliged
to buy of the farmer
a certain quantity of it;
because,
if he
did not buy
this quantity of the farmer,
he would,
it is presumed,
buy it of some smuggler.
The taxes upon both
commodities are exorbitant.
The temptation
to smuggle,
consequently,
is
to many people irresistible;
while,
at the same time,
the rigour of the law,
and the vigilance
of the farmer's officers,
render the yielding
to the
temptation
almost certainly ruinous.
The smuggling
of salt and tobacco
sends every year
several hundred people
to the galleys,
besides
a very considerable number
whom
it sends to the gibbet.
Those taxes,
levied in this manner,
yield
a very considerable revenue
to government.
In 1767,
the farm of tobacco
was let
for twenty-two millions five hundred
and
forty-one thousand two hundred
and
seventy-eight livres a-year;
that of salt
for thirty-six millions four hundred
and
ninety-two thousand four hundred
and four livres.
The farm,
in both cases,
was to commence in 1768,
and to last for six years.
Those
who consider the blood
of the people as nothing,
in comparison
with the revenue
of the prince,
may,
perhaps,
approve of this method
of levying taxes.
Similar taxes and monopolies
of salt and tobacco
have been established
in many other countries,
particularly in the Austrian
and Prussian dominions,
and in the greater part
of the states of Italy.
In France,
the greater part
of the actual revenue
of the crown
is derived
from eight different sources;
the taille,
the capitation,
the two vingtiemes,
the gabelles,
the aides,
the traites,
the domaine,
and the farm of tobacco.
The live last are,
in the greater part
of the provinces,
under farm.
The three first
are everywhere levied
by an administration,
under the immediate inspection
and direction
of government;
and it
is universally acknowledged,
that in proportion to what they
take
out of the pockets
of the people,
they bring more
into the treasury
of the prince
than the other five,
of which the administration
is much more wasteful
and expensive.
The finances of France seem,
in their present state,
to admit
of three very obvious reformations.
First,
by abolishing
the taille and the capitation,
and by increasing
the number of the vingtiemes,
so as
to produce
an additional revenue equal to
the amount
of those other taxes,
the revenue
of the crown
might be preserved;
the expense of collection
might be much diminished;
the vexation
of the inferior ranks
of people,
which the taille
and capitation occasion,
might be entirely prevented;
and the superior ranks
might not be more
burdened
than the greater part
of them
are at present.
The vingtieme,
I have already observed,
is a tax very nearly
of the same kind
with
what is called
the land tax of England.
The burden of the taille,
it is acknowledged,
falls finally
upon the proprietors of land;
and as the greater part
of the capitation
is assessed
upon those
who are
subject to the taille,
at so much a-pound
of that other tax,
the final payment
of the greater part of it
must likewise
fall upon the same order
of people.
Though the number
of the vingtiemes,
therefore,
was increased,
so as
to produce
an additional revenue equal to
the amount
of both those taxes,
the superior ranks of people
might not be more
burdened than
they are at present;
many individuals,
no doubt,
would,
on account
of the great inequalities
with which the taille
is commonly assessed
upon the estates and tenants
of different individuals.
The interest and opposition
of such favoured subjects,
are the obstacles most likely
to prevent this,
or any other reformation
of the same kind.
Secondly,
by rendering the gabelle,
the aides,
the traites,
the taxes upon tobacco,
all the different customs
and excises,
uniform
in all
the different parts
of the kingdom,
those
taxes might be levied
at much less expense,
and the interior commerce
of the kingdom
might be rendered as free as
that of England.
Thirdly,
and lastly,
by subjecting all those taxes
to an administration
under the immediate inspection
and direction or government,
the exorbitant profits
of the farmers-general
might be added
to the revenue
of the state.
The opposition
arising
from the private interest
of individuals,
is likely
to be
as effectual for preventing
the two last
as the first-mentioned scheme
of reformation.
The French system of taxation
seems,
in every respect,
inferior to the British.
In Great Britain,
ten millions sterling
are annually levied
upon less than eight millions
of people,
without its being possible
to say
that any particular order
is oppressed.
From the Collections
of the Abbé Expilly,
and the observations
of the author
of the Essay
upon the Legislation
and Commerce of Corn,
it appears probable
that France,
including
the provinces
of Lorraine and Bar,
contains
about twenty-three
or twenty-four millions
of people;
three times the number,
perhaps,
contained in Great Britain.
The soil and climate
of France
are better than those
of Great Britain.
The country
has been much longer
in a state
of improvement and cultivation,
and is,
upon that account,
better
stocked with all
those things which
it requires a long time
to raise up
and accumulate;
such as great towns,
and convenient
and well-built houses,
both in town and country.
With these advantages,
it might be expected,
that in France
a revenue of thirty millions
might be levied
for the support
of the state,
with as little inconvenience
as a revenue of ten millions
is in Great Britain.
In 1765
and 1766,
the whole revenue paid
into the treasury of France,
according to the best,
though,
I acknowledge,
very imperfect accounts which
I could get of it,
usually run
between 308 and 325 millions
of livres;
that is,
it did not amount
to fifteen millions sterling;
not
the half of
what might have been expected,
had the people
contributed
in the same proportion
to their numbers
as the people
of Great Britain.
The people of France,
however,
it is generally acknowledged,
are much more
oppressed
by taxes
than the people
of Great Britain.
France,
however,
is certainly
the great empire in Europe,
which,
after that of Great Britain,
enjoys
the mildest and most indulgent
government.
In Holland,
the heavy taxes
upon the necessaries of life
have ruined,
it is said,
their principal manufacturers,
and are likely
to discourage,
gradually,
even their fisheries
and their trade
in ship-building.
The taxes
upon the necessaries of life
are inconsiderable
in Great Britain,
and no
manufacture has hitherto been
ruined by them.
The British
taxes which bear hardest on
manufactures,
are some duties
upon the importation
of raw materials,
particularly upon
that of raw silk.
The revenue
of the States-General
and of the different cities,
however,
is said
to amount to
more than
five millions two hundred
and
fifty thousand pounds sterling;
and as the inhabitants
of the United Provinces
cannot well be supposed
to amount
to more than a third part
of those
of Great Britain,
they must,
in proportion to their number,
be much more heavily taxed.
After all
the proper subjects
of taxation
have been exhausted,
if the exigencies
of the state
still continue
to require new taxes,
they
must be imposed
upon improper ones.
The taxes
upon the necessaries of life,
therefore,
may be no impeachment
of the wisdom of
that republic,
which,
in order to
acquire and
to maintain its independency,
has,
in spite of its meat
frugality,
been involved
in such expensive wars
as have obliged it
to contract great debts.
The singular countries
of Holland and Zealand,
besides,
require
a considerable expense even
to preserve their existence,
or to prevent
their being swallowed up
by the sea,
which must have contributed
to increase considerably
the load
of taxes
in those two provinces.
The republican form
of government
seems
to be the principal support
of the present grandeur
of Holland.
The owners of great capitals,
the great mercantile families,
have generally
either some direct share,
or some indirect influence,
in the administration of
that government.
For the sake
of the respect
and authority which
they derive from this situation,
they
are willing
to live in
a country where their capital,
if they
employ it themselves,
will bring them less profit,
and if they
lend it to another,
less interest;
and where
the very moderate revenue which
they can draw from it
will purchase less
of the necessaries
and conveniencies
of life
than in any other part
of Europe.
The residence
of such wealthy people
necessarily keeps alive,
in spite of all disadvantages,
a certain degree
of industry in the country.
Any public calamity which
should destroy
the republican form
of government,
which should throw
the whole administration
into the hands
of nobles and of soldiers,
which
should annihilate altogether
the importance of those wealthy merchants,
would soon render it disagreeable
to them
to live in
a country
where they
were no longer likely
to be much
respected.
They
would remove both
their residence
and their capital
to some other country,
and the industry and commerce
of Holland
would soon follow the capitals
which supported them.
In that rude state of society
which precedes the extension
of commerce
and the improvement
of
manufactures;
when those expensive luxuries,
which commerce
and manufactures
can alone
introduce,
are altogether unknown;
the person
who possesses a large revenue,
I have endeavoured
to show
in the third book
of this Inquiry,
can spend
or enjoy
that revenue in no other way
than by maintaining nearly
as many people
as it can maintain.
A large revenue
may at all times
be said
to consist
in the command
of a large quantity
of the necessaries of life.
In that rude state of things,
it is commonly paid
in a large quantity
of those necessaries,
in the materials
of plain food
and coarse clothing,
in corn and cattle,
in wool and raw hides.
When neither commerce nor
manufactures
furnish
any thing for which
the owner
can exchange
the greater part
of those materials
which are
over and above
his own consumption,
he can do nothing
with the surplus,
but feed
and clothe nearly
as many people
as it will feed
and clothe.
A hospitality in which
there is no luxury,
and a liberality in which
there is no ostentation,
occasion,
in this situation of things,
the principal expenses
of the rich and the great.
But these
I have likewise
endeavoured
to show,
in the same book,
are expenses
by which people
are not very apt
to ruin themselves.
There
is not,
perhaps,
any selfish pleasure
so frivolous,
of which the pursuit
has not sometimes ruined even sensible men.
A passion for cock-fighting
has ruined many.
But the instances,
I believe,
are not very numerous,
of people
who have been ruined
by a hospitality or liberality
of this kind;
though the hospitality
of luxury,
and the liberality
of ostentation
have ruined many.
Among our feudal ancestors,
the long time
during which estates
used to continue
in the same family,
sufficiently
demonstrates the general
disposition
of people
to live
within their income.
Though the rustic hospitality,
constantly
exercised
by the great landholders,
may not,
to us
in the present times,
seem consistent
with that order
which we
are apt to consider
as inseparably connected
with good economy;
yet we
must certainly allow them
to have been
at least so far frugal,
as not
commonly to have spent
their whole income.
A part
of their wool and raw hides,
they had generally
an opportunity
of
selling for money.
Some part of this money,
perhaps,
they spent in purchasing
the few objects
of vanity and luxury,
with which the circumstances
of the times
could furnish them;
but some part of it
they seem commonly
to have hoarded.
They
could not well,
indeed,
do any thing else
but hoard whatever money
they saved.
To trade,
was disgraceful
to a gentleman;
and to lend money
at interest,
which at that time
was considered as usury,
and prohibited bylaw,
would have been still
more so.
In those times
of violence and disorder,
besides,
it was convenient
to have a hoard
of money at hand,
that in case
they should be driven
from their own home,
they
might have something
of known value
to carry
with them
to some place of safety.
The same violence
which made it convenient
to hoard,
made it equally convenient
to conceal the hoard.
The frequency
of treasure-trove,
or of treasure found,
of which no owner
was known,
sufficiently
demonstrates the frequency,
in those times,
both
of hoarding
and of concealing the hoard.
Treasure-trove
was then considered
as an important branch
of the revenue
of the sovereign.
All the treasure-trove
of the kingdom
would scarce,
perhaps,
in the present times,
make an important branch
of the revenue
of a private gentleman
of a good estate.
The same disposition,
to save and to hoard,
prevailed in the sovereign,
as well as in the subjects.
Among nations,
to whom commerce
and manufacture
are little known,
the sovereign,
it has already been
observed in the Fourth book,
is in a situation
which naturally disposes him
to the parsimony requisite
for accumulation.
In that situation,
the expense,
even of a sovereign,
cannot be directed by that
vanity
which delights in
the gaudy finery
of a court.
The ignorance of the times
affords but few
of the trinkets
in which that finery
consists.
Standing armies
are not then necessary;
so that the expense,
even of a sovereign,
like that
of any other great lord
can be employed
in scarce any
thing but bounty
to his tenants,
and hospitality
to his retainers.
But bounty and hospitality
very seldom lead
to extravagance;
though vanity almost
always does.
All the ancient sovereigns
of Europe,
accordingly,
it has already been observed,
had treasures.
Every Tartar chief,
in the present times,
is said
to have one.
In a commercial country,
abounding
with every sort
of expensive luxury,
the sovereign,
in the same manner
as almost
all the great proprietors
in his dominions,
naturally
spends a great part
of his revenue
in purchasing those luxuries.
His own and the neighbouring
countries
supply him abundantly
with all
the costly trinkets which
compose the splendid,
but insignificant,
pageantry of a court.
For the sake
of an inferior pageantry
of the same kind,
his nobles
dismiss their retainers,
make
their tenants independent,
and become gradually themselves
as insignificant
as the greater part
of the wealthy burghers
in his dominions.
The same frivolous passions,
which influence their conduct,
influence his.
How can
it be supposed
that he should be
the only rich man
in his dominions
who is insensible
to pleasures of this kind?
If he does not,
what he
is very likely
to do,
spend
upon those pleasures so great
a part
of his revenue as
to debilitate very much
the defensive power
of the state,
it cannot well be expected
that
he should not spend
upon them all that part
of it
which is over and above
what is necessary
for supporting
that defensive power.
His ordinary expense
becomes
equal to his ordinary revenue,
and it is well
if it
does not frequently exceed it.
The amassing
of treasure can no longer
be expected;
and when
extraordinary exigencies
require
extraordinary expenses,
he must necessarily call
upon his subjects
for an extraordinary aid.
The present and the late king
of Prussia
are the only great princes
of Europe,
who,
since the death
of Henry IV of France,
in 1610,
are supposed
to have amassed
any considerable treasure.
The parsimony
which leads to accumulation
has become almost as rare
in republican as in
monarchical governments.
The Italian republics,
the United Provinces
of the Netherlands,
are all in debt.
The canton of Berne
is the single republic
in Europe
which has amassed
any considerable treasure.
The other Swiss republics
have not.
The taste
for some sort of pageantry,
for splendid buildings,
at least,
and other public ornaments,
frequently
prevails as much
in the apparently
sober senate-house
of a little republic,
as in the dissipated court
of the greatest king.
The want of parsimony,
in time of peace,
imposes
the necessity
of contracting debt
in time of war.
When war comes,
there
is no money in the treasury,
but what is necessary
for carrying
on the ordinary expense
of the peace establishment.
In war,
an establishment
of three or four
times that expense
becomes necessary
for the defence
of the state;
and consequently,
a revenue three or four times
greater than
the peace revenue.
Supposing that
the sovereign should have,
what he scarce
ever has,
the immediate means
of augmenting his revenue
in proportion
to the augmentation
of his expense;
yet still the produce
of the taxes,
from which this increase
of revenue must be drawn,
will not begin
to come into the treasury,
till perhaps ten
or twelve months after
they are imposed.
But the moment in which war
begins,
or rather the moment
in which
it appears likely
to begin,
the army
must be augmented,
the fleet
must be fitted out,
the garrisoned towns
must be put into a posture
of defence;
that army,
that fleet,
those garrisoned towns,
must be furnished with arms,
ammunition,
and provisions.
An immediate and great expense
must be incurred in
that moment
of immediate danger,
which will not wait
for the gradual and
slow returns
of the new taxes.
In this exigency,
government
can have no other resource
but
in borrowing.
The same commercial state
of society which,
by the operation
of moral causes,
brings government in this manner
into the necessity
of borrowing,
produces in the subjects both
an ability
and an inclination
to lend.
If it
commonly brings along
with it the necessity
of borrowing,
it likewise
brings with it the facility
of doing so.
A country
abounding
with merchants and manufacturers,
necessarily
abounds
with a set
of people through whose hands,
not only their own capitals,
but the capitals of all
those who either
lend them money,
or trust them with goods,
pass as frequently,
or more frequently,
than the revenue
of a private man,
who,
without trade or business,
lives upon his income,
passes through his hands.
The revenue of such
a man
can regularly pass through
his hands only
once in a year.
But
the whole amount of the capital
and credit of a merchant,
who deals in
a trade
of which the returns
are very quick,
may sometimes pass through
his hands two,
three,
or four
times in a year.
A country
abounding
with merchants and manufacturers,
therefore,
necessarily
abounds with a set
of people,
who have
it at all
times in
their power
to advance,
if they chuse
to do so,
a very large sum
of money to government.
Hence the ability
in the subjects
of a commercial state
to lend.
Commerce
and manufactures
can seldom flourish
long in any state
which does not enjoy
a regular administration
of justice;
in which the people
do not feel themselves secure
in the possession
of their property;
in which
the faith of contracts
is not supported by law;
and in which the authority
of the state
is not supposed
to be regularly employed
in enforcing
the payment
of debts from all those
who are able
to pay.
Commerce
and manufactures,
in short,
can seldom flourish in
any state,
in which
there is not a certain degree
of confidence in the justice
of government.
The same confidence
which disposes great merchants
and manufacturers
upon ordinary occasions,
to trust their property
to the protection
of a particular government,
disposes them,
upon extraordinary occasions,
to trust
that government with the use
of their property.
By lending money
to government,
they do not
even for a moment
diminish their ability
to carry on their trade
and manufactures;
on the contrary,
they commonly augment it.
The necessities of the state
render government,
upon most occasions willing
to borrow
upon terms extremely advantageous
to the lender.
The security which
it grants
to the original creditor,
is made transferable
to any other creditor;
and from the universal confidence
in the justice
of the state,
generally
sells in the market for
more than
was originally paid for it.
The merchant or monied man
makes money by lending money
to government,
and instead of diminishing.
increases his trading capital.
He generally considers
it as a favour,
therefore,
when
the administration
admits him
to a share
in the first subscription
for a new loan.
Hence the inclination
or willingness
in the subjects
of a commercial state
to lend.
The government of such
a state
is very apt
to repose itself
upon this ability
and willingness
of its subjects
to lend it
their money
on extraordinary occasions.
It foresees the facility
of borrowing,
and therefore
dispenses itself from the duty
of saving.
In a rude state
of society,
there
are no
great mercantile
or manufacturing capitals.
The individuals,
who hoard whatever money
they can save,
and who
conceal their hoard,
do so
from a distrust
of the justice of government;
from a fear,
that
if it was known
that they had a hoard,
and where that hoard
was to be found,
they
would quickly be plundered.
In such a state of things,
few people
would be able,
and nobody
would be willing
to lend their money
to government
on extraordinary exigencies.
The sovereign
feels that
he must provide
for such exigencies
by saving,
because he
foresees
the absolute impossibility
of borrowing.
This foresight
increases still
further
his natural disposition
to save.
The progress
of the enormous debts which
at present
oppress,
and will in the long-run
probably ruin,
all the great nations
of Europe,
has been pretty uniform.
Nations,
like private men,
have generally begun
to borrow upon what
may be called personal credit,
without assigning
or mortgaging
any particular fund
for the payment
of the debt;
and when this resource
has failed them,
they have gone on
to borrow
upon assignments or mortgages
of particular funds.
What is called
the unfunded debt
of Great Britain,
is contracted in the former
of those two ways.
It consists partly in a debt
which bears,
or is supposed
to bear,
no interest,
and which
resembles
the debts
that a private man contracts
upon account;
and partly in
a debt which bears interest,
and which
resembles
what a private man contracts
upon his bill
or promissory-note.
The debts
which are due,
either
for extraordinary services,
or for services either
not provided for,
or not paid at the time
when they are performed;
part of the extraordinaries
of the army,
navy,
and ordnance,
the arrears
of subsidies to foreign princes,
those of seamen's wages,.etc.
usually constitute a debt
of the first kind.
Navy and exchequer bills,
which are issued sometimes
in payment
of a part of such debts,
and sometimes for other purposes,
constitute
a debt of the second kind;
exchequer
bills
bearing interest from the day
on which they are issued,
and navy bills six months after
they are issued.
The bank of England,
either
by voluntarily discounting
those bills
at their current value,
or by agreeing
with government
for certain considerations
to circulate exchequer bills,
that is,
to receive them at par,
paying the interest
which happens
to be due upon them,
keeps up their value,
and facilitates
their circulation,
and thereby
frequently enables government
to contract a very large debt
of this kind.
In France,
where there is no bank,
the state bills
(billets d'etat
(See Examen des
Reflections Politiques
sur les Finances.)) have sometimes sold
at sixty
and
seventy per cent. discount.
During the great recoinage
in king William's time,
when the bank
of England thought
proper
to put
a stop
to its usual transactions,
exchequer bills
and tallies
are said
to have sold
from twenty-five
to sixty per cent. discount;
owing partly,
no doubt,
to the supposed instability
of the new government
established by the Revolution,
but partly, too,
to the want
of the support
of the bank of England.
When this resource
is exhausted,
and it becomes necessary,
in order to raise money,
to assign
or mortgage
some particular branch
of the public revenue
for the payment
of the debt,
government has,
upon different occasions,
done this
in two different ways.
Sometimes it
has made this assignment
or mortgage
for a short period
of time only,
a year,
or a few years,
for example;
and sometimes for perpetuity.
In the one case,
the fund
was supposed sufficient
to pay,
within the limited time,
both principal and interest
of the money
borrowed.
In the other,
it was supposed sufficient
to pay the interest only,
or a perpetual annuity equivalent
to the interest,
government
being at liberty
to redeem,
at any time,
this annuity,
upon paying back
the principal sum
borrowed.
When money
was raised in the one way,
it was said
to be raised by anticipation;
when in the other,
by perpetual funding,
or, more shortly,
by funding.
In Great Britain,
the annual land and malt
taxes
are regularly anticipated
every year,
by virtue
of a borrowing clause
constantly inserted
into the acts which
impose them.
The bank of England
generally advances
at an interest,
which,
since the Revolution,
has varied
from eight to three per cent.,
the sums of which those
taxes are granted,
and receives payment
as their produce
gradually comes in.
If there is a deficiency,
which there
always is,
it is provided for
in the supplies
of the ensuing year.
The only considerable branch
of the public revenue which
yet remains unmortgaged,
is thus
regularly spent before it
comes in.
Like an improvident spendthrift,
whose pressing occasions
will not allow him
to wait
for the regular payment
of his revenue,
the state
is in the constant practice
of borrowing
of its own factors
and agents,
and of paying interest
for the use
of its own money.
In the reign
of king William,
and during a great part of
that of queen Anne,
before we
had become so familiar
as we
are now
with the practice
of perpetual funding,
the greater part
of the new taxes
were imposed but
for a short period
of time
(for four,
five,
six,
or seven years only),
and a great part
of the grants
of every year
consisted
in loans
upon anticipations
of the produce
of those taxes.
The produce
being frequently insufficient
for paying,
within the limited term,
the principal and interest
of the money
borrowed,
deficiencies
arose;
to make good which,
it became necessary
to prolong the term.
In 1697,
by the 8th
of William III c.
20,
the deficiencies
of several taxes
were charged upon what
was then called
the first general mortgage
or fund,
consisting
of a prolongation
to the first
of August 1706,
of several different taxes,
which would have expired
within a shorter term,
and of which
the produce
was accumulated
into one general fund.
The deficiencies
charged
upon this prolonged term
amounted
to £5,160,459:
14:
9½.
In 1701,
those duties,
with some others,
were still further prolonged,
for the like purposes,
till the first
of August 1710,
and were called
the second general mortgage
or fund.
The deficiencies
charged upon it amounted
to £2,055,999:
7:
11½.
In 1707,
those duties
were still further prolonged,
as a fund for new loans,
to the first
of August 1712,
and were called
the third general mortgage
or fund.
The sum borrowed upon it
was £983,254:11:9¼.
In 1708,
those duties
were all
(except the old subsidy
of tonnage and poundage,
of which one moiety
only was made
a part of this fund,
and a duty
upon the importation
of Scotch linen,
which had been taken off
by the articles of union)
still further
continued,
as a fund for new loans,
to the first
of August 1714,
and were called
the fourth general mortgage
or fund.
The sum borrowed upon it
was £925,176:9:2¼.
In 1709,
those duties
were all
( except the old subsidy
of tonnage and poundage,
which was now left
out of this fund altogether )
still further
continued,
for the same purpose,
to the first
of August 1716,
and were called
the fifth general mortgage
or fund.
The sum borrowed upon it
was £922,029:6s.
In 1710,
those duties
were again prolonged
to the first
of August 1720,
and were called
the sixth general mortgage
or fund.
The sum borrowed upon it
was £1,296,552:9:11¾.
In 1711,
the same duties
(which at this time
were
thus subject to
four different anticipations),
together with several others,
were continued for ever,
and made a fund
for paying the interest
of the capital
of the South-sea company,
which had that year
advanced to government,
for paying debts,
and making good deficiencies,
the sum of £9,177,967:15:4d,
the greatest loan which
at that time
had ever been made.
Before this period,
the principal,
so far as I have been
able
to observe,
the only taxes,
which,
in order to pay
the interest of a debt,
had been imposed
for perpetuity,
were those for paying
the interest of the money
which had been advanced
to government
by the bank
and East-India company,
and of what
it was expected
would be advanced,
but which was never advanced,
by a projected land bank.
The bank fund
at this time amounted
to £3,375,027:17:10½,
for which
was paid
an annuity
or interest
of £206,501:15:5d.
The East-India fund amounted
to £3,200,000,
for which
was paid
an annuity
or interest of £160,000;
the bank fund
being at six per cent.,
the East-India fund
at five per cent. interest.
In 1715,
by the first
of George I c.12,
the different taxes
which had been mortgaged
for paying the bank annuity,
together with several others,
which,
by this act,
were likewise rendered perpetual,
were accumulated
into one common fund,
called the aggregate fund,
which was charged not
only with the payment
of the bank annuity,
but
with several other annuities
and burdens
of different kinds.
This fund
was afterwards augmented
by the third
of George I c.8,
and by the fifth
of George I c.3,
and the different duties
which were then added to it
were likewise
rendered perpetual.
In 1717,
by the third
of George I c.7,
several other taxes
were rendered perpetual,
and accumulated
into another common fund,
called the general fund,
for the payment
of certain annuities,
amounting
in the whole
to £724,849:6:10½.
In consequence
of those different acts,
the greater part
of the taxes,
which
before had been anticipated only
for a short term
of years
were rendered perpetual,
as a fund for paying,
not the capital,
but the interest only,
of the money
which had been borrowed
upon them
by different successive anticipations.
Had money
never been raised but
by anticipation,
the course of a few years
would have liberated
the public revenue,
without any other attention
of government
besides
that
of not overloading the fund,
by charging
it with more debt than it
could pay
within the limited term,
and not of anticipating
a second time
before the expiration
of the first anticipation.
But the greater part
of European governments
have been incapable
of those attentions.
They
have frequently overloaded the fund,
even upon the first anticipation;
and when this
happened not
to be the case,
they have generally taken care
to overload it,
by anticipating
a second and a third time,
before the expiration
of the first anticipation.
The fund
becoming
in this
manner altogether insufficient
for paying both principal
and interest
of the money borrowed
upon it,
it became necessary
to charge it
with the interest only,
or a perpetual annuity
equal to the interest;
and
such improvident anticipations
necessarily gave birth
to the more ruinous practice
of perpetual funding.
But though
this practice
necessarily puts off
the liberation
of the public revenue
from a fixed period,
to one so indefinite
that it
is not very likely ever
to arrive;
yet,
as a greater sum can,
in all cases,
be raised
by this new practice than
by the old one
of anticipation,
the former,
when men
have once become familiar
with it,
has,
in the great exigencies
of the state,
been universally preferred
to the latter.
To relieve
the present exigency,
is always
the object
which principally interests
those
immediately concerned
in the administration
of public affairs.
The future liberation
of the public revenue
they leave
to the care of posterity.
During the reign
of queen Anne,
the market rate of interest
had fallen
from six
to five per cent.; and,
in the twelfth year
of her reign,
five per cent.
was declared
to be the highest rate
which could lawfully be taken
for money
borrowed
upon private security.
Soon after the greater part
of the temporary taxes
of Great Britain
had been rendered perpetual,
and distributed
into the aggregate,
South-sea,
and general funds,
the creditors
of the public,
like those of private persons,
were induced
to accept of five per cent.
for the interest
of their money,
which occasioned
a saving
of one per cent.
upon the capital
of the greater part or
the debts
which had been thus funded
for perpetuity,
or of one-sixth
of the greater part
of the annuities
which were paid
out of the
three great funds above mentioned.
This
saving left
a considerable surplus
in the produce
of the different taxes
which had been accumulated
into those funds,
over and above
what was necessary
for paying
the annuities
which were now charged
upon them,
and laid
the foundation of what
has since been
called the sinking fund.
In 1717,
it amounted to £523,454:7:7½.
In 1727,
the interest
of the greater part
of the public debts
was still further
reduced
to four per cent.; and,
in 1753 and 1757,
to three and a-half,
and three per cent.,
which reductions
still further
augmented the sinking fund.
A sinking fund,
though instituted
for the payment of old,
facilitates very much
the contracting
of new debts.
It is a subsidiary fund,
always at hand,
to be mortgaged
in aid
of any other doubtful fund,
upon which money
is proposed
to be raised in any exigency
of the state.
Whether the sinking fund
of Great Britain
has been more frequently applied
to the one
or to other
of those two purposes,
will sufficiently appear
by and by.
Besides those two methods
of borrowing,
by anticipations
and by a perpetual funding,
there
are two other methods,
which hold a sort
of middle place between them;
these are,
that
of borrowing
upon annuities
for terms of years,
and that
of borrowing
upon annuities for lives.
During the reigns
of king William
and queen Anne,
large sums
were frequently borrowed
upon annuities for terms
of years,
which were sometimes
longer and sometimes shorter.
In 1695,
an act
was passed
for borrowing one million
upon an annuity
of fourteen per cent.,
or £140,000 a-year,
for sixteen years.
In 1691,
an act
was passed
for borrowing a million
upon annuities for lives,
upon terms which,
in the present times,
would appear very advantageous;
but the subscription
was not filled up.
In the following year,
the deficiency
was made good,
by borrowing
upon annuities for lives,
at fourteen per cent.
or
a little more than
seven years purchase.
In 1695,
the persons
who had purchased
those annuities
were allowed
to exchange them
for others
of ninety-six years,
upon paying
into the
exchequer sixty-three pounds
in the hundred;
that is,
the difference
between fourteen per cent.
for life,
and fourteen per cent.
for ninety-six years,
was sold
for sixty-three pounds,
or for four
and a-half years purchase.
Such
was the supposed instability
of government,
that even these terms
procured few purchasers.
In the reign
of queen Anne,
money was,
upon different occasions,
borrowed both
upon annuities for lives,
and upon annuities
for terms of thirty-two,
of eighty-nine,
of ninety-eight,
and of ninety-nine years.
In 1719,
the proprietors
of the annuities
for thirty-two years
were induced
to accept,
in lieu of them,
South-sea stock
to the amount
of eleven
and a-half years purchase
of the annuities,
together
with an additional quantity
of stock,
equal to
the arrears
which happened then
to be due
upon them.
In 1720,
the greater part
of the other annuities
for terms of years,
both long and short,
were subscribed
into the same fund.
The long annuities,
at that time,
amounted to £666,821:
8:3½ a-year.
On the 5th of January 1775,
the remainder of them,
or what
was not subscribed
at that time,
amounted
only to £136,453:12:8d.
During the two wars
which began
in 1739 and in 1755,
little money
was borrowed,
either
upon annuities
for terms of years,
or upon those for lives.
An annuity
for ninety-eight
or ninety-nine years,
however,
is worth nearly
as much as a perpetuity,
and should therefore,
one might think,
be
a fund
for borrowing nearly
as much.
But those who,
in order to make
family settlements,
and to provide
for remote futurity,
buy into the public stocks,
would not care
to purchase into one
of which the value
was continually diminishing;
and
such people make
a very considerable proportion,
both of the proprietors
and purchasers of stock.
An annuity
for a long term
of years,
therefore,
though its intrinsic value
may be very nearly the same
with
that of a perpetual annuity,
will not find nearly
the same number
of purchasers.
The subscribers
to a new loan,
who mean generally
to sell their subscription
as soon as possible,
prefer greatly
a perpetual annuity,
redeemable by parliament,
to an irredeemable annuity,
for a long term
of years,
of only equal amount.
The value of the former
may be supposed always
the same,
or very nearly the same;
and it makes,
therefore,
a more convenient
transferable stock
than the latter.
During the
two last-mentioned wars,
annuities,
either
for terms
of years or for lives,
were seldom granted,
but as premiums
to the subscribers
of a new loan,
over and above
the redeemable annuity
or interest,
upon the credit
of which the loan
was supposed
to be made.
They
were granted,
not as the proper fund
upon which
the money was borrowed,
but as
an additional encouragement
to the lender.
Annuities for lives
have occasionally been
granted in two different ways;
either upon separate lives,
or upon lots of lives,
which,
in French,
are called tontines,
from the name
of their inventor.
When annuities
are granted
upon separate lives,
the death
of every individual annuitant
disburdens
the public revenue,
so far as it
was affected by his annuity.
When
annuities
are granted upon tontines,
the liberation
of the public revenue
does not commence
till the death
of all the annuitants
comprehended in one lot,
which may sometimes consist
of twenty or thirty persons,
of whom
the survivors
succeed
to the annuities of all
those
who die before them;
the last survivor
succeeding
to the annuities
of the whole lot.
Upon the same revenue,
more money
can always be raised
by tontines
than by annuities for separate
lives.
An annuity,
with a right of survivorship,
is really worth
more than an equal annuity
for a separate life;
and,
from the
confidence which every man
naturally has
in his own good fortune,
the principle upon which
is founded
the success of all lotteries,
such
an annuity
generally sells for something
more than it
is worth.
In countries
where it
is usual
for government
to raise money
by granting annuities,
tontines are,
upon this account,
generally
preferred
to annuities for separate
lives.
The expedient
which will raise most money,
is almost always preferred to
that which
is likely to bring about,
in the speediest manner,
the liberation
of the public revenue.
In France,
a much greater proportion
of the public debts
consists
in annuities for lives than
in England.
According to a memoir
presented
by the parliament
of Bourdeaux to the king,
in 1764,
the whole public debt
of France
is estimated
at twenty-four hundred millions
of livres;
of which the capital,
for which annuities for lives
had been granted,
is supposed to amount
to three hundred millions,
the eighth part
of the whole public debt.
The annuities
themselves
are computed
to amount
to thirty millions a-year,
the fourth part
of one hundred
and twenty millions,
the supposed interest of
that whole debt.
These estimations,
I know very well,
are not exact;
but having been presented
by so very respectable
a body as approximations
to the truth,
they may,
I apprehend,
be considered as such.
It is not
the different degrees
of anxiety
in the two governments
of France and England
for the liberation
of the public revenue,
which occasions this difference
in their respective modes
of borrowing;
it arises altogether
from the different views
and interests
of the lenders.
In England,
the seat of government
being
in the greatest mercantile city
in the world,
the merchants
are generally the people
who advance
money to government.
By advancing it,
they do not mean to diminish,
but,
on the contrary,
to increase
their mercantile capitals;
and unless they
expected
to sell,
with some profit,
their share
in the subscription
for a new loan,
they
never would subscribe.
But if,
by advancing their money,
they
were to purchase,
instead of perpetual annuities,
annuities for lives only,
whether
their own or those
of other people,
they
would not always be so likely
to sell them with a profit.
Annuities
upon their own lives
they would always sell
with loss;
because no man
will give
for an annuity
upon the life of another,
whose age
and state of health
are nearly the same
with his own,
the same price which
he would give
for one upon his own.
An annuity
upon the life
of a third person,
indeed,
is, no doubt,
of equal value
to the buyer and the seller;
but its real value
begins
to diminish from the moment
it is granted,
and continues to do so,
more and more,
as long as it subsists.
It can never,
therefore,
make so convenient
a transferable stock
as a perpetual annuity,
of which
the real value
may be supposed always
the same,
or very nearly the same.
In France,
the seat of government
not being
in a great mercantile city,
merchants
do not make so great
a proportion of the people
who advance money
to government.
The people
concerned in the finances,
the farmers-general,
the receivers of the taxes
which are not in farm,
the court-bankers,.etc. make
the greater part of those
who advance their money in
all public exigencies.
Such people
are commonly men
of mean birth,
but of great wealth,
and frequently of great pride.
They
are too proud
to marry their equals,
and women
of quality disdain
to marry them.
They frequently resolve,
therefore,
to live bachelors;
and having
neither any families
of their own,
nor much
regard for those
of their relations,
whom
they are not always very fond
of acknowledging,
they desire only
to live in splendour
during their own time,
and are not unwilling
that their fortune
should end with themselves.
The number of rich people,
besides,
who are either averse
to marry,
or whose condition of life
renders it
either improper or inconvenient
for them
to do so,
is much greater
in France than in England.
To such people,
who have little
or no care for posterity,
nothing
can be more convenient than
to exchange their capital
for a revenue,
which is
to last just as long,
and no longer,
than
they wish it to do.
The ordinary expense
of the greater part
of modern governments,
in time of peace,
being equal,
or nearly equal,
to their ordinary revenue,
when war comes,
they
are both unwilling and unable
to increase their revenue
in proportion
to the increase
of their expense.
They
are unwilling,
for fear
of offending the people,
who,
by so great and so sudden
an increase of taxes,
would soon be disgusted
with the war;
and they are unable,
from not well knowing
what taxes
would be sufficient
to produce
the revenue wanted.
The facility
of borrowing
delivers them
from the embarrassment which
this fear
and inability
would otherwise occasion.
By means
of borrowing,
they
are enabled,
with a very moderate increase
of taxes,
to raise,
from year to year,
money sufficient for carrying
on the war;
and by the practice
of perpetual funding,
they
are enabled,
with the smallest possible
increase
of taxes,
to raise annually
the largest possible sum
of money.
In great empires,
the people
who live in the capital,
and in the provinces remote
from the scene of action,
feel,
many of them,
scarce any inconveniency
from the war,
but enjoy,
at their ease,
the amusement
of reading
in the newspapers the exploits
of their own fleets
and armies.
To them this amusement
compensates
the small difference
between the taxes which
they pay
on account of the war,
and those which they
had been accustomed
to pay in time of peace.
They
are commonly dissatisfied
with the return
of peace,
which puts an end
to their amusement,
and to a thousand visionary hopes
of conquest and
national glory,
from a longer continuance
of the war.
The return of peace,
indeed,
seldom
relieves them
from the greater part
of the taxes
imposed during the war.
These
are mortgaged for the interest
of the debt contracted,
in order to
carry it on.
If,
over
and above paying the interest
of this debt,
and defraying
the ordinary expense
of government,
the old revenue,
together with the new taxes,
produce some surplus revenue,
it may,
perhaps,
be converted
into a sinking fund for
paying off the debt.
But,
in the first place,
this sinking fund,
even
supposing
it should be applied
to no other purpose,
is generally altogether
inadequate
for paying,
in the course
of any period during which
it can reasonably be expected
that peace
should continue,
the whole debt contracted
during the war;
and,
in the second place,
this fund
is almost always applied
to other purposes.
The new taxes
were imposed
for the sole purpose
of paying the interest
of the money
borrowed upon them.
If they
produce more,
it is generally something
which was neither
intended nor expected,
and is,
therefore,
seldom very considerable.
Sinking funds
have generally arisen,
not so much from any surplus
of the taxes
which was over and above
what was necessary
for paying the interest
or annuity
originally charged upon them,
as
from a subsequent reduction
of that interest;
that of Holland in 1655,
and that
of the ecclesiastical state
in 1685,
were both formed
in this manner.
Hence the usual insufficiency
of such funds.
During the
most profound peace,
various events
occur,
which
require
an extraordinary expense;
and government
finds it
always more convenient
to defray this expense
by misapplying the sinking fund,
than by imposing
a new tax.
Every new tax
is immediately felt more
or less
by the people.
It occasions always
some murmur,
and meets
with some opposition.
The more taxes
may have been multiplied,
the higher
they may have been raised
upon every different subject
of taxation;
the more loudly the people
complain of every new tax,
the more difficult it
becomes, too,
either
to find out new subjects
of taxation,
or to raise
much higher
the taxes
already imposed upon the old.
A momentary suspension
of the payment of debt
is not immediately felt
by the people,
and occasions
neither murmur nor complaint.
To borrow of the sinking fund
is always
an obvious and easy expedient
for getting
out of the present difficulty.
The more
the public debts
may have been accumulated,
the more necessary it
may have become to study
to reduce them;
the more dangerous,
the more ruinous it
may be to misapply any part
of the sinking fund;
the less likely is
the public debt
to be reduced
to any considerable degree,
the more likely,
the more certainly,
is the sinking fund
to be misapplied
towards defraying all
the extraordinary expenses which
occur in time of peace.
When
a nation
is already overburdened
with taxes,
nothing
but the necessities
of a new war,
nothing
but either the animosity
of national vengeance,
or the anxiety
for national security,
can induce
the people
to submit,
with tolerable patience,
to a new tax.
Hence the usual misapplication
of the sinking fund.
In Great Britain,
from the time that we
had first recourse
to the ruinous expedient
of perpetual funding,
the reduction
of the public debt,
in time of peace,
has never borne
any proportion
to its accumulation
in time of war.
It was in the war
which began in 1668,
and was concluded
by the treaty
of Ryswick,
in 1697,
that the foundation
of the present
enormous debt
of Great Britain
was first laid.
On the 31st of December 1697,
the public debts
of Great Britain,
funded and unfunded,
amounted to £21,515,742:13:8½.
A great part of those debts
had been contracted
upon short anticipations,
and some part
upon annuities for lives;
so that,
before the 31st
of December 1701,
in less than four years,
there
had partly been
paid off;
and partly reverted
to the public,
the sum of £5,121,041:12:0¾d;
a greater reduction
of the public debt
than
has ever since been
brought about in so short
a period of time.
The remaining debt,
therefore,
amounted
only to £16,394,701:1:7¼d.
In the war
which began in 1702,
and which
was concluded
by the treaty of Utrecht,
the public debts
were still more accumulated.
On the 31st of December 1714,
they amounted
to £53,681,076:5:6½.
The subscription
into the South-sea fund,
of the short and long annuities,
increased
the capital
of the public debt;
so that,
on the 31st of December 1722,
it amounted
to £55,282,978:1:3 5/6.
The reduction of the debt
began in 1723,
and went on so slowly,
that,
on the 31st of December 1739,
during seventeen
years-of profound peace,
the whole sum
paid off
was no
more than £8,328,554:17:11 3/12,
the capital
of the public debt,
at that time,
amounting
to £46,954,623:3:4 7/12.
The Spanish war,
which began in 1739,
and the
French war which soon followed it,
occasioned
a further increase
of the debt,
which,
on the 31st of December 1748,
after the war
had been concluded
by the treaty
of Aix-la-Chapelle,
amounted
to £78,293,313:1:10¾.
The most profound peace,
of 17 years continuance,
had taken
no more than £8,328,354,
17:11¼ from it.
A war,
of less than
nine years continuance,
added £31,338,689:18:
6 1/6 to it.
(See James
Postlethwaite's History
of the Public Revenue.)
During the administration
of Mr. Pelham,
the interest
of the public debt
was reduced,
or at least measures
were taken
for reducing it,
from four
to three per cent.; the sinking fund
was increased,
and some part
of the public debt
was paid off.
In 1755,
before the breaking
out of the late war,
the funded debt
of Great Britain amounted
to £72,289,675.
On the 5th of January 1763,
at the conclusion
of the peace,
the funded debt amounted debt
to £122,603,336:8:2¼.
The unfunded debt
has been stated
at £13,927,589:2:2.
But the expense occasioned
by the war
did not end
with the conclusion
of the peace;
so that,
though on the 5th
of January 1764,
the funded debt
was increased
(partly by a new loan,
and partly by funding
a part of the unfunded debt)
to £129,586,789:10:1¾,
there
still remained
(according to
the very well informed author
of Considerations
on the Trade
and Finances of Great Britain)
an unfunded debt,
which was brought
to account in
that and the following year,
of £9,975,017:
12:2 15/44d.
In 1764,
therefore,
the public debt
of Great Britain,
funded and unfunded together,
amounted,
according to this author,
to £139,561,807:2:4.
The annuities for lives, too,
which had been granted
as
premiums to the subscribers
to the new
loans in 1757,
estimated
at fourteen years purchase,
were valued at £472,500;
and the annuities
for long terms of years,
granted as premiums likewise,
in 1761 and 1762,
estimated
at twenty-seven
and a-half years purchase,
were valued at £6,826,875.
During a peace of
about seven years continuance,
the prudent and truly patriotic
administration of Mr. Pelham
was not able
to pay
off an old debt
of six millions.
During a war
of nearly
the same continuance,
a new debt of
more than
seventy-five millions
was contracted.
On the 5th of January 1775,
the funded debt
of Great Britain amounted
to £124,996,086,
1:6¼d.
The unfunded,
exclusive
of a large civil-list debt,
to £4,150,236:3:11 7/8.
Both together,
to £129,146,322:5:6.
According to this account,
the whole debt paid off,
during eleven years
of profound peace,
amounted
only to £10,415,476:16:9 7/8.
Even this small reduction
of debt,
however,
has not been all made
from the savings
out of the ordinary revenue
of the state.
Several extraneous sums,
altogether independent of
that ordinary revenue,
have contributed towards it.
Amongst
these
we may reckon
an additional shilling
in the pound land tax,
for three years;
the two millions
received
from the East-India company,
as indemnification
for their territorial acquisitions;
and the one hundred
and ten thousand pounds received
from the bank
for the renewal
of their charter.
To these
must be added
several other sums,
which,
as they arose
out of the late war,
ought
perhaps to be considered
as deductions
from the expenses of it.
If we
add to this sum the balance
of the earl
of Chatham's
and Mr. Calcraft's accounts,
and other army savings
of the same kind,
together with
what
has been received
from the bank,
the East-India company,
and the additional shilling
in the pound land tax,
the whole
must be
a good deal
more than five millions.
The debt,
therefore,
which,
since the peace,
has been paid
out of the savings
from the ordinary revenue
of the state,
has not,
one year with another,
amounted
to half a million a-year.
The sinking fund has,
no doubt,
been considerably augmented
since the peace,
by the debt
which had been paid off,
by the reduction
of the redeemable four per cents
to three per cents,
and by the annuities
for lives which
have fallen in;
and, if peace
were to continue,
a million,
perhaps,
might now be annually spared out of it
towards the discharge
of the debt.
Another million,
accordingly,
was paid
in the course of last year;
but at the same time,
a large civil-list debt
was left unpaid,
and we
are now involved
in a new war,
which,
in its progress,
may prove as expensive as any
of our former wars.
(It has proved more expensive
than any one
of our former wars,
and has involved us
in an additional debt
of more than
one hundred millions.
During a profound peace
of eleven years,
little more than ten millions
of debt was paid;
during a war
of seven years,
more than one hundred millions
was contracted.)
The new debt
which
will probably be contracted
before the end
of the next campaign,
may,
perhaps,
be nearly
equal to all
the old debt
which has been paid off
from the savings
out of the ordinary revenue
of the state.
It would be altogether
chimerical,
therefore,
to expect
that the public debt
should ever be completely discharged,
by any savings
which are likely
to be made from that
ordinary revenue
as it stands at present.
The public funds
of the different indebted nations
of Europe,
particularly those of England,
have,
by one author,
been represented
as the accumulation
of a great capital,
superadded
to the other capital
of the country,
by means
of which its trade
is extended,
its manufactures
are multiplied,
and its lands
cultivated and improved,
much beyond
what they
could have been by means of
that other capital only.
He does not consider
that
the capital which the first creditors
of the public advanced
to government,
was, from the moment
in which
he advanced it,
a certain portion
of the annual produce,
turned away
from serving
in the function of a capital,
to serve in
that of a revenue;
from maintaining
productive labourers,
to maintain unproductive ones,
and to be spent
and wasted,
generally in the course
of the year,
without even the hope
of any future reproduction.
In return
for the capital which
they advanced,
they obtained,
indeed,
an annuity
of the public funds,
in most cases,
of more than equal value.
This annuity,
no doubt,
replaced to them
their capital,
and enabled them
to carry
on their trade and business
to the same,
or, perhaps,
to a greater extent
than before;
that is,
they
were enabled,
either
to borrow
of other people
a new capital,
upon the credit
of this annuity or,
by selling it,
to get from other people
a new capital of their own,
equal,
or superior,
to that which they
had advanced to government.
This new capital,
however,
which
they in this manner either
bought
or borrowed of other people,
must have existed
in the country
before,
and must have been employed,
as all capitals are,
in maintaining
productive labour.
When it
came into the hands of those
who had advanced their money
to government,
though it was,
in some respects,
a new capital to them,
it was not so
to the country,
but was only
a capital
withdrawn
from certain employments,
in order to
be turned towards others.
Though it replaced to them
what they
had advanced to government,
it did not replace it
to the country.
Had
they not advanced this capital
to government,
there
would have been
in the country two capitals,
two portions
of the annual produce,
instead of one,
employed
in maintaining
productive labour.
When,
for defraying
the expense of government,
a revenue
is raised within the year,
from the produce of free
or unmortgaged taxes,
a certain portion
of the revenue
of private people
is only turned away
from maintaining one species
of unproductive labour,
towards maintaining another.
Some part of what they pay
in those taxes,
might,
no doubt,
have been accumulated
into capital,
and consequently employed
in maintaining
productive labour;
but the greater part
would probably have been spent,
and consequently employed
in maintaining
unproductive labour.
The public expense,
however,
when defrayed in this manner,
no doubt hinders,
more or less,
the further accumulation
of new capital;
but it
does not necessarily occasion
the destruction
of any actually-existing capital.
When the public expense
is defrayed
by funding,
it is defrayed
by the annual destruction
of some capital
which had before existed
in the country;
by the perversion
of some portion
of the annual produce
which had before been
destined
for the maintenance
of productive labour,
towards
that of unproductive labour.
As in this case,
however,
the taxes
are lighter than they
would have been,
had a revenue sufficient
for defraying
the same expense
been raised within the year;
the private revenue
of individuals
is necessarily less burdened,
and consequently their ability
to save
and accumulate some part of
that revenue into capital,
is a good deal less
impaired.
If the method of funding
destroys more old capital,
it,
at the same time,
hinders less the accumulation
or acquisition
of new capital,
than that
of defraying
the public expense
by a revenue raised
within the year.
Under the system
of funding,
the frugality and industry
of private people
can more easily repair
the breaches which
the waste and extravagance
of government
may occasionally make
in the general capital
of the society.
It is only
during the continuance
of war,
however,
that
the system
of funding
has this advantage
over the other system.
Were the expense
of war
to be defrayed always
by a revenue raised
within the year,
the taxes from which
that
extraordinary revenue
was drawn
would last no longer
than the war.
The ability of private people
to accumulate,
though less during the war,
would have been greater
during the peace,
than under the system
of funding.
War
would not necessarily have occasioned
the destruction
of any old capitals,
and peace
would have occasioned
the accumulation
of many more new.
Wars
would,
in general,
be more speedily concluded,
and less wantonly undertaken.
The people
feeling,
during continuance of war,
the complete burden of it,
would soon grow weary of it;
and government,
in order to humour them,
would not be
under the necessity
of carrying
it on longer than it
was necessary to do so.
The foresight
of the heavy
and unavoidable burdens
of war
would hinder the people
from wantonly calling
for it when
there was no real or
solid interest to fight for.
The seasons
during which the ability
of private people
to accumulate
was somewhat impaired,
would occur more rarely,
and be of shorter
continuance.
Those,
on the contrary,
during which
that ability
was in the highest vigour
would be
of much longer duration than
they
can well be under the system
of funding.
When funding,
besides,
has made a certain progress,
the multiplication
of taxes which
it brings along with it,
sometimes
impairs as much
the ability of private people
to accumulate,
even in time of peace,
as the other system
would in time of war.
The peace revenue
of Great Britain amounts
at present
to more than
ten millions a-year.
If free and unmortgaged,
it might be sufficient,
with proper management,
and without contracting
a shilling
of new debt,
to carry
on the most vigorous war.
The private revenue
of the inhabitants
of Great Britain
is at
present as much incumbered
in time of peace,
their ability
to accumulate is as much
impaired,
as it
would have been in the time
of the most expensive war,
had the pernicious system
of funding never
been adopted.
In the payment
of the interest
of the public debt,
it has been said,
it is the right hand
which pays the left.
The money
does not go
out of the country.
It is only
a part
of the revenue of one
set of the inhabitants
which is transferred
to another;
and
the nation
is not
a farthing the poorer.
This apology
is founded altogether
in the sophistry
of the mercantile system;
and,
after
the long examination which
I have already bestowed upon
that system,
it may,
perhaps,
be unnecessary
to say anything further
about it.
It supposes,
besides,
that the whole public debt
is owing
to the inhabitants
of the country,
which happens not
to be true;
the Dutch,
as well as several
other foreign nations,
having
a very considerable share
in our public funds.
But though
the whole debt
were owing
to the inhabitants
of the country,
it would not,
upon that account,
be less pernicious.
Land and capital
stock are
the two original sources
of all revenue,
both private and public.
Capital
stock pays the wages
of productive labour,
whether employed
in agriculture,
manufactures,
or commerce.
The management of those
two original sources
of revenue
belongs
to two different sets
of people;
the proprietors of land,
and the owners or employers
of capital stock.
The proprietor of land
is interested,
for the sake
of his own revenue,
to keep his estate in
as good condition
as he can,
by building
and repairing
his tenants
houses,
by making
and maintaining
the necessary drains
and inclosures,
and all
those
other expensive improvements which
it properly belongs
to the landlord to make
and maintain.
But,
by different land taxes,
the revenue of the landlord
may be so much diminished,
and, by different duties
upon the necessaries
and conveniencies
of life,
that
diminished revenue
may be rendered
of so little real value,
that
he may find himself altogether
unable
to make
or maintain those
expensive improvements.
When the landlord,
however,
ceases
to do his part,
it is altogether impossible
that
the tenant should continue
to do his.
As the distress
of the landlord increases,
the agriculture
of the country
must necessarily decline.
When,
by different taxes
upon the necessaries
and conveniencies
of life,
the owners
and employers of capital stock find,
that whatever revenue
they derive from it,
will not,
in a particular country,
purchase
the same quantity
of those necessaries
and conveniencies which
an equal
revenue
would in almost any other,
they
will be disposed
to remove to some other.
And when,
in order to raise
those taxes,
all
or the greater part
of merchants and manufacturers,
that is, all
or the greater part
of the employers
of great capitals,
come to be continually exposed
to the mortifying
and vexatious visits
of the tax-gatherers,
this disposition
to remove
will soon be changed
into an actual removing.
The industry of the country
will necessarily fall
with the removal
of the capital
which supported it,
and the ruin of trade
and manufactures
will follow
the declension
of agriculture.
To transfer
from the owners of those
two great sources of revenue,
land,
and capital stock,
from the persons
immediately interested
in the good condition
of every particular portion
of land,
and in the good management
of every particular portion
of capital stock,
to another set of persons
(the creditors of the public,
who have
no such particular interest ),
the greater part
of the revenue arising
from either,
must,
in the long-run,
occasion both the neglect
of land,
and the waste or removal
of capital stock.
A creditor of the public has,
no doubt,
a general interest
in the prosperity
of the agriculture,
manufactures,
and commerce of the country;
and consequently in
the good condition
of its land,
and in the good management
of its capital stock.
Should there be any general
failure
or declension in any
of these things,
the produce
of the different taxes
might no longer
be sufficient
to pay him the annuity
or interest
which is due to him.
But a creditor of the public,
considered merely as such,
has no interest
in the good condition
of any particular portion
of land,
or in the good management
of any particular portion
of capital stock.
As a creditor of the public,
he has no knowledge
of any such particular portion.
He has no inspection
of it.
He can have no care
about it.
Its ruin
may in some cases
be unknown to him,
and cannot directly affect him.
The practice
of funding
has gradually enfeebled
every state
which has adopted it.
The Italian republics
seem
to have begun it.
Genoa and Venice,
the only two remaining
which can pretend
to an independent existence,
have both
been enfeebled by it.
Spain
seems
to have learned the practice
from the Italian republics,
and (its taxes
being probably less judicious
than theirs)
it has,
in proportion
to its natural strength,
been-still more
enfeebled.
The debts of Spain
are of very old standing.
It was deeply
in debt
before the end
of the sixteenth century,
about a hundred years
before England
owed a shilling.
France,
notwithstanding all
its natural resources,
languishes
under an oppressive load
of the same kind.
The republic
of the United Provinces
is as much
enfeebled
by its debts as either Genoa
or Venice.
Is it likely that,
in Great Britain alone,
a practice,
which has brought
either weakness
or dissolution
into every other country,
should prove altogether innocent?
The system of taxation
established
in those different countries,
it may be said,
is inferior to
that of England.
I believe it
is so.
But it
ought to be remembered,
that
when the wisest government
has exhausted all
the proper subjects
of taxation,
it must,
in cases of urgent necessity,
have recourse
to improper ones.
The wise republic
of Holland has,
upon some occasions,
been obliged
to have recourse to taxes
as inconvenient
as the greater part
of those
of Spain.
Another war,
begun
before
any considerable liberation
of the public revenue
had been brought about,
and growing in its progress
as expensive as the last war,
may,
from irresistible necessity,
render the British system of
taxation as oppressive as
that of Holland,
or even as that of Spain.
To the honour
of our present system
of taxation,
indeed,
it has hitherto given
so little embarrassment
to industry,
that,
during the course even
of the most expensive wars,
the frugality and good conduct
of individuals
seem to have been able,
by saving and accumulation,
to repair all
the breaches which the waste
and extravagance
of government
had made
in the general capital
of the society.
At the conclusion
of the late war,
the most expensive
that Great Britain
ever waged,
her agriculture
was as flourishing,
her manufacturers
as numerous and
as fully employed,
and her commerce as extensive,
as they
had ever been before.
The capital,
therefore,
which supported all those
different branches
of industry,
must have been equal to
what it
had ever been before.
Since the peace,
agriculture
has been
still further improved;
the rents of houses
have risen
in every town and village
of the country,
a proof
of the increasing wealth
and revenue
of the people;
and the annual amount
of the greater part
of the old taxes,
of the principal branches
of the
excise and customs,
in particular,
has been continually increasing,
an equally clear proof
of an increasing consumption,
and consequently of
an increasing produce,
which could alone support
that consumption.
Great Britain
seems to support with ease,
a burden which,
half a century ago,
nobody
believed her capable
of supporting,
Let us not,
however,
upon this account,
rashly
conclude that she is capable
of supporting any burden;
nor even be too confident
that she could support,
without great distress,
a burden
a little greater than what
has already been
laid upon her.
When national debts
have once been
accumulated
to a certain degree,
there
is scarce,
I believe,
a single instance
of their having been fairly
and completely paid.
The liberation
of the public revenue,
if it
has ever been
brought about at all,
has always been
brought about by a bankruptcy;
sometimes by an avowed one,
though
frequently by a pretended payment.
The raising
of the denomination
of the coin
has been
the most usual expedient by which
a real public bankruptcy
has been disguised
under the appearance
of a pretended payment.
If a sixpence,
for example,
should,
either
by act
of parliament
or royal proclamation,
be raised to the denomination
of a shilling,
and twenty sixpences to
that of a pound sterling;
the person who,
under the old denomination,
had borrowed twenty shillings,
or near four ounces
of silver,
would,
under the new,
pay with twenty sixpences,
or with something
less than two ounces.
A national debt of
about a hundred
and twenty-eight millions,
near the capital
of the
funded and unfunded debt
of Great Britain,
might,
in this manner,
be paid with
about sixty-four millions
of our present money.
It would,
indeed,
be a pretended payment only,
and the creditors
of the public
would really be defrauded
of ten shillings
in the pound of
what was due to them.
The calamity, too,
would extend much further than
to the creditors
of the public,
and those
of every private person
would suffer
a proportionable loss;
and this
without any advantage,
but in most cases
with a great additional loss,
to the creditors
of the public.
If the creditors
of the public,
indeed,
were generally much
in debt to other people,
they might in some measure
compensate their loss
by paying
their creditors
in the same coin
in which the public
had paid them.
But in most countries,
the creditors
of the public are,
the greater part of them,
wealthy people,
who stand more in
the relation
of creditors than in
that of debtors,
towards the rest
of their fellow citizens.
A pretended payment
of this kind,
therefore,
instead of alleviating,
aggravates,
in most cases,
the loss
of the creditors
of the public;
and,
without any advantage
to the public,
extends the calamity
to a great number
of other innocent people.
It occasions
a general
and most pernicious subversion
of the fortunes
of private people;
enriching,
in most cases,
the idle and profuse debtor,
at the expense
of the industrious
and frugal creditor;
and transporting
a great part
of the national capital
from the hands
which were likely to increase
and improve it,
to those who are likely
to dissipate and destroy it.
When it
becomes necessary for a state
to declare itself bankrupt,
in the same manner
as when it
becomes necessary
for an individual
to do so,
a fair,
open,
and avowed bankruptcy,
is always
the measure
which is
both least dishonourable
to the debtor,
and least hurtful
to the creditor.
The honour
of a state
is surely very poorly provided for,
when,
in order to cover
the disgrace
of a real bankruptcy,
it has recourse
to a juggling trick
of this kind,
so easily
seen through,
and at the same time so extremely
pernicious.
Almost all states,
however,
ancient as well as modern,
when reduced
to this necessity,
have,
upon some occasions,
played
this very juggling trick.
The Romans,
at the end
of the first Punic war,
reduced the As,
the coin or denomination
by which
they computed the value
of all their other coins,
from containing twelve ounces
of copper,
to contain only two ounces;
that is,
they raised two ounces
of copper
to a denomination
which
had always before expressed
the value
of twelve ounces.
The republic was,
in this manner,
enabled
to pay
the great debts which it
had contracted
with the sixth part of
what it really owed.
So sudden and so great
a bankruptcy,
we should in the present
times be apt
to imagine,
must have occasioned
a very violent popular clamour.
It does not appear
to have occasioned any.
The law
which enacted it was,
like all other laws
relating to the coin,
introduced
and carried
through the assembly of the people
by a tribune,
and was probably
a very popular law.
In Rome,
as in all
other ancient republics,
the poor people
were constantly
in debt
to the rich and the great,
who,
in order to secure
their votes
at the annual elections,
used to lend them money
at exorbitant interest,
which,
being never paid,
soon
accumulated into a sum
too great either
for the debtor
to pay,
or for any body else
to pay for him.
The debtor,
for fear
of a very severe execution,
was obliged,
without any further gratuity,
to vote
for the candidate
whom
the creditor recommended.
In spite of all
the laws
against bribery and corruption,
the bounty of the candidates,
together
with the occasional distributions
of coin
which were ordered
by the senate,
were the principal funds
from which,
during the latter times
of the Roman republic,
the poorer citizens
derived their subsistence.
To deliver themselves
from this subjection
to their creditors,
the poorer citizens
were continually calling out,
either
for an entire abolition
of debts,
or for
what they called new tables;
that is,
for a law
which should entitle them
to a complete acquittance,
upon paying only
a certain proportion
of their accumulated debts.
The law
which reduced the coin
of all denominations
to a sixth part
of its former value,
as it enabled them
to pay
their debts
with a sixth part of
what they
really owed,
was equivalent
to the most advantageous
new tables.
In order to
satisfy the people,
the rich and the great were,
upon several
different occasions,
obliged
to consent to laws,
both for abolishing debts,
and for introducing new tables;
and they
probably were induced
to consent to this law,
partly for the same reason,
and partly that,
by liberating the public revenue,
they
might restore vigour to
that government,
of which they
themselves
had the principal direction.
An operation of this kind
would at
once reduce a debt
of £128,000,000
to £21,333,333:6:8.
In the course
of the second Punic war,
the As
was still further reduced,
first,
from two ounces
of copper to one ounce,
and afterwards from one ounce
to half an ounce;
that is,
to the twenty-fourth part
of its original value.
By combining
the three Roman operations
into one,
a debt
of a hundred
and twenty-eight millions
of our present money,
might in this manner
be reduced all at
once to a debt
of £5,333,333:6:8.
Even the enormous debt
of Great Britain
might in this manner
soon be paid.
By means of such expedients,
the coin of,
I believe,
all nations,
has been gradually reduced more
and more below
its original value,
and the same nominal sum
has been gradually brought
to contain
a smaller
and a smaller quantity
of silver.
Nations
have sometimes,
for the same purpose,
adulterated
the standard of their coin;
that is,
have mixed a greater quantity
of alloy in it.
If in the pound weight
of our silver coin,
for example,
instead of
eighteen penny-weight,
according to
the present standard,
there
were mixed eight ounces
of alloy;
a pound sterling,
or twenty shillings
of such coin,
would be
worth
little more than six shillings
and eightpence
of our present money.
The quantity of silver
contained
in six shillings and eightpence
of our present money,
would thus
be raised very nearly
to the denomination
of a pound sterling.
The adulteration
of the standard
has exactly the same effect
with what
the French call an augmentation,
or a direct raising
of the denomination
of the coin.
An augmentation,
or a direct raising
of the denomination
of the coin,
always is,
and from its nature
must be,
an open and avowed operation.
By means of it,
pieces
of a smaller weight and bulk
are called by the same name,
which had before been
given
to pieces
of a
greater weight and bulk.
The adulteration
of the standard,
on the contrary,
has generally been
a concealed operation.
By means of it,
pieces
are issued from the mint,
of the same denomination,
and,
as nearly
as could be contrived,
of the same weight,
bulk,
and appearance,
with pieces
which had been current
before of much greater value.
When king John of France,
(See Du Cange Glossary,
voce Moneta;
the Benedictine Edition.)
in order to pay his debts,
adulterated his coin,
all the officers of his mint
were sworn to secrecy.
Both operations
are unjust.
But a simple augmentation
is an injustice
of open violence;
whereas
an adulteration
is an injustice
of treacherous fraud.
This latter operation,
therefore,
as soon
as it has been discovered,
and it
could never be concealed
very long,
has always excited
much greater indignation
than the former.
The coin,
after
any considerable augmentation,
has very seldom
been brought back
to its former weight;
but after
the greatest adulterations,
it has almost always been
brought back
to its former fineness.
It has scarce ever happened,
that
the fury and indignation
of the people
could otherwise be appeased.
In the end
of the reign
of Henry VIII,
and in the beginning of
that of Edward VI,
the English coin
was not only raised
in its denomination,
but adulterated
in its standard.
The like frauds
were practised
in Scotland during the minority
of James VI.
They have occasionally been
practised
in most other countries.
That the public revenue
of Great Britain
can never be completely liberated,
or even
that any considerable progress
can ever be made towards
that liberation,
while the surplus of
that revenue,
or what
is over and above defraying
the annual expense
of the peace establishment,
is so very small,
it seems altogether in vain
to expect.
That liberation,
it is evident,
can never be brought about,
without
either some very considerable
augmentation
of the public revenue,
or
some equally considerable reduction
of the public expense.
A more equal land tax,
a more equal tax upon the
rent of houses,
and such alterations
in the present system
of customs
and excise as those which
have been mentioned in the
foregoing chapter,
might,
perhaps,
without increasing the burden
of the greater part
of the people,
but only distributing
the weight
of it more equally
upon the whole,
produce
a considerable augmentation
of revenue.
The most sanguine projector,
however,
could scarce
flatter himself,
that
any augmentation of this kind
would be
such as
could give
any reasonable hopes,
either
of liberating
the public revenue altogether,
or even of making such
progress towards that liberation
in time of peace,
as either
to prevent
or
to compensate the further
accumulation
of the public debt
in the next war.
By extending the British system
of taxation to all
the different provinces
of the empire,
inhabited
by people either
of British
or European extraction,
a much greater augmentation
of revenue might be expected.
This,
however,
could scarce,
perhaps,
be done,
consistently with the principles
of the British constitution,
without admitting
into the British parliament,
or, if you will,
into the states-general
of the British empire,
a fair
and equal representation
of all those
different provinces;
that of each province
bearing the same proportion
to the produce
of its taxes,
as the representation
of Great Britain
might bear
to the produce
of the taxes
levied upon Great Britain.
The private interest
of many powerful individuals,
the confirmed prejudices
of great bodies
of people,
seem,
indeed,
at present,
to oppose
to so great a change,
such obstacles
as it
may be very difficult,
perhaps altogether impossible,
to surmount.
Without,
however,
pretending
to determine
whether such a union
be practicable
or impracticable,
it may not,
perhaps,
be improper,
in a speculative work
of this kind,
to consider how
far the British system
of taxation
might be applicable to all
the different provinces
of the empire;
what revenue
might be expected from it,
if so applied;
and in what manner
a general union of this kind
might be likely
to affect the happiness and
prosperity
of the differrent provinces
comprehended within it.
Such a speculation,
can,
at worst,
be regarded
but as a new Utopia,
less
amusing,
certainly,
but
no more useless and chimerical
than the old one.
The land-tax,
the stamp duties,
and the different duties
of customs
and excise,
constitute
the four principal branches
of the British taxes.
Ireland
is certainly as able,
and our American
and West India plantations
more able,
to pay a land tax,
than Great Britain.
Where the landlord
is subject neither
to tythe nor poor's rate,
he must certainly be
more able
to pay such a tax,
than
where he
is subject to both
those other burdens.
The tythe,
where there is no modus,
and where it
is levied in kind,
diminishes more
what
would otherwise be
the rent of the landlord,
than a land tax which
really amounted
to five shillings
in the pound.
Such
a tythe will be found,
in most cases,
to amount
to more than a fourth part
of the real rent
of the land,
or of what remains
after replacing completely
the capital of the farmer,
together
with his reasonable profit.
If all moduses
and all impropriations
were taken away,
the complete church tythe
of Great Britain
and Ireland
could not well be estimated
at less than six
or seven millions.
If there was no tythe either
in Great Britain or Ireland,
the landlords
could afford
to pay six
or
seven millions additional land tax,
without being more
burdened
than a very great part
of them
are at present.
America
pays no tythe,
and could,
therefore,
very well
afford to pay a land tax.
The lands
in America
and the West Indies,
indeed,
are, in general,
not tenanted nor leased out
to farmers.
They
could not,
therefore,
be assessed
according to any rent roll.
But neither
were the lands
of Great Britain,
in the 4th
of William and Mary,
assessed
according to any rent roll,
but according to
a very loose
and inaccurate estimation.
The lands in America
might be assessed either
in the same manner,
or according to
an equitable valuation,
in consequence
of an accurate survey,
like that which
was lately made
in the Milanese,
and in the dominions
of Austria,
Prussia,
and Sardinia.
Stamp duties,
it is evident,
might be levied
without any variation,
in all countries
where the forms
of law process,
and
the deeds by which property,
both real and personal,
is transferred,
are the same,
or nearly the same.
The extension
of the custom-house laws
of Great Britain
to Ireland
and the plantations,
provided it was accompanied,
as in justice
it ought to be,
with an extension
of the freedom of trade,
would be
in the
highest degree advantageous
to both.
All
the invidious restraints which
at present
oppress the trade of Ireland,
the distinction between the
enumerated and
non-enumerated commodities
of America,
would be entirely at an end.
The countries
north of Cape Finisterre
would be as open
to every part
of the produce
of America,
as those south of
that cape
are to some parts
of that produce
at present.
The trade
between all
the different parts
of the British empire would,
in consequence of this uniformity
in the custom-house laws,
be as free
as the coasting trade
of Great Britain
is at present.
The British empire
would thus
afford,
within itself,
an immense internal market
for every part
of the produce
of all
its different provinces.
So great an extension
of market
would soon compensate,
both to Ireland
and the plantations,
all that they
could suffer
from the increase
of the duties of customs.
The excise
is the
only part
of the British system
of taxation,
which would require
to be varied in any respect,
according
as it
was applied
to the different provinces
of the empire.
It might be applied
to Ireland without any variation;
the produce and consumption of
that kingdom
being exactly
of tho same nature with those
of Great Britain.
In its application
to America
and the West Indies,
of which the produce
and consumption
are so very different
from those
of Great Britain,
some modification
might be necessary,
in the same manner
as in its application
to the cyder
and beer counties
of England.
A fermented liquor,
for example,
which is called beer,
but which,
as it
is made of molasses,
bears very little resemblance
to our beer,
makes a considerable part
of the common drink
of the people
in America.
This liquor,
as it
can be kept only
for a few days,
cannot,
like our beer,
be prepared
and stored
up for sale
in great breweries;
but every private family
must brew it
for their own use,
in the same manner
as they cook their victuals.
But
to subject every private family
to the odious visits
and examination
of the tax-gatherers,
in the same manner as we
subject
the keepers of ale-houses and
the brewers for public sale,
would be altogether inconsistent
with liberty.
If,
for the sake of equality,
it was thought necessary
to lay a tax
upon this liquor,
it
might be taxed by taxing
the material
of which it is made,
either
at the place of manufacture,
or, if the circumstances
of the trade rendered
such an excise improper,
by laying
a duty
upon its importation
into the colony
in which it
was to be consumed.
Besides the duty
of one penny a-gallon
imposed
by the British parliament
upon the importation
of molasses into America,
there
is a provincial tax
of this kind
upon their importation
into Massachusetts Bay,
in ships
belonging to any other colony,
of eight-pence the hogshead;
and another
upon their importation
from the northern colonies
into South Carolina,
of five-pence the gallon.
Or,
if neither of these methods
was found convenient,
each family
might compound
for its consumption
of this liquor,
either
according to the number
of persons
of which it consisted,
in the same
manner as private families compound
for the malt tax
in England;
or according to
the different ages
and sexes
of those persons,
in the same
manner as several
different taxes
are levied in Holland;
or, nearly as Sir
Matthew Decker proposes,
that all taxes
upon consumable
commodities
should be levied in England.
This mode of taxation,
it has already been observed,
when applied to objects
of a speedy consumption,
is not
a very convenient one.
It might be adopted,
however,
in cases where no better
could be done.
Sugar,
rum,
and tobacco,
are commodities
which are nowhere necessaries
of life,
which are become
objects
of almost universal consumption,
and which are,
therefore,
extremely
proper subjects of taxation.
If a union with the colonies
were to take place,
those commodities
might be taxed,
either
before they
go out of the hands
of the manufacturer
or grower;
or,
if this
mode of taxation
did not suit the circumstances
of those persons,
they
might be deposited
in public warehouses,
both at the place
of manufacture,
and at all
the different ports
of the empire,
to which they
might afterwards be transported,
to remain there,
under the joint custody
of the owner
and the revenue officer,
till
such time as
they should be delivered out,
either to the consumer,
to the merchant-retailer
for home consumption,
or to the merchant-exporter;
the tax
not to be advanced
till such delivery.
When delivered out
for exportation,
to go duty-free,
upon proper security
being given,
that they
should really be exported
out of the empire.
These are,
perhaps,
the principal commodities,
with
regard
to which the union
with the colonies
might require
some considerable change
in the present system
of British taxation.
What might be the amount
of the revenue which this
system
of taxation,
extended to all
the different provinces
of the empire,
might produce,
it must,
no doubt,
be altogether impossible to
ascertain
with tolerable exactness.
By means of this system,
there
is annually levied
in Great Britain,
upon less than eight millions
of people,
more than ten millions
of revenue.
Ireland
contains
more than two millions
of people,
and,
according to the accounts
laid before the congress,
the twelve associated provinces
of America
contain more than three.
Those accounts,
however,
may have been exaggerated,
in order,
perhaps,
either
to encourage their own people,
or to intimidate those
of this country;
and we shall suppose,
therefore,
that our North American
and West Indian colonies,
taken together,
contain
no more than three millions;
or that
the whole British empire,
in Europe and America,
contains no
more than thirteen millions
of inhabitants.
If,
upon less than eight millions
of inhabitants,
this
system of taxation
raises a revenue
of more than ten millions sterling;
it ought,
upon thirteen millions
of inhabitants,
to raise a revenue
of more than
sixteen millions two hundred
and
fifty thousand pounds sterling.
From this revenue,
supposing that this system
could produce it,
must be deducted
the revenue
usually raised
in Ireland and
the plantations,
for defraying
the expense
of the respective civil
governments.
The expense
of the civil and
military establishment
of Ireland,
together
with the interest
of the public debt,
amounts,
at a medium
of the two years
which ended March 1775,
to something
less than seven hundred
and fifty thousand pounds
a year.
By a very exact account
of the revenue
of the principal colonies
of America
and the West Indies,
it amounted,
before the commencement
of the present disturbances,
to a hundred
and
forty-one thousand eight
hundred pounds.
In this account,
however,
the revenue of Maryland,
of North Carolina,
and of all
our late acquisitions,
both upon the continent,
and in the islands,
is omitted;
which may,
perhaps,
make a difference
of thirty or forty thousand pounds.
For the sake of even numbers,
therefore,
let us
suppose
that the revenue
necessary for supporting
the civil government
of Ireland and
the plantations may amount
to a million.
There
would remain,
consequently,
a revenue
of fifteen millions two hundred
and fifty thousand pounds,
to be applied
towards defraying the general
expense
of the empire,
and towards paying
the public debt.
But if,
from the present revenue
of Great Britain,
a million
could,
in peaceable times,
be spared
towards the payment of
that debt,
six millions two hundred
and fifty thousand pounds
could very well
be spared from this
improved revenue.
This great sinking fund, too,
might be augmented
every year
by the interest
of the debt
which had been discharged
the year before;
and might,
in this manner,
increase so very rapidly,
as to be sufficient
in a few years
to discharge the whole debt,
and thus
to restore completely
the at-present debilitated
and languishing vigour
of the empire.
In the meantime,
the people
might be relieved
from some of the most burdensome
taxes;
from those
which are imposed either
upon the necessaries
of life,
or upon the materials
of manufacture.
The labouring poor
would thus
be enabled to live better,
to work cheaper,
and to send their goods
cheaper
to market.
The cheapness of their goods
would increase the demand
for them,
and consequently for the labour
of those
who produced them.
This increase
in the demand for labour
would
both increase the numbers,
and improve the circumstances
of the labouring poor.
Their consumption
would increase,
and, together with it,
the revenue
arising from all
those articles
of their consumption upon which
the taxes
might be allowed
to remain.
The revenue
arising from this system
of taxation,
however,
might not immediately increase
in proportion to the number
of people
who were subjected to it.
Great indulgence
would for some time
be
due to those provinces
of the empire
which were thus subjected
to burdens
to which they
had not before been
accustomed;
and even
when the same taxes
came to be levied everywhere
as exactly as possible,
they
would not everywhere produce
a revenue
proportioned
to the numbers
of the people.
In a poor country,
the consumption
of the
principal commodities
subject to
the duties
of customs
and excise,
is very small;
and in a thinly inhabited country,
the opportunities
of smuggling
are very great.
The consumption of malt
liquors
among the inferior ranks
of people in Scotland
is very small;
and the excise upon malt,
beer,
and ale,
produces less there than
in England,
in proportion
to the numbers
of the people
and the rate of the duties,
which upon malt
is different,
on account
of a supposed difference
of quality.
In
these
particular branches of the
excise,
there
is not,
I apprehend,
much more
smuggling
in the one country than
in the other.
The duties
upon the distillery,
and the greater part
of the duties of customs,
in proportion
to the numbers
of people
in the respective countries,
produce less in Scotland
than in England,
not only on account
of the smaller consumption
of the taxed commodities,
but
of the much greater facility
of smuggling.
In Ireland,
the inferior ranks of people
are still poorer than
in Scotland,
and many
parts of the country
are almost as thinly inhabited.
In Ireland,
therefore,
the consumption
of the taxed commodities
might,
in proportion
to the number
of the people,
be still less than
in Scotland,
and the facility
of smuggling nearly the same.
In America and the West Indies,
the white people,
even of the lowest rank,
are in much better circumstances
than those
of the same rank in England;
and their consumption of all
the luxuries
in which they
usually indulge themselves,
is probably much greater.
The blacks,
indeed,
who make the greater part
of the inhabitants,
both of the southern colonies
upon the continent
and of the West India islands,
as they
are in a state of slavery,
are, no doubt,
in a worse condition
than the poorest people either
in Scotland or Ireland.
We must not,
however,
upon that account,
imagine that they
are worse fed,
or that their consumption
of articles
which might be subjected
to moderate duties,
is less than
that even of the lower
ranks of people in England.
In order that
they may work well,
it is the interest
of their master
that
they should be fed well,
and kept in good heart,
in the same manner as it
is his interest that
his working cattle
should be so.
The blacks,
accordingly,
have almost everywhere
their allowance of rum,
and of molasses or spruce-beer,
in the same manner
as the white servants;
and this allowance
would not probably be withdrawn,
though those articles
should be subjected
to moderate duties.
The consumption
of the taxed commodities,
therefore,
in proportion
to the number of inhabitants,
would probably be
as great
in America
and the West Indies
as in any part
of the British empire.
The opportunities
of smuggling,
indeed,
would be much greater;
America,
in proportion to the extent
of the country,
being
much more thinly inhabited
than either Scotland
or Ireland.
If the revenue,
however,
which is at present raised
by the different duties
upon malt and malt liquors,
were to be levied
by a single duty upon malt,
the opportunity of smuggling
in the most important branch
of the
excise
would
be almost entirely taken away;
and if the duties of customs,
instead of being imposed
upon almost
all the different articles
of importation,
were confined
to a few
of the most general use
and consumption,
and if the levying
of those duties
were subjected to the
excise laws,
the opportunity
of smuggling,
though not
so entirely taken away,
would be very much diminished.
In consequence
of those two apparently
very simple
and easy alterations,
the duties of customs
and excise
might probably produce
a revenue as great,
in proportion
to the consumption
of the most thinly
inhabited province,
as they do at present,
in proportion to
that of the most populous.
The Americans,
it has been said,
indeed,
have no gold or silver money,
the interior commerce
of the country
being carried on
by a paper currency;
and the gold and silver,
which
occasionally come among them,
being all sent
to Great Britain,
in return
for the commodities which
they receive from us.
But without gold and silver,
it is added,
there
is no possibility
of paying taxes.
We already get
all the gold
and silver which
they have.
How is it possible
to draw from them what they
have not?
The present scarcity
of gold and silver money
in America,
is not the effect
of the poverty of
that country,
or of the inability
of the people
there
to purchase those metals.
In a country
where the wages of labour
are so much higher,
and the price
of provisions so much lower
than in England,
the greater part
of the people
must surely have wherewithal
to purchase
a greater quantity,
if it
were either necessary
or convenient
for them
to do so.
The scarcity of those metals,
therefore,
must be
the effect of choice,
and not of necessity.
It is
for transacting either domestic
or foreign business,
that gold or silver money
is either necessary
or convenient.
The domestic business
of every country,
it has been shewn
in the second book
of this Inquiry,
may,
at least in peaceable times,
be transacted by means
of a paper currency,
with nearly the same degree
of conveniency
as by gold and silver money.
It is convenient
for the Americans,
who could always employ
with profit,
in the improvement
of their lands,
a greater stock than they
can easily get,
to save
as much as
possible the expense
of so costly an instrument of
commerce as gold and silver;
and rather
to employ
that part
of their surplus produce
which would be necessary
for purchasing those metals,
in purchasing
the instruments of trade,
the materials
of clothing,
several parts
of household furniture,
and the iron work necessary
for building
and extending
their settlements
and plantations;
in purchasing not dead stock,
but
active and productive stock.
The colony
governments find it
for their interest
to supply
the people with such
a quantity of paper money as
is fully sufficient,
and generally
more than sufficient,
for transacting
their domestic business.
Some of those governments,
that of Pennsylvania,
particularly,
derive a revenue
from lending
this paper money
to their subjects,
at an interest of so much
per cent.
Others,
like that
of Massachusetts Bay,
advance,
upon extraordinary emergencies,
a paper money of this kind
for defraying the public expense;
and afterwards,
when it
suits the conveniency
of the colony,
redeem
it at the depreciated value
to which
it gradually falls.
In 1747,
(See Hutchinson's History
of Massachusetts Bay vol.
ii. page 436 et seq.)
that colony
paid in this manner
the greater part
of its public debts,
with the tenth part
of the money
for which its bills
had been granted.
It suits the conveniency
of the planters,
to save the expense
of employing gold
and silver money
in their domestic transactions;
and it
suits the conveniency
of the colony governments,
to supply them with a medium,
which,
though attended
with some very
considerable disadvantages,
enables them
to save that expense.
The redundancy of paper money
necessarily banishes gold
and silver
from the domestic transactions
of the colonies,
for the same reason
that it
has banished those metals
from the greater part
of the domestic transactions
in Scotland;
and in both countries,
it is not the poverty,
but the enterprizing
and projecting spirit
of the people,
their desire of employing all
the stock which
they can get,
as active
and productive stock,
which has occasioned
this redundancy
of paper money.
In the exterior commerce which
the different colonies
carry on with Great Britain,
gold and silver
are more or less employed,
exactly in proportion
as they
are more or less necessary.
Where those metals
are not necessary,
they seldom
appear.
Where they are necessary,
they are generally found.
In the commerce
between Great Britain
and the tobacco colonies,
the British goods
are generally advanced
to the colonists
at a pretty long credit,
and are afterwards paid for
in tobacco,
rated at a certain price.
It is more convenient
for the colonists
to pay
in tobacco than
in gold and silver.
It would be more convenient
for any merchant
to pay for the goods which
his correspondents
had sold to him,
in some other sort
of goods which
he might happen to deal in,
than in money.
Such
a merchant
would have no occasion
to keep any part
of his stock
by him unemployed,
and in ready money,
for answering
occasional demands.
He could have,
at all times,
a larger quantity
of goods
in his shop or warehouse,
and he
could deal
to a greater extent.
But it seldom
happens
to be convenient
for all the correspondents
of a merchant
to receive payment
for the goods which
they sell to him,
in goods
of some other kind which
he happens to deal in.
The British merchants
who trade
to Virginia and Maryland,
happen
to be a particular set
of correspondents,
to whom it
is more convenient
to receive payment
for the goods which
they sell
to those colonies in tobacco,
than in gold and silver.
They expect
to make a profit
by the sale
of the tobacco;
they
could make none by
that of the gold and silver.
Gold and silver,
therefore,
very seldom
appear
in the commerce
between Great Britain
and the tobacco colonies.
Maryland and Virginia
have as little occasion
for those metals
in their foreign,
as
in their domestic commerce.
They
are said,
accordingly,
to have less gold
and silver money
than any other colonies
in America.
They
are reckoned,
however,
as thriving,
and consequently
as rich,
as any of their neighbours.
In the northern colonies,
Pennsylvania,
New York,
New Jersey,
the four governments
of New England,.etc.
the value
of their own produce which
they export
to Great Britain
is not equal to
that of the manufactures which
they import
for their own use,
and for
that of some of the other colonies,
to which
they are the carriers.
A balance,
therefore,
must be paid
to the mother-country
in gold and silver
and this balance
they generally find.
In the sugar colonies,
the value
of the produce annually exported
to Great Britain
is much greater than
that of all the goods
imported from thence.
If
the sugar and rum annually sent
to the mother-country
were paid for
in those colonies,
Great Britain
would be obliged to send out,
every year,
a very large balance
in money;
and the trade
to the West Indies would,
by a certain species
of politicians,
be considered
as extremely disadvantageous.
But it so happens,
that many
of the principal proprietors
of the sugar
plantations reside
in Great Britain.
Their rents
are remitted to them
in sugar and rum,
the produce of their estates.
The sugar
and rum which
the West India merchants purchase
in those colonies
upon their own account,
are not equal
in value
to the goods which
they annually sell there.
A balance,
therefore,
must necessarily be paid
to them
in gold and silver,
and this balance, too,
is generally found.
The difficulty
and irregularity
of payment
from the different colonies
to Great Britain,
have not been
at all
in proportion to the greatness
or smallness of the balances
which were respectively due
from them.
Payments have,
in general,
been more regular
from the northern than
from the tobacco colonies,
though
the former
have generally paid
a pretty large balance
in money,
while
the latter
have either paid no balance,
or a much smaller one.
The difficulty
of getting payment
from our
different sugar colonies
has been greater
or less in proportion,
not so much to the extent
of the balances respectively due
from them,
as to the quantity
of uncultivated land which
they contained;
that is,
to the greater
or smaller temptation which
the planters
have been under
of over-trading,
or of undertaking
the settlement
and plantation
of greater quantities
of waste land
than
suited the extent
of their capitals.
The returns
from the great island
of Jamaica,
where there is still
much uncultivated land,
have,
upon this account,
been,
in general,
more irregular and uncertain
than those
from the smaller islands
of Barbadoes,
Antigua,
and St. Christopher's,
which have,
for these many years,
been completely cultivated,
and have,
upon that account,
afforded less field
for the speculations
of the planter.
The new acquisitions
of Grenada,
Tobago,
St. Vincent's,
and Dominica,
have opened
a new field
for speculations of this kind;
and the returns
front those islands
have of late
been as irregular
and uncertain as those
from the great island
of Jamaica.
It is not,
therefore,
the poverty
of the
colonies which occasions,
in the greater part
of them,
the present scarcity
of gold and silver money.
Their great demand for active
and productive stock
makes it convenient for them
to have as little dead stock
as possible,
and disposes them,
upon that account,
to content themselves
with a cheaper,
though
less commodious instrument
of commerce,
than gold and silver.
They are thereby enabled
to convert the value of
that gold
and silver
into the instruments of trade,
into the materials
of clothing,
into household furniture,
and into the iron work
necessary
for building
and extending
their settlements
and plantations.
In those branches of business
which cannot be transacted
without gold and silver money,
it appears,
that they
can always find
the necessary quantity
of those metals;
and if they
frequently do not find it,
their failure
is generally the effect,
not of their necessary poverty,
but
of their unnecessary
and excessive enterprise.
It is not because they
are poor
that
their payments
are irregular and uncertain,
but because they
are too eager
to become excessively rich.
Though all that part
of the produce
of the colony taxes,
which was over and above
what was necessary
for defraying the expense
of their own civil
and military establishments,
were to be remitted
to Great Britain
in gold and silver,
the colonies
have abundantly
wherewithal
to purchase
the requisite quantity
of those metals.
They would in this case
be obliged,
indeed,
to exchange a part
of their surplus produce,
with which they
now purchase
active and productive stock,
for dead stock.
In transacting
their domestic business,
they
would be obliged
to employ a costly,
instead of a cheap instrument
of commerce;
and the expense
of purchasing
this costly instrument
might damp
somewhat the vivacity
and ardour
of their excessive enterprise
in the improvement
of land.
It might not,
however,
be necessary
to remit any part
of the American revenue
in gold and silver.
It might be remitted in bills
drawn upon,
and accepted by,
particular merchants or companies
in Great Britain,
to whom a part
of the surplus produce
of America
had been consigned,
who would pay
into the treasury
the American revenue in money,
after having themselves received
the value
of it
in goods;
and
the whole business
might frequently be transacted
without exporting
a single ounce
of gold or silver
from America.
It is not contrary
to justice,
that both Ireland
and America
should contribute
towards the discharge
of the public debt
of Great Britain.
That debt
has been contracted
in support
of the government
established by the Revolution;
a government
to which the protestants
of Ireland owe,
not only
the whole authority which
they at present
enjoy in their own country,
but every security which
they possess
for their liberty,
their property,
and their religion;
a government to which several
of the colonies of America
owe their present charters,
and consequently
their present constitution;
and to which all the colonies
of America owe the liberty,
security,
and property,
which they
have ever since enjoyed.
That public debt
has been contracted
in the defence,
not of Great Britain alone,
but of all
the different provinces
of the empire.
The immense debt
contracted
in the late war
in particular,
and a great part of
that contracted in the war
before,
were both properly contracted
in defence of America.
By a union
with Great Britain,
Ireland
would gain,
besides the freedom of trade,
other advantages
much more important,
and which
would much more than
compensate
any increase of taxes
that might accompany
that union.
By the union with England,
the middling
and inferior ranks
of people in Scotland
gained a complete deliverance
from the power
of an aristocracy,
which
had always before oppressed them.
By a union
with Great Britain,
the greater part
of people of all
ranks in Ireland
would gain
an equally complete deliverance
from a
much more oppressive aristocracy;
an aristocracy
not founded,
like that of Scotland,
in the
natural
and respectable distinctions
of birth and fortune,
but in the most odious
of all distinctions,
those
of religious
and political prejudices;
distinctions which,
more than any other,
animate both the insolence
of the oppressors,
and the hatred and indignation
of the
oppressed,
and which
commonly render
the inhabitants
of the
same country more hostile
to one another than those
of different
countries ever are.
Without a union
with Great Britain,
the inhabitants of Ireland
are not likely,
for many ages,
to consider themselves
as one people.
No oppressive aristocracy
has ever prevailed
in the colonies.
Even they,
however,
would,
in point
of happiness and tranquillity,
gain considerably
by a union
with Great Britain.
It would,
at least,
deliver them
from those rancourous
and virulent factions
which are inseparable
from small democracies,
and which
have so frequently divided
the affections
of their people,
and disturbed
the tranquillity
of their governments,
in their form
so nearly democratical.
In the case
of a total separation
from Great Britain,
which,
unless prevented
by a union of this kind,
seems very likely
to take place,
those factions
would be
ten times more virulent
than ever.
Before the commencement
of the present disturbances,
the coercive power
of the mother-country
had always been able
to restrain those factions
from breaking out
into any thing worse
than gross brutality
and insult.
If that coercive power
were entirely taken away,
they
would probably soon break out
into open violence
and bloodshed.
In all great
countries
which are united
under one uniform government,
the spirit of party commonly
prevails less in
the remote provinces
than
in the centre
of the empire.
The distance
of those provinces
from the capital,
from the principal seat
of the great
scramble
of faction and ambition,
makes them
enter less
into the views
of any of the
contending parties,
and renders them
more indifferent
and impartial spectators
of the conduct
of all.
The spirit of party
prevails less in Scotland than
in England.
In the case
of a union,
it
would probably prevail less in Ireland
than
in Scotland;
and the colonies
would probably soon enjoy
a degree
of concord and unanimity,
at present unknown
in any part
of the British empire.
Both Ireland and the colonies,
indeed,
would be subjected
to heavier taxes
than any which
they at present pay.
In consequence,
however,
of a
diligent and faithful
application
of the public revenue
towards the discharge
of the national debt,
the greater part
of those taxes
might not be
of long continuance,
and the public revenue
of Great Britain
might soon be reduced to what
was necessary
for maintaining a moderate
peace-establishment.
The territorial acquisitions
of the East India Company,
the undoubted right
of the Crown,
that is,
of the state and people
of Great Britain,
might be rendered
another source of revenue,
more abundant,
perhaps,
than all those
already mentioned.
Those countries
are represented
as more fertile,
more extensive,
and,
in proportion to their extent,
much richer and more populous
than Great Britain.
In order to
draw a great revenue
from them,
it
would not probably be necessary
to introduce
any new system
of taxation into countries
which are
already sufficiently,
and more than sufficiently,
taxed.
It might,
perhaps,
be more proper
to lighten than
to aggravate the burden
of those
unfortunate countries,
and to endeavour
to draw a revenue from them,
not by imposing new taxes,
but by preventing
the embezzlement
and misapplication
of the greater part
of those which
they already pay.
If it
should be found impracticable
for Great Britain
to draw
any considerable augmentation
of revenue
from any of the resources
above mentioned,
the only resource which
can remain to her,
is a diminution
of her expense.
In the mode
of collecting and in
that of expending
the public revenue,
though in both
there may be still room
for improvement,
Great Britain
seems to be
at least as economical as any
of her neighbours.
The military establishment which
she maintains
for her own defence
in time of peace,
is more moderate than
that of any European state,
which can pretend
to rival her either in wealth
or in power.
None of these articles,
therefore,
seem to admit
of any considerable reduction
of expense.
The expense
of the peace-establishment
of the colonies was,
before the commencement
of the present disturbances,
very considerable,
and is an expense
which may,
and, if no revenue
can be drawn from them,
ought
certainly to be saved altogether.
This constant expense
in time of peace,
though very great,
is insignificant
in comparison
with what the defence
of the colonies has
cost us in time of war.
The last war,
which
was undertaken altogether
on account of the colonies,
cost Great Britain,
it has already been observed,
upwards of ninety millions.
The Spanish war of 1739
was principally undertaken
on their account;
in which,
and in the French war
that was the consequence
of it,
Great Britain,
spent upwards
of forty millions;
a great part of which ought
justly
to be charged
to the colonies.
In those two wars,
the colonies cost
Great Britain much more
than double
the sum which the national debt
amounted
to before the commencement
of the first of them.
Had it
not been for those wars,
that debt
might,
and probably would
by this time,
have been completely paid;
and had it
not been for the colonies,
the former of those wars
might not,
and the latter
certainly would not,
have been undertaken.
It was
because the colonies
were supposed
to be provinces
of the British Empire,
that this expense
was laid out upon them.
But countries which
contribute
neither revenue nor
military force
towards the support
of the empire,
cannot be considered as
provinces.
They may,
perhaps,
be considered as appendages,
as a sort of splendid
and shewy equipage
of the empire.
But if the empire can no
longer support the expense
of keeping up this equipage,
it ought
certainly to lay it down;
and if it
cannot raise its revenue
in proportion to its expense,
it ought at least
to accommodate its expense
to its revenue.
If the colonies,
notwithstanding
their refusal
to submit to British taxes,
are still
to be considered as provinces
of the British empire,
their defence,
in some future war,
may cost Great Britain
as great
an expense
as it
ever has done
in any former war.
The rulers
of Great Britain have,
for more than a century past,
amused the people
with the imagination
that they
possessed a great empire
on the west side
of the Atlantic.
This empire,
however,
has hitherto existed
in imagination only.
It has hitherto been,
not an empire,
but the project of an empire;
not a gold mine,
but the project
of a gold mine;
a project
which has cost,
which continues
to cost,
and which,
if pursued in the same way
as it has been hitherto,
is likely
to cost,
immense expense,
without being likely
to bring any profit;
for the effects
of the monopoly
of the colony trade,
it has been shewn,
are to the great body
of the people,
mere loss instead of profit.
It is surely
now time that
our rulers should either
realize this golden dream,
in which they
have been indulging themselves,
perhaps,
as well as the people;
or that
they should awake
from it themselves,
and endeavour
to awaken the people.
If the project
cannot be completed,
it ought to be given up.
If any of the provinces
of the British empire
cannot be made
to contribute
towards the support
of the whole empire,
it is surely
time that Great Britain
should free herself
from the expense of defending
those provinces
in time of war,
and of supporting any part
of their civil or
military establishment
in time of peace;
and endeavour
to accommodate
her future views
and designs
to the real mediocrity
of her circumstances.